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Toward A Theory of Congressional-Executive Relations*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Peri E. Arnold  and
L. John Roos
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Extract

The theme of the second Nixon administration appears to be “Save the Presidency.” It is clear that Mr. Nixon views his best defense against critics to be the claim of a constitutional imperative to defend his office. And, he continually reminds us, it is an obligation to defend not only the Presidency, but the strong Presidency.

Mr. Nixon's attachment to the strong Presidency is more than a protective strategy. It grows out of American practice and recent theory. His language and themes are predictable within our political system. In American national politics, substantive issues and questions of institutional roles are continually entangled.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , July 1974 , pp. 410 - 429
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1974

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References

1 Mr. Nixon's question-and-answer session at the Executive Club of Chicago on March 15, 1974, provides an excellent example of the motif of Presidential strength in his recent statements.

2 PresidentLincoln, Abraham, “Message to Special Session of Congress,” 07 4, 1861Google Scholar.

3 See Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr, The Imperial Presidency (Boston, 1973), pp. 64–67Google Scholar, 105–109. Schlesinger stresses informal comity and political understanding as linking the President and Congress at these moments of expansive claims of Presidential power.

4 The major political biographies of Roosevelt are: Freidel, Frank, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 4 vols. (Boston, 1952–1973)Google Scholar; Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr, The Age of Roosevelt, 3 vols. (Boston, 1957)Google Scholar; Burns, James M., Roosevelt, 2 vols. (New York, 1956 & 1971)Google Scholar.

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9 Ibid., pp. 250–251.

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11 Burns, James M., The Deadlock of Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963)Google Scholar.

12 Neustadt's little book is troublesome and, perhaps, deceptive. We want to tread a fine line between oversimplification and all the rich implications we see in Neustadt's analysis. We admit that there are statements here which can be drawn out of the whole context and used to support the alternate theory of the Presidency and Congress we offer below. But we attempt to deal with this book as a whole conception and reconstruct the argument which characterizes the whole work.

13 Neustadt, p. 43.

14 Ibid., p. 174.

15 Burns, p. 338.

16 Ibid., p. 260.

17 Ibid., p. 325.

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26 Ibid., p. 445.

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32 On the politics and practice of PPB see: Schick, Allan, “The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform,” Public Administration Review, XXVI (12, 1966), pp. 243–258CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Merewitz, Leonard and Sosnick, Stephen, The Budget's New Clothes (Chicago, 1971)Google Scholar; Wildavsky, Aaron, “The Political Economy of Efficiency,” Public Administration Review, XXVI (12, 1966), pp. 292–310CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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34 On the “captive” President and Vietnam, see: Halberstam, David, The Best and the Brightest (Greenwich, Conn., 1972)Google Scholar. A consistent, but different, analysis is offered by Janis, Irving, Victims of Groupthink (Boston, 1972), pp. 101–135Google Scholar.

35 On executive reorganization, see: Seidman, Harold, Politics, Position and Power (New York, 1970)Google Scholar; Arnold, Peri E., “Reorganization and Politics,” Public Administration Review, 34 3 (05/06, 1974), pp. 205–211CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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38 In his contribution to this issue, “In the Wake of Watergate: Congressional Reform?”

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44 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1950–1969. Figures for Truman before 1950 were not compiled by CQ. After 1969, rules for recording votes in the House were changed, making totals noncomparable. For 1963 the whole year was attributed to Kennedy.

45 This data is drawn from an examination of the Congressional Record. It is presented in L. John Roos' unpublished master's thesis, University of Chicago, 1969, and Stephen Witham's ongoing master's research at the University of Notre Dame. Our gratitude to Mr. Witham. The bills in 1961–62 were all those receiving a roll call in both houses. In 1947, 1953, 1959, 1962 and 1966, bills were selected at random by Mr. Witham. The other bills come from Roos' thesis.