* For valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I am indebted to Father Gonzalo Arroyo, S.J., Srs. Mario Artaza Rouxel, Hernán Rodríguez, and Professors Donald J. Baxter, Orville G. Cope, Roger W. Smith, Alan J. Ward, and Edward J. Williams.

¹ A comprehensive treatment of Christian Democracy in Latin America is Williams, Edward J., Latin American Christian Democratic Parties(Knoxville, 1967)Google Scholar. For an examination of the Chilean movement, see my El partido demdcrata cristiano chileno(Buenos Aires, 1968)Google Scholar.

² Edward J. Williams, “Latin American Catholicism and Political Integration.” Paper prepared for delivery at the 1968 annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Gatlinburg, Tennessee, November 7–9, 1968 (mimeo).

³ This type of party is discussed in Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties, trans, by Barbara, and North, Robert (Science Editions; New York, 1963), pp. 71ffGoogle Scholar.

⁴ See, for example, Scott's, Robert E. “Political Parties and Decision- Making in Latin America,” in LaPalombara, Joseph and Weiner, Myron (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development(Princeton, 1966), pp. 331 ffGoogle Scholar. The crises or challenges confronted by a developing political system have been defined as state building, nation building, participation, and distribution. See Almond, Gabriel A. and Powell, G. Bingham Jr.'s, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach(Boston, 1966), p. 35Google Scholar.

⁵ Zariski, Ralph, “Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations,” Midwest Journal of Political Science(02, 1960), pp. 33–34Google Scholar.

⁶ An analysis of this fissure is presented in Bascufian, Alejandro Silva, Una experiencia social cristiano(Santiago, 1949)Google Scholar.

⁷ A confessional party is one in which adherence to Catholicism is prerequisite to membership.

⁸ Interview with Dr. Eduardo Cruz-Coke, Santiago, September 23, 1964.

⁹ Zariski, , op. cit., 35Google Scholar, suggests five bases for the formation of factions: (1) shared values, (2) strategic conceptions, (3) choice of allies, (4) affinity based on common material interests, common origins, or common functions, and (5) personal local cliques.

¹⁰ Chile: Election Factbook(Washington, 1963)Google Scholar.

¹¹ Of the Christian Democratic Party's specialized organs, six are devoted to “political action”: Labor, Peasants, Urban Poor, Women, Youth, and Political Action. See Estatutos del partido democrata cristiano(Santiago, 1964)Google Scholar.

¹² For a recent position paper signed by 117 terceristas of the PDC Juventud, see A Pesar de Peñaflor(mimeo, Santiago, 1968)Google Scholar. This document suggests four goals for “more advanced militants”: “a. winning positions within the PDC, in order to gain control of its direction; b. conceptually and programmatically perfecting the noncapitalist path of development and gaining support for it among both the masses and progressive elements of the middle class; c. preventing any regression in reforms already undertaken by the Government, and trying to reach a consensus on new advances; d. promoting a permanent anti-Right policy which impedes any contact whatsoever between the PDC and such sectors and reminding the country of their reactionary significance.”

¹³ Solar, Julio Silva and Chonchol, Jacques, El desarrollo de la nueva sociedad en america latina(Santiago, 1965), p. 74Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁵ For a recent evaluation of the Christian Democratic government, see my “Frei Administration in Chile,” SAIS Review, XII (Summer, 1968), 14–24Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Quoted in Ercilla, July 13, 1966, p. 6.

¹⁷ A Pesar de Peñaflor, p. 3.

¹⁸ Gumucio, Rafael Agustin, “Ideas y realizaciones del partido democrata cristiano,” Politico y Espiritu, XX (08–09, 1966), 63Google Scholar.

¹⁹ The Washington Post, August 24, 1965, p. 8.

²⁰ This document was published in a conservative weekly, P.E.C., July 28, 1967.

²¹ Contrary to this assertion, it appears that the Christian Democrats' losses were attributable more to middle- and upper-class alarm over Frei's program than to discontent with his moderation. Another issue was the Government's failure to halt Chile's soaring inflation which surpassed 20 percent in 1967. Frei was angry with the Chilean Senate for blocking his plannedvisit to the United States. Inaccurate public opinion polls led him to ask the electorate to ratify hisadministration with their ballots. He expected 50 percent and received only 35.6 percent of the votescast. See my “What Next in Chile?” The New Republic, April 22, 1967, pp. 6–7.

²² Gumucio, loc. cit.

²³ Interview with Julio Silva Solar, Santiago, September 13, 1967. When asked to name the “figure in history he most admired,” Silva cited two men, Christ and Lenin. This response suggests the ideological wellsprings of the rebel viewpoint.

²⁴ Parra, Juan Bosco quoted in Ercilla: 07 27, 1966, p. 3Google Scholar.

²⁵ Gumucio, , op. cit., p. 64Google Scholar. According to a reliable source, Gumucio himself is or was recently a member of the elitist Union Club; see, Diccionario biogrdfico de Chile (Tercera, Décima ed. 1965–1967; Santiago, 1967), p. 671Google Scholar.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 60. Among these technicians are Economist Alvaro Marfán, who directed Frei's presidential campaign, and two former Finance Ministers under Frei, Sergio Molina and Raúl Sáez.

²⁷ Ercilla, July 13, 1966, p. 6.

²⁸ El Mercurio, January 5, 1969, p. 43.

²⁹ Ercilla, July 13, 1966, pp. 6–7.

³⁰ Ercilla, August 31, 1966, p. 5.

³¹ Ercilla, November 27 – December 3, 1968, pp. 8–9.

³² Ercilla, July 6, 1966, p. 7.

³³ Maira, Luis quoted inErcilla, 07 6, 1966, p. 3Google Scholar.

³⁴ Gumucio, Rafael A.quoted inErcilla, 08 24, 1966, p. 12Google Scholar.

³⁵ An analysis of the “Chonchol Case” appears in Ercilla, November 20–26, 1968, pp. 12–14.

³⁶ Parra, Juan Bosco quoted inErcilla, 07 6, 1966, p. 3Google Scholar.

³⁷ Frei admitted last November that he made a “big mistake” by not calling for a plebiscite (or a plebiscite on a plebiscite) when the Senate turned down a request for special administrative powers at the outset of his administration. To circumvent such executive-legislative impasses, the President has advanced a constitutional amendment that would enable future chief executives to dissolve congress once during their terms and convoke parliamentary elections. This project is included in a package of amendments that Frei has sent to congress. Other measures concern the use of a plebiscite when congress rejects proposed constitutional reforms, creation of a tribunal to iron out conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, and a “program-law” formula to expedite passage of a chief executive's program.

³⁸ Ercilla, November 6–12, 1968, p. 11.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴¹ ”Declaracion del Consejo Nacional del Partido Democrata Cristiano sobre 'OLAS,'” Politico y Espiritu, XXII (07, 1967), 119Google Scholar.

⁴² Ercilla, January 3, 1968, p. 4.

⁴³ Last December 17, Alberto Baltra (Radical, with Communist support) defeated Jorge Lavandero (Christian Democrat) and Miguel Huerta (National) in a Senate by-election for the provinces of Bío-Bío, Cautin, and Malleco.

⁴⁴ The National Junta, which must meet at least once a year, provides a forum for discussion and dissent within the PDC. It sets the party's political line, selects the National Council (the PDC's national committee which is composed of the President and other principal officials), modifies the party's statutes, and chooses Christian Democratic presidential candidates. See, Estatutos, pp. 16–17.

⁴⁵ In a personal interview (September 1967, Santiago) Senor Castillo informed me that if he had to select a “matiz” with which to identify, his choice would be the terceristas. In order to promote party unity, however, he has frequently aligned himself with the officialists in recent months.

⁴⁶ An explanation of these laws is presented in Cope's, Orville G. “The 1965 Congressional Election in Chile: An Analysis,” Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. X (04, 1968), 256–276CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁷ The list of the PDC nominees for the upcoming parliamentary election was published in La Nacion, August 4, 1968, p. 7.

⁴⁸ An analysis of cleavages within APRA appears in Pike's, Fredrick B. “The Old and the New APRA in Peru: Mythand Reality,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, XVIII (Autumn, 1964), p. 38Google Scholar. Similarities with Accion Democrática (AD) are even more evident. In 1958 AD contained three major factions: the founders (Betancourt, Leoni, Barrios), known as the Guardia Vieja; a somewhat younger stream, the Grupo ARS, headed by Ramos Giménez and Paz Galarrago and the youth sector or Muchachos, led by Domingo Alberto Rangel. The Muchachos were radical revolutionaries and the “moderation and measured pace of the Betancourt coalition administration increasingly seemed to many young people a betrayal of true revolutionary principles,” Martz, John D., Acción Democrática, Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela(Princeton, 1966), p. 178CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In 1960 they broke with Acción Democrdtica. Two years later, the majority of the arsistasalso left AD. The cause of this second split was more personalistic than ideological.

⁴⁹ Tomic resigned his diplomatic post early last year to assume direction of the PDC parliamentary campaign. As yet his own candidacy has not “caught fire.” This is partly because a year and a half remains before the presidential election and partly because of Tomic's tarnished image with some sectors of the party. The rebels, who prefer one of their own as the nominee, look askance at Tomic's three-year absence from the country when important political battles were being waged, view with suspicion the close relations he developed with the Johnson administration, and feel he is ideologically closer to the officialists than to themselves. Nor has the former Ambassador gained a warm reception among the officialists. He and Frei have long competed for party leadership and their personal relations are, at best, “correct.” A number of officialists regard Tomic's return to Chile and the unofficial commencement of his presidential campaign as events that will deflect attention from the incumbent regime.

⁵⁰ The Christian Democrats captured only 30 percent of the popular vote. Though this is less than they had hoped for, their party is still substantially stronger than any competitor. The major victor in the election was the rightwing National Party, which secured about one-fifth of the ballots cast. Next came the tightly disciplined Communists who won 15.7 percent of the vote. Losing ground were the left-leaning Radicals and pro-Castroite Socialists. See The New York Times, March 4, 1969, p. 8.

⁵¹ These results, which originally appeared in El Mercurio, were published in Ercilla, February 12–18, 1969, p. 8. The survey showed that in a threeway race Alessandri (61.3%) also defeated Tomic (21.3%) and Allende (17.4%). When Herrera replaced Alessandri on the hypothetical ballot, the results were: Tomic, 40.5%; Herrera, 30.7%; and Allende, 28.8%. Professor Eduardo Hamuy, a highly respected Chilean social scientist to whom these figures were first attributed, has denied any connection with the survey, calling it full of errors. It nonetheless reflects Alessandri's extreme popularity.

⁵² A network of provincial discipline tribunals exists with ultimate responsibility resting with the five-member National Tribunal of Discipline. Penalties which may be imposed by these courts include verbal admonishment, written censure, suspension from the party, or temporary prohibition on holding party or popularly elective office. Only the National Tribunal can mete out the severest of all punishments, expulsion from the party. See, Estatutos, pp. 21–24.

⁵³ ! A Romper la Ambiguedad para Unir al Pueblo! Santiago, 07, 1968 (mimeo)Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Chile's youth, in general, has become more extremist during the past five years. An index of this tendency emerged from the Chilean Student Federation (FECH) elections held last November. Though the Christian Democrats won six of the executive committee's eleven seats to retain a majority — they have dominated FECH for the past fourteen years — their strength dropped from 45.19 to 40.23 percent of the ballots cast. The vote of the relatively moderate Radical and Communist parties also declined. Gaining in power was the “guerrilla left” composed of Socialists and miristas (members of the Revolutionary Left Movement, MIR) and the “antisubversive” right represented by the National Party. See Ercilla, November 13–19, 1968, p. 8. For a discussion of the ideological roots of present-day Christian radicalism, see Gonzalo Arroyo, S.J., “Doctrina, Utopia y Subversión,” Mensaje, No. 161 (08, 1967)Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ The New York TimesAugust 13, 1968, p. 16; Ercilla, August 14–20, pp. 14–15. The Cardinal suspended the priests involved in the demonstration until they gave him a satisfactory explanation of their behavior.

⁵⁷ Huntington, Samuel P., “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics, Vol. XVII (04, 1965), 387Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Bray, Donald W., “Latin American Political Parties and Ideologies: An Overview,” Review of Politics, Vol. 24 (01, 1967), 84Google Scholar, where Bray speaks about Latin American Christian Democratic parties in general, not the Chilean PDG in particular.