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3 See Drengson, Alan, “The Deep Ecology Movement, and Harold Glasser, Deep Ecology Clarified: A Few Fallacies and Misconceptions,” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 12 (1995).Google Scholar

4 Two excellent introductions to deep ecological thought are Drengson, Alan and Inoue, Yuichi, eds., The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1995)Google Scholar and Sessions, George, ed., Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism (Boston: Shambhala, 1995)Google Scholar. Among the authors developing specific arguments for deep ecology, see Naess, Arne, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Callicott, J. Baird, In Defense of the Land Ethic (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Fox, Warwick, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology (Boston: Shambhala, 1990)Google Scholar; LaChapelle, Dolores, Sacred Land, Sacred Sex, Rapture of the Deep: Concerning Deep Ecology and Celebrating Life (Silverton, CO: Finn Hill Arts, 1988)Google Scholar; Leopold, Aldo, A Sand County Almanac (New York: Ballantine, 1966)Google Scholar; Macy, Joanna, Mutual Causality in Buddhism and General Systems Theory (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Rolston, Holmes, Environmental Ethics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; and Snyder, Gary, The Practice of the Wild (San Francisco: Northpoint Press, 1990).Google Scholar

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9 The classic case for animal rights is Regan, Tom, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983)Google Scholar. The utilitarian case is best made in Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. (New York: New York Review of Books, 1990)Google Scholar. Each fell short of the deep ecology platform. Regan limited rights to mammals and Singer excluded plants and many simpler life forms from “liberation.”

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16 diZerega, Gus, “Democracy as a Spontaneous Order,” Critical Review, 3:2 (1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I have applied this model to illuminate a number of important issues in democratic politics. See “Democracies and Peace: The Self-Organizing Foundation for the Democratic Peace,” Review of Politics 57 (1995): 279–308CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Federalism, Self-Organization and the Dissolution of the State,” Telos, no. 100 (Summer 1994): 57–86; “Elites and Democratic Theory: Insights from the Self-Organizing Model,” Review of Politics 53 (199): 340–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar, “Equality, Self-Government and Democracy: A Critique of Dahl's Political Equality,” Western Political Quarterly 41:3, 09. 1988, pp. 447–468.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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39 Ibid., pp. 138–39.

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41 Ibid., p. 13.

42 Quoted by Worster, Donald, The Economy of Nature: A History of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 181.Google Scholar

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53 I am not arguing that this is the only legitimate definition of freedom. It is, however, one important kind of freedom.

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77 Macy, , Mutual Causality, pp. 200–201.Google Scholar

78 Ibid., p. 201.

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