¹ These frameworks are critical of liberal assumptions of the universal autonomous rational subject, drawing attention to ways in which the subjects of peace interventions are non- or a-liberal and socioculturally embedded. See, for example, Paris, Roland, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Richmond, Oliver P., A Post-Liberal Peace (London: Routledge, 2011)Google Scholar; Ginty, Roger Mac, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Newman, Edward, Paris, Roland, and Richmond, (eds), New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding (New York: United Nations University, 2009)Google Scholar; Campbell, Suzanna, Chandler, David, and Sabaratnam, Meera (eds), A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding (London: Zed Books, 2011)Google Scholar; Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou (ed.), Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External Models and Local Alternatives (London: Routledge, 2011)Google Scholar; Richmond, and Mitchell, Audra (eds), Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Resilience is often defined ‘as the capacity to positively or successfully adapt to external problems or threats’, Chandler, , ‘Resilience and Human Security: The Post-Interventionist Paradigm’, Security Dialogue, 43:3 (2012), pp. 213–29, 217CrossRefGoogle Scholar, but as Philippe Bourbeau notes in his cross-disciplinary survey, a broader definition could understand ‘resilience as the process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks’, Bourbeau, , ‘Resiliencism: Premises and Promises in Securitisation Research’, Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses, 1:1 (2013), pp. 3–17, 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The key point highlighted here is that resilience increasingly focuses on working with and upon the capacities, capabilities, processes, and practices already ‘to hand’ rather than the external provision of policies or programmes.

³ It could be argued that this impasse of binary essentialism is implicit within all liberal sociological approaches to formal institutional frameworks, see, for example, Max Weber's investigation of the cultural roots of the ‘irrationality’ of law and administration in Confucian China, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1951).

⁴ Resilience approaches, which seek to target communities to enhance their existing local capacities are at the forefront of international institutional interventions (from the World Bank's work on climate change to the United Nations Development Project's work on post-conflict governance). These approaches take a much ‘flatter’ and more agent-centred approach than that of the liberal peace, which understands problems in terms of discursive, cognitive, and ideational frameworks, seen to constitute the ‘gap’ between liberal universalist ideals and the problematic realities on the ground.

⁵ I use the term ‘resilience’ heuristically to draw out a shared ontological framing, drawn out further below, which is quite distinctive from the usual categorisation of resilience as merely a buzzword of neoliberal governmentality. See, for example, Joseph, Jonathan, ‘Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism: A Governmentality Approach’, Resilience: Policies, Practices and Discourses, 1:1 (2013), pp. 38–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Walker, Jeremy and Cooper, Melinda, ‘Genealogies of Resilience: From Systems Ecology to the Political Economy of Crisis Adaptation’, Security Dialogue, 42:2 (2011), pp. 143–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Evans, Brad and Reid, Julian, ‘Dangerously Exposed: The Life and Death of the Resilient Subject’, Resilience: Policies, Practices and Discourses, 1:2 (2013), pp. 83–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Neocleous, Mark, ‘Commentary: Resisting Resilience’, Radical Philosophy, 178 (2013), pp. 2–7Google Scholar. Rather than problematising ‘non-liberal’ or ‘non-rational’ subjects or interpellating subjects as ‘responsibilised’ autonomous actors, resilience approaches highlight the embedded and relational nature of the subject in ways which enable governance interventions on the basis of the subject's already existing relational capacities, see further, Chandler, , ‘Resilience Ethics: Responsibility and the Globally Embedded Subject’, Ethics & Global Politics, 6:3 (2013), pp. 175–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Ricoeur, Paul, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 27Google Scholar.

⁷ While liberal peace approaches involve the assumption of a universalist subject position, described well by Ole Jacob Sending as an external ‘Archimedean’ position, resilience approaches remove the external subject position entirely, see ‘Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sensitive to Context’, NUPI Working Paper No. 755 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2009). A good example of the removal of the subject position of the external actor is provided by Louise W. Moe and Maria Vargas Simojoki, in their study of the Danish Refugee Council's work in promoting community development in Somaliland, see ‘Custom, Contestation and Cooperation: Peace and Justice in Somaliland’, Conflict, Security & Development, 13:4 (2013), pp. 393–416, and fn. 11 below.

⁸ The growing attention to concrete practices rather than to explaining the ‘gap’ between theory and the world through the attention to discursive structures can be clearly seen in the growing attention to practice theory and actor-network approaches, see, for example, Kratochwil, Friedrich and Friedrichs, Jörg, ‘On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology’, International Organization, 63:3 (2009), pp. 701–31Google Scholar; Neumann, Iver B., ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 31:3 (2002), pp. 627–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bueger, Christian, ‘From Epistemology to Practice: a Sociology of Science for International Relations’, Journal of International Relations & Development, 15:1 (2012), pp. 97–109CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kessler, Oliver and Guillaume, Xavier, ‘Everyday Practices of International Relations: People in Organizations’, Journal of International Relations & Development, 15:1 (2012), pp. 110–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ See, the key text in this regard, Dewey, John, The Public and its Problems (Athens: Swallow Press, 1954)Google Scholar. Philosophical pragmatism is a broad school of thought from ‘classical’ US pragmatists such as William James and John Dewey in the early twentieth century, to the modern revival of interest in the work of authors such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. The core aspect is the empiricist attitude of concern with practical consequences rather than abstract concepts and beliefs, reflecting a distinctive epistemological outlook of anti-Cartesian fallibilism. Philosophical pragmatism sought to overcome the divide between Cartesian understandings, of objective truth, and sceptical perspectives, that truth is always relative or subjective, through the emphasis on practical consequences; see, for example, Dewey, , The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 4: The Quest for Certainty (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008)Google Scholar. It is this framing which, this article suggests, is at the heart of resilience approaches which go beyond liberal universalist/cultural relativist understandings of liberal peace. See further, Chandler, , ‘Democracy Unbound? Non-Linear Politics and the Politicisation of Everyday Life’, European Journal of Social Theory, 17:1 (forthcoming 2014, published on Online First, 20 June 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ See further, Sen, Amartya's contrapositioning of ‘arrangement-focused’ and ‘realization-focused’ views of justice, The Idea of Justice (London: Allen Lane, 2009)Google Scholar.

¹¹ For neoliberal understandings, the emphasis is upon the limits of classical liberal assumptions of the universal rational subject, thereby focusing on the subjective constraints to exporting liberal peace; see Foucault, Michel's excellent examination of neoliberal discursive framings in The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008)Google Scholar. Resilience approaches transform these limits into positive resources, whereby local practices and understandings can inform pragmatic context-based policymaking in a world understood to be complex. For a useful analysis, see Paul Cilliers' discussion of Lyotard, Jean-François's The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984)Google Scholar highlighting the policy importance of relationally embedded contextual forms of knowledge vis-à-vis the meta-narratives of liberal modernity, Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998), pp. 112–40.

¹² As Moe and Simojoki note, ‘the forms of peace evolving through such pragmatic engagement would be qualitatively different from prevailing notions of liberal peace … building on local practices may involve increasing rather than reducing plurality and diversity … rather than striving for known endpoints’, ‘Custom, Contestation and Cooperation’, p. 411.

¹³ This discussion has been cohered through the publication of a high-profile report from the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States, suggesting that international policy interventions have failed in this area; Organization of African States (OAS), The Drug Problem in the Americas (Washington, DC: OAS, 2013)Google ScholarPubMed.

¹⁴ See, for example, Morton, Adam David, ‘Failed-State Status and the War on Drugs in Mexico’, Global Dialogue, 13:1 (2011)Google Scholar; Cammack, Diana, McLeod, Dinah, Menocal, Alina Rocha, with Christiansen, Karin, Donors and the ‘Fragile States’ Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2006)Google Scholar; the Pulitzer centre project ‘Fragile States: The Drug War in Central America’, information available at: {http://pulitzercenter.org/node/10031/all}; Paula Miraglia, Rolando Ochoa and Ivan Briscoe, ‘Transnational Organised Crime and Fragile States’, OECD Development Cooperation, Working Paper No. 3 (2012); Tokatlián, Juan Gabriel, Organised Crime, Illicit Drugs and State Vulnerability (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, 2011)Google Scholar; Sogge, David, Repairing the Weakest Links: A New Agenda for Fragile States (Madrid: FRIDE, 2009)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Richmond describes the liberal peace approach as ‘a model through which Western-led agency, epistemology and institutions, have attempted to unite the world order under a hegemonic system that replicates liberal institutions, norms, and political, social and economic systems’, A Post-Liberal Peace (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 1.

¹⁶ See, for example, Fukuyama, Francis, ‘The Primacy of Culture’, Journal of Democracy, 6:1 (1995), pp. 7–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Risse, Thomas, Ropp, Stephen C., and Sikkink, Kathryn (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cortell, Andrew P. and Davis, James W., ‘Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda’, International Studies Review, 2:1 (2000), pp. 65–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chandler, ‘Promoting Democratic Norms? Social Constructivism and the “Subjective” Limits to Liberalism’, Democratization, 20:2 (2013), pp. 215–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ OAS, Scenarios for the Drug Problem in the Americas 2013–2025 (Washington, DC: OAS, 2013), p. 55Google Scholar.

¹⁸ See, for example, North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mahoney, James and Thelen, Kathleen (eds), Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)Google Scholar; Peters, Guy B., Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’ (London: Continuum, 2005)Google Scholar; Scott, Richard W., Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests (London: Sage, 2008)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ According to Hayek: ‘The conception of man deliberately building his civilization stems from an erroneous intellectualism that regards human reason as something standing outside nature and possessed of knowledge and reasoning capacity independent of experience.’ Hayek, , The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge, 1960), p. 22Google Scholar.

²⁰ This gap, between de facto legal standing and a purely de jure one, began to enter the sphere of international legal and political understandings of sovereignty with the end of the Cold War. See, for example, Jackson, Robert H., Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

²¹ Tamanaha, Brian Z., On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² Cesarini, Paolo and Hite, Katherine, ‘Introducing the Concept of Authoritarian Legacies’, in Hite, and Cesarini, (eds), Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), p. 7Google Scholar

²³ In this context, research projects and, in fact, even entire research institutes (such as the Käte Hamburger Kollege, Centre for Advanced Study, Law as Culture) work on the basis of the need to investigate ‘law as culture’, see Gephart, Werner, Law as Culture: For a Study of Law in the Process of Globalization from the Perspective of the Humanities (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2010)Google Scholar.

²⁴ Augusto Zimmermann, ‘The Rule of Law as a Culture of Legality: Legal and Extra-legal Elements for the Realisation of the Rule of Law in Society’, available at: {http://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/archives/issues/2007/1/eLaw_rule_law_culture_legality.pdf}, pp. 10–31, 29.

²⁵ See also, the pessimistic view of Douglass C. North, the policy guru of new institutionalist economics, regarding the difficulties of understanding how exported institutions will interact with ‘culturally derived norms of behavior’; North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, p. 140.

²⁶ See, for example, Roberts, David, ‘Hybrid Polities and Indigenous Pluralities: Advanced Lessons in Statebuilding from Cambodia’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1:3 (2007), pp. 379–402Google Scholar; Richmond, , ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’, Review of International Studies, 35:3 (2009), pp. 557–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance; Richmond and Mitchell, Hybrid Forms of Peace.

²⁷ Zimmermann, ‘The Rule of Law as a Culture of Legality’, p. 29.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ See, Chandler, ‘Promoting Democratic Norms?’

³⁰ Zimmermann, ‘The Rule of Law as a Culture of Legality’, p. 30.

³¹ See further, Chandler, , International Statebuilding and the Rise of Post-Liberal Governance (London: Routledge, 2010)Google Scholar.

³² Paula J. Dobriansky, ‘Promoting a Culture of Lawfulness’, Remarks at Georgetown University, Washington, DC (13 September 2004), available at: {http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2004/37196.htm}.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ National Strategy Information Centre, Fostering a Culture of Lawfulness: Multi-Sector Success in Pereira, Columbia 2008–2010 (April 2011), available at: {http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACT131.pdf}, ii.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 1.

³⁷ Ibid., p. iii.

³⁸ Ibid., p. iii.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 1.

⁴⁰ For an excellent study of how these approaches can end up in the pathologising of populations subject to intervention, see Pupavac, Vanessa, ‘Human Security and the Rise of Global Therapeutic Governance’, Conflict, Security and Development, 5:2 (2005), pp. 161–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴¹ National Strategy Information Centre, Fostering a Culture of Lawfulness, p. 2.

⁴² Ibid., p. 9.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 12, 27.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 13.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 16.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 18.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 24.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 26.

⁵² Ibid., p. 20.

⁵³ Local sociocultural understandings and values are usually grounded upon contextual realities, such as structural and socioeconomic frameworks of inequality and exclusion, and thereby are not necessarily amenable to interventions at the level of formal understanding. See further, for example, Acharya, Amitav, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism’, International Organization, 2:1 (2000), pp. 65–87Google Scholar; Belloni, Roberto, ‘Civil Society in War-to-Democracy Transitions’, in Jarstad, Anna K. and Sisk, Timothy D. (eds), From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 182–210CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chandler, , ‘Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building Strategies’, Democratization, 5:4 (1998), pp. 78–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Paffenholz, Thania, Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009)Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Moe and Simiojoki, ‘Custom, Contestation and Cooperation’, p. 400.

⁵⁵ See, for example, Duffield, Mark, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World or Peoples (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), pp. 233–4Google Scholar; Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’; see also Jabri, Vivienne, War and the Transformation of Global Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), p. 177CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁶ Brigg, and Muller, , ‘Conceptualising Culture in Conflict Resolution’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 30:2 (2009), pp. 120–1, 135CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁷ Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace.

⁵⁸ For an excellent critique along these lines see Shannon, Christopher, ‘A World Made Safe for Differences: Ruth Benedict's “Chrysanthemum and the Sword”’, American Quarterly, 47:4 (1995), pp. 659–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁹ Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’, p. 566.

⁶⁰ See also, Sabaratnam, , ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism in the Critique of the Liberal Peace’, Security Dialogue, 44:3 (2013), pp. 259–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶¹ Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’, p. 570.

⁶² Ibid., p. 578.

⁶³ Mitchell, Audra, ‘Quality/Control: International Peace Interventions and “The Everyday”’, Review of International Studies, 37:4 (2011), pp. 1623–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁴ As Ann Swindler has noted ‘a culture is not a unified system that pushes action in a consistent direction … it is more like a “tool kit” or repertoire’, see ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sociological Review, 51:2 (1986), pp. 273–86, 277; see also Sewell, William H. Jr, ‘The Concept(s) of Culture’, in Bonnell, Victoria and Hunt, Lynn (eds), Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture (University of California Press, 1999), pp. 35–61Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ A useful critique of the neoliberal, constructivist, and post-structuralist understandings of culture as constructed meaning is Scott, David, ‘Culture in Political Theory’, Political Theory, 31:1 (2003), pp. 92–115CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁶ See, for example, Brigg, Morgan, ‘Culture: Challenges and Possibilities’, in Richmond, (ed.), Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical developments and Approaches (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), pp. 329–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ginty, Mac, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making versus the Liberal Peace’, Cooperation and Conflict, 43:2 (2008)Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’.

⁶⁸ This is where practice-based understandings become particularly useful. For example, Annemarie Mol's work on the treatment of diabetes draws out how abstract or universal, objective, medical approaches of prescribing treatment also need to account for the context of social practices, and need to be concretely ‘attuned’ to these and for interventions to be seen as ‘a part of ongoing practices: practices of care as well as practices to do with work, school, family, friends, holidays and everything else that might be important in a person's life’; see Mol, , The Logic of Care: Health and the Problem of Patient Choice (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 53Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Boltanski, Luc, On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), p. 44Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ de Certeau, Michel, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998)Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Latour, Bruno, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)Google Scholar; Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Boltanski, On Critique.

⁷² Latour, , We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993)Google Scholar.

⁷³ See also the influential work of Thrift, Nigel, especially Thrift, Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008)Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, p. 40.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 41.

⁷⁷ See, for example, Scott, , Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; there is a similar framing in Rancière's work on politics as a rare eruption from below into the ‘natural’ order of social domination, see Rancière, , Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press)Google Scholar; Tambakaki, Paulina, ‘When Does Politics Happen?’, Parallax, 15:3 (2009), pp. 102–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Similarly, Henri Lefebvre's understanding of the ‘everyday’ could be seen as one that is under the surface of modernity rather than constituting its appearances, see, for example, Lefebvre, , ‘The Everyday and Everydayness’, Yale French Studies, 73 (1987), pp. 7–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁸ Boltanski, On Critique; Latour, , ‘Why has Critique run out of Steam?’, Critical Inquiry, 30 (2004), pp. 225–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also de Certeau, pp. 45–60; and for a good overview, Celikates, Robin, ‘From Critical Social Theory to a Social Theory of Critique: On the Critique of Ideology after the Pragmatic Turn’, Constellations, 13:1 (2006), pp. 21–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁹ Boltanski, On Critique, p. 23.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 24.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 31.

⁸² As de Certeau intimates, the ‘critical’ framing of difference as an ethnological reality remains even with the import of a radical pluralising of identities; these are still understood as ‘enlightened’ and as ‘problematic’, The Practice of Everyday Life, p. 64.

⁸³ Banakar, Reza, ‘Law and Regulation in Late Modernity’, forthcoming in Banakar, and Travers, M. (eds), Law and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013)Google Scholar. Draft available at: {http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2229247}. The limits of law as an instrument of policy have also been widely discussed in terms of the ‘new paternalism’ proposed by Thaler, Richard and Sunstein, Cass, the authors of Nudge (London: Penguin, 2008)Google Scholar, and taken up by by the UK Cabinet Office, Prime Minister David Cameron's Behavioural Insight Team (the ‘nudge unit’) and the Royal Society for the Arts' Social Brain project; see further Chandler, , ‘Resilience and the Autotelic Subject: Towards a Critique of the Societalization of Security’, International Political Sociology, 7:2 (2013), pp. 210–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁴ Banakar, ‘Law and Regulation in Late Modernity’, p. 21.

⁸⁵ See further, Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983)Google Scholar; Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)Google Scholar; Tully, James, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gutman, Amy (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994)Google Scholar.

⁸⁶ Stockholm Resilience Centre, What is Resilience: An Introduction to Social-Ecological Research, available at: {http://www.stockholmresilience.org/download/18.5ea7abe0139d0dada521ac/resilience_summary_lowX.pdf}.

⁸⁷ Where Richmond does bring into his analysis de Certeau and the tactics of the everyday this is still seen in terms of flexible and hybrid approaches combining liberal and non-liberal understandings, rather than as a pragmatic or resilience approach based on practical policy consequences, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’, pp. 571–2.

⁸⁸ As Manuel DeLanda notes, the key to non-linear understandings of complexity is that the internal organisation of an entity is more important that the external or extrinsic factors, which ‘are efficient solely to the extent to which they take a grip on the proper nature and inner processes of things’. One and the same external set of policies or causal actions ‘may produce very different effects’; A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (London: Continuum, 2006), p. 20.

⁸⁹ According to Charles T. Call, Senior Adviser in the US State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, current approaches seek not to impose artificial external goals nor to merely accept local values, but to facilitate local transformative agency: ‘to find those organic processes and plus them up’ (comments at the International Paternalism workshop, George Washington University, 4–5 October 2013, notes with the author).

⁹⁰ Foucault, , ‘Society Must Be Defended’: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979 (London: Allen Lane, 2003), p. 245Google Scholar.

⁹¹ Foucault, , Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 20–1Google Scholar.

⁹² OAS, The Drug Problem in the Americas.

⁹³ OAS, Scenarios, p. 23

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 30.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 41.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 42.

⁹⁷ See, for example, Paris, and Sisk, Timothy D. (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London: Routledge, 2008)Google Scholar.

⁹⁸ However the challenge to liberal universalist understandings could also be seen as a less emancipatory lowering of expectations, analogous to Merilee S. Grindle's conception of ‘good enough governance’. See further Grindle, , ‘Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 17:4 (2004), pp. 525–48Google Scholar; Grindle, , ‘Good Enough Governance Revisited’, Development Policy Review, 25:5 (2007), pp. 553–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁹ OAS, Scenarios, p. 43.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁰² Ed Vulliamy and Saptarshi Ray, ‘David Simon, creator of The Wire, says new US drug laws help only “white, middle-class kids”’, The Observer (25 May 2013), available at: {http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/25/the-wire-creator-us-drug-laws}.

¹⁰³ OAS, Scenarios, p. 20.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁰⁵ As Moe and Simiojoki note, key to interventions based on pragmatic rather than liberal peace understandings is the mobilising and organising of ‘existing capacities’, ‘Custom, Contestation and Cooperation’, p. 407.

¹⁰⁶ OAS, Scenarios, p. 58.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 62.