I would like to thank John Finnis for very helpful corrections and comments on both early and recent versions of this paper. Thanks are due also to Michael Inwood, Tim Chappell and to five anonymous reviewers of The Review of Politics. I am grateful to Elizabeth Miles for her editorial assistance.

1. Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 126;Google Scholar quoting Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. Norton, D. F. and Norton, M. J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) book 3, part 2, sect. 2 [especially § 18], p. 318Google Scholar. To show that some measure of selfishness is required by justice, Hume writes: “'Tis easy to remark, that a cordial affection renders all things common among friends; and that married people in particular mutually lose their property, and are unacquainted with the mine and thine, which are so necessary, and yet cause so much disturbance in human society.” He concludes, “that 'tis only from the selfishness and confin'd generosity of man, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin” (ibid. § 17) (his italics).

2. Rawls, , Theory of Justice, p. 128Google Scholar.

3. Sandel, Michael J., Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 32Google Scholar.

4. Sandel, , Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 33Google Scholar.

5. Badhwar, Neera Kapur, “The Circumstances of Justice: Pluralism, Community, and Friendship,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 1 (1993): 258CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Allen Buchanan calls one of the theses advanced by Sandel “the proportionality thesis” which holds that: “the need for and value of principles of justice vary with the extent of pluralism or divergence in conceptions of the common good” (Buchanan, , “Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” Ethics 99 [1989]: 876–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

6. For Sandel, (Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 30)Google Scholar the “breakdown of consensus and the loss of common purposes“ makes up the “subjective” circumstances of justice. In addition (p. 33) he speaks of justice as a remedy needed by societies where: “there is sufficient discord to make the accommodation of conflicting interests and aims the overriding moral and political consideration.” See also Sandel, , Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 183Google Scholar; Badhwar, , “The Circumstances of Justice,” p. 260Google Scholar; Buchanan, , “Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” p. 877Google Scholar.

7. Sandel, , Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 172Google Scholar.

8. Sandel argues that allegiances such as family and community “go beyond the obligations I voluntarily incur and the ‘natural duties’ I owe to human beings as such. They allow that to some I owe more than justice requires or even permits, not by reason of agreements I have made but instead in virtue of those more or less enduring attachments and commitments which taken together partly define the person I am” (Sandel, , Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 179 [my italics]Google Scholar). Badhwar reasonably concludes from this passage read in context that, for Sandel, “our communal obligations even allow us to give to members of our community more than is permitted by respect for the negative rights of those outside the community.” See her “Moral Agency, Commitment, and Impartiality,” Social Policy and Philosophy 13 (1996): 8Google Scholar.

9. See Sandel, , Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 33Google Scholar. See also Badhwar, , “The Circumstances of Justice,” pp. 262–63Google Scholar.

10. Affirming or denying the truth of the presumed facts invoked in defence of the Inverse Proportionality thesis does not imply acknowledging that these presumed facts have any actual bearing on the truth value of the Inverse Proportionality thesis itself.

11. Abbreviations: Car.: Quaestiones Disputatae de Caritate; Eth:. Sententia Libri Ethicorum; Impugn.: Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem; in Heb.: Expositio super Epistolam ad Hebraeos; in Hier.: Super Hieremiam et Threnos; In I Cor.: Commentarium et Reportatio super Epistolam Primam ad Corinthios; In II Cor.: Commentarium et Reportatio super Epistolam Secundam ad Corinthios; In Ioann.: Reportatio super Ioannem; in Matt.: Reportatio super Evangelium Matthaei; Pot.: Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia; Ps.: Postilla in Psalmos; Quodl.: Quaestiones de Quodlibet; ST: Summa Theologiae ( I, I-II, II-II, III, Suppl.); Ver.: Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate; Virt.: Questiones Disputatae de Virtutibus. I have consulted (and sometimes departed from) these translations: Summa Theologiae (London: Blackfriars and Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964–1980)Google Scholar (BF); Fathers of the English Dominican Province, The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas literally translated (Westminster, Mar., Christian Classics, 1980 c. 1911)Google Scholar (DF); Schmidt, R. W., The Disputed Questions on Truth (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954)Google Scholar. Editions and line numbers unless otherwise noted as in Busa, Roberto, Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia cum Hypertextibus in CD-ROM (Milan: Editoria Elettronica Editel, 1996)Google Scholar. Paragraph numbers [in square brackets] as in Marietti editions.

12. Rawls, , Theory of Justice, p. 129Google Scholar. But Rawls and Sandel would agree about the case of the saints because of different reasons. As Sandel (pp. 169–70) recognises, Rawls does not think that justice needs to wait for “confined generosity” in order for it to be necessary, not that it becomes displaced by abundant benevolence. Rawls writes: “Benevolence is at sea as long as its many loves are in opposition in the persons of its many objects.” (Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 190)Google Scholar For him, benevolence and love need the guidance of justice. Rawls's, “circumstances of justice” require mutual disinterest (defined—p. 129Google Scholar—as unwillingness to have one's interests sacrificed to others, rather than as egoism, or confined generosity). Competing interests do not necessarily arise from limited generosity or egoism. So, for Rawls, it is not too much benevolence, or too much love, or too much friendship that prevents the saints from engaging in disputes about justice but, rather, the absence of competing interests.

13. In II Sent, d.ll q. 2 a. 5Google Scholar; ST II-II q. 29 a. 3 obj. 2, ad 2;Google ScholarST II-II q. 37 a. 1c.Google Scholar

14. For the distinction between formal and material union of wills see Ver. q. 23 a. 8c. [184–92]Google Scholar and my “Aquinas on Friendship and Conformity of Wills,” Review of Metaphysics 57 (2003): 25–42Google Scholar.

15. One may speculate that Aquinas would consider the communio sanctorum, in patria, as a possible exception.

16. [For Rawls] “What bounds between persons confine is less the reach of our sentiments—this they [that is, persons] do not prejudge—than the reach of our understanding, of our cognitive access to others” (Sandel, , Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 172Google Scholar).

17. Ibid.

18. The heart was traditionally seen as the seat of thoughts. The reins were traditionally seen as the seat of the lowly pleasures. Aquinas sometimes associates them with affections and intentions.

19. Jer. 17:9–10Google Scholar. The Old Vulgate reads “pravum est cor omnium et inscrutabile, quis cognoscet illud? Ego, Dominus scrutans cor et probans renes.”—not so the Nova Vulgata (Vatican City: 1979):Google Scholar “Dolosum es cor super omnia et insanabile; quis cognoscet illud?” Aquinas typically quotes “cor hominis” in place of “cor omnium” (ST I q. 57 a. 4sc, ST III, q. 59 a. 2 obj. 3; Ver. q. 8 a. 4 sc. 8 [181–3]).

20. He relies on the Septuagint's use of “profundum” instead of “pravum” to interpret a passage from the book of Psalms (Ps. 42 in Nova Vulgata and English Bibles, Ps. 41 in old Vulgates) that runs: “Abyssus abyssum invocat in voce cataractarum tuarum.” Aquinas reasons that since a man's heart is profundum, a man is like an abyss. So the passage can be allegorically interpreted as saying that a man calls another man to Christ. “Secundum aliam litteram, profundum est cor hominis et inscrutabile. Ergo, abyssus, idest unus homo, invocat alium ad Christum” Ps. 41 n. 5 [lines 46–8] in Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1876), 18:491Google Scholar.

21. See in Matt. [2431] ad v. 28:5:Google Scholar An angel says to Mary Magdalene: “I know you are looking for Jesus, who was crucified” (Matt. 28:5Google Scholar). But—Aquinas asks—how did the angel know this? And answers: “it wasn't but for divine revelation” (dicendum est quod non, nisi per revelationem divinam; vel per signum, quia frequenter per gestus corporis habentur indicia voluntatis). Also Ver. q. 8 a. 13c. Quodl. 7 q. 5 a. 2c.

22. ST I q. 57 a. 4 ad 1. Also in Heb. [226]: “In voluntate autem est ipsa intention finis, quae de natura sua est invisibilis. Quid enim homo facit vel cogitat manifestatur per opus, sed qua intentione hoc faciat, penitus est incertum.” (“In the will, intentions about aims are present which are invisible because of their very nature. That which man does or thinks is manifest through acts which carry out intentions; that which is inward is uncertain.”) Also In Heb. [228].Google Scholar

23. ST I q. 57 a. 4c; ad 1. This article, placed within the treatise on angelic knowledge, is Aquinas's focal examination in ST of the kind of knowledge the human soul can have of another human soul. When he discusses human knowledge he does not discuss this question again, from which one can speculate that he was content with the treatment given in ST I q. 57 a. 4c.

24. ST I q. 57 a. 4c. “Et sic solus Deus cogitationes cordium et affections voluntatum cognoscere potest.” This view has implications for procedural justice; it prohibits “judicium temerarium”: to judge on matters uncertain. “Occulta vero Deus suo reservat iudicio. Sunt autem occulta nobis, quae latent in corde, vel etiam in abscondito fiunt” … “Unde homo quidem de his est temerarius iudex, sicut iudex delegatus, qui excedit formam mandati iudicii de causa non sibi comissa.” In I Cor. [195] ad v. 4:5Google Scholar [lines 185–7]. Also ST II-II q. 60 a. 2c, ad 2.

25. ST I-II q. 28 a. lc.

26. ST I-IIq. 28 a. 2c.

27. ST I-II q. 28 a. 2c. “Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem inquantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora ejus ingreditur.”

28. ST I-II q. 28 a. lc. Nic. Eth. 1166a32; Confessions 4, 6Google Scholar.

29. ST I-II q. 27 a. 2 ad 2 “Ob hoc ergo contingit quod aliquis plus amatur quam cognoscatur: quia potest perfecte amari, etiam si non perfecte cognoscatur.”

30. As an example of Franciscan criticism, see Scotus, John Duns, In III Sent, d. 33Google Scholar, resolutio. Reportata Parisiensa, Opera Omnia (Hidesheim: Georg Olms, 1969 c. 1639), XI 1:545Google Scholar.

31. Buridani, Iohannis, Quaestiones in Decent Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis (Oxford: H. Cripps, E. Forrest, H. Curtayne and I. Wilmot, 1637)Google Scholar. He wonders why, while the subject of all other cardinal virtues is the sensitive appetite, for Aquinas the subject of justice is the will alone: “Miror autem de istis, quomodo putaverunt propter istas rationes justitiam in sola voluntate poni debere, cum putarent ceteras virtut [u]s non in voluntate esse, sed in solo appetito sensitivo” (p. 366). He then provides the example of the judge who judges a young woman, a task which would require him to moderate whatever affections he has (or the attraction he experiences). He concludes “igitur similiter justitia moderabit passiones circa distributiones, aut permutationes faciendas” (p. 367).Google Scholar

32. Plato, Republic 331c7–9Google Scholar. In Plato the deposit is of weapons and the friend is “not in his right mind.”

33. ST II-II q. 89 a.7 ad 2. Aquinas on Plato's example of the mad friend: ST II-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 1.

34. See Sandel, , Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 33Google Scholar.

35. I Cor 6:6. Also Matt. 5:40: “if someone wishes to go to law with you to get your tunic, let him have your cloak as well.”

36. I Cor 6:6 and it continues (v. 7):Google Scholar “No; it is a fault in you, by itself, that one of you should go to law against another at all: why do you not prefer to suffer injustice, why not prefer to be defrauded?” Or, as NRSV translates: “In fact, to have lawsuits at all with one another is already a defeat for you!”

37. This is not to say that, for Aquinas, one should rush to court, or be hasty in making public accusations. His entire treatise on “fraternal correction” (ST II-II q. 33, especially a. 7 and 8) identifies the various instances that must be exhausted before publicly denouncing partakers in the friendship of charity. ST II-II q. 43 a. 8c. allows in certain cases that temporal goods be foregone in order to avoid the harm caused by scandal. Aquinas's overall view is that it is not always convenient to resort to courts and one should employ discretion regarding such a move (for example, to consider the possible harm inflicted to the good name of the accused, and to consider the plausibility of winning the case). So, although one should not think lightly about going to law, recourse to court as such is licit if certain conditions are observed. Also ST II-II q. 68 a. lc.

38. See Torrell, Jean-Pierre, St. Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, trans. Royal, R. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), pp. 76–79.Google Scholar

39. In I Cor. [279]; Deut, . 1:16.Google Scholar

40. “Sciendum tamen, quod ilia Glossa non est authentica, sed magistralis: quod patet ex hoc quod est quaedam conclusio ex verbis Augustini illata: unde paulo ante praemittitur: “Ut autem praedicta verba Augustini etc.”: in quibus Augustini verbis quamvis dicatur, habere iudicium infirmis concessum essesecundum veniam, non tamen dicitur quod non liceat perfectis: nee magister etiam subdit postea, quod eis non liceat, sed quod eis non conveniat.” Impugn. [456] “Apparet autem ex hoc, ut dicit hie glossa Augustini, “quod peccatum est iudicium habere contra aliquem” sed hoc videtur esse falsum” in I Cor. [279] (in both cases Aquinas refers to, and rejects Peter Lombard's interpretation of Augustine). Lombard, Peter, in Enchiridion c. 78, PL 191 col. 1578. Also ST II-II q. 43 a. 8 obj. 4; ad 4Google Scholar

41. “[E]t ideo non licet eis in iudicio repetere quasi propria, cum eis non liceat habere proprium, licet tamen eis in iudicio repetere ea quae sunt communia.” in I Cor. [279] ad v. 7. Also Impugn. [456].

42. “Non enim hoc faciendo peccant, sed magis merentur.” in I Cor. [279] A somewhat different (but compatible) approach can be found in ST II-II q. 71 a. 2c.

43. Impugn. [451]. The house of studies where Aquinas taught in Paris, in Rue Saint Jacques, received royal armed protection against university masters and students during the winter of 1255–56. Torrell, , St Thomas Aquinas, p. 79 n. 22.Google Scholar

44. On states of freedom and servitude see: ST II-II q. 183 a. lc.

45. Impugn. [452].

46. Impugn. [453].

47. Impugn. [454] “The adversaries of the religious may impugn the religious status either as to spiritual matters or as to temporal matters. Regarding spiritual matters one ought to resist. Regarding temporal matters one should be ready tosustain some personal harm (proprium detrimentum) but should nevertheless resist harm aimed at the community. Not defending the community from harm does not belong to perfection bur rather to negligence and pusillanimity./” Impugn. [455].

48. In I Cor. [279]: “Est enim opus charitatis defendere vel recuperare res pauperum.”

49. Impugn. [449].

50. “Dicendum, quod non semper quando aliquis rem suam repetit in iudicio, pacem quam cum proximo debet habere, a corde suo repellit. Unde quamvis pax cordis nullo modo sit perdenda pro terrena re recuperanda, non sequitur quod aliquis non possit in iudicio terrenam rem repetere. In ipso enim tumultu iudicii plerumque est salva pax pectoris, cum etiam a bonis viris in bellorum tumultibus non amittatur: alias omnia bella essent illicita” (Impugn. [462]).

51. Given the context, I read “pax pectoris” not as “peace of heart” but as harbouring a desire of peace with the neighbour which, however, is not manifest in external actions.

52. ST II-II q. 29 a. la; ad 1: “[I]f one man concord with another, not of his own accord (spontanea voluntate), but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace.” Terms that Aquinas uses to describe non-violent unjust situations: pax mala ST II-II q. 40 a. 1 ad 3, In Matt. [884] adv. 10:34;Google Scholarpax malorum, pax apparens, ST II-II q. 29 a. 2 ad 3; pax falsa, pax fraudulenta, In Hier. cp. 14 lc. 1; pax simulata, In II Cor. [542] ad v. 13:12.Google Scholar Peace and concord is preserved by justice: autographi deleta of ScG, III in Opera Omnia, xiv (Roma: Riccardi Garroni, 1926), p. 47^*, Pol. (II lc. 9) [271];Google Scholar peace as enabled by justice: ST II-II q. 29 a. 3 ad 3; peace as caused by justice: ST II-II q. 180 a. 2 ad 2; peace as an effect of justice: Rom. c. 14 lc. 2 [1128] ad v. 2:17.Google Scholar

53. “For meriting, an agent must possess dominion over his acts and be able to apply himself to his act; where his dominion is lacking, so too is merit” (Wawrykow, Joseph, God's Grace & Human Action: “Merit” in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas [Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995], p. 108).Google Scholar See In II Sent. d. 35 q. 1 a. 4 sol.: an action “ex termino autem habet speciem bonitatis, sed ex voluntate habet rationem merendi, quia secundum hoc est in potestate facientis quod ex voluntate procedit”; also d. 39 q. 1 a. 2 ad 2; In III Sent. d. 30 a. 3 sol. un. c.

54. In II Sent. d. 27 q. 1 a. 3 obj. 3; obj. 4; In III Sent. d. 18 qu. a. 2 ad 4; a. 4 sol. lc; ad 1 sol. 4c; a. 5 sol.un. c.

55. ST 1 q. 62 a. 4c; Ver. q. 29 a. 6c.

56. In III Sent. d. 18 q.un. 1 a. 2 sol.un. obj. 6

57. In III Sent. d. 18 q.un. a. 2 obj. 6: “praeterea, nullus meretur id quod suum est: et propter hoc apud homines filii non merentur a patribus, sed servi, quia ea quae patris sunt, hereditario jure competunt filio.”

58. Charity as radix merendi: In II Sent. d. 11 q. 2 a. 1 obj. 1; In III Sent. d. 18 q.un. a. 5 ad 2; d. 30 q.un. 1 a. 5 sc. 1; sc. 2; sc. 3; In IV Sent. d. 12 q. 3 a. 2 sol. 3c. ST II-II q. 23 a. 2c; q. 182 a. 2c; ST III q. 48 a. 1 obj. 3; Pot. q. 6 a. 9 obj. 3c; dilectio as radix merendi: Car. q.un. a. la; no merit for opera extra caritatem facta: In II Sent. d. 40 q. 1 a. 5 ad 2, In IV Sent. d. 15 q. 1 a. 3 sol. 3c; sol. 4c ad 1; Pot. q. 6 a. 9c; nullum meritum sit sine caritate: Virt. q.un. a. 10 ad 4, q. 1 a. l i e (end); q. 2 a. 7 obj. 4.

59. For some instances where the distinction between merit ex congruo and ex condigno is used, see In II Sent. d. 27 q. 1 a. 3 sol.un. c, a. 6c; Pot. q. 6 a. 9c; In Heb. c. 6 lc 3 [305]; ST I-II q. 114 a. 3c, 5c, 6c. For the theoretical grounds for this distinction see ST I q. 21 a. lc. For the Anselmian background to Aquinas's position see Proslogium, ch. 10.

60. ST I-II q. 114 aa. 1–3.

61. ST I-II q. 114 a. 2c

62. In comparing Aquinas's ex-professo treatments of merit, Wawrykow identifies as the main novel elements in ST (i) divine ordination (or divine plan) as the source of “debt” owed to creatures, and (ii) the focus on the actual objects or rewards of meritorious acts and especially the focus on what can not be merited (pp. 266–68). Wawrykow, following Henri Bouillard's clue [Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Aubier, 1944)Google Scholar], attributes these changes to Aquinas's reading of later Augustine's anti-Pelagian works (De praedestinatione sanctorum; De dono perseverantiae) in the 1260s. It must be noted that the text that I analyse below (In IV Sent. d. 15 q. 1 a. 3 sol. 4c.) is not found in Aquinas ex-professo treatment of merit, but rather it is placed in his discussion about satisfaction. It is not clear why Aquinas inserts an article about the requirements of merit in what appears not to be the most suitable context. Wawrykow's account does not explain (nor pretend to) why questions about the need for charity and friendship for meriting are not formulated in ST. Yet note that friendship is not entirely absent from the main discussion of merit, since in ST I-II q. 114 prol. merit is announced as the effect of co-operative grace. Grace (habitual grace) is called co-operative insofar as it is the origin or principle of meritorious works. (ST I-II q. I l l a. 2c.) Certainly co-operation is not friendship, but it is part of what goes on in friendship. For the distinction between operative and co-operative grace see ST I-II q. I l la. 2c. Here the emphasis is placed on the need for our actions to be voluntary in order for them to be meritorious, whereas in the passage of In IV Sent, the emphasis is on the need for actions to be shared to be meritorious.

63. “[C]um autem in omnibus illis quae gratis dantur prima ratio dandi sit amor; impossibile est quod aliquis tale sibi debitum faciat, qui amicitia caret, et ideo cum omnia bona et temporalia et aeterna ex divina liberalitate nobis donentur, nullus acquirere potest debitum recipiendi aliquod illorum, nisi per caritatem ad Deum; et ideo opera extra caritate facta, non sunt meritoria ex condigno neque aeterni neque temporalis alicujus boni apud Deum.” In IV Sent. d. 15 q. 1 a. 3 sol. 4c.= Suppl. q. 14 a. 4c. (DF)

64. In IV Sent. d. 15 q. 1 a. 3 sol. 4 obj. 1.

65. Proverb quoted in Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1159 b31, quoted by Aquinas in Eth. VIII, lc. 9 [1660] [the Marietti text reads slightly differently: “amicorum omnia sunt communia”] and Pol. II, lc. 4 [200 (end)].

66. In loann. c. 15 lc. 3 [2015] [lines: 130–5]: “ille servus qui movetur solum ab alio, et non a se, habet se ad moventem sicut instrumentum ad artificem. Instrumentum autem communicat cum artifice in opere, sed non in operis ratione. Sic ergo tales servi participant solum in opere.”

67. This solution of Aquinas stirs up some troubling questions which I will not discuss here: Is not God rewarding himself when he rewards actions done within the bond of charity? Does not Aquinas fall back on merit ex congruo by which God acts not in response to the merits of creatures but rather in consonance with His own attributes?

68. On communicatio see Bobik, Joseph, “Aquinas on Communicatio, the Foundation of Friendship and Caritas,” Modern Schoolman 65 (1986): 1–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

69. “Reasons not available within friendship… “: a reason is available in a particular context if the resources conducive to grasping that reason are present (these resources can be intellectual stimuli, conversation, accumulated experiences, the presence of a person who has knowledge). Arguably, two reasons identical in content (I eat oranges because they are healthy) may nonetheless differ at least in some respects, for instance, in the way we get to make them ours (i.e. solitary thinking, deliberation, learning, authority, etc.).

70. See Finnis, John M., Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 37–40.Google Scholar