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An Overlapping Consensus: A Critique of Two Approaches
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Abstract
This essay examines various intellectual challenges posed by John Rawls's conception of an overlapping consensus, both in terms of his own approach and also that of Charles Taylor. Two questions are entertained: (1) whether various criticisms of Rawls's view are indeed justified and (2) if they are, whether Taylor puts them to rest. Though the latter question is answered somewhat in the negative, Taylor's version of overlapping consensus is interestingly different from that of Rawls in that Taylor introduces an important distinction between a tradition on the one hand and what Rawls terms a “comprehensive doctrine” on the other. The advantage of this distinction, among other things, is that it clarifies what is at stake in moving to any sort of overlapping consensus.
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References
1. See Rawls's, John, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)Google Scholar, especially “Lecture IV: The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” pp. 133–72.Google Scholar
2. This point is made repeatedly in discussions of the issue. See Bauer, Joanne R. and Bell, Daniel A., eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)Google Scholar. as well as Bell, Lynda S., Nathan, Andrew J., and Peleg, Ilan, eds., Negotiating Culture and Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3. This is, for example, a consistent theme in Paz's, Octavio, In Light of India (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995)Google Scholar, recording his lifelong experiences of India and its culture as a Mexican diplomat.
4. See, for example, Hoffman, Eva, Lost in Translation: A Life in a New Language (New York: Penguin Books, 1989).Google Scholar
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34. I want to emphasize that I am not excluding the possibility that different fundamentalist comprehensive doctrines might achieve a modus vivendi with others of whom they disapprove. But as Rawls points out, this is not political consensus in any strong sense.
35. For an interesting and very recent example of how an Islamic liberal reformer might proceed see The New York Times' recent profile of the Canadian critic and commentator Irshad Manji. Krauss, Clifford, “The Saturday Profile: An Unlikely Promoter of an Islamic Reformation,” The New York Times, 10 4, 2003, A4.Google Scholar
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