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Aristotle and the Republican Paradigm: A Reconsideration of Pocock's Machiavellian Moment
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
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J. G. A. Pocock's Machiavellian Moment has become an authoritative source for our understanding of the republican tradition, the place Aristotle holds as its founder, and its adversarial relation to liberalism. In this article it is argued that Pocock exaggerates the republican character of Aristotle's thought in a way that ignores the extent to which stability and prosperity, as opposed to the kind of virtue fostered by political participation, are among the chief practical ends of the Politics. This suggests that Pocock's strict opposition between republican and liberal “paradigms” is an artificial and distorting imposition on the tradition, one more apt to limit than to broaden our understanding of the fundamental alternatives it contains.
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References
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6 Ibid., p. 55.
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10 Machiavellian Moment, pp. 537–38, where Pocock calls Tocqueville's critique of égalité des conditions “basically Aristotelian.”
11 “The dereliction of one citizen, therefore reduced the others' chances of attaining and maintaining virtue, since virtue was now politicized” (Machiavellian Moment, p. 75, emphasis added).
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14 See note 5, above.
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16 Aristotle, , Politics, trans. Lord, Carnes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1280a30–1280b40CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Further references to the Politics will be made in the body of the text.
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19 Pocock's treatment of Aristotle is the most notable exception to what J. H. Hexter has praised as his practice of “not try[ing] to translate the political terminologies men once used into the ones with which late twentieth-century readers are familiar” (Hexter, J. H., On Historians [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979], pp. 265–66Google Scholar). Cf. also Pocock's description of the “angst” suffered by certain Greek and Roman intellects (Machiavellian Moment, p. 31), and his practice of putting a key-word or concept into the mouth of an author when “it helps if we insert it” {e.g., pp. 189, 533).
20 See Politics 1279b33–1280a6.
21 Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 17Google Scholar. Cf. Arendt, Hannah, On Revolution (Bungay: Penguin, 1963), p. 276Google Scholar. For Pocock's acknowledged debt to Arendt, see Machiavellian Moment, p. 550. The extent to which Pocock's reading of the Politics owes more to Arendt than Aristotle can be seen by comparing her loose paraphrase of Jefferson's proposal for a ward system (On Revolution, pp. 251–55) with Machiavellian Moment, pp. 66–75. See Mansfield, Harvey C., Machiavelli's Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 319 n. 30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Rahe, Paul A., “Thomas Jefferson's Machiavellian Political Science,” Review of Politics 57, no. 3 (1995): 479 n. 81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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26 Cf. 1256a30–38, 1256b22–25 where Aristotle treats piracy and hunting human beings as a means of acquisition on par with hunting, shepherding, and farming.
27 Given the extent to which Aristotle identifies polity with the regime based on military virtue, an aspect of polity ignored in The Machiavellian Moment, it becomes necessary to re-examine Pocock's claim that Machiavelli's great innovation within the republican tradition was “the militarization of citizenship” (pp. 213, 200, 218). More importantly, this allegedly Machiavellian “innovation” is also among the most prominent themes of Xenophon's Education of Cyrus (see Book 1. 5 and Book 2), a work which goes unmentioned in The Machiavellian Moment despite it being the only book Machiavelli explicitly recommends in the Prince for further reading.
28 Aristotle Politics 1255a14–17, 1288a38–41, 1295a25–32, 1325b38, 1331b40–a2; Nicomachean Ethics 1178a24–b24, 1098a10–20, 1108a23–31. Madison, James, Letter to Jefferson, 8 02 1825, in The Republic of Letters, vol. 3, ed. Smith, James Morton (New York: Norton and Company, 1995), p. 1924.Google Scholar
29 Salkever, , Finding the Mean, pp. 230–31.Google Scholar
30 Pocock, , Machiavellian Moment, pp. 175, 207–08, 316–17Google Scholar. SeeSullivan, , “Momentary Moment,” 314Google Scholar. Machiavelli does use traditional teleological language, but for the non-traditional purpose of showing how “form” must be imposed on recalcitrant “matter” through a continuous effort of the human will. See Machiavelli, , Discourses, 1.16–17, 3. 1, 1. 1.Google Scholar
31 For an elaboration of the motives and consequences of this break, see Manent, Pierre, La cité de l'homme (Paris: Fauard, 1994).Google Scholar
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