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Just Wars and Selective Objectors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

John A. Rohr
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Extract

Whenever Americans have gone to war, the problem presented by the conscientious objector (CO) has always arisen. Various solutions have been tried but until the present war in Vietnam the problem has always focused on men who were opposed to bearing arms in any war. Today, as in the past, there is no dearth of such men, but in addition to the traditional pacifist, a new type of CO has arisen—the selective conscientious objector (SCO) whose scruples do not extend to all wars, but only to particular wars that fail to meet certain moral norms. These norms are usually derived from the just war doctrine.2 The SCO has figured prominently in several important cases in the federal courts. He raises the interesting constitutional question of whether the government's present policy of exempting from military service only those conscientious objectors who oppose all wars is not a violation of the free exercise of religion of the “just warriors” who oppose only certain wars.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 33 , Issue 2 , April 1971 , pp. 185 - 201
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1971

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References

* This article relies substantially upon the seventh chapter of the author's forthcoming book, Prophets without Honor: Public Policy and the Selective Conscientious Objector, which will be published by the Abingdon Press in June, 1971.

1 For the history of the CO in America, see “Conscientious Objection”, Selective Service Monograph, No. 11 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1950)Google Scholar. See also Mansfield, John H., “Conscientious Objection, 1964 Term”, Religion and the Public Order, ed. Giannella, Donald A. (Chicago, 1965), pp. 3–81Google Scholar; Sibley, Mulford Q. and Jacob, Philip E., Conscription of Conscience: The American State and the Conscientious Objector, 1940–47 (Ithaca, 1952)Google Scholar; Leach, Jack F., Conscription in the U.S. (Rutland, 1952)Google Scholar.

2 For a detailed discussion of the development of the just war doctrine, see Vanderpol, Alfred, La doctrine scolastique du droit de guerre (Paris, 1919)Google Scholar. For a contemporary Protestant position see Ramsey's, Paul, The Just War (New York, 1968)Google Scholar. See also Ramsey's, PaulWar and the Christian Conscience (Durham, 1961)Google Scholar. For an interpretation of the American understanding of the just war doctrine, see Tucker, Robert W., The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine (Baltimore, 1960)Google Scholar.

3 U. S. v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511, 297 F. Supp. 907; U.S. v. Mitchell 369 F2d 323; 386 U.S. 972; U.S. v. Spiro, 384 F2d 159; 390 U.S. 956; U.S. v. Kurki, 255 F. Supp. 161; 384 F2d 905; Negre v. Larsen, 418 F2d 908; U.S. v. Gillette, 420 F2d 298.

4 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, Chairman, Burke Marshall (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 50Google Scholar.

5 Shinn, Roger L., “The Selective Conscientious Objector Again”, Christianity and Crisis, XXVII (04 3, 1967), 63Google Scholar.

6 Shinn, Roger L., “How Free Can a Society Be?” Christianity and Crisis, XXV (11 1, 1965), 224–225Google Scholar.

7 The converse of this statement is not true. It is not true that a war in the national interest must be moral. That a war be in the national interest is a necessary but insufficient condition for a just war. Unless there is some national interest involved, a war cannot be justified. But the fact that a nation's interests would be furthered by a war does not necessarily justify the war.

8 For a cogent criticism of Shinn's position, see Quade, Quentin, “Selective Conscientious Objection and Political Obligation”, in Finn, James (ed.), A Conflict of Loyalties: The Case for Selective Conscientious Objection (New York, 1969), pp. 197–198Google Scholar.

9 Shinn, , “The Selective Conscientious Objector Again”, p. 63Google Scholar.

10 Riga, Peter J., “Selective Conscientious Objection”, Modern Society (07–08, 1968), p. 115Google Scholar.

11 Ibid., p. 111.

12 Zahn, Gordon, “An Explosive Principle”, Worldview, X (03, 1967), 5Google Scholar.

13 For other examples of the tendency of SCO proponents to separate morals and politics, see Congressman Koch's, Edward I. letter to President Nixon, printed in Congressional Record, 02 17, 1969Google Scholar, H.R. 897 and Zinn, Howard, Disobedience and Democracy: Nine Fallacies on Law and Order (New York, 1968), pp. 8–15Google Scholar. In the pages I have cited, Zinn develops his basic jurisprudence which differs radically from mine. His explicit treatment of SCO (pp. 96–99) follows quite clearly from his jurisprudence.

14 The Documents of Vatican II, Abbott, Walter M., ed. (New York, 1966), pp. 674–700Google Scholar.

15 “The Selective Conscientious Objector”, p. 73.

16 Ibid.

17 The Christian Century, LXXXIII (03 30, 1966), 404Google Scholar.

18 Quade, pp. 201–202.

19 New York Times, July 17, 1968, p. 1.

20 Davis, Harry R., “Christian Neglect of Political Values”, The Christian Century, LXXXVI (11 26, 1969), 1511Google Scholar.

21 Kaufman, Arnold S., “The Selective Service System: Actualities and Alternatives”, in Finn, James (ed.), A Conflict of Loyalties: The Case for Selective Conscientious Objection (New York, 1969), pp. 224–225Google Scholar.

22 For further discussion of the difference between CO and SCO, see Greenfield, Jeff, “The Selective CO.”, The New Republic, CLIX (07 6, 1968), 15–16Google Scholar.

23 Swomley, John M., “The Limited Objectors”, The Christian Century, LXXXII (12 15, 1965), 1542Google Scholar.

24 Cohen, Carl, “The Case for Selective Pacifism”, The Nation, CCXLVII (07 8, 1968), 12Google Scholar.

25 For examples of this sort of reasoning, see the articles by Riga and Zahn cited above. See also Gendler, Everett, “As Freedom Is a Fantasy”, Worldview, X (02, 1967), 7Google Scholar and Haskell, Elleiy, “Fortas and Selective Objection”, Christianity and Crisis, XXVIII (10 30, 1968), 1373Google Scholar.

26 Politics, VI., ii.

27 Ibid., V., ix.

28 Ibid.

29 Consider, for example, the sincere but misguided racist who withholds tax dollars earmarked for facilitating racial integration. He might look upon the color of a man's skin as a mark of divine disapproval. Or take the case of the fundamentalist whose conscience might oppose certain welfare programs because the Bible says that the man who does not work should not eat. If the basis of the case for SCO is the integrity of the individual, it would seem that whatever is done for the objector to war should also be done for the objector to integration. A man does not surrender his human dignity simply because he is wrong. A public interest argument, on the other hand, might find ways of justifying a more benign treatment for the SCO than for the sincere racist.