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What does it take to be a great power? The story of France joining the Big Five

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2014

GADI HEIMANN
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Abstract

The article illuminates the International Relations (IR) enigma of how states with relative low power succeed in gaining privileges reserved for great powers. Many IR studies on status stress the importance of social recognition as a precondition for enjoying the status of a great power. However, very few focus on the factors that affect such recognition. This article tries to fill this gap by looking at systemic wars. Systemic wars are special circumstances wherein a new world order is built and privileges are redistributed among states. In these situations, states may use their symbolic, moral, and circumstantial assets to grant themselves a paramount role in the new order. A state's previous status as a great power, its contribution to victory in a war, and the utilitarian considerations of other countries are all assets that help it to win the privileges reserved for great powers – and that in the long run could gain it recognition as a great power, despite its lack of the requisite capabilities. By using this conceptual framework in the case of France during and after the Second World War, this article tries to explain how a relatively weak power can gain a leading role in a postwar order.

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Articles
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , January 2015 , pp. 185 - 206
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2014 

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57 FRUS, Malta and Yalta (10 February 1945), pp. 899–900. It is probable that he was also influenced by his state department, which strongly supported France's inclusion. See FRUS, Malta and Yalta (5 January 1945), pp. 293–4; and also Snell, John L., The Meaning of Yalta: The Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1956), p. 69Google Scholar.

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90 The minutes of the Council of Four clearly reveals Orlando's minimal participation.

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