1 Those in the Leba region were Protestants. About the religious factor as a rival of nationality, see below.

2 This rule lasted 13 years in Lusatia, and from 2 to 26 years in Bohemia and Moravia, respectively.

3 More specifically, the German statistics stated that 384,000 had “two mother tongues” (bilinguals) and that 117,000 of the remaining 151,000 knew German. Throughout this paper these distinctions are neglected in order to give to a non-German interpretation as much scope as possible. It must be stressed again, however, that a linguistic minority is not necessarily a national minority. Thus in the part remaining with Germany the plebiscite showed only about 200,000 Polish votes as compared with 510,000 German. In the part that came to Poland the proportion was 280,000 Polish to 200,000 German votes. For some of the problems implied in the post-war plebiscites, see below; for Upper-Silesia, see: Rose, W. J., The Drama of Upper-Silesia (Brattleboro, 1935), pp. 180–186.Google Scholar

4 “En désespoir de cause,” as Professor O. Halecki puts it correctly. (La Pologne. 963–1914. (Paris 1933), p. 47).Google Scholar Other Polish historians have tried to minimize this fact.

5 One of the “Grand Masters” of the 14th century (Luther of Brunsvig) rendered this part of the Old Testament into German verse.

6 It is mere fancy when Machray, R. assumes that the state of the Order tended to “break up into its component nationalities.” (East Prussia—Menace to Poland and Peace. (Published by American Polish Council, Chicago, 1943), p. 26).Google Scholar

7 For East Prussia the traditional misinterpretation and the lack of historic perspective appears again in R. Machray's statement: “… the people of East Prussia were decidedly gravitating towards Poland.” (loc. cit. p. 33.Google Scholar

8 There is no doubt that in the middle of the 17th century the south of East Prussia was predominantly non-German, with the exception of some towns. Also Mazourian noblemen flocked to this region when the duchy of Mazovia was incorporated into Poland in 1526. But the invasion of 1658 depopulated the country-side and the plague of 1709 took away almost one-third of the population.

9 When in 1806 the Prussian Queen on her flight passed through a town in the south (Ortelsburg) she answered the salute of the population with “dzienkuje” (thank you). A French historian picked up this anecdote in 1933 and in order to support post-Versailles Polish claims transferred the scene resolutely to the provincial capital in the north (Koenigsburg). See: Driault, M. E. in La Pologne et la Prusse Orientale (Paris, 1933), p. 101.Google Scholar The author then concluded “C'est la reine Louise de Prusse qui nous déclare que la Prusse Orientale est polonaise puis qu'on n'y entend que le polonais.”(!) In general, the book on “La Prusse Orientale” gives little credit to the French scholars who volunteered this propagandist campaign.

10 See the complaints of a Prussian Superintendent in 1834 (Machray, , loc. cit., p. 42)Google Scholar. On the other hand church services in Mazourian continued into the 20th century. No discrimination of any kind was imposed upon the Mazourians and Bismarck's Kulturkampf left them unharmed.

11 They refer to the distinction between Polish and Mazourian and the category of the bilinguals. The present author does not think that these distinctions are insignificant but, for reasons mentioned before, has neglected them. Some Polish authors (e. g., E. v. Romer) prefer the census taken in the primary schools in 1911 to the general language census of 1910. But the difference in figures is explained by a somewhat higher birthrate of the Mazourians and does not necessarily reflect upon the total numbers or suggest “falsification” of the general census.

12 There is, however, a striking inconsistency in the arguments applied. Either there was Germanization, then the drop in percentages seems quite plausible, or the statistics are wrong, then there cannot have been much Germanization. Needless to say that the 800,000 or more “unredeemed” Poles, of whom one hears occasionally and who are supposed to be covered only by a “thin German veneer,” are mere fancy.

13 The district of Soldau (Dzialdowo) with an important railway junction. According to the census of 1910 less than a third of the population spoke Polish and a Polish document of 1923, which the present author happened to see in the archives, acknowledged the prevailing German character of the district.

14 Of this area the southern Ermland and the circles (Kreise) of Marienburg and Stuhm had belonged to Poland from 1466–1772, whereas the circles of Marienwerder and Rosenberg and the Mazourian lake region had not.

15 For the purpose of the present discussion it may be noted that this number further decreased inasmuch as three villages in the southeast and five on the right bank of the Vistula were actually ceded to Poland.

16 Wambaugh, S., Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933). See the careful analysis in chapter III and the conclusions, pp. 138–141.Google Scholar

17 Machray, R., loc. cit., p. 88.Google Scholar It would be more appropriate to apply this characterization to the Polish practices during the plebiscite campaign in Upper Silesia where the French commanding general admittedly worked hand in hand with Polish terrorists. The Inter-Allied supervision in East Prussia compares favorably with this example and should not be exposed to insulting comments.

18 The Poles themselves had been in favor of this extension in assuming the emigrants had left for reasons of “national persecution.” This proved to be a mistake. But the principle itself seems thoroughly sound.

19 Ironically enough it was a French Professor at Strasbourg (Tesniéres) who wrote in 1933 that the Mazourians “ont eu la faiblesse de laisser échapper la seule chance … de rester Slaves.” (La Pologne et la Prusse Orientale, p. 93Google Scholar).

20 In 1921: 12,194; in 1924 (Dez.): 6,487. In 1930 all small parties in East Prussia together, including a number of socio-economic splinter groups and the Lithuanians, polled 17,463. It may also be noted that, before 1914, the Poles in East Prussia never polled more than 11,000 votes (Wambaugh, S., loc. cit., p. 100Google Scholar). There was no women's suffrage at that time.

21 This third of the province is euphemistically called “the city of Koenigsberg with the area adjacent to it”.

22 Incidentally it may be said that it is as erroneous (though likewise current) to speak of East Prussia as the “cradle of the Junkers.” For a rectification, see Muncy, Lysbeth W., The Junker in the Prussian Administration (Providence, 1944), p. 34.Google Scholar

23 Newman, B., The New Europe (New York, 1943), p. 132.Google Scholar The present writer confesses that he does not think very highly of such rationalistic proposals. With effective demilitarization of Germany, East Prussia would have been a “hostage” anyway. And a solution should be sought by diminishing, rather than by strengthening, the importance of national boundaries.

24 Cf. the criticism which K. Marx raised in discussing the notion of “strategic frontiers” in 1870: “If limits are to be fixed by military interests,” he wrote, “there will be no end to claims, because every military line is necessarily faulty and may be improved by annexing some more outlying territory; and, moreover, they can never be fixed finally and fairly because they always must be imposed by the conqueror upon the conquered, and consequently carry within them the seed of fresh wars.” (Quotation from: Cobban, A., National Self-Determination (London, New York, Toronto, 1945), p. 176).Google Scholar

25 It has also definite reactions upon the French policy of “buffer states” in West Germany.

26 Brailsford, H. N., Our Settlement with Germany (New York, 1944), p. 75.Google Scholar

27 “The greatest mass migration in the history of mankind,” as MrAlexander, Lipsett puts it in a Letter to the Editor of the New York Times (08. 26, 1945).Google Scholar From the authoritative Vatican newspaper Osservatore Romano, he quotes the following verdict: “It is against natural rights to remove millions upon millions of persons from their homes, churches, cemeteries and the soil enriched by the work of their fathers. It was unjust yesterday and it is unjust and ungenerous today.”

28 Since these questions were asked, reliable information has leaked out which begins to stir public opinion, particularly in England. See the Letter to the London Times (Oct. 26) in which Bertrand Russell accuses Russia and Poland of killing Germans “not by gas but by depriving them of their homes and food, leaving them to die by slow and agonizing starvation.” See also the article “Orderly and Humane” (The Nineteenth Century and After, London, 11 1945, pp. 193–205)Google Scholar which gives horrid details about the events in Danzig, the regions to the east of the Oder and Czechoslovakia. The description is mainly based on reports by British officials, one of whom declares eastern Germany to be “a gigantic Belsen.”

29 It may be desirable to those who think that “the only good German is a dead German” and do not realize that they repeat what Hitler might have said of the Jews. But this is definitely not official policy.

30 The figure of 1937, before the first steps beyond the frontiers of 1919, was near 68 millions. Re-immigration from Danzig, Memel, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary may amount at least to 4 millions. That leaves a generous margin for definite losses of 10 millions as direct or indirect victims of the war. Mr. Morgenthau speaks only of 55 to 60 million survivors.

31 Mr. Morgenthau, for instance, estimates that Germany would be able to raise “at least 95% of her real needs” and in addition (!) would have enough “farm exports to pay for fertilizer and the other 5% of her food” (pp. 54–55).

32 Miss S. Wambaugh with her intimate knowledge of European conditions speaks of self-determination as “rooted in the passionate attachment of the peasant to his field, the villager to the home of his fathers ….” (loc. cit., p. XII). This statement of 1933 compares favorably with that of Mr. Morgenthau, who praises the exchange (or rather the expulsion) of populations as progressive in contrast to the “old feudal conception that the people go with the land.” (loc, cit., p. 160).

33 The Economist, 11, 1945.Google Scholar