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The SALT II ceilings and why they are so high*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Milton Leitenberg
Milton Leitenberg
Affiliation:
Research Associate, Center for International Studies, Cornell University
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Extract

Several articles and editorials have already appeared presenting the argument that the “ceilings” on strategic nuclear weapon systems, and within these on ‘MIRV’s, that were agreed upon at Vladivostok are too high. But none of these articles have even raised the question, no less attempted to answer it, as to why they are so high. Why were such high “ceilings” agreed to, and not lower ones.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , July 1976 , pp. 149 - 163
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1976

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References

page 150 note 1. Getler, M., ‘U.S. Asks Meeting on SALT Accord’, Washington Post, 16 Nov. 1974;Google Scholar see also Robinson, C. A. Jr, ‘Soviets Hiding Submarine Work’, Aviation Week and Space Technology, ci, no. 19, 11 Nov. 1974, pp. 14–16.Google Scholar

page 150 note 2. Parks, M., ‘Soviet denies silos are built against pact’, Baltimore Sun, 16 Nov. 1974;Google Scholar‘Soviet Aide Denies Arms Pact Breach’, New York Times, 16 Nov. 1974Google Scholar; see also ‘Kosygin Complains U.S. Camouflages Some of its Missiles’, New York Times, 15 Nov. 1974Google Scholar. [These are quite different from Soviet statements at the time of their first nuclear weapons test in 1949, that the Soviet Union would only use nuclear energy “for peaceful purposes, to move mountains and rivers”, etc., which are not really denials but deceptions.] Thus the denial by Gen. Vladimir Tolubko, a Deputy Soviet Defense Minister with responsibility for the strategic rocket forces states:

Not a single silo for a ground-based launching pad has been set up since May 1972. No new intercontinental mobile systems are being made. … The Soviet Union in all its history has never failed to honor its commitments. Still less can it violate its commitments regarding such an important political matter as the Soviet–American interim agreement on strategic offensive arms limitation. We strictly observe the documents signed (in Nedelya–Izvestia, and Tass, 15 Nov. 1974, cited in M. Parks, op. cit.)

page 152 note 1. ‘New Chance for SALT’ (Editorial), New York Times, 26 Dec. 1974Google Scholar; see also the very important article by D. Aaron cited in p. 158 below.

page 152 note 2. Gelb, L., ‘How U.S. Made Ready for Talks at Vladivostock’, New York Times, 3 Dec. 1974.Google Scholar

page 152 note 3. Mr Kissinger's statement was made in his press conference of 7 Dec. 1974: see p. 157, n. 1. Fritchey, C., ‘The SALT Disagreement’, Washington Post, 14 Dec. 1974.Google Scholar

page 152 note 4. Nitze, P., ‘How the Soviets Negotiate’, Wall Street Journal, 24 Jan. 1975;Google Scholar see also Prina, L. E., ‘Nitze on SALT: With a Large Grain of Salt’, Sea Power Magazine, Jan. 1975, p. 23.Google Scholar

page 152 note 5. Zorza, V., ‘The SALT Bargain with the Military’, Washington Post, 12 Dec. 1974Google Scholar.

page 153 note 1. ‘Soviet Military Hints at Dissent on Arms Issue’, New York Times, 2 Dec. 1974Google Scholar, quoting Krasnaya Zvezda of 1 Dec. 1974.

page 153 note 2. Osipov, V., ‘Common Sense and Ulterior Motives’, Izvestia, 4 Dec. 1974Google Scholar, translation in full by Novosti Press Agency.

page 153 note 3. For example, the Washington Post, Baltimore Sun, Neiv York Times, Philadelphia Inquirer, Christian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Express, Chicago Tribune, Washington Star Neivs, Boston Globe, Philadelphia Bulletin, etc.

page 153 note 4. Leitenberg, M., ‘Soviet Secrecy and Negotiations on Strategic Weapon Arms Control and Disarmament’, Bulletin of Peace Proposals (Oslo), v, no. 4, 1974, pp. 377–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar and vi, no. i,. 1975, pp. 94–96.

page 154 note 1. Osnos, P., ‘Soviets Sounding Rhapsodic on Virtues of Arms Accord’, Washington Post, 6 Dec. 1974.Google Scholar

page 156 note 1. Weiler, L. D., ‘The Status of SALT: A Perspective’. Arms Control Today, iv, no. 12, Dec. 1974, pp. 1–4Google Scholar (see also David Aaron's important article (p. 15 8, n. 1) on U.S. unwillingness to. ‘bargain’ on the Trident submarine or B-I bomber systems. Thus major U.S. programs still in development were not considered by the U.S. matters for negotiation while Soviet ones were so considered).

page 157 note 1. Newhouse, J., ColdDaivn; The Story of SALT (New York, 1973).Google Scholar

page 157 note 2. Nifcze, P. H., SALT, ‘The Strategic Balance Between Hope and Skepticism’, Foreign Policy, no. 17, Winter 1974, pp. 136–56.Google Scholar

page 157 note 3. ‘MIRV Madness’, New York Times (Editorial), 24 Jan. 1975Google Scholar. (see also ‘Vladivostok's Gaps’, New York Times (Editorial), 18 Dec. 1974)Google Scholar.

page 157 note 4. Rnina, J., ‘Arms Progress’, NeivYork Times, 23 Dec. 1974.Google Scholar

page 158 note 1. Record of Press Conference, the Secretary of State, 7 Dec. 1974, pp. 1–4.

page 158 note 2. ‘Kissinger Sums Up ‘74’ (Interview), Newsweek, 30 Dec. 1974, pp. 31-32.

page 158 note 3. Record of Press Conference, op. cit.

page 159 note 1. Aaron, D., ‘SALT, A New Concept‘, Foreign Policy, no. 17, Winter 1974, pp. 157–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 159 note 2. ‘Kissinger Sums Up ‘74’, op. cit.

page 160 note 1. Record of Press Conference, op. cit.

page 160 note 2. ‘Spurring the Arms Race’ (Editorial), New York Times, 4 Dec. 1974Google Scholar.

page 160 note 3. Record of Press Conference, op. cit.

page 160 note 4. ‘Kissinger Sums Up ‘74’, op. cit.

page 161 note 1. The higher figure of 100 billion dollars has appeared in several New York Times’ editorials and columns, for example, 9 Dec. 1974 and 23 Jan. 1975. The lower figure comes from a system by system compilation of the anticipated costs of strategic weapon programs either under way or under development (such as the Trident submarine system, the B–1 bomber, etc.). Part of the difference is probably accounted for by whether one assumes that the Joint Chiefs and the President will press for a successor to the U.S. Minuteman I.C.B.M. system, either as a new fixed-site land based system or as a mobile system.

page 162 note 1. ‘The Status of SALT: A Perspective’, op. cit.

page 162 note 2. Excerpts from Kissinger's ‘Briefing on Arms Accord’, Neiv York Times, 22 June 1973. In Mr Kissinger's ‘briefing’ on the June 1973 U.S.–Soviet Accords on Nuclear Arms Talks, a provisional statement signed by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev for SALT II, he twice mentioned the objective in a permanent agreement of not only limiting arms “but the objective of reducing arms”: “Thirdly, it includes reduction as one of the objectives of the agreement and not simply limitation …”. Now the Vladivostok accord suggests an agreement that is not “permanent”, and has no reductions.