1 “Problems in Germany Reflect World Issues,” New York Times, March 17, 1946.Google Scholar

2 Elimination of German Resources for War. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Part 9, December 20, 1945, p. 1128.

3 (New York, 1945), pp. xi–xiii.

4 For the political background of the final adoption of these policies, see Bess, Demaree. “How We Botched the German Occupation,” The Saturday Evening Post, 01 26, 1946.Google Scholar A vigorous treatment of this subject from the point of view of an insider was given by Mr. Laird Bell, formerly Deputy Director of the Economic Division of the Office of Military Government, in his talk before The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, entitled “Policy over Berlin.” (Lecture Reporting Service, mimeographed.)

5 The Tyrants' War and the Peoples' Peace (Chicago, 1944), p. 181.Google Scholar

6 The Treasury Department was, of course, properly interested in safeguarding American financial interests in the new reparations settlement, but if it had been guided by such considerations, its recommendations would hardly have been those made by Mr. Morgenthau. Arthur Krock expressed what, at that time, were the feelings of many when he said:

“In an orderly administration the State and War Departments would be the central figures in this problem (treatment of Germany), particularly since neither Secretary Stimson nor Secretary Hull can even faintly be suspected of any inclination to be easy with the Germans. And in that type of administration the Cabinet Minister for Foreign Affairs would have conferred at Quebec with his opposite number, Mr. Eden. But the United States Government these days is much too personal to be thus systematized.” (New York Times, Sept. 22. 1945.)

7 Made public on October 17, 1945. For the text, see New York Times, Oct. 18.

8 It should be borne in mind that the Potsdam declarations reveal a third motive (in addition to “reparations” and economic disarmament): “To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.” President Truman's message to Congress on the Potsdam declarations, and even more so his letter to Senator Hawkes (inserted by the latter into the Congressional Record of January 29, 1946, pp. 1945–46) make it clear what this sentence means: It is an affirmation of the doctrine of collective guilt, rejected so vigorously by MrGollancz, Victor (What Buchenwald Really Means (London 1945), pp. 14–15)Google Scholar and condemned by Pope Pius XII in his address to the Cardinals of February 20 1946, as one of the “erroneous doctrines current in the world.” (For the full text see the New York Times, February 21, 1946). From a mixture of contradictory motives a coherent policy is not likely to follow. Besides, the proclamation of collective guilt repeats what historians had come to consider as one of the most unnecessary mistakes of the Versailles settlement. Article 231 imposed upon Germany reparations as the country exclusively guilty for starting the first world war—a statement without any meaning as to the concrete nature of the issue to be settled, but containing the seeds of endless controversy about “war guilt.” In 1945 few level-headed people, on both sides, would have denied that it was the Nazi government of Germany that wantonly started the war, and this fact made it all the more surprising why a collective condemnation of the entire people of Germany was to be included.

9 Congressional Record, December 4, 1945, p. 11558.Google Scholar

10 This view is, however, controversial. See Briefs, Götz, “Cartels, Realism or Escapism,” The Review of Politics, April 1946;Google ScholarFlexner, Abraham, International Cortels (Chapel Hill, 1945)Google Scholar

11 This is subject to doubt. The Economist asserted, some time ago, that denunciation of cartels has becomes a part of the “demonology” of our day and that the intention is to destroy German industry rather than German cartels.

12 “Economic Relationships among European Countries,” in Eighth Report of the House Special Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning, Part 2, 79th Congress, 2nd Session House Report No. 1527, p. 67.

13 Keynes, J. M., The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London 1920), p. 14.Google Scholar

14 In this case it seems that to the limitation of production there was added an even more irrational prohibition of sales. See Ross, Albion, “Cutting Off Germany from Austria Hit,” The New York Times, 04 18, 1946.Google Scholar

15 “To Stop Starvation,” March 21, 1946, “Famine and Peace,” March 24, 1946, and “Nazi Revival Fails,” April 1, 1946.

16 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Volume 414, No. 25, pp. 2359 ff.Google Scholar

17 A Swiss traveller has given a graphic description of what railroad transportation in Germany was like in December 1945; see “Stationen des Nachkriegselendes; Eindrücke eines Schweizers von einer Reise nach Hannover,” St. Joseph's Blatt, May 13, 1946.Google Scholar

18 “Monthly Report of Military Governor, March 20,” Food and Agriculture, p. 5.Google Scholar

19 Monthly Report of Military Governor, Zone, U. S., 03 1946, section entitled “Industry (Including Coal),” p. 21.Google Scholar

20 McLaughlin, Kathleen, New York Times, March 2, 1946.Google Scholar

21 “World's Fishing Picture: Excess Here, Shy There,” Chicago Tribune, April 15, 1946.Google Scholar

22 It is, of course, not here contended that without artificial restrictions German industrial activity would have been normal. Difficulties would have been great under the best of circumstances. However, the results of the bombing survey of remaining German industrial capacity, made public by the Foreign Economic Administration and the Kilgore Committee, with all their exaggerations, do make it clear that substantial production could have been achieved where in fact there was almost no production at all.

23 The mere fact of a sacrifice in efficiency does not, of course, amount to a gain in security, as is now so often assumed. See my article on “The Potsdam Policies,” Forum, 02 1946.Google Scholar

24 Wales, Henry, “Four Billions Most Germany Can Pay Allies,” Chicago Tribune, March 2, 1946.Google Scholar

25 Lubell, Samuel, “Dutch Leader Fears German Self-Rule,” The Chicago Sun, April 2, 1946.Google Scholar

26 Matthews, Herbert, “Attlee Assails Pre-Ticket Voting and Outside Influences in Europe,” The New York Times, 05 6, 1946.Google Scholar

27 The English Constitution, ed. World's Classics, p. 132.Google Scholar

28 “Revenge But Not Peace,” United States News, August 10, 1945.Google Scholar

29 “The German Crisis,” a group of five articles written by members of the staff of The Economist who are at present in Germany, or have just returned from there. Above quoted from No. 4, “The New Luddites.” April 6, 1946, p. 531.Google Scholar

30 Hamm, A., “Germany's Industrial Future,” Letter to the Editor of The Manchester Guardian, weekly edition of 03 1, 1946.Google Scholar

31 Reporters should not, of course, be propagandists, but in recent years a high percentage of them have been just that. For some details, see Hermens, F. A., “The Danger of Stereotypes in Viewing Germany,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter, 1945–1946.Google Scholar There is, on the other hand, a minority whose work one must appreciate all the more because of the difficulties under which it had to be done. Kathleen McLaughlin of The New York Times, Russel Hill of the Herald-Tribune, and Max Jordan of the Catholic press (NCWC News Service) are among them.

32 The Chicago Sun, November 18, 1945.Google Scholar

33 See the Foreign Economic Administration's “A Program for German Economic and Industrial Disarmament.” Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs, April 1946, p. 346. Apparently, the work of the Military Government is to be carried out under the assumption that complete deforestation is desirable; see Bach, Julian Jr., America's Germany (New York 1946), p. 301.Google Scholar

34 Commentary, A Jewish Review, January 1946, pp. 90–1.Google Scholar

35 “A Program for German Economic and Industrial Disarmanent,” op. cit., p. 344.Google Scholar

36 “The Potsdam Program,” editorial, New York Times.

37 See release of Citizens Conference on International Economic Union, May, 14, 1946.

38 DrBonn, M. J., “The Reparation Settlement,” The Commercial & Financial Chronicle, April 11, 1946, p. 1951.Google Scholar

39 “Hitler Racial Aim Declared Success,” The New York Times, April 14, 1946.Google Scholar

40 Pertinax, , “French Would Ban Any Rule of Ruhr by New Germany,” The Chicago Sun, August 28, 1945.Google Scholar

41 Bach, Julian, America's Germany (New York 1946), pp. 102–03.Google Scholar

42 Op. cit., p. 37.Google Scholar

43 Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U. S. Zone, 20 March 1946, p. 44.