With the precipitate and well-deserved demise of positivism as the only theory of knowledge backstopping international relations, a large number of ethical issues, emasculated by positivism's non-cognitivist views of morality, are emerging for philosophical reflection and analysis. One of the most important of these is relativism. Despite its obvious (and increasing) significance, however, few international theorists have specifically addressed the issues it raises. One of the main reasons for this neglect, this article argues, lies in the conspicuous failure on the part of the newer normative approaches to international relations even to acknowledge that a relativist interpretation is a plausible construal of their position. In the next section, three examples of such failure will be described. It is no accident that these examples derive from anti-realist positions. A perspicuous feature of anti-realism has been its evident incapacity to give sufficient weight to the fact that the world is divided into antagonistic groups which have serious, perhaps even irreconcilable, moral and political conflicts with one another. But whatever may be the case for anti-realists, revisionary political realism is in no position to obscure its relation to relativism. The possibility of relativism, for the revisionary political realist, arises from simple reflection on the realist tradition.

A group of writers have taken up Nietzsche's hammer against the constructions of contemporary international theory. Postmodern approaches problematize the dominant understanding of international relations as a world of sovereign states which demarcate inside from outside, order from anarchy, identity from difference. More generally, they challenge the notion of sovereignty as an ahistorical, universal, transcendent concept, be it applied to the sovereign state, the sovereign individual or a sovereign truth. Sovereignty and the dichotomies regulated by its power are mechanisms of domination and closure which limit the play of political practice. It is the aim of these writers to hammer away at these limitations, opening space for plural and diverse practices in world politics.

The emergence of transnational markets in securities issuance and trading is a dramatic development in the contemporary financial services sector with larger consequences for national policy-making. The liberalization of access to domestic securities exchanges, the progressive reduction of regulatory restrictions leading to product innovation such as derivatives trading, the growing involvement of transnational banks in securities dealing, and the elimination of capital controls have all combined to yield rapid change over the past fifteen years. The process is, however, relatively poorly researched. Folklore about the global markets abounds but much remains to be done to put the global integration of the markets into perspective and understand its complexity. Specifically, there has been a failure to analyse the consequences of the liberalization and transnationalization of financial markets for democratic political systems in an increasingly global market economy.

Defence is a policy sector central to international relations. If war and conflict lie at the heart of traditional, Realist analyses of interstate relations, this derives in no small part from the claim that states are continually putting themselves in a position of readiness to wage such wars and triumph in conflict. If, as some commentators maintain, the nature of military doctrine, and national defence policies—offensive or defensive—can condition the nature of interstate relations, an explanation of the nature of national defence policies is vital in order to fully comprehend the nature of international relations.

During his visit to Berlin, the first American President to give a speech on the eastern side of the Brandenburg Gate proclaimed Germany to be a special partner for his country. President Clinton demanded an extended role, i.e. more responsibilities in international politics, for the Federal Republic.

Raymond Cohen ends his ‘reappraisal’ of the democratic-peace proposition by calling it ‘a formula that looks to be the product of both conceptual imprecision and wishful thinking’. Fortunately for the proposition, however, Professor Cohen's glass house is too fragile for him to be safe in throwing stones. Although he raises important issues, the substance of his critique violates some elementary rules of evidence and logic required for any scholarly endeavour, whether historical or social scientific. Specifically, those rules are: (1) Define your terms clearly and consistently; (2) Know your data base—in this case, know your history; (3) Look for probabilities (not mere existence or non-existence) where probabilities are specified theoretically; (4) Observe the other principles of logic.