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Rethinking the End of The Cold War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2009
Extract
Like nuclear weapons, the literature on the end of the Cold War continues to proliferate. Much of this work it has to be said has been limited in its depth (if not range) by the simple fact that the structure of the new international order has yet to assume a finished form. Writing meaningfully about a constantly evolving subject is no easy undertaking. There is also the added problem of perspective. In many ways we are still living too close to recent events to say much that is particularly profound about them. Finally, understanding the new world has been made all the more difficult by the sheer scale of the changes that have occurred since 1989. Because of the triple collapse of communism as an ideology, the Soviet Union as a European power, and the USSR as a united country our known political universe has fallen apart. Making sense of the global results is no easy job; indeed it is turning out to be an extraordinarily difficult task—one for which we may not yet have the proper conceptual tools.
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References
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