¹ It is not referred to by, for example, Dahl, Robert A., A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago and London, 1956);Google ScholarSartori, Giovanni, Democratic Theory (Detroit, 1962);Google ScholarLively, Jack, Democracy (Oxford, 1975);Google ScholarPateman, Carole, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge, 1970);CrossRefGoogle ScholarPennock, J. R., Democratic Political Theory (Princeton, 1979).Google Scholar

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³ Rousseau, , Contrat Social, 4:3; cf. 3:4.Google Scholar

⁴ Aristotle, Constitution of Athens 43.2.Google Scholar

⁵ Ibid., 24.3, 63–69.

⁶ Cf. Gomme, A. W. and Hopper, R. J., “Population (Greek),” Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1970), pp. 861–63.Google Scholar

⁷ Aristotle, Constitution of Athens 43.1, 61.Google Scholar

⁸ Ibid., 56–59.

⁹ Ibid., 22.5.

¹⁰ Jones, A. H. M., Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1969), p. 104.Google Scholar

¹¹ Aristotle, Constitution of Athens 47.1.Google Scholar

¹² Ibid., 48.1.

¹³ Ibid., 51.1.

¹⁴ Politics 1317 61–2.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Aristotle, Constitution of Athens 55.3–4;Google ScholarHignett, C., A History of the Athenian Constitution (Oxford, 1952), p. 232.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Hignett, , Athenian Constitution, p. 136 n 5.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Plato, Apology 32b.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Jones, , Athenian Democracy, p. 37.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Staveley, E. S., Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (London, 1972), pp. 51, 110–11 n 80.Google Scholar

²⁰ Iliad 23:350–56.Google Scholar

²¹ Odyssey 10:206.Google Scholar

²² Iliad 7:177–82Google Scholar (translated Richmond Lattimore).

²³ Cf. Iliad 3:316.Google Scholar

²⁴ See de Coulanges, N. D. Fustel, The Ancient City (New York, 1959), p. 182;Google Scholar cf. Headlam-Morley, J. W., Election by Lot at Athens (Cambridge, 1933), p. 7 n 2.Google Scholar

²⁵ Aeschylus, Eumenides 32;Google ScholarEuripides, Ion 416.Google Scholar

²⁶ Laws 579c.

²⁷ Numbers 26:52–6.Google Scholar Thanks are due to Douglas Campbell for providing biblical references.

²⁸ Judges 20:8–10.Google Scholar

²⁹ Proverbs 16:13;Google Scholar cf. 18:18.

³⁰ Acts I: 24–36Google Scholar (New English Bible).

³¹ Headlam-Morley, , Election by Lot, pp. 4–12.Google Scholar

³² Ibid., pp. 10–11. In the Republic, Plato recommends that the rulers' selection of marriage partners be concealed behind an ingenious system of lots so that those who come off badly may blame “chance and not the rulers” (460a).

³³ Memorabilia 1.2.9.

³⁴ See Dodds, E. R., The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, 1951), p. 42;Google Scholar cf. Dover, K. J., Greek Popular Morality (Oxford, 1974), pp. 138–41.Google Scholar

³⁵ Pindar, , Olympian Odes 12. 1;Google Scholar and Sophocles fragment, cited Lloyd-Jones, Hugh, The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley, 1971), p. 162, n 6.Google Scholar

³⁶ Laws 757e; cf. 690c.

³⁷ Aristotle's account of chance in Physics II 4–6, it will be remembered, assumes that chance events, though exceptional, are causally determined not random events.

³⁸ Cf. Politics 3. 9.

³⁹ Ibid., 1280a 24–5, 1317b 2–7.

⁴⁰ History 3.80.

⁴¹ Cf Adkins, A. W. H., Merit and Responsibility (Oxford, 1960), chaps. 3, 8, 10.Google Scholar

⁴² Staveley, , Greek and Roman Voting, pp. 54–57,Google Scholar argues that alternation (or rotation) was fundamental and lot merely subsidiary, the most convenient method of selection once it has been decided that offices will be held in turn. Certainly, alternation was an important democratic principle (cf. Euripides, Suppliant Women 405–8;Google ScholarAristotle, Politics 1317b 20–22Google Scholar) and lot was frequently coupled with alternation as the normal method of ordering those who are to take turns. Nonetheless, lot would have been independently significant as an expression of distributive equality.

⁴³ Politics 1317b 22.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Ibid., 1273b 40–1.

⁴⁵ Thucydides, 2.37 (translated Crawley).

⁴⁶ History 3.80.

⁴⁷ Republic 561a–b; 557.

⁴⁸ Politics 1317b 20–1.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Cf. Turner, Frank M., The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain (New Haven and London, 1981), p. 187;Google ScholarGrote, George, History of Greece (London, 1862), pp. iv, 267–75;Google ScholarMill, J. S. in Essays on Philosophy and the Classics, ed. Robson, J. M. (Toronto, 1978) 333–34.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See above, n 33.

⁵¹ Politics 1305a 28;Google Scholar 1303a 14–16. Cf. Newman, W. L., The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1887–1902), 4;306–307;Google ScholarPlato, Laws 757e.Google Scholar

⁵² 1424a 12–20.

⁵³ Hignett, , Athenian Constitution, p. 231.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ For the history of the courts, see ibid., pp. 96–97, 200.

⁵⁵ These bodies were not always precisely accurate cross sections of the citizen body. Juries in the fifth century may have contained a preponderance of older citizens of the poorer class who were attracted by the small per diem allowance; in the fourth century, both the courts and the Council seem to have had slightly less than their fair share of poorer citizens. It is also true that only a minority of eligible citizens regularly attended the assembly. Thus a cross section of the citizen body was not necessarily a cross section of the assembly and vice versa. Nonetheless, we do not hear of any permanent or deep-seated clash of interests between the assembly on the one hand and the courts or Council on the other; this confirms the assumption that a panel of jurors or the members of the Council in any year, being appointed by lot, would be near enough to a cross section of the assembly as a whole (Jones, , Athenian Democracy, pp. 106, 123–24Google Scholar).

⁵⁶ Three stages may be identified in this development: (1) election by all citizens of candidates drawn from the wealthiest class; (2) election by all citizens of a panel drawn from the wealthy from which final selection was made by lot; (3) selection by lot from among all citizens (Staveley, , Greek and Roman Voting, pp. 33–40Google Scholar). This development might appear to be progression towards greater democracy (Hignett, , Athenian Constitution, pp. 173–92;Google ScholarForrest, W. G., The Emergence of Greek Democracy (London, 1966), pp. 204–212Google Scholar). However, the change from the first to the second stage, from direct election to the combined method of lot from a large preselected group, diminished rather than increased the ordinary citizen's control over the archonship. While the archons were elected, the people could guarantee that these magistrates, who still made important legal decisions and who had a significant influence on public policy in general, would be generally sympathetic to a majority of citizens, even if they were all drawn from the wealthy classes. Introduction of the lot, while the archonship remained restricted to the wealthy, would have reduced the likelihood of popular leaders; it would be more likely to have produced a cross section of the wealthy, supporting the interests of the wealthy rather than the poor. This first change, therefore, from election to lot, sometimes seen as part of the inexorable development of the power of the Athenian demos, could have been reactionary in intent, aimed at diminishing the populism associated with the office of archon. If so, the intention was ultimately unsuccessful because the result of introducing lot for the archonship was to reduce the status and importance of the office itself and to transfer popularity and political influence to the elected generals. Indeed, it could be argued that this was the real purpose of the change, to diminish the importance of the archons by altering the method of their selection, from election which confers status and authority, to lot which does not. Whatever the real motives behind this particular reform (and there is no firm historical evidence beyond the bald description of the change in the Constitution of Athens 22.5), we can see that lot is not a democratic method unless all citizens are eligible to be selected.

⁵⁷ Politics 1300 b 2.

⁵⁸ Areopagiticus 23.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Cf. Birch, A. H., Representation (London, 1971), p. 15;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPitkin, Hanna F., The Concept of Representation (Berkeley, 1967), chaps. 4,6.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Cf. Barry, Brian, Political Argument (London and New York, 1965), pp. 88–89;Google ScholarRawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1971), p. 374;Google ScholarAckerman, Bruce A., Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven and London, 1980), pp. 285–89.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Oliver, W. H. with Williams, B. R., editors, The Oxford History of New Zealand (Oxford and Wellington, 1981), p. 60.Google Scholar

⁶² United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360, cited Guillo Calabresi and Philip Bobbin, Tragic Choices (New York, 1978), n 114.Google Scholar

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 41–44. See also Rae, Douglas, Equalities (Cambridge and London, 1981), note 9, pp. 172–73.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ E.g., Pateman, , Representation.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Mansbridge, Jane J., Beyond Adversary Democracy (New York, 1980), pp. 59–71.Google Scholar