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² Ibid.Ping-ti, Ho, “Salient Aspects of China's Heritage,”Google Scholar in Ping-ti, Ho and Tsou, Tang, China in Crisis (Chicago, 1968), I, book I, 18–19.Google Scholar

³ Oksenberg, Michael, “Comments,”Google Scholaribid., book 2, 499–500.

⁴ Khrushchev, Nikita S., “Stalin and the Cult of the Individual,”Google Scholar in Hendel, Samuel, The Soviet Crucible (second edition, Princeton, 1963), pp. 383–415Google Scholar. Also, “‘Wu-ch'i-i Kung-ch'eng’ Chi-yao” (571 Engineering Outline), Chungkung Yen-chiu (Studies in Chinese Communism), 07, 1972, p. 102Google Scholar. This document purports to be a plan for a coup d'état drawn up by Lin Li-kuo. the son of Lin Piao. The document will be cited as “Outline.” A summary of this document and of other related documents appears in the Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News: CDN) (Taipei), international edition, 04 13, 1973, p. 1Google Scholar. References to these will be cited as “Secret Documents.”

⁵ Schapiro, Leonard and Lewis, John W., “The Role of the Monolithic Party Under the Totalitarian Leader,”Google Scholar in Lewis, , Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (Cambridge [Eng.], 1970), pp. 114–145Google Scholar; Nyomarkay, Joseph, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party (Minneapolis, 1967).Google Scholar

⁶ Johnson, Chalmers, “The Changing Nature and Locus of Authority in Communist China,” in Lindbeck, John, China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle, 1971), pp. 64–70.Google Scholar

⁷ In “Liquidate the Menshevist Ideology Within the Party,” written in 1943, Liu criticizes the so-called “Bolshevik” faction of the CPC, a group of students trained in the Soviet Union, as dogmatists who have a good knowledge of Marxist texts and a bookish familiarity with foreign experiences, but know nothing about conditions in China. The CPC does not need these men, since it has “produced its own great leader, Comrade Mao Tse-tung,” “a great and resolute revolutionary.” This document is reproduced as an appendix to the English translation of Liu, 's On Inner-Party Struggle (Peking, 1951), pp. 71–82.Google Scholar

⁸ Preamble to 1945 constitution; appendix to Shao-ch'i's, LiuLun Tang (On the Party) (Peking, 1952).Google Scholar

⁹ Ibid., pp. 12–13.

¹⁰ Shao-ch'i, Liu, Lun Kung-ch'an-tang-yuan Hsiu-yang (The Self-Cultivation of a Communist Party Member) (n.p., 1947), p. 11.Google Scholar

¹¹ The connotations were somewhat different, of course, when the essay was republished in 1962.

¹² Cf. Myers, James T., “The Political Dynamics of the Cult of Mao,”Google Scholar in Wei, Yung, Communist China: A System-Functional Reader (Columbus, 1972), p. 81.Google Scholar

¹³ Shao-ch'i, Liu, Lun Tang, p. 14.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily: PD), 04 12, 1967, p. 2.Google Scholar

¹⁵ PD, 02 18, 1954, p. 1.Google Scholar

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¹⁷ Hsiao-p'ing, Teng, in PHB, 1957, p. 32.Google Scholar

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²² See his speech to the second session of the Eighth National Congress, PD, 05 27, 1958, pp. 1–3.Google Scholar

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²⁴ PD, 10 1, 1958, p. 10Google Scholar. See also Fokkema, D. W., Literary Doctrine in China and Soviet Influence, 1956–1960 (The Hague, 1965), p. 203CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a discussion of Mao as superman in the poetry of the early Leap.

²⁵ Schram, Stuart, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York; revised and enlarged edition, 1969), introduction.Google Scholar

²⁶ Nyomarkay, , op. cit.Google Scholar, passim. For an example of the operation of this principle within the Kuomintang, see Tuan-sheng, Ghien, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 128–132.Google Scholar

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³⁴ Juan-hung, Lo, in Kung-tso T'ung-hsun (Work Bulletins: WB), 8 (02 6, 1961), pp. 11–19.Google Scholar

³⁵ Chien-ying, Yeh, WB, 26 (07 13, 1961), p. 2.Google Scholar

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³⁷ See Solomon, Richard, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley, 1971), p. 440.Google Scholar

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³⁹ For example, Jen-chung, Wang, PD (07 25, 1965), p. 5.Google Scholar

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⁴³ For the “conservativization” of the Inner Court, see Wen-yuan, Yao, PD (09 8, 1967), p. 1Google Scholar and (August 26, 1968), pp. 1–2.

⁴⁴ For a study of this incident, with reproductions of documents and speeches, see Mo, Hsuan, “Yang-fei Ch'eng-wu Shih-chien Mu-ch'ien Mu-hou,” (Front-stage and Back-stage Aspects of the Bandit Yang Ch'eng-wu Incident), Fei-Ch'ing Yen-Chiu (Bandit Affairs) (08, 1968), pp. 53–56.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ RF, 10 (09 19, 1970), p. 6Google Scholar. Lin Piao rarely spoke of Marx or Lenin. He usually restricted himself to Mao.

⁴⁶ RF, 2 (02 1, 1971), pp. 5–7.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ RF, 12 (11 17, 1970), p. 12Google Scholar; RF, 5 (05 1, 1971), p. 35.Google Scholar

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⁴⁹ RF, 7–8 (07 1, 1971), p. 18.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ These include “Outline” and “Secret Documents,” loc. cit. The other document used here purports to be excerpts of speeches delivered by Mao, edited by the (Communist) “Party Center,” at various places, during the month prior to Lin's demise. CDN (08 10, 1972)Google Scholar, international edition, p. 1. There is at least one more document, an alleged letter by Mao to Chiang Ch'ing, supposedly written in the summer of 1966, in which Mao expresses a certain uneasiness about Lin Piao. CDN (11 4, 1972), p. 1.Google Scholar

⁵¹ “Speeches.”

⁵² For a copy of this draft, see CDN (11 5, 1970), p. 2.Google Scholar

⁵³ “Speeches.”

⁵⁴ “Secret Documents.” One of these is a “confession” by a friend of Lin Li-kuo who was involved in designing the plot. Was he an agent provocateur?

⁵⁵ PD (09 12, 1971), p. 1.Google Scholar

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⁵⁷ Ibid., 101–102.

⁵⁸ “Speeches,” loc. cit.

⁵⁹ PD (01 12, 1971), pp. 1, 3Google Scholar. “Collective leadership” as a term has certain implications against the cult of Mao, but at the local level also serves as a civilian check against the military, which (at least then) virtually monopolized the leading positions.

⁶⁰ PD (10 20, 1971), p. 1 and (December 1, 1971), p. 1.Google Scholar

⁶¹ PD (10 28, 1971), p. 1.Google Scholar

⁶² Che, Wang, op. cit.Google Scholar There are further wrinkles to this line. In June, Red Flag (No. 6) published a criticism of the Liu-type swindler's notion that “history is made jointly by heroes and slaves.” The article, however, in fact seems to argue for this view. “Heroes are bom of the masses” and are good if they “represent the interests of the revolutionary classes and the progressive forces.” A few Chinese heroes are mentioned. In July an expanded version was published in English. This English version discusses Robespierre. Robespierre did a good job for a while. “But, after all, Robespierre was a bourgeois revolutionary.” He began to ignore the masses, and “he himself was finally sent to the guillotine by the reactionary forces.”

Foreign journalists hold, plausibly, I think, that Robespierre here means Lin Piao. The implications are fascinating. Lin Piao, it seems, did a good job for a while, but after all he was nothing but a bourgeois revolutionary and the reactionaries cut him down. Is reaction now in the saddle in China, and the revolution in Thermidor? This article, especially in its English version, is probably an Inner-Court attack on Chou En-lai. See Chih-sung, Tien “The Masses Are the Makers of History,” Peking Review, 29 (07 21, 1972), 7–11.Google Scholar

⁶³ Nathan, Andrew J., “Models of Conflict in Chinese Politics.” Problems of Communism (05–06, 1972), p. 82.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Mao, 's Speeches, loc. cit.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Cohen, Jerome A., “Comments,”Google Scholar in Ho, and Tsou, , op. cit., p. 364.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Solomon, , op. cit., pp. 523–524.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ “Slowly everything begins to come apart.” I found this felicitous term in Pike, Douglas, “North Vietnam in 1971,” Asian Survey, XII, No. 1 (01, 1972), 22.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1967)Google Scholar; Pye, Lucian, Warlord Politics (New York, 1971)Google Scholar; Henderson, Gregory, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, 1968).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ This would mean, of course, the realization of what Mao used to claim were his worst fears, that China would “change color.” The Communists in China can take credit for many things, but few of their accomplishments would seem to be a direct result of the totalitarian nature of the regime, and in many cases the accomplishments may have come about despite totalitarianism.

Mao's fear of “revisionism” (remembering all the caveats discussed above concerning attributing anything to Mao) led him to move away from any attempt to insure social harmony, and to stress “struggle” instead. There is something compelling in Mao's view of progress as resulting from ceaseless struggle, although this struggle should perhaps be balanced by some Confucian concepts of harmony. But in the totalitarian context this “struggle” is a travesty. It involves, among the “masses,” the mobilization of the force of the state and of manipulated public opinion against persons both unable to defend themselves or threaten others; and among the Party members it involves the heaping of calumny upon men rendered helpless, whose crime was to have had the wrong affiliations or simply to have been available for scapegoating. A looser type of regime might allow a more meaningful kind of “struggle.”

This sort of regime, of course, would hardly lead to the “liberation of mankind.” But I doubt the present system will either, and perhaps Mao Tse-tung himself doubts it: “With the advent of communism will there be no more struggle? I don't believe it. With the advent of communism there will still be the struggle between old and new, between truth and error. Ten thousand years hence error will still be no good, and will not be able to stand.” (“Mao's Speeches”) A people that has now undergone more than a century of internal turmoil and external aggression may find such a vision less than Utopian, and may wonder whether this is the sort of thing worth striving for.