¹ 1252a30. Bekker numbers will henceforth be cited in the text. References to the books and chapters of Aristotle's works will be based on the Oxford edition. Translations are mine. For discussions of the polis and of the insuperable obstacles to translating “polis” adequately, see SirBarker, Ernest, The Politics of Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. xlvii–liiGoogle Scholar; Strauss, Leo, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 30–34Google Scholar; and Jaffa, Harry V., “Aristotle's Politics,” in The History of Political Philosophy, eds. Strauss, Leo and Cropsey, Joseph (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 65–72.Google Scholar

² Plato Republic 473c6–474c2, 456b12–c2, cf. 497a9–d2, 499a9–c2. The regime of the Laws is likewise defended on the basis of its naturalness, and yet the Athenian Stranger goes on to note respects in which it is not natural (Plato Laws 711e7–712a3, 858cl–4, 757dl–758a2, 739b8–d5; cf. Pangle, Thomas L., The Laws of Plato [New York: Basic Books, 1980], pp. 480–81).Google Scholar When Socrates does undertake to defend the authority of Athens over himself, he does so on several grounds but does not claim that Athens is by nature or according to nature (Plato Crito 50a–54e). On the apparent disagreement between Plato and Aristotle regarding the naturalness of the city, see Bloom, Allan, “Response to Hall,” Political Theory, 5 (1977), 316CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Newman, W. L., The Politics of Aristotle (New York: Arno Press, 1976), 1:20.Google Scholar All emphasis in quotations is mine.

³ For the classic formulations of the view that the city and its laws lack natural status, see Plato Republic 358e3–361d3; Gorgias 483a7–484c3, 491e5–492c9; cf. Laws 889b1–890a9.

⁴ For the view that Aristotle was especially eager to rebut the sophistic attack on the city, see Newman, , Politics, 1:24–27Google Scholar; SirBarker, Ernest, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (New York: Dover, 1959), pp. 272–73Google Scholar; Bradley, A. C., “Aristotle's Conception of the State,” in Hellenica, ed. Abbot, Evelyn (London: Rivingtons, 1880), pp. 190, 199Google Scholar; von Fritz, K. and Kapp, E., “The Development of Aristotle's Political Philosophy and the Concept of Nature,” in Articles on Aristotle: Ethics and Politics, eds. Barnes, , Schofield, , and Sorabji, (New York: St. Martin's, 1977), p. 126.Google Scholar Indeed, Kagan and Havelock see Aristotle's argument as scarcely more than a conservative polemic against the Sophists: Kagan, Donald, The Great Dialogue: History of Greek Political Thought from Homer to Pblybius (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 209Google Scholar, and Havelock, Eric A., The Liberal Temper in Greek Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 339–40.Google Scholar But if Aristotle is eager to challenge the Sophists, it must be noted that it is against a Socratic position that the Politics is directed in the first instance (1257a7; cf. Plato Statesman 258e8–259d5, Erastai 138c7–ll; Xenophon, Memorabilia III. 4Google Scholar, Oeconomicus 13.5). See also Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1160b22–1161a9.

⁵ Barker's summary of Aristotle, 's “teleological view of nature”Google Scholar shows how useful it is for the defense of the city's authority (Barker, , Political Thought, pp. 218–25).Google Scholar Hobbes, after all, can call a certain sort of city natural and yet not flatter it by this designation (De Cive, 5. 12).Google Scholar Nevertheless, more attention should be paid to variations among Aristotle's different accounts of this teleology. In book 1 of the Politics, for example, the personification or, rather, divinization of nature occurs with unusual frequency (1252b1–5; 1253a9; 1256a26–27; 1256b20–22; 1256b7–10; 1258a20–25, 35–36; 1254b27–32; 1255b3–4). Since such personifications are not always present, or equally present, in Aristotle's account of nature, one might wonder whether certain political purposes do not require a somewhat distorted view of nature. Newman and Wieland both note that such personifications of nature are not in perfect keeping with the more scientific accounts of Aristotle's teleology. The latter speculates that Aristotle tries to accommodate his view to certain popular notions; the former dismisses the problem. (Newman, , Politics, 1:18–19Google Scholar; Wieland, W., “The Problem of Teleology,” in Articles on Aristotle: Science, eds. Barnes, , Schofield, , and Sorabji, [London: Duckworth, 1975], pp. 141–58).Google Scholar

⁶ More or less typical summaries of Aristotle's argument may be found in Kagan, , Great Dialogue, pp. 206–209Google Scholar; Barker, , Political Thought, pp. 264–70Google Scholar; Newman, , Politics, 1:25–33Google Scholar; Fritz, and Kapp, , “Development of Aristotle's Political Philosophy,” p. 125Google Scholar; Bradley, , “Aristotle's Conception of the State,” pp. 194–96.Google Scholar

⁷ Chapter 2 declares its intention to watch “matters as they grow” (ta pragmata phyomena, 1252a24). Since the word for nature (physis) is derived from the word to grow (phyein), Aristotle's present choice of “the genetic method” contributes substantially to the conclusion that the city is natural, a conclusion never reached by the analytic method. For an attempt to identify the genetic and the analytic methods, see Barker, , Politics, p. 3n.Google Scholar

⁸ If Aristotle appears to be following a straightforward method when he promises to address these major issues by an analysis of the city into its parts, the observation that he offers a number of different analyses of the city shows his method to be more complex. Are the parts of the city to be found in its households (1253b1–4), its citizens (1274b39–41), its economic classes (1259b1–3; cf. 1318a30–31), its functional elements (1321a5–7, 1290b37ff.)? If each of these analyses is in some sense correct, then each is also in some sense incomplete. Is not the teaching of chapter 2, which sees human beings as being the parts of the city (1253a19–21), incomplete in failing to note that all cities have ruling arrangements, that different cities have different ruling arrangements, and that different men hold different positions with regard to these ruling arrangements? These differences have a bearing on the city's claim to promote virtue and rule justly. Thus the analysis of book 3 corrects that of book 1.

⁹ Havelock, Kagan, and Lloyd each note that Aristotle's defense of slavery and despotic rule is related to his defense of the city and political rule, so each must sense that there is at least some unity to the first part of book 1. Unfortunately, however, they do not see that Aristotle's account of political rule is more (or less) than a polemical defense, for they observe neither that Aristotle criticizes conventional slavery nor that a defense of despotic rule is not a defense of political rule (Havelock, , Liberal Temper, p. 344Google Scholar; Kagan, , Great Dialogue, p. 206Google Scholar; and Lloyd, G. E. R., Aristotle: The Growth of His Thought [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968], p. 251).Google Scholar

¹⁰ For exceptions to this general rule, see Strauss, , City and Man, pp. 41–42Google Scholar, and Berns, Lawrence, “Rational Animal — Political Animal: Nature and Convention in Human Speech and Politics,” Review of Politics, 38 (04 1976), 177–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Certainly it is awkward to speak in English of “the naturally servile” (to physei doulon), but to say “the natural slave” misleads one into thinking that Aristotle is necessarily thinking of a human being.

¹² For indirect signs of Aristotle's opinion of Greek antiquity, see the immediate context of his quotation from Hesiod (1252b10–12, Works and Days 405–6Google Scholar), consider that the stories of Zeus and Chronos were based on the way men once lived (1252b26–27), and note that Aristotle likens the ancient household to the Cyclopean household (1252b22–23).

¹³ A partial explanation of the continued existence of the household might be found in Aristotle's discussion of conjugal friendship (Nic. Ethics 1162a16–26). This discussion maintains that man is by nature more a conjugal than a political animal. That no such emphasis on conjugal friendship is evident in the account of the city's naturalness contributes to my suspicion that a consciously political account of man's nature is presented in this context.

¹⁴ The account of the city's growth is complete by 1253a1. Before this point, the word for “human being” (anthropos) was used only once, and this was in a digression (1252b27). The words for woman (gyne) and wife (alochos) were used once each, but only in quotations from Hesiod and Homer. The remainder of this chapter, on the other hand, uses anthropos seven times and has human beings almost always directly in view. It is here that Aristotle calls the first founder “the cause (aitios) of the greatest goods” (1253a30–31).

¹⁵ Of course the question of the city's contribution not simply to peace and prosperity but especially to virtue is an important theme of the Politics as a whole. But that Aristotle is silent for the time being about the frequency with which actual cities neglect and distort virtue is another sign of the civic-minded character of the beginning of the Politics (cf. 1336b27–33). Elsewhere, for example, Aristotle says that Sparta was almost the only city that made virtue a public concern. As if this remark were not melancholy enough, Aristotle adds that this champion of virtue failed to understand what virtue was (Nic. Ethics 1180a24–26; cf. Politics 1333b5–35, 1334a34–41, 1271a41–b10, 1324b3–9, 1276b16ff.)!

¹⁶ I suspect, then, that Aristotle is trying to lead cities to become what they should be rather than simply defending them for what they are. Indeed, if Aristotle's defense of the city should turn out to be a defense only of cities which meet the standard of bringing men to true virtue (cf. 1280b6–8), then it might be less misleading to call it an attack than a defense. In expressing a similar thought, Jaeger remarks that, while appearing to save it, Plato and Aristotle had actually abandoned the ship of state (Jaeger, Werner W., Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Highet, Gilbert [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968], 1:398–400).Google Scholar While there is much to be said for this view, it does not explain why Aristotle would have created the appearance of supporting actual cities. If they are unworthy of support insofar as their relationship to true virtue is concerned, does Aristotle so simply dismiss their other possible claims on our support?

¹⁷ Although Aristotle considers the idea that the best life is identical for city and man, he eventually seems to drop it; perhaps he does so because the city cannot itself philosophize (1323a14–1325b32; Nic. Ethics 10. 7–8).Google Scholar Perhaps it is in view of this limitation of the city that Aristotle inverts his earlier statement and implies that the city is a mere part of, or precondition for, the extraordinary man (1288a24–28; cf. 1253 a19).

¹⁸ This remark by G. E. R. Lloyd is faithful to the conventional literature on Aristotle's treatment of slavery: “[It] has been cited as a particularly striking example of a great philosopher being misled into taking a temporary, manmade institution for something natural and permanent. And so indeed it is” (Lloyd, , Aristotle, p. 251).Google Scholar See also Havelock, , Liberal Temper, pp. 342–53Google Scholar, and SirChance, Roger J. F., Until Philosophers Are Kings (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1968), pp. 179–80.Google Scholar A more subtle discussion, but one which nonetheless begins by assuming that Aristotle's account of the natural slave is intended to defend conventional slavery is Smith, Nicholas D., “Aristotle's Theory of Natural Slavery,” Phoenix, 37 (06 1983), 109.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁹ Newman seems to see the radical consequences that would follow from the attempt to limit the slavery of Greek antiquity to cases involving natural slaves as defined by Aristotle, but then he minimizes the impact of his observation by characterizing this transformation a “reform” (Newman, , Politics, 1:151–52).Google Scholar It is a further sign of the gap between natural and conventional slavery that Aristotle ceases to speak of “the naturally mastering” and generally refers to the slave master as a “free man” (eleutheros, 1254b28, 34, 1255a2, 35, 40, 1255b5). Since free men must themselves be subject to rule (1255b20), do they embody “the naturally mastering”?

²⁰ 1330a25–33. See also Strauss, , City and Man, p. 23.Google Scholar Is it not t he case that as actual slaves become more and more like natural slaves they become both less useful and fewer?

²¹ This difficulty, and many others as well, might be avoided if we should construe “city” in some very strict sense. We thus might be able to say that every city is indeed natural, but we would also have to admit that such cities are most unlike those whose authority is a center of controversy. The literal teaching could thus be saved, but its bearing on actual politics would be transformed. For passages suggesting a very strict use of the word city, see 1280b6–8, 1279a19–21; for a general reflection which cuts in the opposite direction, see 1275b39–1276a6. See notes 15 and 16.

²² The more common view does not note Aristotle's distinction between gnosis and chresis, so it sees Aristotle as advocating a kind of return to natural modes of acquisition. See Newman, Politics, 1:126–133Google Scholar and Barker, , Political Thought, pp. 375–90.Google Scholar As in the case of slavery, so in this case Aristotle's account of what is natural is often understood to be the result of “ordinary Greek prejudice,” as Ross puts it (Ross, W. D., Aristotle [London: Methuen, 1956], p. 243).Google Scholar

²³ The decline in the immediate importance of nature after book 1 is reflected in the frequency with which words based on the root phyo occur. There are about ninety such words in book 1, slightly more than in the other seven books combined. The closest rival to book 1 on this score is book 7; it has but 36 in over half again as many pages as book 1. Further, a number of the references to nature after book 1 are but reminders of that earlier discussion (1278b19, 33, 34; 1325a29, 30; 1325b10).

²⁴ When criticizing Socrates' demand that the city be one, Aristotle says that the city is a multitude (plethos) in its nature and is hence much less of a unity than is a human being (1261a18–22). Previously, however, and when arguing the city's naturalness, Aristotle had presented the city as a whole (holos) and hence analogous to a human being (1253a19–25). This is another of the details which lead me to see the Politics as beginning with certain happy exaggerations.

²⁵ C. J. Rowe's critique of Jaeger's preoccupation with the development of Aristotle's thought is helpful especially for its observation that Aristotle's careful articulation of the best regime is not accompanied by an attempt to guide actual politics in this direction (Rowe, C. J., “Aims and Methods in Aristotle's Politics,” Classical Quarterly, 27 [NS, 1977], 159–72).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Rowe notes that some have been led to conclude from this that Aristotle is something of a Machiavellian, but Rowe himself hazards no explanation.

²⁶ Oates provides a catalog of different standards used by Aristotle in defense of his various judgments, but he does not offer any reflection on their relationship one to another (Oates, Whitney J., Aristotle and the Problem of Value [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963], pp. 324–31).Google Scholar

²⁷ Callicles not only thinks nature has a revolutionary bearing on politics; he also thinks the revolution it calls for should be attempted (Plato, GorgiasGoogle Scholar 483b4–484c3). Although in a very different way, Hippias also thinks he sees how to bring nature to bear directly on “political” action (Plato, ProtagorasGoogle Scholar 327c6–e2).

²⁸ To note this general difficulty is not to deny that it was perhaps aggravated by the Sophists in particular. Nor is it to deny that strong cities may do harm through their strength just as weak ones suffer it through their weakness. But if good politics is some sort of mean between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy, perhaps it is more opposed to the latter than the former (cf. Nic. Ethics 1109a30–b1).