1. This study utilizes the definition of a political symbol developed by political scientist Barbara Hinckley in her study of “the symbolic presidency. ” She denotes a political symbol as an object that “has a range of meaning beyond itself” and that conveys an “emotional, moral, or psychological impact. This larger meaning need not be independently true, but will tap ideas people want to believe in as true” (The Symbolic Presidency: How Presidents Portray Themselves [New York: Routledge, 1990], pp. 4–7).Google Scholar

2. See Brigham's, JohnThe Cult of the Court (Philadelphia: TempleUniversity Press, 1987)Google Scholar and his “Exploring the Attic: Courts and Communities in Material Life,” in Courts, Tribunals, and New Approaches to Justice, ed. Mendelsohn, Oliver and Maher, Laurence (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 1994),Google Scholar as well as Kammen's, Michael “Temples of Justice: The Iconography of Judgment and American Culture,” in Origins of the Federal Judiciary: Essays on the Judiciary Act of 1789, ed. Marcus, Maeva (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

3. Gibson, James L., Caldeira, Gregory A., and Baird, Vanessa A., “On the Legitimacy of National High Courts,” American Political Science Review 92 (1998): 345.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. Much of the information regarding the Court's design and symbolism originates in the script of the Court's exhibit entitled, “The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Form and Function.” Unveiled in 1994, the display is the first permanent exhibit in the Supreme Court building. I am grateful to the Court's Curator Gail Galloway for generously sharing the script with me. The most recent publication on the U.S. Supreme Court's art and architecture is a spectacularly produced “coffee-table book” by J., Fred and Maroon, Suzy, The Supreme Court of the United States(New York: Thomasson-Grant and Lickle, 1996).Google Scholar The equivalent publication for its Israeli counterpart is Sharon's, YosefThe Supreme Court Building, Jerusalem (Jerusalem: Yad Hanadiv, 1993).Google Scholar

5. Kammen,, “Temples of Justice,” p. 251.Google Scholar

6. Ibid., p. 252.

7. Ibid., p. 265.

8. Brigham, , “Exploring the Attic,” pp. 134 and 147.Google Scholar

9. Ibid., pp. 147 and 151.

10. Forgey, Benjamin, “A Courthouse That Acquits Itself Well,” Washington Post, 3 10 1998, p. Cl, C5.Google Scholar

11. U.S. District Court Judge Douglas Woodlock, as quoted in ibid., p. C5. Judge Woodlock, along with Justice Breyer and U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Sandra L. Lynch, formed the panel of jurists who oversaw the Boston federal courthouse project. They worked closely with the two architectural firms responsible for the plans, Pei Cobb Freed and Partners and Jung/Brannen Associates.

12. Woodlock, , as quoted in “The Courthouse as a Center of Civic Life,” The Third Branch 30 (11 1998): 8.Google Scholar

13. “Federal Courthouses Win NEA Recognition,” The Third Branch 32 (06 2000): 8.Google Scholar

14. See Jacobsohn's, Gary Jeffrey learned study, Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the United States(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).Google Scholar

15. For a superb analysis of Israel's judiciary in the context of the state's political culture, see Edelman, Martin, Courts, Politics, and Culture in Israel (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994), especially chaps. 1, 2, 3 and 7.Google Scholar

16. The text of all Basic Laws can be found at the official Israeli government website: http://www.mfa.gov.il.

17. Edelman, Martin, “The New Israeli Constitution” Middle EasternStudies 36 (04 2000): 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18. Dorner, Dalia, “Does Israel Have a Constitution?” St. Louis Ųniversity Law Journal 43 (Fall 1999): 1328,Google Scholar citing Gavison, Ruth, “The Constitutional Revolution: A Description of Reality or Self-fulfilling Prophecy,“ Mishpatim 38 (1997): 21 (in Hebrew).Google Scholar

19. Ms. Sandy Barkan, Director of Public Affairs for the Supreme Court of Israel, provided these figures.

20. Hirschl, Ran, “Israel's 'Constitutional Revolution': The Legal Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Order,” American Journal of Comparative Law 46 (Summer 1998): 435.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21. The U.S. Supreme Court handed down a mere 73 full caseopinions in 1999–2000,Google Scholar the lowest number of cases decided in four decades.

22. In addition to Edelman's comparative political study of the Israeli judiciary, two other books cover the topic from the perspective of the legal profession. See Shetreet's, Shimon comprehensive Justice in Israel: A Study of the Israeli Judiciary (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994)Google Scholar and a casebook by Zamir, Itzhak and Zysblat, Allen, Public Law in Israel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).Google Scholar Several law journal articles provide expert analysis of recent developments in the Israeli Supreme Court's evolution: Gavison, Ruth, “The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies,” Israel Law Review 33 (Spring 1999): 216–50;CrossRefGoogle ScholarGelpe, Marcia, “Constraints on Supreme Court Authority in Israel and the United States: Phenomenal Cosmic Powers, Itty Bitty Living Space,” Emory International Law Review 13 (Fall 1999): 493–559;Google Scholar and Mandel, Michael, “Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in Israel,” Israel Law Review 33 (Spring 1999): 259–321.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23. Aharon Barak “Foreword,” in Zamir, and Zysblat, , Public Law, pp. vii–viii.Google Scholar See also Barak, , “The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy,” Israel Studies 3 (Fall 1998): 6–29.CrossRefGoogle ScholarBasic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, both passed by a simple majority in the Knesset, in 1992,Google Scholar have created another source for “judge-made” rights in Israel. Edelman notes that the language of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation “calls for judicial review.” Edelman, , “The New Israeli Constitution,” p. 15Google Scholar. For trenchant analyses of these most recent Basic Laws, see Hirschl, “Israel's Constitutional Revolution,” and Hofnung, Menachem, “The Unintended Consequences of Unplanned Constitutional Reform: Constitutional Politics in Israel,” American Journal of Comparative Law 44 (Fall 1996): 585–604.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24. Interview with Freiman, Ziva, “Representing the Institutional Client, Chief Justice Meir Shamgar Discusses Some of the Tenets Underlying the Supreme Court's Design,” Progressive Architecture 74 (04 1993): 80–81.Google Scholar

25. Kantrowitz, Min, “The Supreme Court in Jerusalem,” Progressive Architecture 68 (09 1987): 45–48.Google Scholar

26. Frieman, , “Representing the Institutional Client,” p. 80.Google Scholar

27. Frieman, Ziva, “The Job of a Lifetime,” Progressive Architecture 74 (04 1993): 68.Google Scholar

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., pp. 70–73.

31. Sharon, , Supreme Court Building, pp. 86–91.Google Scholar

32. Goldberger, Paul, “A Public Work That Ennobles As It Serves,” New York Times, 13 08 1995, p. 30.Google Scholar

33. Sharon, , Supreme Court Building, pp. 102–104.Google Scholar

34. Edelman, , Courts, Politics, and Culture in Israel, p. 51.Google Scholar

35. Liebman, Charles S. and ElihuKatz, , eds. The Jewishness of Israelis: Responses to the Guttman Report (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1997), p. 22.Google Scholar

36. Edelman, , Courts, , Politics, and Culture in Israel, p. 39.Google Scholar

37. As quoted in Mandel, , “Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in Israel,” p. 262.Google ScholarSee also Barak's, general description of that revolution above, as well as Edelman's, in “The Israeli Constitution,” p. 16.Google Scholar

38. Edelman, , “The Israeli Constitution,” p. 22Google Scholar, offers a sophisticated analysis of the judicial-political implications of the “conversion crisis” over who will be considered a Jew and how he/she may attain that status. For doctrinal descriptions of the nonkosher meat case and the draft-exemption decision, along with the Knesset's response to each, see Mandel, , “Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in Israel,” pp. 262, 304Google Scholar; for journalistic reports on the cases regarding highway closures and women worshipers at the Western Wall, as well as other recent battles between secular and Orthodox Israelis, see Sharrock, David, “Jerusalem Comes to a Standstill as 200,000 Orthodox Jews Object to the Secular,” The Guardian (London), 15 02 1999, p. 3Google Scholar; Fletcher, Elaine Ruth, “Israeli Protests Signal Cultural Rifts,” Star Tribune (Minneapolis), 20 02 1999, p. 5BGoogle Scholar; and Greenberg, Joel, “Israeli High Court Rules for Women's Services at Western Wall,” New York Times, 23 05 2000, p. A6.Google Scholar

39. See below for a description of recent criticism.

40. Liebman, and Katz, , Jewishness of Israelis, p. 21.Google Scholar

41. Liebman, Charles S. and Don-Yehiya, Eliezer, Religion and Politics in Israel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 15–16.Google Scholar

42. Cohen, Eric, “Citizenship, Nationality and Religion in Israel and Thailand,” in The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers, ed. Kimmerling, Baruch (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), p. 70.Google ScholarThis quote appears in Jacobsohn, Gary Jeffrey's excellent paper, “Three Models of the Secular Constitution: India, Israel, and the United States,” produced during his fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 1994–95.Google Scholar

43. “Architects Ram Karmi and Ada Karmi-Melamede Reveal Some of the Thinking Behind Their Decisions/” Progressive Architecture 74 (04 1993): 72. Psalm 23:3 states, “He will lead me in the circles of justice.”Google Scholar

44. “The Physical and Philosophical Premises of the Parti,” Progressive Architecture 74 (04 1993): 70.Google Scholar

45. Ibid., pp. 70–71.

46. “Architects Ram Karmi,” p. 72.Google Scholar

47. Frieman, , “Representing the Institutional Client,” p. 74.Google Scholar

48. Kammen, , “Temples of Justice,” p. 276.Google Scholar

49. Ibid.

50. Israeli scholar Menachem Hofnung observes that the 1984 Basic Law on the judiciary, which established the courts' authority, “can still be amended by a simple majority of the Knesset” (“The Unintended Consequences of Unplanned Constitutional Reform,” p. 603).Google Scholar

51. As reported in Edelman, , Courts, Politics, and Culture in Israel, 45.Google Scholar

52. “Contempt of Court,” Jerusalem Post, 29 03 1995, p. 6.Google Scholar

53. The exercise of judicial review, in a country where there is still disagreement over the nature of its constitution, is particularly problematic and controversial. For clear explanations of the background and context for this debate, see Gavison, , Gelpe, , and Mandel, , cited above, as well as Gross, Aeyal M., “The Politics of Rights in Israeli Constitutional Law/” Israel Studies 3 (Fall 1998): 80–118Google Scholar, and Aronson, Shlomo, “David Ben-Gurion and the British Constitutional Model,” Israel Studies 3 (Fall 1998): 193–214.CrossRefGoogle ScholarSee also Hofnung, , “The Unintended Consequences of Unplanned Constitutional Reform,” pp. 594–95.Google Scholar

54. Gross, , “The Politics of Rights in Israeli Constitutional Law,” p. 85.Google ScholarDotan, Yoav and Hofnung, Menachem of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem illuminated this development in their presentation at the American Political Science Association Meeting in Boston, 08 1998.Google Scholar For an explanation of splintering among Orthodox and secular Jews; Ashkenazi, Sephardi, and Mizrakhi Jews; and Israelis and Palestinians, see Barzilai, Gad and Nachmias, David, “Governmental Lawyering in the Political Sphere: Advocating the Leviathan,“ Israel Studies 3 (Fall 1998): 30–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Hofnung, , “The Unintended Consequences of Unplanned Constitutional Reform,” p. 593.Google ScholarMandel, 's analysis of the fissures in Israeli politics, and their impact on the judiciary, is particularly insightful, “Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in Israel,” pp. 274–79.Google Scholar

55. Noted above.

56. Dunn, Ross, “Judges in Israel Ban Torture by Shin Bet,” The Times (London), 7 09 1999.Google Scholar

57. Smith, Jeffrey, “Israel to Free 13 Lebanese Being Held As Hostages,” Washington Post, 13 04 2000, p. A20.Google Scholar

58. Oz-Salzberger, Fania and Salzberger, Eli, “The Secret German Sources of the Israeli Supreme Court,“ Israel Studies 3 (Fall 1998): 159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

59. Silver, Eric, “100,000 Orthodox Jews Oppose Rule of Law,” The Independent (London), 15 02 1999, p. 11.Google Scholar

60. As reported in Mandel, , “Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in Israel,'” p. 294.Google Scholar

61. For the former see, Gavison, Gelpe, and Mandel cited above, and for the latter see Neuer, Hillel, “Israel's Imperial Judiciary,” Commentary (10 1999), pp. 28–31.Google Scholar

62. Barak, , “The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy,” pp. 6–28.Google Scholar

63. “Israel's Other Barak,” The Economist, 10 04 1999, p. 43.Google Scholar In a more scholarly fashion, Mandel also notes the Israeli Supreme Court's lack of “representativeness” (“Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in Israel,” pp. 281–82).Google Scholar

64. “Israel's Other Barak,” p. 44.Google ScholarSee also Hockstader, Lee, “Netanyahu Set to Leave Politics,” Washington Post, 24 05 1999, p. A16, A26.Google ScholarIn 1998 Knesset Speaker Tinchon, Dan threatened to respond to the Court's judicial activism by passing “laws which circumvent High Court rulings,“ as quoted in “Judicial Review,” Jerusalem Post, 8 06 1998, p. 10.Google Scholar

65. As'ad Ghanem, , Rouhana, Nadim, and Yiftachel, Oren, “Questioning 'Ethnic Democracy′: A Response to Sammy Smooha,” Israel Studies 3 (Fall 1998): 253–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

66. Professor Asher Arian of Haifa University kindly provided this polling data.

67. Gibson, , Caldeira, , and Baird, , “On the Legitimacy of National High Courts,” p. 254.Google Scholar

68. Edelman, , “The New Israeli Constitution,“ p. 23.Google Scholar

69. Mandel, , “Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in Israel,” p. 321.Google Scholar

70. Barak, , “The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy,” pp. 27–28.Google Scholar

71. See Perry, Barbara A., The Priestly Tribe: The Supreme Court's Image in the American Mind (New York: Praeger, 1999)Google Scholar for a complete analysis of this theory.

72. Although the U.S. Constitution did not explicitly grant the power of judicial review to the federal courts, at least Chief Justice John Marshall was expounding a supreme, entrenched constitution, created independently by a constitutive assembly and ratified by the states. In contrast, Israel's “new constitution,” a set of parliamentary-created (albeit “basic”) laws written in lieu of a constitution, has simply been declared to be the fundamental governing document by the Supreme Court. Marshall, 's famous proclamation in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137 [1803])Google Scholar, that “it is the duty and province of the judicial department to say what the law is” (emphasis added), was bold enough, but President Barak's equivalent paraphrase might be that “it is the duty and province of Israel's Supreme Court to say what is the Constitution.”