¹ James Townsend relates the crisis of leadership in Communist China to the more general consideration of other single-party systems. He cites the stress that is engendered as leaders try to perpetuate party rule under conditions different from those during the initial acquisition of power, as well as the cumulative effects of two decades of effort to expand control over Chinese society. See his “Intraparty Conflict in China: Disintegration in an Established One-Party System,” in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society, edited by Huntington, Samuel B. and Moore, Clement C. (New York, 1970), p. 284Google Scholar. The thesis of the present article does not conflict with Townsend's analysis, but seeks to consider the extent of actual cohension in Chinese society by examining the operational images of the Party leadership and the implications of policy in realizing those images.

² Johnson, Chalmers notes that “Not a single Communist party has come to power under circumstances of the sort that Marx identified as propitious for revolutions.” Change in Communist Systems (Stanford, 1970), p. 5Google Scholar. Perhaps it is this dissonance between objective reality and ideological predictions that is partially responsible for the strident and self-conscious polemical content of postrevolutionary nation-building in Communist countries. The anomaly of Marxist formulations of legitimacy and the absence of appropriate conditions that reinforce those expectations that have been generated by ideology, can be resolved only by transforming conditions to match the broad predictive content of Marxism. Fundamental alteration of ideology is revisionism and thus unacceptable.

³ Lyman Van Slyke's study of the united front strategy in China analyzes the techniques used by the Communists in maintaining the ideological and organizational integrity of the Party throughout its modifications of party line, and the way in which the idea of a broad alliance in China became a central element in other areas of policy orientation after the seizure of power. Enemies and Friends (Stanford, 1967)Google Scholar.

⁴ From the Common Program of the CPPCC, September 29, 1949.

⁵ The notion of the “mass line” principle in leadership can be interpreted as the operational modification of Party dictatorship. The avoidance of “commandism” and emphasis on “style of work” that stressed “comradely relationships” between Party cadres and the population were organizational imperatives that were cultivated to maintain the support of the people. See Lewis, John W., “The Leadership Doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party: The Lesson of the People's Commune,” Asian Surney, 10, 1963Google Scholar.

⁶ In 1929, for example, military expenditures comprised 37.8% of the national budget. The China Year Book (Tientsin) 1929–1930, p. 643Google Scholar.

⁷ In 1930, for example, the Central Government of China had a total, debt of $710,600,000 (American dollars), including obligations such as the Japanese indemnity loans of 1895, the Boxer indemnities of 1902, and other equally nonproductive liabilities. Remer, C. F., Foreign Investments in China (New York, 1933), p. 133Google Scholar. China's total indebtedness in 1930 was estimated at over U.S. $3 billion.

⁸ “Marriage in Communist China,” Current Background, No. 136.

⁹ See Chou En-lai's report at the meeting of the National Committee of the CPPCC, September 30, 1950. “Fight for the Consolidation and Development of the Chinese People's Victory,” Current Background, No. 12.

¹⁰ “Report on Financial and Economic Achievements during the Past Year,” by Ch'en Yün. October 5, 1950. CB 13.

¹¹ “Develop the Spirit of Patriotism and Overcome Capitalistic Mentality,” by Hsü Ti-hsin. September 21, 1951. Translated in CB 127.

¹² “Annual Report of the All-China Federation of Labor” Chung-Kuo Kung-Jen (May 15, 1950), in CB 24.

¹³ “Greet the Unprecedented Land Reform Movement in New Liberated Areas,” New Observer (Peking) 12 10, 1950Google Scholar, in CB 63.

¹⁴ See Mao Tse-tung's report to the Central Committee of the CCP, June 6, 1950. CB 1.

¹⁵ Chu Teh speech in commemoration of the 24th Anniversary of the Founding of the PLA. New China News Agency, July 31, 1951.

¹⁶ “Twenty-five years of the Chinese People's Liberation Army,” by Teh, Chu in Pravda, translated in NCNA, 08 1, 1952Google Scholar.

¹⁷ “The armed forces should act both as the organizer and publicizer of party policy. The military struggles of the armed forces should accordingly be well coordinated with the struggles of the people's masses …” Yi, Chen, “Learn from the Marxist-Leninist Creative Style of Work of Chairman Mao,” NCNA 07 31, 1951Google Scholar.

¹⁸ “General Report on the National Conference of Combat Heroes,” NCNA, December 20, 1951.

¹⁹ Goldman's, MerleLiterary Dissent in Communist China (Cambridge, 1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar examines the many dimensions of the relationship between the Party and literary intellectuals. For the Leftist writers of China a moral and political dilemma was posed by the obvious need for national solidarity and the professional commitment to writing artistic truth even when it might be critical of the Communist Party.

²⁰ “Cultural and Educational Work in Shanghai,” October 16, 1950, CB 28.

²¹ See the materials in CB 103, “Minority Groups in Kwangtung Province.”

²² En-lai, Chou, “Political Report to the Third Session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC,” 10 23, 1951, NCNA, 11 2, 1951Google Scholar.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ R. William Liddle has examined the way that primordial and subnational loyalties may reinforce positive orientation to the nation-state, rather than being in contradiction to the demands of national integration. See his Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration (New Haven, 1970)Google Scholar, on the case of Indonesia. In place of primordial loyalties, the Chinese leadership was faced with a situation of extended social fragmentation in 1949. The task was to create functional groupings as mediators between state and citizen that could facilitate economic and political reconstruction.

²⁵ “Strengthen and Develop Further the People's Democratic Dictatorship,” May 29, 1951.

²⁶ “An Explanation of the Election Law,” by Hsiao-p'ing, Teng, CB 234 (03 6, 1953)Google Scholar.

²⁷ “Directives on Elections and National Census in Communist China,” CB 241 (May 5, 1953).

²⁸ “Composition of the First National People's Congress,” CB 290 (September 5, 1954).

²⁹ JMJP editorial: “To Practice the System of People's Congresses Elected through Universal Franchise.” 01 15, 1953Google Scholar.