1. Herken, Gregg, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York: Knopf, 1980).Google Scholar

2. On the denial-punishment distinction see Mearsheimer, John, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983)Google Scholar, and for the defenseretaliation distinction see Snyder, Glenn, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. The Germans do not, of course, go nearly so far as do the French bishops in their letter, who treat deterrence as so imperative that they endorse their government's explicitly counter-city targeting policy. The letters are appropriately titled, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response (American), Out of Justice, Peace (German), and Winning the Peace (French).

4. They seem to differ in some of their estimates of probabilities; e.g., the Germans may be somewhat more sanguine about the likelihood that deterrence (perhaps even a “bluff” deterrent, see below) will work, and less skeptical than the Americans (and that is very skeptical) that escalation could be controlled if deterrence should fail. I believe their policy recommendations reflect these differences.

5. Some still do not choose to see this, most recently Winters, Francis X., “Bishops and Scholars: The Peace Pastoral Under Siege,” Review of Politics 48, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 31–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I believe I conclusively refute him in “Reply to Winters,” Review of Politics 48, no. 3 (Summer 1986): 456–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The draft statement of the American bishops’ 1988 retrospective on developments since the pastoral makes it clear that my interpretation is correct.

6. Hehir's reasons that a bluff deterrent would not be acceptable were: (a) democratic governments must be candid with their citizens, (b) it would be inconsistent with the promises given in international alliance relationships, (c) expectations and predelegations in the chain of command would be inconsistent with withholding use under an intended mere bluff, (d) if the reasoning supporting “bluff only” were understood by the adversary the threat would have no deterrence credibility. Hence “threat without use” for nuclear deterrence would imply morally questionable behavior (a & b), and either would in execution result in immoral acts (c) or simply would not work (d). Hehir's comments were made at a conference held in Bonn, Germany, in September 1987. Note that Hehir has shifted from his earlier espousal of a bluff deterrent, as in his contribution to Gessert, Robert A. and Hehir, J. Bryan, The New Nuclear Debate (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1976).Google Scholar

7. For a rigorous demolition of invasion and occupation myths see Shepherd, William G., The Ultimate Deterrent: Inherent Superpower Security under Stable Competition (New York: Pracger, 1986).Google Scholar

8. This research is described in much more detail in Huth, Paul and Russett, Bruce, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation,” International Studies Quarter 32, no. 14 (03 1988): 29–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9. On the Cuban crisis, see Bundy, McGeorge, “The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy,” in The Nuclear Crisis Reader, ed. Prins, Gwyn (New York: Vintage, 1984).Google Scholar For relatively systematic examination of many cases which support this position see Kugler, Jacek, “Terror without Deterrence: Reassessing the Role of Nuclear Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 3 (09, 1984) 470–506CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Blechman, Barry and Kaplan, Stephen S., Force without War: Unite Stales Military Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D. C: Brookings Institution, 1978).Google Scholar Contrary conclusions are suggested by Weede, Erich, “Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance,” Jouraal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 2 (06 1983) 231–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Both the Kugler and Weede studies, however, suffer from rules for including and excluding cases that make their conclusions somewhat suspect; I referred to the problems with the Weede analysis in an “Editorial Comment” immediately following his article.

10. For instance, the Argentine government seems never to have considered that Britain might use its nuclear weapons in the Falkland-Malvinas war. Though common in the first two decades of the cold war, no overt nuclear threats, for coercion or deterrence, have been made since 1980. See Betts, Richard, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D. C.: Brookings, 1987)Google Scholar, and Halperin, Morton, Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987).Google Scholar

11. See Mccgwire, Michael, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D. C.: Brookings, 1987).Google Scholar

12. See paragraph 150, “We do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare… can be morally justified.”

13. Schelling, Thomas C., Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 99.Google Scholar

14. See Bracken, Paul, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983)Google Scholar, chap. 5, and Charles, Daniel, Nuclear Planning in NATO (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987).Google Scholar

15. Turner, Stansfield, “Reagan Is Right: No ICBMs Means No First Strike,” Washington Post, 10 26, 1986, pp. B1–2.Google Scholar

16. I am not referring here to the form of SDI that would provide only a limited point defense for hardened targets such as nuclear retaliatory forces. If cost-effective, such a limited capability would be strategically stabilizing. While technically it could “limit damage” to those retaliatory forces, it would not be damage-limiting in the more common sense of able to preserve the nation's basic social, economic, and political structure.

17. For an excellent exposition on notions of targeting elites and protracted war-fighting see Herken, Greg, Counsels of War (New York: Knopf, 1985).Google Scholar

18. “Nuclear Decapitation,” Foreign Policy, 45 (Winter 1981–1982): 22–23.Google Scholar

19. Russett, Bruce, Power and Community in World Politics (New York: Freeman, 1974), chap. 14.Google Scholar

20. Zuckerman, Solly, Nuclear Illusion and Reality (New York: Vintage, 1982).Google Scholar

21. See Russett, , The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence, the Arms Race, and Arms Control (New York: Freeman, 1983)Google Scholar, chap. 6, and “Sensible Deterrence as Arms Control,” in American Security in a Changing World, ed. Goldman, Joseph Richard (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1987).Google Scholar

22. Soviet troops on the Chinese border — in many cases not morally culpable for their position, not a direct threat to the United States, and perhaps not yet engaged in any hostile action toward China — would probably constitute a licit target, but nonetheless a regrettable one.

23. See Nye, Joseph S. Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986), chap. 7.Google Scholar