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Taboo or tradition? The non-use of nuclear weapons in world politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 November 2010

T. V. PAUL
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Abstract

The non-use of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 has emerged as a major puzzle in international politics. Traditional International Relations scholarship views this largely as a function of the deterrent relationship that emerged between the nuclear powers, especially during the Cold War era. The fact that nuclear weapons have not been used against non-nuclear states, despite temptations to use them, remains a challenge to the deterrence-only explanation. More normatively oriented scholars have argued that a taboo has emerged against the non-use of nuclear weapons. Nina Tannenwald's book, The Nuclear Taboo is the most comprehensive study on this subject which relies on constructivist logic of inter-subjective taboo-like prohibition in accounting for the puzzle. While I see much merit in Tannenwald's empirical case studies, it is far-fetched to call the non-use largely a function of a taboo-like prohibition. For, taboos by their very nature forbid discussions of their breaking, whereas nuclear states have national military strategies that call for nuclear use under certain circumstances. They have also in many crises situations considered the use of nuclear weapons. I have argued in my book, The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford University Press, 2009), that a more modest tradition can be given partial credit for the absence of nuclear attacks on non-nuclear states. The tradition emerged because of a realisation of the horrendous effects of nuclear attack (a material fact) which generated reputation costs for a potential user. These reputation costs in turn generated self-deterrence which has helped to create a tradition which is partially restraining nuclear states from using their weapons for anything other than existential deterrence. Unlike Tannenwald, I contend that the tradition is not a strict taboo and hence it can be altered if material and political circumstances compel nuclear states to do so. The recent policy changes that have taken place in nuclear powers such as the US, Russia, UK, and France do not augur well for the tradition as the conditions for atomic use have been expanded to include prevention, pre-emption and other non-proliferation objectives involving rogue states and terrorist groups.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , October 2010 , pp. 853 - 863
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2010

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References

1 More details on my position in favour of the tradition can be found in,Paul, T. V., The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), chaps 1–2.Google Scholar

2 Her earlier works include: Tannenwald, Nina, ‘Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo’, International Security, 29 (Spring 2005), pp. 5–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Tannenwald, Nina, ‘The Nuclear Taboo: The US and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-use’, International Organization, 53 (Summer 1999), pp. 433–468CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Price, Richard and Tannenwald, Nina, ‘Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos’, in Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 137Google Scholar . Previous publications on this subject include: Schelling, Thomas C., ‘The Role of Nuclear Weapons’, in Ederington, Benjamin L. and Mazarr, Michael J. (eds), Turning Point: The Gulf War and US Military Strategy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 110Google Scholar ; Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 260Google Scholar ; Gaddis, John Lewis, ‘Nuclear Weapons, the End of the Cold War, and the Future of the International System’, in Garrity, Patrick J. and Maaranen, Steven A. (eds) Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World (New York: Plenum Press, 1992)Google Scholar ; Gizewski, Peter, ‘From Winning Weapon to Destroyer of the World: The Nuclear Taboo in International Politics’, International Journal, 51 (Summer 1996), pp. 397–419CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Paul, T. V., ‘Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation: Nuclear Weapons in Regional Conflicts’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39 (December 1995), pp. 696–717CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Quester, George, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006)Google Scholar .

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4 For these see, Paul, Tradition of Non-Use.

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8 Ibid., p. 17.

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16 I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.

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