Renewed interest in international institutions makes clear the need for a better theory of institutional possibilities. Friedrich Hayek held that institutions are either designed, though badly, or emerge spontaneously, and providently, as an unintended consequence of agents' self-interested choices. Hayek's historical sketch misses a third set of possibilities reflecting the claim that agents make institutions in keeping with nature's design or, as we say today, make them on some occasions to suit large social purposes. The English School treats institutions as spontaneous developments. Liberal scholars in the US start with the rationalist position that agents design institutions as they see fit, but end up closer to the view that institutions constitute a purposive whole.

It is often said that reciprocityÑreturning good behaviour for good behaviour and bad for badÑstabilizes co-operation by making nonco-operative behaviour unprofitable. Nevertheless, our understanding of how reciprocity works in international politics is unnecessarily limited. Only two patterns are now well recognized. In one of these, both actors in a relationship insist that the value of their concessions must be equivalent and that each must be made highly conditional on the other. The polar opposite pattern is one in which the actors consider both the value and timing of individual concessions to be irrelevant. What is not well understood is that there are two other exchange patterns that actors may also see as mutually satisfactory. In these situations, even though the value and timing of individual concessions both clearly matter to the actors, the pattern of exchange on oneÑthough not bothÑof them is clearly ‘unbalanced’. We lack a way to make sense of such partially unbalanced relationships. This article develops a typology that specifies four types of reciprocity, analyses the conditions under which they are likely to evolve, and draws out the implications of each pattern for actors' strategic choices and bargaining behaviour. The utility of this typology is demonstrated through an analysis of the shifting patterns of reciprocity in Russian-American relations from 1947 through to 1997.

Recent literature on the disciplinary history of IR has furthered our understanding of aspects of the discipline without specifying its own methods clearly enough. ‘Critical’ or ‘internal discursive’ disciplinary historians have rejected Quentin Skinner's contextual approach to the history of ideas in ways that suggest they have misunderstood it, and have failed to appreciate its potential. Furthermore, ‘critical IR’ itself can and should be subjected to intellectual-historical examination. The article suggests that ‘critical IR’ has been a form of anglophone academic radicalism specific to the late Cold War and early post-Cold War periods, and advocates further comparative work on the history of non-anglophone IR communities.

This article addresses the inadequate analysis of modern social revolutions within orthodox International Relations due both to the historical context and the trajectory of the discipline. A critical review of the literature that has more recently come to acknowledge the relevance of revolutions and revolutionary states to IR reveals a number of enduring shortcomings. The present article suggests an alternative framework for the study of revolutions by conceiving them as rooted in the dynamics of the globally dominant socio-economic system, capitalism. It is argued that the uneven global expansion of this system and its peculiarity contribute to the explanation of revolutionary upheavals in the modern world. This is illustrated in the final section of the article by a case study of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which also challenges recent explanations of the revolution in terms of ‘Islam’ or ‘Islamic culture’.

The article proposes to conjoin the analysis of European integration and a modern systems theory of society. At first identifying some deficiencies in current debates on governance and democracy in Europe, it then introduces some tenets of modern systems theory relevant for the argument, focusing on the notions of ‘world society’;, ‘structural coupling’, and ‘social evolution’;. Using the debate on an emerging European constitution as an example, it then demonstrates how a systems-theoretical perspective can help to resituate the account of a European constitutionalism in the overall evolution of world society's legal and political systems. In an equal fashion, it proposes to sharpen the theoretical discussion on democracy in Europe by first outlining the function of legitimacy in a functionally differentiated political system. A concluding section comments on the ‘value added’ of a modern systems-theoretical perspective which is still uncommon in European Studies and IR.

This article examines representations of the League of Nations as a creature of early twentieth century modernity. In particular it focuses on the propagation of the doctrine of rationalization in that forum from mid-1920s until early 1930s. Rationalization came to signify not only the scientific organization and control of social development, but also world interpenetration in technical, industrial, cultural and political spheres. Conjuring images of a globe crisscrossed by streams of electric energy, League functionaries and devotees spoke of a bright new dawn. Industrial flow would meld the ‘minds of men’. Discussions of globalization today have a similar repertoire of arguments and many of the same linguistic items as of rationalization. In the inter-war period rationalization was held out as the destiny of the world's people, promising both harmonious integration and cultural profusion. Its rapid evaporation from intellectual and public discourse in the face of the crises of the 1930s serves as a warning to those who would weave fantastic tales of globalized tomorrows.

This study demonstrates the link between rising levels of capital mobility and European financial and monetary integration. State policies are driven and constrained by the financial structure of the international political economy. However, political adaptation to structural conditions can itself force changes in the structure – a process of ‘structuration’. Practically, the study outlines the rise of capital mobility in the post-war period, and argues that the creation of a European Financial Area was an imperative of the associated deregulatory dynamic. The consequences of this development for state sovereignty are outlined in terms of the Capital Mobility Hypothesis. The proposition is advanced that political motivation to reassert some degree of state autonomy is the driving force behind the move to a single currency. In taking this innovative policy step, the EU countries will have challenged the financial structure by reasserting some degree of political control over the way finance flows around the global economy.

The concept of authority has recently received heightened attention in the international politics literature. Unfortunately, considerable confusion still exists regarding who possesses authority, how authority is constituted, how it erodes and how it differs from other means of generating compliance, most notably power. Drawing on work from international political economy and political theory, this article sets out to clarify some of the many ambiguities surrounding authority. It builds hypotheses regarding state/market authority relations and tests these hypotheses in the context of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of 1992–93. The article concludes that the ERM crisis did not represent a mere ‘bump in the road’ on the way to European Monetary Union, but rather the break-up of policy consensus in a dramatic way.

Sovereignty is heavily contested by existing states which view the survival of territorial sovereignty as vital to international order and many ethnic groups that see states as an obstacle to their own claims to sovereignty. This article looks at how and why ethnic claims to sovereignty arise. It examines when such claims may emerge, what forms such claims may take, the benefits ethnic groups perceive may accrue, and the implications for the international system and the emerging post-Westphalian international society.

The article responds to a recent call for a more systematic interrogation of the persistence of the dichotomous relation between ethics and International Relations. The addition of ethics into International Relations, it has recently been claimed, has left unquestioned the ethical assumptions encompassed in the ‘agenda’ of International Relations itself. Thus, the article examines the ethics implicit in the ‘agenda of IR’ and, in so doing, considers the condition of possibility for a movement beyond the dichotomy ‘ethics and IR’ and towards ‘an ethical International Relations’. To achieve this task the article calls for an understanding of ethics as ethos. It further illustrates how the ‘dangerous ontology’ of realist IR is discursively created through an exposition of Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan and Carl Schmitt's The Concept of the Political. In this anarchical ontology of danger an ‘ethos of survival’ has come to be the relational framework through which the other is conceptually encountered as an enemy. Subsequently, the article considers what repercussions this ethos has for the reception of ethics into IR.

Examination of Woodrow Wilson's concept of national self-determination in light of both Wilson's own intellectual development and the evolution of wartime strategy and diplomacy establishes that there was no prior consideration of ethnic or collective versus liberal or civic nationalism in Wilson's idea of ‘national’ self-determination and that the actual enunciation and application of the principle was deeply affected by considerations of wartime strategy and diplomacy, above all to counter defeatist tendencies following Russia's withdrawal from the war as well as to induce a separate Austrian peace. Wilson thus understood that the idea could not be applied in an unqualified way, that considerations of national self-determination might in specific instances have to yield to compelling questions of security, diplomacy and economics. At the same time, Wilson was not well informed about many key aspects of nation and state in East-Central Europe. In the end, Wilson accepted many unsatisfactory compromises at the peace table based on the promise that the League and its version of collective security held for international security and justice. Ignorance, liberal myopia, and political incompetence thus have to be weighed against Wilson's considerable tactical pragmatism in prosecuting the war when arriving at a final judgement on Wilson and the legacy of national self-determination.

In Sovereignty, Developing Countries and International Financial Institutions: A Reply to David Williams, Ralf Leiteritz takes issue with some of my arguments in Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi-States and the International Financial Institutions. I want to answer some of Leiteritz's charges