The author wishes to thank Daniel Garber, Warren Ze'ev Harvey, Ralph Lerner, Daniel Northrop, Nathan Tarcov, and Elhanan Yakira for their many useful comments and suggestions.

1. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (henceforth designated by the letters TTP) in Gebhardt, Carl, ed., Spinoza Opera (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Verlag, 1925), 3: 1–267Google Scholar. TTP references are given according to chapter number, Latin page. I have also consulted A Theological-Political Treatise and a Political Treatise, trans. Elwes, Robert H. M. (1883; New York: Dover, 1951)Google Scholar. I have also benefitted from Edwin Curley's translation of the TTP (forthcoming).

2. Spinoza offers two other reasons for avoiding an analysis of the New Testament: first, other men have already performed the task, and second, the original Hebrew texts of the New Testament have been lost. Both of these reasons are unconvincing. The first is merely a cover for the revolutionary novelty of Spinoza's own remarks on the New Testament while the second, discussed below, would render hopeless any efforts (including Spinoza's) to uncover the true meaning of the New Testament.

3. See Introduction to Elwes's, translation of A Theological-Political Treatise, p. xi.Google Scholar

4. Spinoza has already shown in chapter 6 of the TTP how the Hebrew manner of speaking exaggerates natural events to make them appear miraculous encourages theologians to study Hebrew and thereby understand the Gospel's miraculous reports as pious exaggerations. However, he prudently avoids initiating such a critique himself.

5. Pollock, Frederick, for instance, claims that the TTP is a “work of conciliation” which attempts to appeal to Christians despite its heterodoxy in Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul and Co., 1880), pp. 336ffGoogle Scholar. Similarly, Leo Strauss argues that Spinoza favored Christianity in the TTP because, paradoxically, he thought that it would lead ultimately to the advent of a liberal society and therewith “the liberation of the Jews” (Spinoza's Critique of Religion [New York: Schocken Books, 1965], p. 21)Google Scholar. More recently, Steven Smith has argued that Spinoza's positive presentation of Christianity “was dictated not by the methods of historical philology but by the need to gain genuine support for his universal religion of tolerance” (Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997], p. 105)Google Scholar. Such judgments have been based largely on internal evidence from the TTP itself; however, J. Samuel Preus has attempted in a recent series of articles to show that Spinoza's TTP must be understood as part of the larger seventeenth-century theological debate among Christians. See “Part III: The Hidden Dialogue in Spinoza's Tractatus,” Religion 28 (1998): 111–124CrossRefGoogle Scholar and “A Hidden Opponent in Spinoza's Tractatus,” Harvard Theological Review 88 (1995): 361–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Even scholars who deny that Spinoza's presentation of Christianity is more favorable than his presentation of Judaism admit that Spinoza hoped to establish a novel theology among Christians in the TTP. See, for instance, Donagan, Alan, Spinoza (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988): pp.13–32,180–83Google Scholar and Harris, Errol, Is There an Esoteric Doctrine in The TTP? (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978)Google Scholar.

6. For more on Spinoza's rhetorical strategy in the TTP, see my “Politics and Rhetoric: The Intended Audience of Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,” Review of Metaphysics 52 (1999): 897–924Google Scholar.

7. For more on the religious characteristics of Spinoza's Christian audience, see Preus, , Harvard Theological Review 88 (1995): 361–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8. See TTP, I, 15Google Scholar. For an analysis of “certo cognito” see Donagan's, Alan “Spinoza's Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Garrett, Don (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 357,360ffGoogle Scholar.

9. Similarly, Maimonides defines prophecy as “an overflow overflowing from God” in The Guide of the Perplexed, 2 vols., trans. Pines, Shlomo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963): 2: 36Google Scholar. However, he points out at TTP, I,65Google Scholar, that when the Bible says “God spoke” it means “the prophet understood.” For Maimonides, revelation is an act of intellectual apprehension rather than a supernatural communication.

10. Ethica (henceforth designated by the letter E) in Gebhardt, Carl, ed., Spinoza Opera (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Verlag, 1925), IIIGoogle Scholar, preface. E references are given according to chapter number, Latin page. Cf. Strauss, Leo, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 171–72Google Scholar.

11. TTP, I,15Google Scholar. Later he summarizes his treatment of prophecy as follows: “we showed that the prophets had only a special power to imagine things, not a special power to understand them, that God did not reveal to them any secrets of philosophy but only the simplest matters, and that He accommodated Himself to their previous opinions” (TTP, XIII, 167Google Scholar).

12. The Political Treatise (henceforth PT) can be found in Gebhardt, , Spinoza Opera, 3: 271–360Google Scholar.

13. For an account of the radically heretical implications of Spinoza's critique, particularly the denial of the supernatural, see Bayle, Pierre, “Spinoza,” in Historical and Critical Dictionary trans. Richard Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 288–338Google Scholar.

14. If prophets were also skilled politicians, then it is likely that they too would appear impious to theologians. Obviously, theologians venerate the prophets, but do so at the cost of ignoring the political circumstances which determine the prophets' messages.

15. Thus, insofar as the Bible records Moses' deeds accurately, it is a storehouse of useful political experience rather than theological insight. Indeed, in chapters 17–19, Spinoza demonstrates this claim by mining the Hebrew Bible for useful political advice. Spinoza also interprets other prophets, such as Ezekial and Jeremiah, in light of their political circumstances (cf. TTP, III, 55ffGoogle Scholar.) In addition, Spinoza offers examples of prophets who are unwise political leaders. Not surprisingly, they resemble the theologians whom Spinoza attacks in terms of their hostility to political leaders who neglect religious duty.

16. See, for example, his account of the Ottoman Empire, in which theologians succeed so well at confusing “everyone's judgement” that no one in the regime is able to distinguish truth from error (TTP, preface, 7).

17. Later, when contrasting Moses with Jesus in the same chapter, Spinoza claims that “the old law was imparted by an angel, but not by God immediately. So if Moses spoke to God face to face as a man speaks with his friend (i.e., by means of their two bodies), Christ communicated with God mind to mind” (TTP, I, 21Google Scholar).Here, Spinoza does interpret the voice of God metaphorically as belonging to an angel. See also Maimonides, , Guide, 2:39Google Scholar.

18. Furthermore, we would expect Spinoza to argue here for the uniqueness of Jesus instead of Moses' as he does later on. Why should he distinguish Moses from all the prophets if he intends to distinguish Jesus from Moses?

19. The Hebrew Bible omits the histories of non-Jewish prophets because “the Hebrews were concerned to write only of their own affairs and not of other nations” (TTP, III, 51Google Scholar). Since the Hebrew Bible is not a universal history of mankind but an account of the Hebrew nation, it focuses its attention on the relationship between God and the Israelites.

20. “To the first Jews, religion was imparted in writing as a law, because at that time they were regarded as infants” (TTP, XII, 158–59Google Scholar; see also VII, 101).

21. Cf. Matt. 3: 7, Luke 18:9ff., etc. Spinoza asserts that Jesus was so repulsed by the teachings of the Pharisees that his “sole care” was to refute their identification of the Mosaic Law with true blessedness (cf. TTP, V, 71Google Scholar).

22. “Moses, more than anyone else, had gotten control of the judgment of his people, not by deception but by a divine virtue, with the result that he was believed to be divine and to speak and act in everything with divine inspiration” (TTP, XX, 239Google Scholar).

23. In light of this notion of chosenness, Spinoza's comment at the end of chapter three—“If the foundations of their religion did not effeminate their hearts, I would absolutely believe that some day, given the opportunity, they will set up their state again, and God will choose them anew, so changeable are human affairs”—which was held by early Zionist thinkers to be prophetic, proves to have the opposite meaning. To “choose the Jews anew” means that they reestablish their political nation. But this can only be accomplished by surrendering their antiquated religious laws. Thus, Spinoza ironically suggests that the Jews must surrender their religion if they want to be chosen again. For more on the relation between Spinoza and Zionism see Levy, Ze'evBaruch or Benedict: On Some Jewish Aspects of Spinoza's Philosophy. (New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 1989), pp. 74ffGoogle Scholar.

24. Spinoza restates this point in chapter twelve as follows: “It is one thing to understand Scripture and the mind of the prophets, and another to understand the Mind of God, i.e., the truth of the matter itself. This follows from what we showed in chapter two about the prophets” (TTP, XII, 163Google Scholar).

25. The way in which a prophet imagines God depends on a number of factors such as the prophet's physical temperament, the strength of his imagination, and his previously held opinions. See also: “God accommodated himself to the imaginations and preconceived opinions of the prophets, and the faithful have cultivated different opinions about God” (TTP, XIII, 171Google Scholar).

26. Moses' view of God is ultimately inadequate for political life as well. This can be seen by comparing Spinoza's presentation of Moses' theology (TTP, II, 38Google Scholar) with Spinoza's tenets of universal faith (chapter 15). Most notably, Moses did not perceive God's omniscience, a necessary condition for a God whom the multitude fear.

27. See Harvey, W. Z., “A Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 171CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28. I owe this insight to Daniel Garber of the University of Chicago. Professor Garber also points out that the idea of a completely rational individual is itself an inadequate idea (see E, IV, 68).

29. See Smith, Steven, “Spinoza's Paradox: Judaism and the Construction of Liberal Identity in the TTP,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 4 (1994): 217ffGoogle Scholar.

30. Edwin Curley offers a plausible interpretation of these passages that does not accept the literal meaning as the only meaning of this text: “I take his position to be that it is not necessary for salvation to know Christ, but only to know God's eternal wisdom, which may have manifested itself most clearly in Jesus, but which has manifested itself in all things” (see Curley's forthcoming translation of the TTP). Indeed a number of Spinoza's letters seem to support this view (see letter #71, 73, 75, 78). Nevertheless, Spinoza explicitly says that Jesus is the way to salvation, and we must see what he intends by this in the TTP, particularly for readers who are unfamiliar with the discussion of salvation in the Ethics.

31. Despite the fact that Spinoza seems to be advancing a position acceptable to orthodox Christianity, he still attacks theologians here for their claims about Christ. Though he begins from orthodox Christian dogma, his position is too radical and innovative to furnish the grounds for any lasting reconciliation with orthodox theologians.

32. Cf. TTP, V, 69ffGoogle Scholar. and XII, 163. The fact that Jesus' teaching is for Spinoza as commonplace as the teachings of the other prophets demonstrates the extent to which he must revise that teaching in order to preserve a religion based on Jesus' authority.

33. As the opening sentence of the TTP suggests, men will always be in “the grip of superstition.”

34. See TTP, XIV, 178Google Scholar. Also see: “If men did not have this hope and fear, but believed instead that minds die with the body, and that the wretched, exhausted with the burden of morality, cannot look forward to a life to come, they would return to their natural disposition, and would prefer to govern all their actions according to lust and to obey fortune rather than themselves” (E, V, 41s).

35. Shlomo Pines goes further, claiming that for Spinoza all religions which contain laws enslave the multitude: “Spinoza's sharpest criticism is undoubtedly directed against the Mosaic law, but it is equally valid if directed against all religious systems of legislation which draw their authority from a God conceived as a ruler and lawgiver. All such systems contain a series of commandments and prohibitions and are founded upon the (inadequate) concepts of good and evil. They lead men into bondage and they keep him there” (“On Spinoza's Conception of Human Freedom and Good & Evil,” in Spinoza: His Thought and Work, ed. , Rotenstreich and , Schneider. [Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1983”, pp. 154–55)Google Scholar.

36. Spinoza omits the phrase “in the sight of God” when paraphrasing this passage (see TTP, IV, 59Google Scholar). Apparently, obedience to the law in order to please God is akin to slavery. Similarly, he claims that Jesus “was sent, not to preserve the state and institute laws, but only to teach the universal law” (TTP, V, 70–71Google Scholar).

37. Jesus taught universal truths not contingent on historical narratives and free of ceremonies aimed at enslaving men and legislators, who attempted to control unruly mobs with specific ceremonies and myths (cf. TTP, IV, 61–62Google Scholar). In this way, Spinoza diminishes the importance of ceremonies and expunges superstitious meaning from them.

38. According to Jesus and the Gospels, the path to true blessedness and salvation cannot be legislated by a statesman, even the greatest prophet. At best, “the whole law of Moses” succeeded in securing only “the conveniences of the body,” an end to which every wise human law is aimed (TTP, V, 76Google Scholar). Jesus' teaching transcends politics altogether and consequently, the universal divine law can have little impact on those laws prescribed to homo carnalis.

39. In light of this fact, Spinoza argues in chapter 19 that religious duty “becomes impious if some harm to the state as a whole should follow from it” (TTP, XIX, 232Google Scholar).

40. Only the rational few recognize the “divine law” and obey it freely because it aims at the greatest good (cf TTP, IV, 60Google Scholar).

41. Cf TTP, IV, 62Google Scholar. Spinoza emphasizes the importance of faith which “cannot give us the knowledge and love of God…[but] is very useful with a view to life in the world. For the more we have observed and the better we know the character and circumstances of men…the better will we be able to live more cautiously among them and accommodate our lives to their disposition as much as reason suggests.”

42. The TTP does not attempt to provide “a complete Ethics” because the multitude as well as most theologians would not find such a teaching compelling. Rather than transform the multitude into philosophers, Spinoza hopes to teach them a number of sub-rational (but not irrational) lessons which he calls “the divine law in general.” David Lachterman offers an interesting alternative explanation of the treatment of law in the TTP. According to Lachterman, the TTP attempts to retranslate the scientific concept of law back into the human domain so that the “pre-scientific understanding of law, legislation, legislators, obedience and disobedience can all be intelligently derived” (“Laying Down the Law: The Theological-Political Matrix of Spinoza's Physics,” in Leo Strauss's Thought: Toward A Critical Engagement, ed. Udoff, Alan [Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991] p. 132)Google Scholar.

43. “Everyone, Jew and Gentile alike, has always been the same; in every age virtue has been extremely rare” (TTP, XII, 160Google Scholar). Because virtue is so rare, Spinoza does not make the inculcation of virtue a primary goal of his interpretation of Scripture; instead, he aims at the more modest goal of instilling obedience to the state.

44. See for example: “no social order can subsist without dominion and force, and hence, laws which restrain men's immoderate desires and unchecked impulses” (TTP, V, 74Google Scholar.)

45. See Gilden, Hilail, “Spinoza and the Political Problem,” in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Grene, Marjorie (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 377–87Google Scholar.

46. As we have seen, Spinoza's theology proves that Mosaic theocracy is obsolete and that any attempt to coerce religious belief contradicts the teachings of Jesus; therefore, Spinoza endorses democracy as the best regime (cf. TTP, XVI, 195Google Scholar). Spinoza also argues that the failure of Maimonides' religious reform demonstrates that men cannot discern wisdom from superstition, and consequently, they resent the authority of philosophers (cf. TTP, VII, 114Google Scholar). See my “The Dual Teachings of Scripture: Spinoza's Solution to the Quarrel between Reason and Revelation,” Archivfür Geshichte Der Philosophie (forthcoming).

47. Lewis Feuer, for instance, attempts to establish Spinoza as one of the founders of modem liberalism, by focusing primarily on the advocacy of democracy in the TTP. But Feuer cannot account for the host of apparently authoritarian assertions both in the TTP and in the entire Spinoza corpus. Ultimately, he concludes that Spinoza had not adequately clarified his own thought and remained torn between a personal preference for liberalism and a hard-nosed recognition of the need for authority: “The democratic aspiration and the trauma of the mob struggled within his thought. The political thinker found himself divided within as did the philosopher, meditating on man and the universe. Not all the resources of the geometrical method could resolve the conflict within himself.” Feuer conjectures that after writing the TTP, Spinoza changed his mind about democracy as he gradually became aware of the political instability of the people. Thus for Feuer, the discrepancies between the PT and the TTP are a result of Spinoza's incoherent political thought. See Feuer, , Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), p. 197Google Scholar, see also chaps. 4–5.

48. See Kolakowski's, Leszek “The Two Eyes of Spinoza,” in Grene, Spinoza, pp. 279–94Google Scholar.

49. This nonphilosophic freedom is dedicated to a noble end in its own right (cf. E, IV, 73). Thus, Spinoza does not speak simply ironically when he relates the freedom of a philosopher to that of the multitude in a democracy (see TTP XVI, 194–95,199Google Scholar).

50. See also TTP, XIII, 167Google Scholar.

51. “Although faith in historical narratives cannot give us the knowledge and love of God, we do not deny that reading them is very useful in relation to civil life”(TTP,IV,61Google Scholar).

52. Spinoza returns to this issue in chapter 14 of the TTP where he defines the necessary dogmas of universal religion. In this way, Spinoza limits freedom of opinion among the multitude without harming the free inquiry of science and philosophy.