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Rationality and politics: the case of strategic theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Trevor C. Salmon
Trevor C. Salmon
Affiliation:
Lecturer, The National Institute for Higher Education, Limerick
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Extract

The development of new kinds of weapons in the immediate post-war period led to a great increase in academic interest in strategic problems. After occasional forays into the field by thinkers such as Bernard Brodie, the output of literature on strategic matters by academics has grown enormously. Most of the work has been done by Americans and reflects an American perspective of the world. It deals with problems that the United States has faced, and is facing, in strategic policy matters.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , October 1976 , pp. 293 - 310
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1976

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References

page 293 note 1 I am grateful to Mr Phil Williams of Aberdeen University for commenting upon earlier drafts of this article. His own views are contained in: Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (London, 1976)Google Scholar.

page 293 note 2 For Brodie's early efforts see his Absolute Weapon (New York, 1964)Google Scholar. A general account of the evolution of modern academic strategy is contained in Gray, Colin, ‘The Rise and Fall of Academic Strategy’, Journal of Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (henceforth (R.U.S.I.), cxvi (1971), pp. 54–77Google Scholar

page 293 note 3 See Rapoport, Anatol, ‘Introduction’, Clausewitz: On War (Great Britain, 1968)Google Scholar and Green, Philip, Deadly Logic (Ohio, 1966)Google Scholar.

page 293 note 4 Gray, Colin, ‘The “Second Wave”: New Directions in Strategic Studies’, R.US.I., cxviii (1973), pp 36–37Google Scholar.

page 294 note 1 See, for example, Allison, Graham T., The Essence of Decision (Boston, 1971)Google Scholar.

page 294 note 2 Kanan's testimony to U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations “Strategic Arms Limitations” hearings 92nd Congress 2nd Session (Washington D.C., 1972), p. 202Google Scholar.

page 295 note 1 Kaufmann, William, Military Power and National Security (Princeton, 1956), pp. 248–9Google Scholar; Kissinger, Henry, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957).Google Scholar

page 295 note 2 Hilsman, Roger, To Move A Nation (New York, 1967), pp. 242ffGoogle Scholar.

page 296 note 1 See Bull, Hedley, The Control of the Arms Race (New York, 1961), pp. 48–49Google Scholar. Verba, S., ‘Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System’, in Jacobson, H. K. and Zimmerman, W. (eds.), The Shaping of Foreign Policy (New York, 1969), pp. 179–208Google Scholar.

page 297 note 1 The Times, 27 and 29 Oct. 1973.

page 297 note 2 Sunday Times, 29 Feb . 1976.

page 297 note 3 Sorensen, T. C., Decision-Making in the White House (New York, 1963), p. 76Google Scholar.

page 298 note 1 The Times; 29 Oct. 1973.

page 298 note 2 The Pathology of Leadership (London, 1969), p. 9Google ScholarPubMed.

page 299 note 1 Buchan, Alastair, The End of the Postwar Era (London, 1974), p. 82Google Scholar.

page 299 note 2 Despite President Ford's disavowal of this term, he does believe that the U.S. must “seek to relax tensions so that we can continue a policy of peace through strength”. Interview -Miami Television Station WCKT-T.V., 1 Mar. 1976.

page 300 note 1 The Irish Times, 18 June 1974 and Sunday Times, 28 Mar. 1976.

page 300 note 2 Paige, G., The Korean Decision (New York, 1968), p. 292Google Scholar.

page 300 note 3 Kahn, H., On Escalation (London, 1963), p. 38Google Scholar.

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page 301 note 2 G. Allison, op. cit. p. 204.

page 301 note 3 Kennedy, Robert F., Thirteen Days; A. Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, 1969), p. 47Google Scholar

page 302 note 1 Neustadt, R., Presidential Poiver (New York, 1964), p. 123Google Scholar.

page 302 note 2 G. Allison, op. cit. p . 203.

page 303 note 1 Ibid., pp. 67 ff.

page 303 note 2 Ibid., p. 125.

page 303 note 3 Compare Greenwood, D. E., Budgeting for Defence (London, 1972), pp. 23–24Google Scholar and Lindblom, C., ‘The Science of Muddling Through’, Public Administration Review, xix (Spring, 1958)Google Scholar.

page 303 note 4 Simon, H., Models of Man (New York, 1957), pp. 204Google Scholar ff.

page 303 note 5 Kennedy, op. cit. p. 111.

page 303 note 6 Sorensen, T. C., Kennedy (London, 1965), p. 765Google Scholar.

page 304 note 1 Hilsman, R., ‘The Foreign Policy Consensus’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, III (1959), pp. 364–71Google Scholar.

page 304 note 2 The Observer, 18 Apr. 1976, pp. 17 and 28.

page 304 note 3 Neustadt, op. cit. pp. 22-24, pp. 120-45.

page 305 note 1 Maxwell, S., ‘Rationality in Deterrence’, Adelphi Paper 50 (London, 1968), pp. 1Google Scholar ff. Kahn, op. cit. pp. 48. Jervis, R., ‘Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics’, in Pennock, J. R. and Chapman, J. W. (eds.), Coercion (Chicago, 1972)Google Scholar.

page 305 note 2 Young, Oran, The Politics of Force (Princeton, 1968), pp. 217Google Scholar ff. and Sorensen, op. cit. p. 761.

page 306 note 1 Brodie, B., Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton, 1966).Google Scholar

page 306 note 2 Schelling, T., Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 187Google Scholar ff.

page 306 note 3 B. Brodie, op. cit. pp . 101-2.

page 306 note 4 T. Schelling, op. cit. pp. 187 ff., and Schelling, T., Arms and Influence (London, 1966)Google Scholar.

page 307 note 1 Arms and Influence, op. cit. pp. 94-96; for a discussion of this aspect of Schelling see Knight, J., ‘Risks of War and Deterrence Logic’ in Canadian Journal of Political Science, vi (1973), especially p. 34Google Scholar.

page 307 note 2 Arms and Influence, op, cit, p. 96.

page 308 note 1 Ibid., pp. 92 ff.

page 308 note 2 Ibid., p. 99.

page 308 note 3 Ibid., p. 110.

page 308 note 4 Stanley Hofiman notes that although the nuclear powers play the game of chicken they are careful to keep their foot on the brake pedal. In fact, according to most strategists they do even more than this. Hoffman, S., The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (London, 1965), p. 142Google Scholar.

page 308 note 5 Kahn, op, cit. p. 66.

page 308 note 6 The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 5th edition (Oxford, 1964), p. 426Google Scholar.

page 309 note 1 Holsti, R., Crisis, Escalation, War (London, 1972), p. 193Google Scholar. He cites Arms and Influence by Schelling, op. cit. pp. 94-99 as an example of such a faith.

page 309 note 2 Compare Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, op. cit. with The Necessity for Choice (New York, 1960).Google ScholarPubMed

page 309 note 3 Dror, Y., Crazy States: A. Counter-Conventional Strategic Issue (Farnborough, Hants, 1971), p. 4Google Scholar.