* This essay is a part of a study undertaken for the University of Notre Dame Committee on International Relations. The Middle East, a British administrative term in origin, embraces the Levantine and Biblical Near East, the oil-rich Arab world as well as Iran, Egypt and Turkey. Two useful books are: The Middle East (New York, 1950), a survey published by the Royal Institute of International AffairsGoogle Scholar, and Seton-Williams, M. V., Britain and the Arab States (London, 1948).Google Scholar

1 Many attempts have been made to define British interests in the Middle East. The basic interests are: 1) to enjoy the unimpeded use of communications through this area, the meeting place of three continents; 2) the oil resources of Iran and Iraq; 3) to prevent any other power from dominating the region, and thereby the Mediterranean. See three studies issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs: Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom (London, 1940)Google Scholar, British Security (London, 1946)Google Scholar and United Kingdom Policy (London, 1950).Google Scholar Another valuable study is by Monroe, E., “British Interests in the Middle East,” The Middle East Journal, II (04, 1948), 129–146.Google Scholar Two recent works on the role of the United States are Reitzel, William, The Mediterranean (New York, 1948) and the Brookings Institution Pamphlet no. 2, “Security in the Middle East.”Google Scholar

2 During 1916 Russia, France and Britain in the famous secret treaties agreed upon the distribution of the Turkish Empire among themselves. In letters of October 1915 to January 1916, Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, had encouraged the Arab Revolt by telling the Sharif Husain, ruler in the Hejaz, that Britain would recognize the independence of much of the Arab world. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, May 16, 1916, provided a more specific allotment of strategic territories to Britain and France. Finally, the Balfour Declaration of Nov. 2, 1917, affirmed that the British Government viewed “with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” Apart from the multiplication of promises the two crucial points in the future controversy are: 1) McMahon did not specifically except Palestine from the ptomise of Arab independence; 2) die British announced their support not of a Jewish state but of a Jewish national home.

3 “MESC was under the British Ministry of War Transport, which controlled wartime shipping. Before the war the Middle East imported more than five million tons of civilian supplies annually; after 1941 imports dropped to less than one and one-half million tons annually,” Boardman, Francis, “Civilian Requirements from War to Peace: The Middle East Supply Center,” Department of State Bulletin, XVIII (12. 23, 1945), 997. Paradoxically, one of the major imports of the region was coal for locomotives. Under MESC the locomotives changed over to oil.Google Scholar

4 Churchill, Winston, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950), pp. 253–267, 476–500.Google Scholar

5 Hull, , The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), II, 1231, 1451–1459. This arrangement made possible British action against the Communist attempt to seize power in December 1944.Google Scholar

6 Bevin had supported and defended British action in Greece in December 1944. A number of earlier speeches revealed that he had an appreciation of the necessity of power and strategic considerations. Such understanding was rare among Labour Party spokesmen. Bevin had several times insisted on a bipartisan policy in foreign and defence affairs, e.g., in a speech at Leeds in April 1945, The Times, 07 28, 1945.Google ScholarAt the Labour Party Conference inMay 1945 he insisted that revolutions do not change geography.Google Scholar

7 Prime Minister Attlee indicated his decision against continuing the posts of Minister Resident on Aug. 12, shortly after taking office. The Times, Aug. 13, 1945.Google Scholar

8 In 1945 the United States probably would not have continued participation in this agency, but it is also possible that at the time the British did not seek American partnership. Cordell Hull noted that Britain in the Middle East had a “somewhat contradictory attitude … in that she did not wish us to seek a predominant postwar position in any part of that area, while on the other hand, she did not want us to lose interest there entirely.” The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), II, 1475.Google Scholar

9 The Economist, CXLIX (12. 1, 1945), 787Google Scholar. A French writer in Le Monde, April 4, 1946Google Scholar, phrased this differently. British imperial politics, he said, were in the course of reconstruction, for the British in the Middle East had reached the very end of the era of promises.

10 Speiser, E. A., writing at the end of 1946, estimated that the recognized Middle East experts which the United States could assemble “would probably be outnumbered by the secretariat of an average-size British legation” there, The United States and the Near East (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), p. 235.Google Scholar

11 It is very likely that this position had been formulated by the permanent officials of the Foreign Office, and that the Conservatives would have adopted a similar approach, possibly with less emphasis on economic and social assistance. The position parallels a number of expressions of opinion by British Middle Eastern experts in 1944–1945. Freya Stark, who worked for the British Ministry of Information during the war and sponsored a Brotherhood of Freedom in the Arab world, believed that the “young effendis,” representatives of a rising “middle class,” afforded a basis for cooperation between Britain and the Arab States. See her eloquent book, The Arab Island: The Middle East, 1939–1943 (New York, 1946).Google Scholar

12 The Times, Sept. 21, 1945.Google Scholar

13 The Times, Nov. 2, 1945.Google Scholar

14 Bevin readily made use of the concept of a vacuum in reference to Germany and the Middle East. The French had attached themselves to the minorities in the Middle East, whereas the British sought alliances with the majority force.

15 The dilemma was expressed in the Royal Empire Society Address of Lord Altrincham, who as Sir Edward Grigg had been Minister Resident in the Middle East in 1944–45. He recognized that die shreds of tutelage had to go and to be succeeded by equal and mutually beneficent partnership, and that spheres of influence, which inevitably smack of power politics, had also become outmoded. But, he added, nations have special interests in certain regions: Britain in the Middle East and Russia in her immediate neighbors. The Times, Nov. 15, 1945.Google Scholar

16 The Times, Nov. 14, 1945.Google Scholar Bevin's acute embarrassment about Palestine was bluntly expressed during a debate on the United Nations Charter. A Labour M.P., George Griffiths attacked the Conservative M.P., Colonel Stanley, who said that his party had been wise enough to be silent about Palestine. Griffiths retorted that the Conservatives were sitting on die fence, and Stanley submitted that such a course was better dian coming down prematurely on the wrong side. Bevin then interjected: “You cannot always get off.” Parliamentary Debates, 413, House of Commons, Aug. 23, 1945, elms. 934–935.

17 New York Times, June 5, 1945.Google Scholar

18 Ibid., June 20, 1945.

19 Ibid., June 6, 1945.

20 Text reprinted in the Chronology of International Events and Documents, II (12. 20, 1945-01. 6, 1946), 30.Google Scholar

21 Earlier French policy in Syria is discussed in Hourani, A. H., Syria and Lebanon (New York, 1946)Google Scholar. The quarrel of 1945 is described in , W.G.E.'s article, “France, Syria and the Lebanon” in The World Today, II (03 1946), 112–121.Google Scholar

22 The Lord President of the Council, Herbert Morrison, arriving in New York and facing the questions of American newsmen, said: “We are great friends of rhe jolly old Empire, and we are going to stick to it,” Chronology of International Events and Documents, II (01. 7-01. 20, 1946), 47.Google Scholar

23 The Memoirs of King Abdullah (London, 1950) appeared too late for use in writing this article.Google Scholar

24 Haines, C. Grove, “The Problem of the Italian Colonies,” The Middle East Journal, I (10 1947), 417–431Google Scholar, and Rivlin, Benjamin, The United Nations and the Italian Colonies (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United Nations Action, Case Histories I, 1950).Google Scholar

25 Chronology of International Events and Documents, II (07 8–07 21, 1946), 419Google Scholar; ibid., II (07 22–08. 11, 1946), 447, 451–452. The newspaper accounts of this incident, apart from the Russian press, are very scanty. See Lenczowski, George, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948 (Ithaca, 1949), pp. 304–306. A particularly entrancing event in the midst of this turmoil was a mass demonstration of the Tudeh Party in Teheran against the Franco Government (July 21, 1946).Google Scholar

26 Most Egyptian parties are held together by personal influences and alliances, and are best defined by their relationship to the Wafd Party and the Crown. All are extremely nationalist, and never more so than when in opposition. The Wafd Party has the largest mass following, and presents a more democratic nationalist front, but it lacks competent administrators and behaves more arbitrarily in office than the other parties. Its tenure of power is marked by unusual corruption. In general the nationalist temper of the Wafd Party in opposition provides insuperable barriers to an Anglo-Egyptian accord, and slightly less formidable difficulties when in power. Churchill's comment that the party in power always wins Egyptian elections contains a minute exaggeration.

27 Such as a promise to remove British troops out of the major Egyptian cities. This was the burden of the Conservative attack on the later concessions of the Labour Government. In view of the Egyptian nationalist temper it is most unlikely that such a promise, even if made in August 1945, would have been acceptable to Egypt. Indeed, the basic weakness of the British position was described by Lord Lloyd more than twenty years ago: “If the abortive Sarwat treaty negotiations showed anything it was the difficulty at this date, when we have already given Egypt so much, of finding sufficient further concessions to make it worth her while to accept our minimum desiderata and thus to liquidate 1922.” SirPetrie, Charles, The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. SirChamberlain, Austen (London, 1940), II, 358. The 1936 Treaty was concluded largely because of Egyptian fears of Italy. The British rather reluctantly rose to the opportunity.Google Scholar

28 This was a brave gesture, but it was not more than that. If the Egyptians responded to it warmly, and made provisions for defence, presumably the British would have had to stay on. Kirk, George E. in A Short History of the Middle East (Washington, 1949), p. 228Google Scholar, wrote that the offer was made dependent on the provision of satisfactory military arrangements. But the British offer did not specifically make that condition. The offer was possibly conceived as a move to convince the Egyptian Government that the Labour Government was not as other governments, interested in power and determined to keep weak nations in their lowly places. Herbert Morrison in an ingenious and tortured reply to Conservative attacks indicated that the Government's decision was “reluctantly” agreed upon.

29 Weekly Hansard, no. 18, House of Commons (May 24–May 30, 1946), May 24, 1946, elms. 770–783. Sidky Pasha, who was determined to use the United Nations as a bargaining weapon and to argue that its existence made British security worries unnecessary, announced to the Egyptian Parliament, May 8, 1946, that his Government planned to conclude a special agreement with the Security Council, putting the might of Egyptian arms and the right of military passage through Egypt at the disposal of the projected world police force. Daily Telegraph (London), 05 9, 1946Google Scholar. Bitter domestic criticism was directed against the Egyptian member of the Security Council, when he supported Britain on the presence of British troops in Indonesia, Manchester Guardian, March 4, 1946.Google Scholar

30 The process of preparing increased Sudanese participation in government was notably accelerated during 1946. On this issue British diplomacy was shrewd and successful, and the Sudan, of course, was administered through the Foreign Office. A dispatch from Khartoum to The Times, March 28, 1946Google Scholar, indicated that the Sudanese (British) officials believed that the decisive consideration was the widely expressed Sudanese desire for independence. A typical, moderate Egyptian view was expressed by Fanous, Senator L. A., who said that Sudanese nationality was a laughing matter and warned the British against creating an African Alsace-Lorraine, Manchester Guardian, Oct. 31, 1946Google Scholar. See also Awad, Mohamed, “Egypt, Great Britain, and the Sudan: an Egyptian View,” The Middle East Journal, I (07 1947), 281–291.Google Scholar

31 New York Times, May 23, 1946. British press comments usually regretted that Egypt thought only in nationalist terms, whereas the British entreated her to think in regional terms. The Egyptian reply was twofold: 1) partnership with the British would involve them in foreign conflict; 2) regional defence arrangements were unnecessary in the era of the United Nations.Google Scholar

32 The Observer, Oct. 27, 1946.Google Scholar

33 Manchester Guardian, Dec. 9, 1946Google Scholar. An Egyptian quoted in La Bourse Egyp-tienne, Jan. 9, 1947Google Scholar, observed that Britain in the face of Soviet expansion was resolved to keep Egypt as a sphere of influence, and would not give complete independence, Le Monde, June 24, 1948Google Scholar, expressed sardonic admiration for Britain's outwitting the Egyptians on the Sudanese issue. Sidky Pasha in statements to the Arab press innocently indicated that he never understood what had happened. Initially he blamed British imperialist attacks, but later he condemned the appeal to the U.N. on the grounds that the draft treaty afforded important gains to Egypt. He had, he continued, been unable to discover the exact reasons for the breakdown of the negotiations. Manchester Guardian, 01. 3, 1947Google Scholar; The Times, 02. 10, 1947Google Scholar. In early 1948 the British Government invited Egyptian participation in a discussion of Sudanese reforms. Subsequent refusals, a little more restrained, however, prompted the British Government on June 14, 1948, to announce its determination to go ahead with the Sudan constitution independently of Egypt, which in view of the liquidation of the British empire in India and Palestine continued to consider itself unfairly treated.

34 Briggs, Herbert W., “Rebus Sic Stantibus Before the Security Council: The Anglo-Egyptian Question,” The American Journal of International Law, XLIII (10, 1949), 762–769.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35 The British finally refused to execute any decision, which was unacceptable to either side. In particular, they refused to impose a decision by force. Thus, they determined to evacuate Palestine, to end the Mandate, handing the Holy Land over to chaos and war. R. M. Graves, the last mayor of Jerusalem under the Mandate, feared in October, 1947 that on the Palestine question reason would not move Bevin, who “is cemented up to the knees and can't be moved.” Of the British decision, Sept. 26, 1947, to end the Mandate and withdraw the British troops, Graves, wrote: “It is difficult to take this declaration seriously. If it is meant seriously, I can't comment without profanity.” Graves, Experiment in Anarchy (London, 1949), pp. 88–94Google Scholar. The vacillations of the United States in the face of the consequences of its partition policy are well described in Campbell, John C., The United States in World Affairs, 1947–1948 (New York, 1948), pp. 305–340, and his volume for 1948–1949 (New York, 1949), pp. 375–407.Google Scholar

36 See the excellent article by Arendt, Hannah, “Peace or Armistice in the Near East,” The Review of Politics, XII (01 1950), 56–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roosevelt, Kermit, “The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics,” The Middle East Journal, II (01 1948), 1–16Google Scholar, and Arnold, G. L., “Lessons of Palestine,” Nineteenth Century and After, CXLIV (10 1948), 192–201.Google Scholar

37 Doubtless the rapprochement was stimulated by a renewed recognition of the importance of defending Africa in view of the loss of much of Asia to the communist world. A concern with Africa was expressed in the first French discussions of the Schuman Plan. The military value of the Arab states is very dubious. Beginning in June 1950 The Economist ran a series of articles appraising the military resources of the Middle East. The author found the task particularly vexing, finding the Egyptian army a “misfit” in terms of regional defence and a concern with the Lebanese army a waste of time. See Montagne, Robert, “France, England and the Arab States,” International Affairs, XXV (06 1949), 286–294.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

38 See an article by the French journalist, Moyal, Maurice, “The Middle East and the Western World,” World Affairs, IV (10 1950), 460–468Google Scholar; also, Seabury, Paul, “The League of Arab States: Debacle of a Regional Arrangement,” International Organization, III (11 1949), 633–642.CrossRefGoogle Scholar