¹ The doctrine rarely appears to be a part of the intellectual equipment of men involved in the conduct of foreign affairs. In academic circles it has been subjected to a good deal of criticism, but still has strong supporters.

“If sovereignty is the mast to which the sails of modern statecraft are attached, the precept of the balance of power is the wind which drives the vessel over the stormy seas of international politics. The one has become the central concept of nationhood and of international law. The other has become the most important single pattern of political action in the international arena.” Schumann, Frederick L.. International Politics (Fifth Edition, New York, 1953), p. 65.Google Scholar

“It will be shown … that the balance of power in international affairs is only a particular manifestation of a general social principle to which all societies composed of a number of autonomous units owe the autonomy of their component parts; that the balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only inevitable, but are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations; and that the instability of the international balance of power is due not to the faultiness of the principle but to the particular conditions under which the principle must operate in a society of sovereign states.” Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations (Second Edition, New York, 1954), p. 155.Google Scholar

² In a useful article in the July 1953 issue of World Politics V, 442–477Google Scholar, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda,” Ernest Haas deals with eight different ways in which he finds the term used. Most of these involve an attitude toward the idea rather than a particular conception of its substance. For example, it is treated as synonymous with peace and stability by some and as synonymous, with instability and war by others. By some it is regarded as a policy to be pursued by nations while others think of it as a universal law of history. On the substantive side he finds the term balance of power used to refer to (1) any distribution of power; (2) a hegemony; (3) an equilibrium. When used in the first sense it lacks precision and has no special value for purposes of analysis or description. When used in the second sense, it acquires precision but not usefulness, since it simply becomes synonymous with “preponderance.” This leaves the third usage for serious examination.

³ Vagts, Alfred, “The Balance of Power: Growth of an Idea,” World Politics, I, (10, 1948), 82–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ “Indeed, incredible as it may seem today, the theorists of the balance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw in it a ‘beautiful design.’ At that period men were seeing ‘natural balances’ everywhere. There was Galileo's and Kepler's balance of heavenly bodies in the universe, followed by Selden's balance of trade and by Harrington's and Locke's balance of power within the state, and finally Shaftesbury's balance of affections. The fundamental basis for these conceptions of a balanced existence lay in the firm belief in the ‘pre-established harmony’ of the universe and a similar natural harmony of interests in society. Its latest and most potent expression appeared in the economics of Adam Smith and the classical school.” Friedrich, Carl J., Foreign Policy in the Making (New York, 1938), p. 119.Google Scholar

⁵ “From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness.

“For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We can not afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength…. If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United States, with all such cooperation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe, and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of security.” Churchill, Winston, Speech at Fulton, Missouri, New York Times, 03 6, 1946, p. 4.Google Scholar

⁶ If it is arbitrary to assume that countries invariably seek an equilibrium of power, it is just as arbitrary to assume, as Professor Spykman did, that they invariably seek preponderant power. “The truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective. There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger.” Spykman, Nicholas John, America's Strategy in World Politics (New York, 1942), p. 21.Google Scholar

⁷ SirCrowe, Eyre, “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany,” British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914, edited by Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, Harold (London, 1928), Vol. III, p. 403.Google Scholar

⁸ Changes of this kind are sometimes described as “shifts in the balance of power.” Used in this sense the term simply refers to shifts in the distribution of power. This observation owes nothing to the balance of power concept and the latter, in its special and historical sense, is not really involved even though the phrase is used. Whenever the phrase “distribution of power” can be substituted for that of “balance of power” without changing the meaning of a passage, the chances are the concept of the balance of power is not concerned.

⁹ Western Europe and Communist China have been offered as power centers that may accede to the role of balancer. This would mean that Western Europe would have to be prepared to add its weight to the Soviet bloc if it appeared that the power of the free nations was becoming too great, and that Communist China would have to entertain a lively concern lest the Communist bloc prove too strong for the free nations.

¹⁰ It is interesting that the assumption underlying the descriptive aspect of the balance of power approach is quite at odds with the assumption underlying the prescriptive side. In the first case the assumption is that all nations are seeking an equilibrium; in the second, it is assumed that any nation would upset the equilibrium if it could.

¹¹ In some circumstances a country may choose to pursue a policy almost the reverse of that indicated by the balance of power doctrine. In the negotiations of the North Atlantic Treaty countries over defense contributions it sometimes appears the rule that each country justifies a minimum defense effort on its part in terms of its peculiar problems and limited economic capabilities while encouraging other countries to contribute more to the common effort in accordance with the principle of equality of sacrifice. Indeed, adoption of the principle of a contribution from each country in accordance with political and economic capabilities almost certainly means that the strong will ecome relatively stronger, with the complete approval of the smaller countries.

¹² The following passages are taken almost at random to illustrate the point. “In the balancing-of-power process, long festering fears and hatreds lead to periodical explosions of violence because the process operates haltingly and ineffectively. Any increase in the power of unsatiated states, through heavier armaments or alliancés, creates new insecurities among the satiated and causes them to seek to redress the balance by still heavier armaments or counteralliances.” Schuman, , op. cit., p. 254.Google Scholar

“The establishment of one overwhelming power, of a dictatorial power monopoly, is thus the danger against which stands guard the balance of power doctrine. This danger is so real that all protestations and ostensibly quite different formulations of policy do not alter the fact that all governments observe, as it were instinctively, the balance of power doctrine. With the exception of the would-be world ruler they are united in their desire to prevent the upsetting of the balance on a world scale.” Strausz-Hupé, Robert and Possony, Stefan, International Relations (New York, 1950), p. 243.Google Scholar

¹³ A Study of History, vols. I and II (London, 1934)Google Scholar, “The Geneses of Civilizations.”

¹⁴ A number of writers have observed that the balance of power scheme is of little help in thinking about the problems associated with collective security. Indeed, the very objective of collective security, with its emphasis on the creation of preponderant power, seems to be fundamentally at odds with the divided and equal power which would result from the application of the balance of power principle. If truly preponderant power were created it would appear that the balance of power concept must become wholly inapplicable. There can be no real balance if a near monopoly of power is created.

¹⁵ It might be worthwhile to indicate the uses of the concept that have been touched on in these pages and the further uses to which it might be put. Challenge and response has been referred to as (1) an historically observable pattern of behavior on the part of powers; (2) a tool for the detailed analysis of various situations past and present; (3) a basis for projection (“If there is a challenge there is likely to be a response”); (4) an aid in elaborating a program of action once the major decision as to the desirability of challenging or responding has been taken. In addition, an observer might regard challenge and response as involving a norm (“It is the responsibility of the leaders of this country to plan a response to the challenge.”) Finally, it might be used as a statement of policy (“It is the firm intention of this country to respond in ways it deems appropriate to any challenge jeopardizing its vital interests.”).

¹⁶ The term “challenge” is not used in this article to refer to such “challenges” as those of economic instability, over-population, the need to develop the under-developed areas and sp on. If it were to be used in this broader sense it would meet the objection made above. Two quite different conceptions of “challenge” would then be involved, however, and the likelihood of confusion would be great. On the whole it would seem better to use terminology that would illuminate these differences rather than obscure them.