* The material for this article was gathered with the assistance of M. José de Broucker. The author also wishes to thank those with whom he discussed a draft of the article in Paris.

¹ “A St. Brieuc, M. Pleven a dit,” Le Figaro, 09 11, 1950.Google Scholar

² Under the 1946 constitution, a French Prime Minister, after having been “designated” by the President of the Republic, must present himself to the National Assembly, and be “invested” by it with an absolute majority before he is supposed to form his cabinet, although there is no explicit provision in the constitution to prevent him from having completed his cabinet before appearing before the Assembly.

³ La Republique Française, 12, 1943.Google Scholar

⁴ Debré, M., “Scrutins—Partis—Institutions,” Les Cahiers Politiques, 07, 1946Google Scholar. See also his later works: La Mort de L'Etat Republican (Paris, 1947)Google Scholar, and La Republique et Son Pouvoir (Paris, 1950).Google Scholar

⁵ Michel Debré has emphasized most consistently that the electoral system predetermines the outline of a constitution. (See his above-mentioned article.) Professor Ferri resorts to a deliberate over-statement in order to clarify this problem: “The true constitution of a democratic government lies in the electoral law—the democratic principle and the majority principle complete and exhaust each other without residue.” Ferri, G. D., “Le Conseguenze Anarchiche della Rappresentanza Proporzionale,” Estratto dell' Annuario di Diritto Comparato e di Etudi Legislatori, Vol. XXIV (Rome, 1946), p. 24.Google Scholar

⁶ “La Défense de la République,” Le Populaire, 06 13, 1951.Google Scholar

⁷ This is the so-called d'Hondt system, named after the Belgian mathematician who invented it.

⁸ Journal Officiel de la Répubtique Françhise, Debats Parlementaires, Assemhlee Nationale, 3^e Seance du Fevrier 1951, p. 1590.Google Scholar

⁹ Journal Ofiidel de la République Française, op. cit., p. 1591.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 1590.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Projet de Loi portant modification de la loi … relative a l'élection des membres de l'Assemblé Nationale, présentée au nom de M. René Pleven, par M. Paul Giacobbi. … (No. 10948, Assemblée Nationale, Première Législature, Session de 1950). Certain changes were later introduced: see Lettre Rectificative … published as document No. 121555.

¹³ For the details, see de France, Ambassade, Service de Presse et d'Information, Document No. 43, 05 9, 1951.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Goguel, François, “Le Cetcle Vicieux de la Réforme Electorate,” Christianisme Social, 05–06, 1951, pp. 425 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 431.

¹⁶ French economists, however, frequently quote statistics according to which the rise of wages kept somewhat above that of prices. American observers are inclined to agree with them. It does, of course, have to be borne in mind that if average wages do rise as much as the price level, this is small comfort to those, including the white collar workers whose incomes rose at less than the average rate, since in France, in many cases, incomes are close to the subsistence level. (For details see the current ECA publications.)

¹⁷ See, in particular, the article by the founder of the “Fourth Force,” Senator Duchet, Roger, “Le RPF a-t-il raison de s'opposer aux autres partis nationaux?” Paris-Presse, 06 8Google Scholar, and the one by Petit, Guy, entitled “Que fera le RPF dans la prochaine legislature?”, Paris-Presse, 06 7Google Scholar. The latter were chided for ruining the best opportunity which the country had had since 1928 to elect a majority of “moderates.”

¹⁸ de France, Ambassade, Service de Presse et d'Information, Document No. 51, “The New French National Assembly; Results of the General Elections Held June 17,” pp. 2–3.Google Scholar

¹⁹ These votes were cast for Gaullist Union lists.

²⁰ Goguel, François, in his article, “Géographie des Elections du 17 Juin 1951,” Esprit, 09, 1951.Google Scholar

²¹ Hermens, F. A., Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy (Notre Dame, 1951), pp. 147–9.Google Scholar

²² Such as M. de Breucker, who made this point in a memorandum submitted to the author.

²³ For the details concerning the Communist losses, see Fauvet, Jacques, “Lecons de Geographie Electorale,” Terre Humaine, 07 1951, pp. 12–13Google Scholar. There is reason to believe that under a consistent majority system the Communists would have lost votes as well as seats; see Hermens, , Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy, pp. 248–50.Google Scholar

²⁴ Terre Humaine, op. cit., p. 14.Google Scholar

²⁵ Le Monde, 06 21, 1951.Google Scholar

²⁶ Op. cit., p. 10.Google Scholar

²⁷ The “Comité Général d'Ėtudes,” on behalf of which Michel Debré prepared the above-mentioned draft of a new constitution, was headed by François de Menthon, a professor of constitutional law, who was to become one of the MRP leaders, as well as a minister of justice (Garde des Sceaux).

²⁸ For details, see Gurian, Waldemar, Die Politischen und Socialen Ideen des französischen Katholkimus von 1789 bis 1914 (Muenchen Gladbach, 1928).Google Scholar

²⁹ This is also supported in an article by Frederico Alessandrini, published in L'Osservatore Romano, of 05 26.Google Scholar For the French text, see Liaisons Internationales, 07, 1951.Google Scholar

³⁰ Fauvret, L., Les Forces Politiques en France (Paris, 1951, p. 180).Google Scholar

³¹ “Quelle est aujourd'hui l'Audienoe du MRP sur Le Plan Electoral?” Liaisons Internationales, Bulletin d'Information du Movement Républicain Populaire, 01, 1951.Google Scholar

³² Hamon, Leo, “Perspectives républicaines populaires sur un lendemain d'elections”, Terre Humaine, 07, 1951, p. 25.Google Scholar

³³ Borne, Étienne, “Le Scrutin de L'Enracinement,” L'Aube, 06 25, 1951.Google Scholar

³⁴ Issues of June 18 and 19, 1951.

³⁵ For the details see Fauvet, , Les Forces Politiques en France, op. tit., pp. 99 ff.Google Scholar

³⁶ As expressed in the campaign manifesto of the “Peasant Patty of Social Unity” (mimeographed), made available to the author by the office of M. Anltier.

³⁷ “The End of the Crisis,” 08 13, 1951, p. 36.Google Scholar

³⁸ “Nous sommes prètes à assumer le pouvoir avec tous ceux qui seront d'accord avec nous sur l'application d'un programme minimum, déclare le General de Gaulle,” Le Parisien Libere, 06 23, 1951.Google Scholar

³⁹ “Gauche Contre Droite?”, L'Observateur, 09 13, 1951.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ European Edition, 10 18, 1951.Google Scholar

⁴¹ “Parteikrisen und Krisenparteien in Frankreich,” Die Tat, 10 27, 1951.Google Scholar

⁴² Sec die debate in the National Assembly held on 11 29, 1950Google Scholar, Journal Officiel de la République Française, Debats Parlementaires, Assemblée Nationale, issue of 11 30, 1950, pp. 308 ff.Google Scholar See also various “Propositions de Resolution” aiming at constitutional revision introduced in the National Assembly, such as the one by the deputy, LeRoy Ladurie, (No. 134) of the Assembly documents for the session of 1951, by Paul Coste-Floret and other MRP deputies, (No. 402), and by Alfred Coste-Floret and others, (No. 506), as well as a report on behalf of the Committee on Universal Suffrage made in an earlier version of such proposals by the deputy, Madame Germaine Peyroles, (Session of 1950, Document No. 11431). For a non-technical summary of the principal points at issue, see the article by Verpraet, Georges, “Le Revision de la Constitution,” Témoignage Chrétien, 03 30, 1951.Google Scholar

⁴³ France's political instability is only slightly mitigated by the relative continuity in the personnel of her cabinets. Reference might be made to an interview given by Reynaud, Paul to Le Figaro (issue of 09 13, 1951)Google Scholar listing examples of the confusion caused by the failure, now chronic, to vote the budget in time to make proper planning of government activities possible, and to the article by Legneu, F. F., “Sans Reforme de l'État Pas de Stabilisation des Prix et des Salaires,” Le Carrefour, 09 9, 1951.Google Scholar Much could be said on the relation between instability and deficiencies in other fields.

⁴⁴ This right is at present, more often than not, exercised by the coalition parties which bring about a fall of the cabinet by withdrawing their support.