1 Schwalm, R. P., O.P., Leçons de Philosophie Sociale, reedited in part under the title, La Societé et l'Etat (Paris, Flammarion, 1937).Google Scholar

2 Garrigou-Lagrange, R. P., O.P., La Philosophie de l'Etre et le Sens Commun (1st edition, Paris, Beauchesne, 1904; 4th edition, Desclée de Brouwer, 1936).Google Scholar

3 Welty, Eberhard, O.P., Gemeinschaft und Einzelmensch (Pustet, Salzburg-Leipzig, 1935).Google Scholar

4 Cf. Three Reformers (New York, Scribners, 2nd edition, 1932);Google ScholarTrue Humanism, (New York, Scribners, 1938);Google ScholarScholasticism and Politics (New York, Macmillan, 1939);Google ScholarThe Rights of Man and Natural Law (New York, Scribners, 1943).Google Scholar

5 Cf. Rohner, M., O.P., “Kommentar des hl. Albertus Magnus zur Einführung in die Politik des Aristoteles,” Divus Thomas (Friburg [Switzerland], 1932), pp. 95 ff.Google Scholar

6 Eschmann, I. Th., O.P., “In Defense of Jacques Maritain,” The Modern Schoolman, St. Louis University, 05, 1945, p. 192.Google Scholar I am grateful to the author of these lines for having taken my defense in a debate in which I prefer to limit myself to a purely objective exposition; yet, in which, strangely enough, it has happened that, while criticizing ideas which are not mine, one has nevertheless, even when carefully refraining from uttering my name, allowed the reader to believe that I was indirectly referred to. I would like to hope that the present paper, while correcting some excessive expressions which I myself did not use, would put an end to the misunderstandings and confusions due to the original vice of such a controversy.

7 Each intellectual substance is made, first, for God, the separated common good of the universe, second, for the perfection of the order of the universe (not only as the universe of bodies but also as the universe of spirits), and third, for itself, that is, for the action (immanent and spiritual) by which it perfects itself and accomplishes its destiny. (Cf. Sum. Theol., I, 65, 2,Google Scholar and Cajetan's commentary.) Using a distinction established further on, we may say that as individual or part, the intellectual substance is first willed and loved for the order of the universe and the perfection of the created whole; as person, it is first willed and loved for itself. Yet, like every creature, it differs from God, or Personality in pure act, more than it resembles Him. Hence, absolutely speaking, it is part or “individual” more than “person” and before it as a “person.” (It is this that Kant failed to see.) It follows therefrom that, absolutely speaking, the intellectual substance is loved and willed for the order of the universe of creation before being loved and willed for itself. This in no wise hinders it, in contrast to irrational beings, from being really for itself and referred directly to God.

Let us add that if we pass to the supernatural order, the order of formal participation in the deity, this priority of the universe of created nature over the person is reversed. Each person is here willed and loved for its own sake, puta ut fruatur Deo (He truly died for each of them) before being willed and loved for the order and perfection of this world or of the universe of nature and creation. Elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem, Ephes., I, 4.Google Scholar (Whereas “respectu vitae naturalis non est electio, neque liber vitae,” Sum. Theol. I, 24, 2 ad 2Google Scholar). In the words of St. Augustine, the justification of the impious is a work greater than the creation of heaven and earth. In his teaching that the justification of the impious is maximum opus Dei, St. Thomas proposes the following objection: “Justificatio impii ordinatur ad bonum particulare unius hominis, sed bonum universi est majus quam bonum unius hominis, ut patet in I Ethic. Ergo majus opus est creatio coeli et terrae, quam justificatio impii.” To it, he answers: Bonum universi esl majus quam bonum particulare unius, si acciapiatur utrumque in eodem genere. Sed bonum gratiae unius majus est, quam bonum naturae totius universi, the good of grace of one alone is greater than the good of nature, of the whole universe,” including the angelic natures. (Sum. Theol., I–II, 113, 9, ad 2.Google Scholar)

On the other hand, in this same supernatural order, each person, willed and loved for itself and for the communication of the divine goodness which is made to it, is also and first of all, willed and loved (by the same act of transcendent love which grasps all at once the whole and the part) for the communication of the divine goodness which is made to the whole city of the blessed in the sense that each of its members beholds the uncreated essence according to the multiple degrees of their participation in the light of glory.

Finally if in the order of grace, the person itself desires God as its good, it does so in loving God for Himself, more than itself, and in willing the good of God more than its own proper good. Indeed, if it wills God for itself (“sibi”), it is not for the sake of itself as final reason (non “propter se,” at least “simpliciter”) but rather for the sake of God purely and simply as final reason. (Cf. the invaluable commentary of Cajetan on the relations between Hope and Charity, II–II, 17, 5.

8 Cf. Sum. Contra Gentiles. III, 112:Google Scholar “Substantiae intellectuales gubernantur propter se, alia vero propter ipsas…. Sola igitur intellectualis natura est propter se quaesita in universo, alia autem propter ipsam.”—Ibid., III, 113: “Anima rationalis non solum secundum speciem est perpetuitatis capax, sicut aliae creaturae, sed etiam secundum individuum…. Sola rationalis creatura dirigitur a Deo ad suos actus non solum secundum congruentiam speciei, sed etiam secundum congruentiam individui…. Creatura rationalis divinae providentiae substat sicut secundum se gubernata et provisa, non solum propter speciem, ut aliae corruptibiles creaturae; quia individuum quod gubernatur solum proper speciem non gubernatur propter seipsum, creatura autem rationalis propter seipsam gubernatur…. Sic igitur solae rationales creaturae directionem a Deo ad suos actus accipiunt, non solum propter speciem, sed etiam secundum individuum.”

9 That the extrinsic or separated common good of a multitude, to which it is ordained, is greater than the immanent common good of the multitude is a universal principle: … sicut bonum multitudinis est majus quam bonum unius qui est de multitudine; ita est minus quam bonum extrinsecum, ad quod multitudo ordinatur, sicut bonum ordinis exercitus est minus quam bonum ducis; et similiter bonum ecclesiasticae unitatis, cui opponitur schisma, est minus quam bonum veritatis divinae, cui opponitur infidelitas. Sum. Theol., II–II, 39, 2, ad 2.Google Scholar

10 Sum. Theol., I, 93, 2.Google Scholar

11 Paul, Saint, I Cor., 13:12: “Tunc … cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum.”Google Scholar

12 Sum. Theol., I–II, 4, 8, ad 3.Google Scholar

13 Saint Thomas, 2 Sent., d. 26, 1. 1 ad 2.

14 De Civ. Dei, XIX, 13.Google Scholar

15 Sum. Theol., I–II, 4, 8 ad 3.Google Scholar

16 Sum. Theol., I–II, 3, 5, ad 1.Google Scholar

17 Sum. Theol., I–II, 47, 2 and 11.Google Scholar

18 3 Sent., 35, I, 4 sol. 1c et ad 2 et 3, 4 Sent., 49. I, 1, sol. 3 ad 1.

19 Sum. Theol., II–II, 188, 8.Google Scholar

20 “Bonum universi est majus quam bonum particulare unius, si accipiatur utrumque in eodem genere.” Sum Theol., I–II, 113, 9, ad 2.Google Scholar

21 “Finis politicae est humanum bonum, id est optimum in rebus humanis.” Thomas, St., in Eth., I, 2.Google Scholar

22 As expressed by Pope Pius XII in His Christmas Message of 1942, “The origin and the primary scope of social life is the conservation, development and perfection of the human person, helping him to realize accurately the demands and values of religion and culture set by the creator for every man and for all mankind, both as a whole and in its natural ramifications.” (Translation published by The Catholic Mind, Jan. 1943Google Scholar).

From the Encyclical Mystici Corporis: “In a natural body the principle of unity so unites the parts that each lacks its own individual subsistence; on the contrary in the Mystical Body that mutual union, though intrinsic, links the members by a bond which leaves to each intact his own personality. Besides, if we examine the relation existing between the several members and the head, in every physical, living body, all the different members are ultimately destined to the good of the whole alone; while every moral association of men, if we look to its ultimate usefulness, is in the end directed to the advancement of all and of every single member. For they are persons, utpote personae sunt.” (Prepared by Joseph J. Bluett, S.J., The America Press, New York.) This passage is truly the charter of the Christian doctrine on the person.

23 La Pira, Giorgio, “Problemi della persona umana,” Acta Pont, Academiae Romance Sancti Thomas Aq., vol. VIII (Rome—Torino, Marietti, 1945).Google Scholar

24 “Persona significal id quod est perfectissimun in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura.” Sum. Theol., I, 29, 3.Google Scholar

25 And also collective realities constituted of individuals, such as society (umum per accidens).

26 Cf. My work The Degrees of Knowledge, Appendix IV.

27 Cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Le Sens Commun, la Philosophic de l'Etre et les Formules Dogmatiques, 3e et 4e editions, 3e Partie, Chap. II.

28 In an animal society, the individual is not a person; hence, has not the value of a moral “whole” and is not a subject of right. If the good of the whole profits the parts, as the good of the body profits its members, it does not in the sense that it is turned back or redistributed to them. It is merely in order that the whole itself might subsist and be better served that its parts are kept alive or maintained in good condition. Thus, they partake of the good of the whole but only as parts of the whole. Indeed, how could it be the good of the whole without thereby profiting the parts which compose the whole (except when it requires the sacrifice of this or that part which then spontaneously exposes itself to peril, as the hand to save, the body, because by nature it loves the whole more than itself, cf. Cajetan, in I, 60, 5) ? Such a good is a common good in a general and improperly social sense. It is not the formally social common good with which we are concerned in this paper. It is common to the whole and to the parts only in an improper sense, for it does not profit the parts for themselves (finis cui) at the same time as for the whole according to the characteristic exigencies of a whole constituted of persons. It is rather the proper good of the whole—not foreign to tht parts, to be sure, but benefiting them only for its own sake and the sake of the whole.

This kind of common good of an animal society is analogically a “bonum honestum” (reached maierialiter et executive, sub directione Dei auctoris naturae), but in its proper order, where the whole is composed of individuals who are not persons. The common good, formally social, of human society, in order to be truly common good and to attain, as common good, the character of “bonum honestum,” implies redistribution to the persons as persons.

29 In III Sent. d. 5, 3, 2. St. Thomas, in this text, refers to the human composite (unum per se) and shows that, because it is only a part of the human being, the separated soul cannot be a person. To anyone whose knowledge of Thomism is sufficiently deep it is clear that the principle—the ratio of part is repugnant to that of personality— is an entirely general principle and is applied analogically depending on the case. Thus, John of St. Thomas shows, in speaking of the hypostatic union, which takes place in persona (Sum. Theol., III, 2, 2.Google Scholar), that God can be united to human nature only as person just as He can be united to human intelligence only as species intelligibilis because in both cases He is united to them as term and as whole, not as part. (Cursus Theol., “De Incarnatione Disput.” IV, a. 1Google Scholar). The same principle must evidently come into play also—though under completely different conditions and following another line of application—when the notion of person is considered with respect to wholes which are no longer, like the human composite, substantial but have only an accidental unity, and are themselves composed of persons like the social whole.

30 Sum. Theol., I, 30, ad 4.Google Scholar

31 Sum. Theol., I, 42, 5.Google Scholar

32 In the formally social sense specified above p. 436, n. 28.

33 In this sense—because there do exist supra-temporal goods of the natural order (as, for example, the contemplative life as conceived by Aristotle)—it is perfectly true to say with Mortimer Adler and the Rev. Walter Farrell that the natural happiness of the human being transcends in certain essential elements the political common good (cf. Farrell, Walter, O.P., “Person and the Common Good in a Democracy,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Volume XX, 12 27 and 28, 1945Google Scholar) These supra-temporal natural goods, by reason of which, even in the natural order, the human person transcends the State, are refracted imperfectly and diminishingly, in accordance with a certain social-temporal participation, in the political common good itself. (It is much the same with the supernatural virtues of the saints in so far as they add to the moral patrimony and glory of their temporal fatherland.) But of themselves, they are related to the order of civilization, and even more to the order of what, farther on, we call the community of minds. They are integrated in the common good of civilization (and this is “temporal” in contrast to the “spiritual” or supernatural order of the kingdom of God. but its highest natural values are “supra-temporal” or of the absolute order) and they arise directly out of the common good of the community of minds. Yet both the common good of civilization and that of the community of minds are themselves subordinated to the supernatural common good.

34 The Rights of Man and Natural Law (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), pp. 39–43.Google Scholar

35 Ibid., p. 32.

36 For this reason, Christ could say of Judas: “Bonum erat ei, si natus non fuisset homo ille.” (Mat., 26, 24.) Of course the act of existing never ceases to be per se good and desirable; but per accidens it ceases to be so when it fails completely and lacks everything to which it is ordained. (Cf. Sum. Theol., I, 5, 2, ad 3.Google Scholar)

37 De Bergson à Thomas D'Aquin, pp. 148–149.

38 Sum. Theol., II–II, 64, 2.Google Scholar Elsewhere too: “Cum enim unus homo sit pars multiludinis, quillbet homo hoc ipsum quod est, et quod habet, est multudinis, sicut et quaelibet pars id quod est, est totius” (I–II, 96, 4). “Persona comparator ad communitatem sicut pars ad totum” (II–II, 61, 1). “Ipse totus homo ordinatur ut ad finem ad totam communitatem cujus est pars.” (II–II, 65, 1.) “Quaelibet pars, id quod est est totius; quilibet autem homo est pars communitatis et ita id quod est, est communitatis.” (II–II, 65, 5.)

39 “Homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se totum et secundum omnia sua.” (Sum. Theoi., I–II, 21, 4, ad 3.Google Scholar) And again: “Totum quod homo est, et quod potest, et quod habet, ordinandum est ad Deum” (Ibid.).

40 Cf. The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 17.Google Scholar

41 Cf. Phelan, Gerald B., “Justice and Friendship,” in The Maritain Volume of the Thomist (New York, Sheed and Ward, 01. 1943). pp. 153–170.Google Scholar

42 Let us note here that just as the “extrinsic common good” of an army (victory) is superior to its “immanent common good,” so the “extrinsic common good” of the social life of men in the course of terrestrial history (victory over servitude and the antagonisms that divide humanity) is superior to its “immanent common good” and completes its evolution. Out of this fact arises the historical dynamism which, through trials and disasters in the direction of an end, which perhaps will never be attained in the conditions of life here below, carries along with it the social forms of peoples and civilizations.

43 Cf. Clérissac, H., Le Mystère de I'Eglise, Chap. VI.Google Scholar

44 Cf. Maritain, Jacques, Freedom in the Modern World (New York, Charles Seribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 51–52.Google Scholar

45 “Item pars naluralis est praecise propter totum in corpore: in Ecclesia singuli homines sunt propter Deum et propter se solum, nec bonum privatum ordinatur ad bonum totius, saltern praecise, nec principaliter, sicut nec gratia nec fides, nec spes, nee aliae formae supernaturales sunt immediate in tota communitate: sic nec potestas spiritualis, quae est aeque, aut plus etiam supernaturalis.” De potestate Ecclesiae, II, 5.Google Scholar Cf. Genito, , R'leccciones del Maestro Fray Francisco de Vitoria, Madrid 1934, t. II, p. 117.Google Scholar

46 Thomas, Saint, Expos, in Ep. ad Rom. c. 8, lect. 6.Google Scholar

47 John, Saint of the Cross. Avisos y Sentencias (ms. d'Andujar), Silv. IV, p. 235.Google Scholar

48 In another sense, this law always holds; in the sense that the infinite communicability of the incomprehensible Essence forever transcends the communication which, through its vision, the creature receives of it.

49 Journet, Charles, “La cause matérielle de l'Eglise glorieuse,” Nova et Vetera, 01–03, 1945, p. 86.Google Scholar