The Second World War acted like an earthquake on the international law of war and left some of it in ruins. This essay attempts to explain why. But before analysing the nature of the historic forces, and, so far as they are relevant, specific events which produced this disturbance, it will be helpful if we remind ourselves of something even more basic: the intrinsic fragility of the law of war – a fragility which exists and has its unsettling effects even when historic forces happen to be helpful. The law of war of course shares in the chronic weakness of international law in general, that is it is a law without a sovereign – rules without a ruler. But before that, the law of war rests uniquely upon a paradox which hostile critics have not hesitated to call an absurdity. It offers mediation between the demands of on the one hand Humanity, on the other Military Necessity. It opens a middle path between the peaceable brotherly conduct which civilized men believe they would, in favourable circumstances, like to observe towards their neighbours, and the lethal violence they find themselves using when the circumstances are those of war. It requires a cohabitation of logical inconsistencies which some – certainly not all – interpretations of Humanity or Military Necessity have alleged to have been no more practical than squaring the circle. Yet the idea of the law of war has survived, something about which the philosopher and psychologist at any rate might have much to say. The historian, however, feels obliged to pass by those deeper levels of his theme with the reflection, for what it is worth, that such tolerance, even appetite, for inconsistency need not surprise anyone whose idea of human nature includes a divided mind or whose idea of the human condition includes tragedy.

The subject of nonverbal communication, or signalling, as it is usually called, between states, has received some attention in the literature in the past, usually within the context of conflict or crisis studies. John W. Burton argues that ‘military smoke signals’ are used by parties to conflict when direct communication is ruled out. James Cable, in a study of gunboat diplomacy, suggests that displays of naval power can perform the ‘expressive function’ of emphasizing attitudes, lending verisimilitude to otherwise unconvincing statements or providing an outlet for emotion. Specific examples of nonverbal signalling are common: among others Charles McClelland describes its use in the Berlin and Quemoy crises; Coral Bell shows how the superpowers have developed the mechanism to a fine degree of sophistication.

This paper sets out to investigate the importance to less developed countries (LDCs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a source of short to medium term finance. A discussion of longer term concessionary aid falls outside the scope of the analysis, though this will be alluded to at times.

With the widespread usage of systems analysis in political science over the last twenty years it is axiomatic that the problem of adaptation has been a recurring theme in the literature. At the level of the individual political system this concern has been germane to the work of Easton, the structural functionalists and the developmental/modernization writers. In International Politics writing, the problem of adaptation is central to both the applications of systems theory, at whatever level of analysis (for example Kaplan, Rosecrance at the systemic level, and Hanrieder and Modelski at the state level) and the less overtly theoretical works which still emphasize the importance of a state adapting to its environment.