page 151 note 1. Quoted in d'Ombrain, N., War Machinery and High Policy (Oxford, 1973), pp. 113–14Google Scholar.

page 151 note 2. Terraine, J., Douglas Haig – the educated soldier (London, 1963), p. 72Google Scholar.

page 151 note 3. Guinn, P., British Strategy and Politics 1914–18 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 24–25Google Scholar; Williamson, S., The Politics of Grand Strategy (Harvard, 1969), pp. 200, 361Google Scholar.

page 151 note 4. d'Ombrain, , op. cit. p. 102Google Scholar.

page 152 note 1. Grey to Asquith 16 Apr. 1911, Grey, , Twenty-Five Years (London, 1925), i. 94Google Scholar. This followed a request from Cruppi, the French foreign minister, for “an understanding which would not bind the two Government to act but which would define what the joint action should be in case they had to cooperate”. For “to defer such a definition until the crisis came would be very bad policy, for if … war came it might be too rapid in its progress to await the conclusion of the arrangements which would be necessary for effective cooperation”. Bertie to Grey, 13 Apr. 1911 Gooch and Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914 (London, 1926–38), vii, no. 207. See also Bertie to Grey, 17 Apr. 1907, Grey MSS. P.R.O. F.O. 800/50.

page 152 note 2. B.D. iii, nos. 210, 216.

page 152 note 3. Proceedings and Report in CAB 16/5.

page 152 note 4. B.D. x (ii), nos. 414, 415.

page 152 note 5. Hansard 5th series 1, cols 42–43, 10 Mar. 1913; Asquith to Grey, 14 Mar. 1913, Grey MSS. F.O. 800/100; B.D. vi, no. 467.

page 152 note 6. Grey did not deny Sir Arthur Nicolson's claim in Aug. 1914 that he had “over and over again promised M. Cambon that if Germany was the aggressor you would stand by France”. He merely replied: “Yes, but he has nothing in writing”. Henry Wilson, Diary, 2 Aug. 1914. According to Sazonov, Poincare told him during a visit to St Petersburé in the summer of 1912 of une convention verbale en vertu de laquelle l'Angleterre s'est déclarée prête à porter secours à la France par ses forces de terre comme par ses forces de mer, dans le cas d'une attaque de la part de l'Allemagne sur terre. Marchand, R. (ed.), Un Livre Noir (Paris, 1922–3), ii, p. 339Google Scholar.

page 153 note 1. Esher, Journal, 4 Oct. 1911, Esher to Brett 12 Mar. 1913, in Brett, M. V. and , Esher (eds.), Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher (London, 1934–8), iii, pp. 61, 122Google Scholar.

page 153 note 2. Notes by McKenna of conversation with Asquith, 20 Oct. 1911, McKenna MSS. 4/2.

page 153 note 3. Note by Harcourt on memo by Churchill, 15 June 1912, Harcourt MSS.

page 153 note 4. Quoted in Williamson, , op. cit. p. 309Google Scholar.

page 153 note 5. Ibid. p. 222.

page 153 note 6. War Council minutes, 5 Aug. 1914, CAB 42/1/2.

page 153 note 7. Bertie to Grey, 25 Aug. 1911, B.D. vi, no. 475; Asquith to Grey, 5 Sept. Grey to Asquith, 8 Sept. 1911 in Grey, op. cit. i, p. 95.

page 154 note 1. “It was always understood that (the conversations) did not commit either Government to go to war to assist the other, but were to enable the respective naval and military authorities to carry out cooperation at short notice, if that was in any emergency the decision of their Governments.” Minute by Grey, 5 May on Nicolson to Grey, 4 May 1912, Grey MSS. F.O. 800/94.

page 154 note 2. Nicholson to Churchill, 2 Sept. Nicholson to Haldane 16 Dec. 1911, ADM 116/3474.

page 154 note 3. Grey to Bertie, 11 Mar. 1913 B.D. x(ii), no. 466.

page 154 note 4. Diary, Wilson, 11 March 1913Google Scholar; contrast d'Ombrain op. cit. p. 113, n. 97. Major Grant-Duff also disputed Esher's view that Britain was “absolutely compromised”. He noted in his Diary for 6 Nov. 1911: “the understanding has always been absolutely clear that the negotiations committed no one to anything.” Grant-Duff MSS. 2/1. (The Grant-Duff Diary is quoted by kind permission of Mrs S. S. Grant).

page 154 note 5. Isvolsky to Sazonov, 5 Dec. 1912 Livre Noir, i, p. 362; and see minute by Crowe on Buchanan to Grey, 3 Apr. 1914, F.O. 371/2092; memo by Bertie, 23 June 1913, Bertie MSS. F.O. 800/166.

page 154 note 6. Newton, Lord, Lord Lansdowne (London, 1929), p. 441Google Scholar.

page 155 note 1. McKenna notes, 20 Oct. 1911, McKenna MSS. 4/2; Esher, , Journals, op. cit. iii, p. 62, 4 October 1911Google Scholar.

page 155 note 2. Harcourt to Runciman, 26 Aug., Runciman to Harcourt, 24 Aug. 1911, Runciman MSS.

page 155 note 3. Loreburn to Grey, 25 Aug. 1911, Grey MSS. F.O. 800/99.

page 155 note 4. Asquith to the King, 2, 16 Nov. 1911, CAB 41/33, Asquith MSS,, vol. 6; draft by Asquith of Cabinet resolutions, 15 Nov. 1911, ibid,; Wilson, T. (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott (London, 1970), p. 61Google Scholar.

page 156 note 1. Asquith to the King, i, 21 Nov. 1912, Asquith MSS. vol. 6.

page 156 note 2. Nicolson to Buchanan, 7 Apr. 1914, Carnock MSS. F.O. 800/373; and see Bertie to Grey, 3 Aug. 1914, B.D. xi, no. 566; Gooch, J., The Plans of War (London, 1974), p. 295Google Scholar.

page 156 note 3. Memo, by Ewart, 8 Mar. 1909 ‘The Value to a Foreign Power of an Alliance with the British Empire’, W.O. 106/45 E1/1 – also in Grey MSS., F.O. 800/102.

page 156 note 4. Memo, by Wilson, 11 Aug. 1911, W.O. 106/47A E2/23; see also appendix A to General Staff memo., ’The Military Aspect of the Continental Problem‘, 12 Aug. 1911, para 15, CAB 38/19/47. Grant-Duff Diary 17, 25 Aug. 1911, Grant-Duff MSS. 2/1.

page 156 note 5. Memo, by Churchill, 16 Oct. 1911, ADM 116/3474. This and other documents from this file are printed in my article, ‘The War Office, Churchill, and the Belgian Option, August to December 1911’, to be published in Bulletin of Historical Research No. 122 (1977).

page 157 note 1. Memo, by Wilson, ‘Appreciation of the Political and Military Situation in Europe’, para. 25, 20 Sept. 1911, W.O. 106/47A E2/26.

page 157 note 2. CAB 42/1/2.

page 157 note 3. This was composed of Asquith (chairman), Crewe, McKenna, Haldane, Hardinge, Esher, Fisher, French, Nicholson, Ewatt, and Slade (replaced as D.N.I, by Bethellin Mar. 1909).

page 157 note 4. Bacon, R. H. S., Life of Lord Fisher (London, 1929), ii, pp. 182–3Google Scholar.

page 157 note 5. Marder, A. J. (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought (London, 1952–9), ii, pp. 232–3Google Scholar.

page 157 note 6. C.I.D. Sub-Committee Report, 24 July 1909, CAB 16/5; McKenna, ‘Remarks by the Admiralty on Proposal (B) of Memo by the General Staff 130B’, Aug. 1911, CAB 38/19/48.

page 158 note 1. Grant-Duff Diary, 17 Aug. 1911, Grant-Duff MSS. 2/1; minutes of 114th meeting of C.I.D. CAB 2/2/2.

page 158 note 2. ibid.; Marder, A. J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow (Oxford, 1961), i, p. 387Google Scholar; Fisher's views were unchanged: see his notes for Churchill, 30 Oct. 1911 in Churchill, R. S., Winston S. Churchill, companion vol. 2, part 2, p. 1303 (London, 1969)Google Scholar.

page 158 note 3. Asquith to Haldane, 31 Aug. 1911, Haldane MSS. 5909; also 9 Sept: ‘The arguments as put in the W.O. letters are, of course, conclusive as against Sir A. W.'s scheme.’ ibid.

page 158 note 4. d'Ombrain, , op. cit. pp. 255–8Google Scholar; Maurice, Sir F., Haldane (London, 1937), i, pp. 283–4Google Scholar.

page 158 note 5. Wilson Diary, 21 Nov. 1911.

page 158 note 6. Churchill to Haldane, 8 Jan. 1912, Haldane MSS. 5909.

page 158 note 7. Marder, , op. cit. i, pp. 367–77Google Scholar.

page 159 note 1. d'Ombrain, , op. cit. pp. 105–6Google Scholar.

page 159 note 2. C.I.D. Sub-Committee, report and appendix IV, CAB 16/5.

page 159 note 3. d'Ombrain, , op. cit. p. 97Google Scholar.

page 159 note 4. ibid. p. 89.

page 160 note 1. Only one memorandum, of remarkable percipience, went to the heart of the matter. Colonel Adye, in a long note on a memo by Major Grant-Duff of Jan. 1907, wrote:

In discussing possible British military operations in Belgium we need consider one situation only, that which would be brought about by a conflict between France and Germany in which the latter, for strategic reasons, decides to violate Belgian territory … If Germany decides to violate neutral territory it may be that she will not confine that violation to Belgium, but, by moving north of the Meuse, force the line of that river and obtain the advantage of the superior railway facilities north of Cologne without increasing the risk of British intervention …

It may be assumed that the initiative will rest with Germany, and, had she a Napoleon to inspire her policy and direct her armies in the field, there is little doubt that an advance through Belgium … would be undertaken.

Grant-Duff's memo, of 4 Jan. 1907, ‘A War with Germany in the defence of the neutrality of Belgium’, and Adye's note, are in W.O. 106/46. Contrast also memo, by Grant-Duff, July 1908, ‘Military Policy in a war with Germany’ ibid.; General Staff memo., 27 Nov. 1908, appendix IV to C.I.D. Sub-Committee CAB 16/5; General Staff memo. 23 Sept. 1905, ‘The Violation of the Neutrality of Belgium during a Franco-German War’, pp. 1, 3, CAB 38/10.

page 160 note 2. C.I.D. Sub-Committee Report, para. 5 CAB 16/5. The attitude of the Foreign Office was best revealed by Hardinge on a memo by Crowe of 15 Nov. 1908: ‘Supposing that France violated the neutrality of Belgium in a war against Germany, it is, under present circumstances, doubtful whether England or Russia would move a finger to maintain Belgian neutrality, which [sic] if the neutrality of Belgium were violated by Germany it is probable that the converse would be the case.’ B.D. viii, no. 311.

page 160 note 3. Notes by Ommanney on Grant-Duff, memo. 4 Jan. 1907, W.O. 106/46. These are taken by d'Ombrain, op. cit. (p. 104) to have been made in Sept. 1907, but may well have been made later. The dating reads ‘Sept/10'. Adye's notes are undated.

page 161 note 1. Memo, by Grant-Duff, July 1908, W.O. 106/46.

page 161 note 2. See memo, by Wilson, 12 Aug. 1911, W.O. 106/47A E2/25; Wilson at 114th C.I.D., p. 5, CAB 2/2/2; memo by Wilson, 20 Sept. 1911, W.O. 106/47 A E2/26. This became the accepted orthodoxy. Not even Kitchener could shift it well into Aug. 1914. Arthur, Sir George, Life of Lord Kitchener (London, 1920), iii, pp. 22–23Google Scholar.

page 161 note 3. C.I.D. Sub-Committee, appendix IV, para. 4, CAB 16/5.

page 161 note 4. Memo, by General Staff, 8 Apr. 1907, ‘Our Position as regards the Low Countries’, CAB 18/24.

page 161 note 5. See ibid.; memo, by Grierson, 1 Jan. 1906, W.O. 106/44; memo, by Grant-Duff and Adye notes, Jan. 1907, W.O. 106/46; Sub-Committee Report para. 19 and appendix IV, CAB 16/5.

page 161 note 6. Pellé to Berteaux, 7 Mar. 1911, Documents Diplomatiques Francais 2nd series, xiii, no. 180.

page 161 note 7. Note by Wilson, 24 Apr. 1911, W.O. 106/47A E2/21; B.D. vi, no. 460.

page 162 note 1. Wilson Diary, 28 Aug. 1911; Wilson to Churchill, 29 Aug. 1911, ADM 116/3474.

page 162 note 2. Wilson Diary, 29, 31 Aug. 1911; Nicholson to Wilson, 1 Sept., to Churchill 2 Sept. 1911, ADM 116/3474. This point had not been neglected by Churchill when he followed up his original questions with a note to the D.M.O. on 30 Aug. 1911: “If the withdrawal of two divisions from the decisive centre led to the utilisation of the Belgian Army, would it not mean a far larger subtraction from German strength at the decisive point? If Belgium were our ally wd it not be better to send the whole army to Antwerp and act against the german flank than simply to take posts on the left of the French?” ibid. In conversation with Churchill on 31 Aug. Wilson had mentioned the figure of ten or twelve German divisions being subtracted from the decisive battle by Anglo-Belgian co-operation on the German flank. Churchill to loyd George, 31 Aug. 1911, Churchill, R. S., op. cit. companion vol. 2, part 2, pp. 1118–19Google Scholar.

page 162 note 3. Wilson Diary, 4, 9 Sept. 1911; Williamson, , op. cit. p. 179, n. 36Google Scholar.

page 163 note 1. Wilson Diary, 5, 10 Sept. 1911; Wilson memo. 20 Sept. 1911, W.O. 106/47A E2/26, my italics.

page 163 note 2. Wilson Diary, 20, 21 Sept. 1911. Macleay was able to report that no secret agreement had been made between Belgium and Germany such as would allow the passage of troops by the latter through Belgian territory and more especially through the south-eastern corner of Belgium, and that in his opinion the Belgian reaction to any such German action would in great measure be governed by the assurances of support she may receive from Great Britain. Grey congratulated him on exploring ‘this delicate ground with promptness, ability and discretion’. Macleay to Nicolson and minute by Grey, 29 Sept. 1911, F.O. 371/1050/39992.

page 163 note 3. Wilson Diary, 24, 27 Oct. 1911; see Macleay to Nicolson, 7, 28 Oct. 1911, Carnock MSS.F.O. 800/351.

page 163 note 4. Williamson, , op. cit. p. 180, n. 40Google Scholar. It was Nicholson, not Wilson or French, who remained loyal.

page 163 note 5. Wilson Diary, 29 Sept. 1911.

page 163 note 6. Churchill in a memo, of 16 Oct. 1911 considered that “the strategic advantage of placing the British Army behind the line of the Belgian Meuse wd appear to exceed any that can be obtained from prolonging the French left on the Verdun-Maubeuge front”: ADM 116/3474; Williamson, , op. cit. p. 179, n. 36Google Scholar; memo, of meeting between General Dubail and General Wilson, 20 July 1911, B.D. vii, no. 640.

page 164 note 1. Note by Wilson, 30 Oct. 1911, W.O. 106/47A, my italics in A.1. This was elaborated on by Wilson in Nov. and finally initialled by Nicholson in Dec. 1911. To Answer 1 was added: “The area of detraining and of concentration would alone be altered.” The estimate of the number of German divisions detached from the decisive point became “10 to 15”. It was agreed that “in the opening stages of the war the British Force ought never to lose touch with the French Army if the latter has to fall back”. Note by Wilson, 21 Nov. 1911, ibid, and enclosure in Nicholson to Haldane, 16 Dec. 1911, ADM 116/3474.

page 164 note 2. ‘Attitude of Great Britain towards Belgium in the event of the violation of the neutrality of the latter Power by Germany’, Apr. 1912, W.O. 106/48 E2/27.

page 164 note 3. Wilson Diary, 7 Apr. 1912; Helmreich, J. E., ‘Belgian Concern over Neutrality and British Intentions 1906–14’, Journal of Modern History, xxxvi (1964), pp. 423–4Google Scholar.

page 164 note 4. Wilson Diary, 22 Oct. 1912; note by Wilson, 21 Oct. 1912, W.O. 106/48.

page 164 note 5. Wilson Diary, 18 Nov. 1912. This led to an exchange between Nicolson and Villiers at the turn of the year. The ambassador reported: “Our reception as friends or enemies should we advance troops into Belgium to repel a German aggression would depend upon circumstances … I am of opinion that if we were to take action before the Germans actually entered Belgium, or in any case without agreement with the Belgian Government, or without an invitation from them, we should be considered to have violated the neutrality of the country and thus to be enemies.” The diplomatic position rested with Grey's assurance that as long as Belgian neutrality was not violated by any other Power “we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory”. Nicolson, H., Lord Carnock (London, 1930), pp. 398–400Google Scholar; Grey to Villiers, 7 Apr. 1913, B.D. viii, no. 330. Sir J. French was much more in harmony with Wilson's views on Belgium than Sir W. Nicholson had been. Wilson had come to consider the latter “hopeless”. (Wilson Diary, 6 Sept., 31 Dec. 1911, 7 Jan. 1912). He believed Nicholson did not even read his long paper of 20 Sept. 1911 and that he refused to allow it to be circulated. French, on the other hand, was highly complimentary about it and arranged for it to be printed for the C.I.D. (ibid. 28 Oct. 1911, 20 Mar., 12, 17, 19 Apr. 1912). He also supported at the C.I.D. in Apr. 1912 the idea that the attitude of the Belgians would make an immense difference to a British army employed on the Continent (Minutes of 116th meeting, 25 Apr. 1912, CAB 2/2/3).

page 165 note 1. Williamson, , op. cit. pp. 217–18Google Scholar.

page 165 note 2. CAB, 42/1/2.

page 165 note 3. The Wilson Diary records a discussion between himself, Grierson, Haig and Paget on 17 Nov. 1912 in which there were “some amazing contributions to strategy and a general want of knowledge and clear thinking”. French, who in Mar. 1911 had the idea of having flat-bottomed boats full of troops towed up the Rhine to form a point d'appui, aptly described by Wilson as “AMAZING” (ibid. 20 Mar. 1911), revived in Aug. 1914 an idea for landing at Antwerp. This was not possible then because naval protection did not extend so far north (ibid. 3 Aug. 1914, CAB 42/1/2). Both Haig especially and French were not absolutely convinced that Britain should not wait for some months before crossing to the Continent (Wilson Diary, 5 Aug. 1914).

page 165 note 4. See Wilson questioned by Churchill at 16th meeting of C.I.D. Sub-Committee on Invasion, 12 Nov. 1913, CAB 16/28A, and Wilson note 17 Oct. 1912 on his paper of 20 Sept. 1911 in Hazlehurst, Cameron, Politicians at War (London, 1971), p. 319Google Scholar.

page 165 note 5. Wilson to Seely, 21 Oct. 1912, W.O. 106/48.

page 165 note 6. See my article ‘The British Decision for War: 2 August 1914’, British Journal of International Studies, i (1975), pp. 148–59Google Scholar.

page 166 note 1. Hazlehurst, , op. cit. p. 87Google Scholar, my italics.

page 166 note 2. Pease to his wife, 3 Aug. 1914, and similarly on 2 Aug., Gainford MSS. 521.

page 166 note 3. CAB 42/1/2,3. Also Blake, R. (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914–19 (London, 1952), pp. 68–70Google Scholar. On 12 Aug. Wilson claimed that Maubeuge had been agreed upon as concentration area. This was riot so. Wilson Diary, 5, 12 Aug. 1914.

page 166 note 4. CAB 42/1/2; Wilson at 114th C.I.D. CAB 2/2/2 p. 9; enclosure in Nicholson to Haldane, 16 Dec. 1911, ADM 116/3474.

page 166 note 5. Memo, by Grant-Duff, July 1908, W.O. 106/46; C.I.D. Sub-Committee, appendixes IV, VII and minutes of meeting, 23 Mar. 1909, CAB 16/5.

page 166 note 6. 114th C.I.D., CAB 2/2/2, p. 5. Also memo, by Churchill, 13 Aug. 1911, CAB 38/19/50.

page 166 note 7. Grey to Bertie, 2 Aug. 1914, B.D. xis no. 487; and see memo, by Major Ollivant, 1 Aug. 1914 in Hazlehurst, op. cit. p. 326.

page 167 note 1. Esher, , Journals, op. cit. iii, p. 175, 178, 6, 14 August 1914Google Scholar; Grey to Bertie, 13, 19 Apr. 1907, B.D. vi, nos. 10, 14; Balfour to Haldane, 4 Aug. 1914, Balfour MSS. Add. MSS. 49724.

page 167 note 2. Asquith's announcement to the Cabinet, however, was couched in very reassuring terms: “the big experts … all urged an expeditionary force should be landed and kept on our right hand of naval force – not on left hand of French force necessary – they would not be wiped out as they could always retire to the sea, even in event of France being overwhelmed.” Pease Diary, 6 Aug. 1914, Gainford MSS.

page 167 note 3. Hankey, Lord, The Supreme Command 1914–18 (London, 1961), i, pp. 170–1Google Scholar.

page 167 note 4. Esher, , Journals op. cit. ii, p. 359Google Scholar; Huguet to Picquart, 9 Nov. 1908 D.D.F., 2nd series, xi, no. 558; Hardinge to Nicolson, 11 Nov. 1908: “the question of British intervention in the event of a Franco-German conflict – the possibility of which is now happily removed – has been the subject of discussion here during the past week.” Hardinge MSS., vol. 13.

page 167 note 5. Williamson, , op. cit. p. 367Google Scholar; Hardinge in C.I.D. Sub-Committee, Proceedings of 23 Mar. 1909, CAB 16/5.

page 167 note 6. B.D. vii, no. 197, my italics.

page 167 note 7. Grey to Bertie, 10 Apr 1911, ibid, no, 206; see. also note by Nicolson, 2 Nov. 1911 and minute by Grey, ibid, no, 617.

page 168 note 1. B.D. xi (ii), 110s. 415, 400. It was in this sense that Charles Trevelyan was right when he wrote “The Entente was an alliance after all, no less real in Edward Grey's mind because it was not written”. Trevelyan to Runciman, 4 Aug. 1914, Runciman MSS.