The authors would like to thank Anthony Simon, Director of the Yves R. Simon Institute, Ralph Nelson, Terry Hall, Nelson Dometrius, Mark Somma, Charles Fox, Siegrun Fox, Evan Ringquist and three anonymous reviewers for helpful criticisms of earlier drafts of this article.

1. Sirico, Robert A., “Encyclical Swings Church Deep into Capitalist Camp,” National Catholic Reporter, 24 05 1991, p. 16.Google Scholar

2. Wilber, Charles K., “Argument that Pope ‘Baptized’ Capitalism Holds No Water,” National Catholic Reporter, 24 05 1991, p. 10.Google Scholar In this article, we will not be addressing the debates about Catholic social teaching specifically. Instead, we will focus on some of the theoretical issues involved in Yves R. Simon's treatment of authority, the common good and economic justice. The authors intend to bring Simon's insights to bear upon the debates over Catholic social teaching in a subsequent article.

3. Simon, Yves R., A General Theory of Authority, with introduction by Kuic, Vukan (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), p. 29.Google Scholar

4. Simon, Yves R., Philosophy of Democratic Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 64.Google Scholar

5. Simon, , General Theory of Authority, p. 29.Google Scholar

6. Ibid. See also Simon, , Philosophy of Democratic Government, pp. 64–66.Google Scholar

7. Simon, , Philosophy of Democratic Government, p. 64.Google Scholar

8. Ibid., p. 65.

9. Simon, , The Tradition of Natural Law (New York: Fordham University Press 1965), p. 70.Google Scholar Simon's distinction between common and individual goods is in contrast to the notion of mutual benefit as understood by public choice theory. The latter theory, as far as we understand it, argues that people come together in politics as they do in the economic marketplace; in short, people come together in politics to pursue self-interest. This seems to imply that only particular, private goods are involved. Therefore, it seems to us that public choice theory reduces the political community to a partnership, contrary to Simon's position.

10. The following paragraphs draw on Cochran, Clarke E., “Yves R. Simon and The Common Good': A Note on the Concept,” Ethics 88 (1978): 236–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11. See Simon, , Tradition of Natural Law, pp. 86–109.Google Scholar

12. Simon, Yves R., “Common Good and Common Action,” Review of Politics 22 (1960): 223–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13. Simon, , Philosophy of Democratic Government, p. 41.Google Scholar

14. Aquinas, Saint Thomas, Summa Theologiae (3 vols.; New York: Benziger Brothers, 1948), I–II q. 91, a. 2,3.Google Scholar Hereafter referred to as ST.

15. ST-II q.91, a.3.

16. Simon, , “Common Good and Common Action,” p. 240.Google Scholar

17. Simon, Yves R., Work, Society, and Culture, ed. Kuic, Vukan (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971), pp. 116–63.Google Scholar

18. Simon, , Work, Society, and Culture, p. 127.Google Scholar

19. Simon, Yves R., Freedom and Community, ed. O'donnell, Charles P. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1968), pp. 163–64.Google Scholar

20. The preceding is from Simon, , Work, Society, and Culture, pp. 122–23.Google Scholar

21. Simon, , Freedom and Community, p. 81.Google Scholar

22. See Simon, , Work, Society, and Culture, pp. 133–42.Google Scholar

23. ST II-II a. 2, 7.

24. It is certainly true that the common use principle is more widely recognized than the conclusion that the economic system is a common good; in this sense, the principle of common use is prior. However, it seems to us that a good argument can be made for the position that common use, philosophically speaking, is derivative in the manner suggested here.

25. The following draws on Cochran, , “Simon and The Common Good,'” p. 233.Google Scholar

26. Simon, , Work, Society, and Culture, pp. 38–39; 126–42.Google Scholar

27. Simon's concern to consider needs when discussing distributive justice is not to be understood to mean that needs alone are relevant. In The Definition of Moral Virtue (Fordham University Press, 1986)Google Scholar, Simon states that distribution is also according to merit. While we are not sure exactly how Simon conceives of merit, here it seems fair to hypothesize, first of all, that Simon would understand merit as related to the common good. In other words, more merit would accrue to those who contribute more to the common good. Secondly, we doubt that Simon's understanding of merit would correspond to any purely market-based determination of merit, which would permit those who contribute little to the common good to extract a great deal of the common wealth.

28. Simon, , Work, Society, and Culture, p. 141.Google Scholar

29. Simon, Yves R., “Beyond the Crisis of Liberalism,” in Essays in Thomism, ed. Brennan, Robert Edward (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), p. 277.Google Scholar Of course, “corporative” in Simon's sense is radically different from fascist corporate concepts.

30. Simon, , Community of the Free, trans. Trask, Willard (New Yorkand London: University Press of America, 1984), p. 164.Google Scholar Emphasis ours.

31. For fuller explication of Simon's concept of authority, see Cochran, , “Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves R. Simon and Michael Polanyi,” American Political Science Review 71 (1977): 546–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32. While antitrust laws do regulate particular interests in order to contribute to the common good, the rationale is not the principle of common use, but merely the desire to prevent unfair competition. Neither do we see in the approximately 1.5% of the GNP spent on needs-based programs evidence that the principle of common use is accepted in the United States. Moreover, the trend in recent years has clearly been away from even the limited commitment to needs-based programs, the most lamentable recent example of which was the cancellation of General Assistance for thousands of people in Michigan and other states which, at the time of this writing, has served only to increase homelessness.

33. Ryan, John, “Economic Philosophy of Saint Thomas,” in Brennan, , Essays in Thomism, pp. 248–49.Google Scholar

34. Simon, , Tradition of Natural Law, pp. 165–66.Google Scholar

35. For a more extended discussion of the issue of economic organization in Simon's thought, see Nelson, Ralph, “Freedom and Economic Organization in a Democracy,” in Freedom in The Modern World, ed. Torre, Michael (Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 141–53.Google Scholar

36. Kuic, , “Introduction” to Work, Society, and Culture, p. xv.Google Scholar

37. Simon, , Practical Knowledge (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991) p. 61.Google Scholar

38. Simon, , Tradition of Natural Law, p. 127.Google Scholar

39. On modern substitutes for virtue, see Simon, , Definition of Moral Virtue, pp. 1–15.Google Scholar Since, for Simon, virtue is not a science, it seems fair to conclude that he would reject any purely formulaic approach to economic policy. This would extend to the rejection of a natural law approach that would attempt, on the basis of reasoning from principles however sound, to bypass consideration of all the contingencies involved in the real world of politics.