¹ For a fuller development of these themes, see my Spanish America 1900–1970: Tradition and Social Innovation (New York, 1973).Google Scholar

² See Valcárcel, , Del ayllu al imperio (Lima, 1924)Google Scholar and Arze, , Sociografía del inkario: ¿ Fue socialista o comunista el imperio inkaico? (La Paz, 1952)Google Scholar. Touching in many of its pages on these corporatist aspects of preconquest Andean life is the superb article by Spalding, Karen, “Kurakas and Commerce: A Chapter in the Evolution of Andean Society,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, LIII (1973), 581–599CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Spalding also intimates that during the course of the colonial period, Indian life developed along a two-culture pattern. Indian masses often retained a collectivist style of life within their comunidades, while a class of Indian principales or important men became successful private capitalists. Often the principales served as a bridge between the collectivist comunidad and the outside, European, capitalist marketplace. Therefore, the collectivism below, capitalism above dichotomy, an important feature of the old as well as the new Iberian corporatism, has an important reflection in Indian culture of the colonial period. In regard to Latin American-United States relations, the significant point is that the Hispanic past and the Indian past mutually reinforce incompatibility with North American liberal models.

* The dichotomized society, with the leading classes relatively independent and self-reliant (in their international relationship to that society at least) and caught up to some extent in capitalist operations while the masses remained dependent and subsistence oriented, may well be the principal feature of corporatism as it has existed and re-emerged in the Iberian and Ibero-Indian cultures. This is why the Cuban endeavor, under Fidel Castro, to eradicate private capitalism altogether and to construct essentially a oneculture society is so totally revolutionary and unprecedented within the Iberian context — and also why it is not destined, in my view, to have many emulators elsewhere in the Iberian world. Many of the non-Iberian forms of corporatism referred to by Philippe Schmitter in the preceding essay seem to me to manifest less clearly the two-culture aspect of Ibero-Indian corporatism, an aspect — incidentally — that has exercised a far greater molding force on Catholicism than Catholicism on it. The issue, then, is not settled (at least not for me) as to whether certain characteristics of corporatism are associated with the general cultural milieu of the Iberian and Ibero-Indian civilizations throughout their historical trajectories. Indeed, the issue faced here may never be resolved with any greater finality than the heredity vs. environment debate, or the question as to whether Spanish disinclination toward liberal capitalism arose basically from the character of the people or from legal restrictions and other existential factors.

³ See Mikesell, Raymond, Foreign Investments in Latin America (Washington, D.C., 1955), p. 11.Google Scholar

⁴ See Winn, Wilkins B., “The Efforts of the United States to Secure Religious Liberty in a Commercial Treaty with Mexico, 1825–1831,” The Americas, XXVIII (1972), 311–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Quoted in Minger, Ralph Edwin, “William Howard Taft and the United States Intervention in Cuba in 1906,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLI (1961), 80.Google Scholar

⁶ As Arthur Link puts it, “Wilson and Bryan meant to undertake a new policy and hasten the day when the New World would be free from European financial exploitation.” See Link, , Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York, 1954), p. 79Google Scholar. In a way this harked back to the “large policy” advocated by Thomas Jefferson which aimed at excluding all European influence from this hemisphere. The essence of the “large policy” subsequently found its way into the Monroe Doctrine and the various additions to it. See Whitaker, Arthur P., The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800–1830 (New York, 1964), p. 43.Google Scholar

⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, II (Washington, D.C., 1940), p. 464Google Scholar. Responding to the Lansing suggestion, Wilson wrote: “The argument of this paper seems to be unanswerable, and I thank you for setting it out so explicitly and fully. This will serve us as a memorandum when the time comes, and the proper occasion, for making a public declaration of policy on this important matter.” See ibid., p. 470.

⁸ Because of his lack of understanding of Latin American culture Wilson, even as a later president, John F. Kennedy, probably did not realize how profound a revolution would have to be carried out in order to attain his objectives.

⁹ The Chilean newspaper La Nación (Santiago) commented favorably on the Puig y Casauranc address in its December 17, 1933, edition. Its commentary was typical of the Latin American response to the message of the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁰ This was the appraisal of Fortune made in a 1934 edition (X, p. 45) devoted to an analysis of the Italian system; it is quoted by Garraty, John A., “The New Deal, National Socialism, and the Great Depression,” The American Historical Review, LXXIV (1973), 914.Google Scholar

¹¹ Address of Berle, June 24, 1941, to the fourth Conference on Canadian-American Affairs in Kingston, Ontario, quoted in Green, David, The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago, 1971), p. 82.Google Scholar

¹² Quoted in ibid., p. 129.

¹³ Quoted in Feurlein, W. and Hannan, E., Dollars in Latin America (New York, 1949), p. 117.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Duggan, , The Americas: The Search for Hemispheric Security (New York, 1949), p. 117.Google Scholar

¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, Inter-American Series No. 32, Private Enterprise in the Development of the Americas: An Address by Assistant Secretary Braden Before the Executives' Club of Chicago, September 13, 1946 (Washington, D.C., 1946), pp. 2–3Google Scholar. Braden's position, similar to that of Taft and Wilson, was also in line with views expressed by Henry Stimson in his 1927 book, American Policy in Nicaragua (pp. 122–123)Google Scholar: “The intelligent leaders in Nicaragua… realize that Nicaragua today lacks one of the principal foundations for a democratic government in that she has no well-developed middle class…. Such a middle class cannot come into existence until the industries of the country are developed. These industries cannot be developed without capital, and capital can be obtained only by foreign loans. …”

¹⁶ Quoted in Green, , p. 277.Google Scholar

¹⁷ The statistics on which the United States position at the Buenos Aires Conference was based are found in U.S. Department of Commerce, United States Investments in Latin America (Washington, D.C., 1960)Google Scholar. According to this work, United States companies, while employing a little over 1 percent of the labor force in Latin America, accounted for roughly 10 percent of the area's gross national product and paid one-fifth of all taxes and one-third of all direct assessments on income. See also the July, 1963, issue of the Quarterly Review, published by the Bank of London and South America, Ltd., which was reprinted in the U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee hearings entitled, Private Investment in Latin America (Washington, D.C., 1964), pp. 442–451.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Eisenhower, Milton, The Wine Is Bitter (Garden City, N.Y., 1963), p. 205.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 206.

²⁰ Quoted by Wagner, R. Harrison, United States Policy Toward Latin America: A Study in Domestic and International Politics (Stanford, 1970), p. 147.Google Scholar

* In his essay in this collection, Howard Wiarda suggests that United States pressure, as applied immediately after World War II and intensified in the Alliance for Progress era, was largely responsible for Latin America's renewed experiments with liberalism and rejection of corporatism. In line with my own general conviction that Latin America responds primarily to an internal dynamic rather than to foreign pressures, I tend to view United States influence as relatively unimportant in causing the temporary shift of its southern neighbors back to liberalism. A contrary interpretation seems to assume too large a degree of United States omnipotence. The shift under discussion represents to me simply another incident in Latin America's perennial identity crisis. In reacting to this crisis Latin America identifies sometimes with liberalism, especially as it is preached even if not practiced in the United States, and at other times with the corporatism of the Iberian and also—in the case of Indo-America—the Indian past. The prosperity occasioned by World War II, and fed later by high export prices occasioned by the Korean War, encouraged Latin American leaders to believe that “statism” and the managed economy were less essential than in the decade of the 1930's. Further, a relatively quiescent social scene encouraged governing groups to imagine they could discard some of the paternalistic burdens that had seemed essential to prevent upheaval at an earlier period. Not until Latin America as a whole fell into the throes of a depression, as it had by 1957, and social problems had acquired a frightening intensity, did a shift back to corporatism seem imperative. In general, it can be hypothesized that in eras of economic optimism, especially if during these eras the social problem seems manageable in proportions, Latin America will incline toward liberalism. In times of economic uncertainty, however, and especially on those occasions when explosive social problems bring widespread and immediate fear to accommodated sectors, the shift is toward corporatism. If, then, the Alliance for Progress was conceived at least partially in the hope of spreading liberalism in the republics to the south, it came into being at one of the least propitious moments in Latin American history. For an excellent study of factors originating in the United States that contributed to the Alliance's failure, see Lowenthal, Abraham F., “United States Policy Toward Latin America: ‘Liberal,’ ‘Radical,’ and ‘Bureaucratic’ Perspectives,” Latin American Research Review, VIII (1973), 3–25.Google Scholar

²¹ Quoted by Lafeber, Ernest W., “Moralism and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Orbis, XVI (1972), 403–404.Google Scholar

²² Quoted by Wilkie, James W., The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid Since 1952 (Los Angeles, 1969) p. 37.Google Scholar

²³ See Milenky, Edward S., “Developmental Nationalism in Practice: The Problems of Progress of the Andean Group,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXVI (1973), 49–58Google Scholar, and Switzer, Kenneth A., “The Andean Group: A Reappraisal,”Google Scholaribid., 69–82.

²⁴ The ideology of Peronism, known as justicialism, laid stress on finding the proper balance between individualism and collectivism. There can be no doubt that it envisioned individualism primarily for elite groups and collectivism specifically for the masses. Walter Little makes the following judicious assessment: “Justicialism was not designed to radically transform the national economic and social structure, but it is ironic that its conservative tendencies were lost upon the conservative critics of the regime, who saw only the illiberalism which accompanied it. The Peronists were overthrown by those who objected to their apparent radicalism and who did not understand how truly conservative their vision of society was. The novelty to which they objected lay in the fact that while Peronism required the support of the common people the mediatory role normally performed on their behalf by the political parties was now to be performed by the State.” See Little, , “Party and State in Peronist Argentina, 1945–1955,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, LIII (1973), 661.Google Scholar

²⁵ Similarities between the corporatist patterns of the military government in Peru and the policies of the military rulers of Bolivia are revealed in Bolivia, Ministerio de Planificaci6n y Coordinación, Estrategía socio-económica del desarrollo nacional, 2 vols. (La Paz, 1970)Google Scholar, and Pittari, Salvador Romero, “Bolivia: sindicalismo campesino y partidos políticos,” Aportes, No. 23 (1972), 62–100Google Scholar. See also footnote 40 of the Malloy essay.

²⁶ For background material see Atkins, George Pope, “La Junta Militar Ecuatoriana (1963–1966): los militares latinoamericanos de nuevo tipo,” Aportes, No. 24 (1972), 6–21Google Scholar, and Martz, John D., Ecuador: Conflicting Political Culture and the Quest for Progress (Boston, 1972)Google Scholar. On the similarity of the program of the Ecuadorian military to Peruvian models see Latin America, VII (09 28, 1973), 309–310.Google Scholar

²⁷ The United States press tended to hail Brazil's economic success after the military overthrew President João Goulart in 1964 as proof that liberal, laissez-faire approaches still worked. The fact of the matter seems to be, though, that the Brazilian economic miracle has been based less on liberal than on corporatist models, a matter discussed by Howard Wiarda and touched on by Philippe Schmitter in their essays. Douglas Chalmers, moreover, provides a persuasive appraisal in his discussion of authoritarian politics in Roett, Riordan, ed., Brazil in the Sixties (Nashville, 1972), esp. p. 52Google Scholar. He argues that Brazil is developing into a “sort of flexible corporate state in which politics takes place essentially within nominally administrative structures” and that politics is based on vertical structures of patron-client relationships. Whatever the current situation may be, it is clear, as Wiarda argues, that Brazilian development and political patterns during the Getulio Vargas regime (1930–1945) were largely based on corporative models. Here, in fact, is a classic example of how a Latin American country used a close economic relationship with the United States to strengthen its own, un-United States-like traditions. For all of his success in this, however, Vargas continued to be apprehensive that economic dependence on the United States would in the long run limit Brazil's freedom of action, a point properly stressed by Rady, Ronald E., Volta Redonda: A Steel Mill Comes to a Brazilian Coffee Plantation (Albuquerque, 1973).Google Scholar

A significant difference between corporatism under Vargas and under the military is readily apparent, and it reveals a great deal about the nature of the new corporatism not only in Brazil but in all of Latin America. In his approach to corporatism, Vargas relied heavily on the Catholic Church and acknowledged the ideological inspiration of its doctrines. In the corporatism that has emerged under military aegis since 1964, the Church is not only a thoroughly insignificant factor but it is also locked in a serious confrontation with the government. On this see Bruneau, Thomas C., The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church (Cambridge, England, 1973)Google Scholar and “Power and Influence: Analysis of the Church in Latin America and the Case of Brazil,” Latin American Research Review, VIII (1973), 25–51Google Scholar. Even though elsewhere in Latin America the new corporatism has not produced a Church-state confrontation, Catholicism does not exercise the ideological influence it did in the 1930's, the last era in which homage was widely and openly paid to corporatism. The secular, “this-worldly” religions of developmentalism and nationalism have gained the upper hand and governments tend to rely on nonmaterial rewards distinct from those provided by religion to keep the masses appeased and quiescent.

²⁸ Burke, Melvin and Malloy, James, “Del populismo nacional al corporativismo nacional (El caso de Bolivia, 1952–1970),” Aportes (10, 1972), 67–96Google Scholar, argue that the United States aid policies had already shifted from promotion of liberalism to acceptance of corporatism by the latter 1950's in the case of Bolivia. The primary reason for this they trace to the classic dilemma of whether to stress rising consumption for the lower classes as an essential political objective, or to pursue strictly economic goals which, in the interest of capital formation that does not weigh heavily upon middle classes, demand limiting the consumption of the masses. In effect, the authors seem to argue that United States planners abandoned once cherished dreams of spreading liberalism, accepting instead a situation in which the masses would be dependent for their subsistence upon the willingness of a new capitalist elite to assume the burdens of paternalism. In this, United States policymakers have acted in accord with one-time populist movements in Latin America whose leaders had initially emphasized increased consumption for the masses. When faced, however, with a choice of increasing purchasing power among the masses or pursuing economic goals that would primarily benefit a new bourgeoisie, both United States “nation builders” and Latin American populists chose the second approach. In line with this decision, corporatism has been accepted, tacitly at least, as the proper development formula.

²⁹ Review by Harold Bloom of Grebanier, Bernard, The Uninhibited Byron: An Account of His Sexual ConfusionGoogle Scholar, and Marchant, Leslie A., Byron, A Portrait, New York Times Book Review, 11 22, 1970, p. 8.Google Scholar

³⁰ It is instructive that the counterculture's assault against the United States system, still ensconced behind the façade of liberalism, was no more successful in the 1960's and early 1970's than the attack of Latin American guerrillas against their increasingly corporatist establishments. Today the “greening” of the United States seems no more likely than the successful upheavals from below that only a short time ago were widely predicted for Latin America by many journalists and even those purporting to be serious scholars —myself among those at the head of the list.

Admittedly one must not claim too much for corporatism as the means for defusing revolutionary explosions. Perhaps the least corporatist of any of the major Latin American countries, Venezuela is also among the most stable. In December of 1973 no less than 85 percent of the voters, in a presidential election that has been hailed as a model of honesty, rejected extremes of right and left in giving their support to the two candidates of moderate parties committed to reform but opposed to revolution. Undoubtedly many factors which account for the Venezuelan situation escape this writer. Certainly, though, the country's comparatively—for Latin America—advanced degree of development, based largely but by no means exclusively on petroleum production, as well as its lack of racial prejudice has some bearing on the matter. Owing to a complex set of factors in its historical development, Venezuela is probably the country in all Latin America, Brazil included, that is the least contaminated by racism. Not led by racial bias to fear and despise the masses, Venezuela's ruling classes have felt little need to resort to corporatism in order to keep the masses essentially depoliticized and immunized against individualism. On the other hand, Colombia is by no means a model either of economic development or racial tolerance. Yet in the past few years it seems to have achieved greater political and social stability with what appears to be only a minimal reliance on the methods of corporatism. I suspect, though, that Colombia is more corporatist than some observers recognize. Having disavowed its flirtation with liberalism and returned in many ways to its corporatist traditions with the Conservative restoration of the mid-1880's, Colombia in recent times has not had to introduce publicized crash programs of corporatism in the endeavor to safeguard elites and maintain stability.