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‘Second front in 1942’—a strategic controversy revisited
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2009
Extract
In his Lees-Knowles lectures on the Mediterranean strategy in 1966, Professor Michael Howard largely disposed of the concept of a British politically motivated “Balkan Strategy” and went some way towards disposing of the larger and more general concept of a “Mediterranean Strategy” itself. In so doing he may be thought to have presented Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. However, those four lectures on the subject indicate that even after this rigorous scrutiny something is still left of the concept - the smile on the face of the Cheshire cat perhaps.
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References
page 47 note 1. These were also accepted by the Americans as an essential part of Allied strategy in preliminary talks before Pearl Harbour, though some U.S. representatives in these, notably General Embick even then expressed doubts about Britain's “peripheral strategy”. U.S. Joint Board memoranda JB 325, series 642–5 and other documents cited by Matloff, M. and Snell, E., Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare (Washington, U.S. War Department, 1953), pp. 34–48Google Scholar; also British series B.U.S., 1–40 (GAB 99/5) The joint report (ABCr) of the Anglo — American Staff talks (Jan-Mar, 1941) is especially relevant.
page 47 note 2. cf. Sherwood, R. S., The White House Papers of Harry Hopkins, ii (London, 1948), pp. 566–71.Google Scholar
page 48 note 1. See e.g. Matloff and Snell, op. cit. p. 101, citing U.S. War Department memoranda, WPD 4494–4513.
page 48 note 2. Churchill's memorandum, of 16 Dec. 1941, which formed the basis of subsequent British presentations to the Americans, is printed in Vol. iii of his The Second World War (London, 1950), pp. 574–585.Google Scholar
page 49 note 1. See Matloff and Snell, op. cit. pp. 25–8. JB Series 707 (Memorandum of 21 Dec. 1941) op. cit. and British Records (Arcadia) CR17 (CAB 99), 23 Dec. 1941. Churchill, iii, op. cit. pp. 620–4.
page 49 note 2. JB 355, and War Department, Chief of Staff Army, WDCSA 381.
page 49 note 3. Admiral King's current biographer, K. Love, believes King to have been less hostile to the concept of “Atlantic First” than he has sometimes been represented. The forthcoming biography will presumably furnish fresh evidence on this point.
page 50 note 1. King had had experience of co-operating with the British Admiralty in the First World War - and had disliked the experience.
page 50 note 2. Ambrose, S. E., The Supreme Command (London, 1971), p. 25Google Scholar. Pogue, F., Ordeal and Hope (London, 1968), pp. 276–80Google Scholar, citing U.S. “Arcadia” records ABC 337. British Records, CR 17 25 Dec. 1941; CR 21, 27 Dec. 1941.
page 50 note 3. See e.g. Williams, F., A Prime Minister Remembers (London, 1961), p. 51.Google Scholar
page 51 note 1. British Records (Arcadia) WWI (Final), 12 Jan., 1942. For Roosevelt's comment, Sherwood, i, op. cit. p. 479. Matloff and Snell, op. cit. pp. 185–190. This point and others is more fully explored in my North African Landings 1942 (London, 1976), pp. 77–92Google Scholar. It is clear the U.S. historians regard Marshall's later efforts to reverse the decision as a little “irregular” (Matloff and Snell, op. cit. p. 190).
page 52 note 1. North African Landings, 1942, op. cit. Appendix, pp. 178–179, and Churchill, iii, op. cit.
page 52 note 2. The relevant document is the famous aide-memoire (GAB 65, WM 42/73, 11 June, 1942, Annexe) cited in Churchill iv, p. 305. I. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador at the time, says that this document was “thrust into Molotov's hand” at the last minute, but this hardly alters its significance, which is that the British government “could give no promise” to open a Second Front in Europe in 1942. See Maisky, I., Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador (London, 1967), p. 282.Google Scholar
page 53 note 1. Sherwood, iii op. cit. pp. 600–606. Matloff and Snell, op. cit., pp. 276–278. U.S. Documents WDGSA 381, 1 (SS). British documents, GAB 79, COS 42/71. 10 July 1942.
page 53 note 2. Earl Mountbatten, who was at this time a member of the British Chiefs of Staff, had told Roosevelt in June 1942 that “Sledgehammer” was “not on”, and believed that the chances of success for “Round-Up” were also dubious (Earl Mountbatten to the author, 21st July 1975) cf. Sir Bryant, A., The Turn of the Tide (London, 1965), p. 357Google Scholar.
page 53 note 3. Churchill, iv, op. cit. p. 582, citing his memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff of 9th November, 1942, in which, however, he also admits a preference for an invasion of Southern France or Italy.
page 54 note 1. Ambrose, op.cit. (pp. 67, 70, 73, 89) gives Eisenhower's views, and his post-war change of heart on the whole question.
page 55 note 1. This qualification, if taken at all seriously, would in fact have ruled out an operation such as “Sledgehammer” completely. Marshall's attitude in his discussions with Eisenhower during the July conferences makes it clear that he would in fact have preferred to concentrate throughout 1942 simply on the build up of troops and resources for “Round-Up”, with no major operations in 1942. His proviso that the final decision should be postponed till September would have probably brought about that result, if carried out. Ambrose, op. cit. pp. 72, 74. Chandler, A. D., The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, ii, (Baltimore, 1970)Google Scholar, EP 381.
page 55 note 2. Churchill, iv, op. cit. p. 615.
page 55 note 3. Pogue, op. cit. p. 96.
page 56 note 1. Bryant, op. cit. p. 296. Churchill iv, op. cit., pp. 283, 286.
page 56 note 2. Churchill iv, op. cit. p. 288–9.
page 56 note 3. Pogue, op. cit. p. 317–319, 345.
page 57 note 1. Stimson, H. and Bumdy, M., On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947), p. 221.Google Scholar
page 57 note 2. Ambrose, op, cit. p. 77
page 58 note 1. Pogue, op. cit. pp. 330, 342. Ambrose, op. cit. pp. 75–6.
page 58 note 2. Ambrose, op. cit. p. 77.