Introduction

After years of retirement in the academy, macro’historical commentary on contemporary events has returned to fashion. Radical domestic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and new patterns ofEast’West relations-in short, the collapse of communism and the end othe Cold War’mark the end of an era and present an invitation to international theorizing.1 Few would deny that these changes are momentous, but there is little consensus concerning their origins, trajectory, and implications. Explaining these events will necessitate a reweighing of fundamental theoretical issues. Thesize and speed of these changes were largely unexpected,reminding us how primitive our theories really are and encouraging us to broaden our theoretical perspective. To capture these events, theorists must reach across the disciplinary divides of Sovietology, international relations theory political economy, and political sociology.

Introduction

Prior to the Suez crisis of 1956, the United Nations found itself restricted in its military response to threats to international peace and security. The authors of the UN Charter had originally called for member states to make armed forces available to the UN Security Council under a set of special agreements to be concluded in the post-war period. These would furnish the UN with the military means to take collective action against aggression which was to be the essential precondition of the success of the UN. The body responsible for the conclusion of these special agreements under Article 43 of the UN charter was the Military Staff Committee (MSC), which comprised the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council. However, the divisions of the developing Cold War permeated the MSC from 1946 and it became clear that there were major differences amongst the permanent members on the military role that the UN should play in the post-war international system. As a result, the Article 43 special agreements were stillborn and the UN was left without a formal system to provide it with its own armed forces.

The crisis in Communism and the apparent end of the Cold War have provoked a resurgence of liberal optimism and Western triumphalism. Recent visions of a peaceful world have been conjured up, only to be overtaken by war in the Persian Gulf and the threat of global recession. Awareness of the dark side of international relations in the twentieth century persists despite the irrepressible hopes of many of its students. At this juncture in history, therefore, when eternal hope once again collides with recurrent despair, it is timely to consider the international relations thought of Oswald Spengler, the author of The Decline of the West and ‘pessimist extraordinary’.

J. A. Hobson died on April Fools’ Day in the first year of the Second World War. This, and a whimsical anecdote from A. J. P. Taylor, might appear to be enough to justify the portrayal of Hobson as an idealist. This paper critically assesses the work of J. A. Hobson and its relation to idealism as a category of international relations thought. An examination of Hobson’s writings on international relations shows that there are three distinct strands of thought, three modes of idealism. These modes of idealist thought differ on fundamental propositions about international relations as well as in their prescriptions for a reformed world order. In short, consideration of Hobson’s work destabilizes the monolithic category of idealism in international relations. Put another way, idealism blurs important distinctions in Hobson’s work.

Hold hard. Ten years on, the second wave is about to break. The ultimate Channel 4 documentary series is already in the can. It seems that the tributary of personal reminiscence from high and low (but chiefly high) has not run dry after all Recollected in tranquillity, it turns turbulent once more—as witness the fascinating collective testimony elicited by Michael Charlton in The Little Platoon (1989), at once pointer and landmark for the new wave. Already we have the Carrington memoirs, the Whitelaw memoirs, and even that most unlikely artefact, the Tebbit memoirs. From Washington come the Haig memoirs and the Weinberger memoirs, not to mention a shoal of smaller fry. Our man in Buenos Aires author of a prophetic complaint about the typical British approach to the Falklands, that is, ‘to have no strategy at all beyond a general Micawberism’ talked at length to Michael Charlton and to Peter Kosminsky (for the excellent Yorkshire TV documentary ‘Falklands—The Untold Story’). Our men in Washington and at the UN, both writers of distinction, have published revealing accounts of their stewardships. These British accounts can now be matched against the waspish reflections of Jeane Kirkpatrick, the dissentient US Representative at the UN, an exercise full of interpersonal and international interest. The generals and admirals of each side continue to be remarkably forthcoming, in one case from prison, in the other from retirement—such are the spoils of war.