¹ ‘Transnational’ and ‘NGOs’ have become conventional terms widely used in the academic literature. These terms are less prevalent among practitioners who prefer terms such as ‘international civil society organizations’. In the IR literature, ‘transnational’ is primarily a descriptive category connoting sustained relations among societal actors across borders. See Risse-Kappen, Thomas (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The term ‘NGO’ was first officially introduced with the United Nations Charter of 1945 (Article 71) where the participation of non-state entities in UN proceedings is acknowledged.

² The United Nations count of ‘consultative status’ granted to non-governmental organisations is a rough proxy for the explosion in transnational activism since World War II and especially since the end of the Cold War. The number of NGOs with consultative status at the United Nations increased from 41 in 1946 to 700 in 1992 at an average rate of slightly over 14 organisations annually. After 1992, this average rate increased more than tenfold to 151 organisations added annually. As of December 2011, 3,534 NGOs had attained consultative status. See United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘Consultative Status with ECOSOC and other accreditations’ (New York: United Nations, 2011).

³ Roeger, Katie L., Blackwood, Amy, and Pettijohn, Sarah L., The Nonprofit Sector in Brief: Public Charities, Giving, and Volunteering, 2011 (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2011)Google Scholar.

⁴ ‘Principled activism’ is guided by the question: ‘Is this choice an appropriate reflection of the prevailing community standards?’ A non-principled approach would ask instead: ‘What is the cost-benefit calculation of my choice?’ For example, a principled response to gross human rights violations will invariably call for the prosecution of those responsible, while a non-principled response will also take into consideration possible consequences (intended or unintended), including how such activism affects fundraising, how it may affect levels of future human rights violations, or the likelihood of apprehending the alleged perpetrators.

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⁸ The five sectors covered are human rights, humanitarian relief, sustainable development, conflict resolution, and environmental protection.

⁹ With regard to intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore expressed similar sentiments in arguing that ‘we can better understand what IOs do if we better understand what IOs are’. See Barnett, Michael and Finnemore, Martha, Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

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¹⁵ Alexander Cooley and James Ron, ‘The NGO Scramble’.

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²³ Ibid., p. 36.

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³³ Jo Becker, Campaigning for Justice, pp. 245–59.

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³⁶ We thank the reviewers for this particular suggestion on framing the core contribution of this research.

³⁷ TNGOs are groups recognised as 501(c)(3) organisations by the United States Internal Revenue Service with a significant part of their operations reaching abroad (in multiple countries). While the interviews present the main empirical basis for the claims presented here, we also draw on basic financial information collected by our research team independent of the interviews. In the past three years, we have also conducted several workshops with TNGO leaders from a cross-section of well-known US-based and international groups where we have discussed the preliminary results of our study around issues of governance, leadership, effectiveness, and accountability. These workshops were held under the ‘Chatham House rule’, meaning that participants are allowed to use the information exchanged, but may not reveal the identity or affiliation of particular speakers.

³⁸ The sampling population consisted of organisations that had 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status from the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS), had at least four consecutive years of IRS Forms 990 available, and had received public support greater than $500,000 during their most recent fiscal years. Organisations that reported zero fundraising costs or that were overwhelmingly funded through government grants or fees for services were excluded from the population, along with private foundations, hospitals, hospital foundations, private universities, colleges, community foundations and public broadcasting stations. The selection criteria thus effectively exclude organisations not generally considered to be TNGOs.

³⁹ Margaret G. Hermann, Jesse D. Lecy, George E. Mitchell, Christiane Pagé, Paloma Raggo, Hans Peter Schmitz, and Lorena Viñuela. ‘The Transnational NGO Study: Rationale, Sampling and Research Process’ (Syracuse: Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, 2010).

⁴⁰ The strata were defined by five sectoral, three size (budget) and four financial classifications derived from information provided by Charity Navigator {www.charitynavigator.org}. The three categories of budget size were small (less than $1 million), medium ($1 million to $10 million), and large (greater than $10 million). The four financial classifications were based on Charity Navigator's organisational efficiency and capacity ratings, derived from information from IRS Forms 990.

⁴¹ One hundred and twenty-three organisations from the initial sample of 182 organizations participated in the study, yielding a response rate of 123/182=0.68. Twenty-nine replacements were subsequently added, yielding a total sample size of 152.

⁴² Fundraising and grant management are contained under a single code. The number of respondents who mentioned fundraising specifically is substantially smaller.

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⁴⁴ Amnesty International is an exception among prominent advocacy organisations by relying primarily on membership dues. In the service sector, the child sponsorship programmes approximate a membership model (without the participation of donors in the governance of the organisation). While these fundraising strategies have issues of their own, they are effective in preserving the autonomy of the organisation from large donors.

⁴⁵ This sentiment has also been confirmed in subsequent in-depth conversations with TNGO leaders. When discussing the role of collaborations and partnerships in a workshop setting, leaders frankly admitted that competition is a part of their daily lives, but insisted that it is not a predominant concern.

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⁴⁷ We would also expect more evidence of goal displacement at the programme level among non-US organisations, which could be subject to greater power inequalities in the North-South context.

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⁴⁹ Alexander Cooley and James Ron, ‘The NGO Scramble’.

⁵⁰ Jesse D. Lecy, George E. Mitchell, and Hans Peter Schmitz, ‘Advocacy Organizations, Networks, and the Firm Analogy’.

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