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⁴ For a summary of this position, cf. Vincent, R. J., ‘Realpolitik’, in Mayall, James (ed.), The Community of States (London, 1982), p. 74.Google Scholar

⁵ The classic statement is provided by Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations (New York, fifth edn, 1978), pp. 4–15.Google Scholar

⁶ Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London, 1977), pp. 13–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar and passim.

⁷ Cf. e.g. Linklater, Andrew, Men and Citizens and the Theory of International Relations (London, 1982).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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¹¹ Lyotard, Jean-François, The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge (Manchester, 1984).Google Scholar

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¹⁴ Bull identifies the process we are referring to, but does not address it directly: ‘The standard view [i.e., what we have called the diffusion view of international society], moreover, neglects the influence of Asian international practices on the evolution of European ones: the international society to which non-European powers came to adhere was not one made in a Europe isolated from the rest of the world, but grew up concurrently with the expansion of Europe into other continents over four centuries, and was marked by this experience.’ Bull, Hedley, ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’ in Bull, and Watson, , Expansion, pp. 117–26, on p. 123.Google Scholar

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¹⁶ Harbsmeier, Michael, ‘Early Travels to Europe: some remarks on the magic of writing’, in Barker, Francis et al. (eds.), Europe and Its Others (Colchester, 1985), pp. 72–88Google Scholar, on p. 72, is among those who stress how ‘the European’ was defined by means of an Other: ‘early modern European civilisation came to make its own ability properly to describe and understand the other, its own proper literacy, into the very definition of its own identity as against the rest of the world’.

¹⁷ There are precedents for the existence of a positive Other, most notably in eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinking. Hence, for example, Rousseau pointed to the merits of the ‘noble savage’. Where relations with ‘the Turk’ are concerned, an alternative European tradition stretching back to Cusanus has held that if the two parties could only engage in dialogue, positive results would surely follow.

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²⁰ Simmel, Georg, ‘The Stranger’, in Simmel, Georg, On Individuality and Social Forces. Selected Writings, ed. Levine, Donald N. (Chicago, 1970), pp. 143–9.Google Scholar

²¹ E.g. Epstein, Arnold L., Ethnos and Identity. Three Studies in Ethnicity (London, 1978).Google Scholar

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²³ ‘Indeed, if the idea of Europeanism is to be realised, it will inevitably be based on dualism. Europeanism will not be an alternative to dualism, Europeanism is from beginning to end just a new application of dualistic patterns. And in this application, there are candidates for the role of common unifying enemy: Islam in religion, Japan and the other Pacific–Asian countries in economic competition, and the United States in economics, politics and security.‘ Harle, Vilho, ‘European Roots of Dualism and Its Alternatives in International Relations’, in Harle, Vilho (ed.), European Values in International Relations (London, 1990), pp. 1–14, on p. 11.Google Scholar

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²⁷ ‘The barbarians in question […] cannot be barred from being true owners, alike in public or in private law, by reason of the sin of unbelief or any other mortal sin, nor does such sin entitle Christians to seize their goods and lands.’ Vitoria's De Indis et de Ivre Belli cited in Gong, Standard, p. 36; also Parkinson, F., The Philosophy of International Relations (Beverly Hills, 1977), pp. 18–24Google Scholar; Bull, Hedley, Kingsbury, Benedict and Roberts, Adam (eds.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford, 1990), pp. 43–4.Google Scholar

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³¹ Strémooukhoff, Dimitri, ‘Moscow and the Third Rome: Sources of the Doctrine’, Speculum, 28 (1953), pp. 84–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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³⁴ Moreover, the ancient Greeks entertained the idea of an internal Other in relation to which the Greek city state defined itself, the pharmakos (magician; poisoner; the one sacrificed in expiation for the sins of the city), which illustrates that both types of ‘Otherness’ were operative at least from the time of the beginnings of writte n history; Derrida, Jacques, ‘Plato's Pharmacy’ in Dissemination (London, 1981), pp. 61–171, on p. 132.Google Scholar

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⁴¹ E.g. presentation in Meinecke, Friedrich, Machiavellism; The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History (1924; London, 1957), ch. 3.Google Scholar

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⁴⁶ Naff, in Bull, and Watson, , Expansion, p. 148Google Scholar. In fact, the Turkish attitude towards diplomatic relations with the Europeans parallels the Chinese emperor's view of commercial relations with the Japanese; where the latter saw trade, the former saw tribute, see Suganami, Hidemi, ‘Japan's Entry into International Society’, ibid. pp. 185–99.Google Scholar

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⁵³ ‘ “We are bidden to exclude no class of men from our deeds of kindness”, says Grotius, but the Christian law “ought to be received with due regard to difference in degree, so that we should be doers of good to all, but particularly to those who share the same religion”.’ Bull, , Kingsbury, , and Roberts, , Grotius, p. 14.Google Scholar

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⁵⁷ The Treaty of Carlowitz was also the first instance in which the Turk was invited to participate in a European congress. In addition, by signing the treaty, the Ottoman Empire acknowledged the formal existence of non-Muslim states for the first time. Cf. McKay, Derek and Scott, H. M., The Rise of the Great Powers: 1648–1815 (London, 1983), p. 76.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Lewis, , Tanner Lectures, 5 March 1990.Google Scholar

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⁶⁰ Parkinson, , Philosophy, p. 24Google Scholar; also Gong, , Standard, p. vii.Google Scholar

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⁶⁶ McKay, and Scott, , Rise, p. 205Google Scholar. Previous to 1793, the Sultan had sent individual missions for specific purposes, after which they returned to Constantinople; ‘The absence of permanent resident Ottoman embassies reflected a basic assumption of superiority: diplomacy was unnecessary during the centuries of Ottoman power.’ Ibid. p. 204.

⁶⁷ Anderson, M. S., The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations (London, 1966), p. xi.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁷⁰ Cited in Gong, , Standard, p. 71Google Scholar. The quotation is from a memorandum delivered by a special task force set up within the Foreign Ministry to review Russia's policy towards the Porte in its entirety.

⁷¹ Cf. Rodinson, , Europe, p. 59.Google Scholar

⁷² Palmer, Alan: Alexander I, Tsar of War and Peace, (London, 1974Google Scholar), ch. 18. In fact, the whole affair demonstrates to what extent Alexander's notions about the logic of culture differed from the Western powers, and bears witness to Russia's perceived need to underline its European identity by means of an even more obvious ‘Other’.

⁷³ Cited in Gulick, , Balance, p. 16Google Scholar. Cobden, of course, was also a vocal opponent of the idea of the balance of power.

⁷⁴ Gong, , Standard, p. 107Google Scholar makes a similar assessment. On p. 32 he bolsters his case by citing a passage from Oppenheim's early-twentieth-century standard work on international law which maintains that Turkey's ‘position as a member of the family of nations was anomalous because her civilization fell short of that of the Western states.’ Gong even maintains that this was an expression of the ‘general consensus’ of international lawyers at the time.

⁷⁵ Bull, , ‘The Importance of Grotius’, p. 82Google Scholar. Also Gong, , Standard, pp. 31–3.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Hall, W. E., cited in Wight, , Systems, p. 115Google Scholar. See also Bull, , Kingsbury, and Roberts, , Grotius, pp. 47–8.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Gong, , Standard, p. 10; p. 36; pp. 14–15Google Scholar; on p. 42, he suggests that ‘In part, the standard reflected Europe's need to explain and justify its overlordship of non-European countries in other than merely military terms.’

⁷⁸ Cited in Wight, , Systems, p. 122.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Turkish hesitations about Russian demands for an agreement guaranteeing the position of Orthodox Christians within the Ottoman Empire were a vital part of Russo-Turkish relations from the time of the Treaty of Kucuk-Kaynarca onwards.

⁸⁰ It must be acknowledged that the reform demands of the European states were also oriented towards their own economic interests, or the interests of non-Muslim communities. These interests often conflicted with the goals of the Ottoman elite. For a further discussion of this point, see Berkes, Niyazi, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964), pp. 147–54.Google Scholar

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⁸³ Cited in Riha, Thomas, A Russian European. Paul Miliukov in Russian Politics (Notre Dame, 1969), p. 257.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Cf. e.g. Weisensel, Peter R., ‘Russian Self-Identification and Travelers' Descriptions of the Ottoman Empire in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century’Google Scholar. Paper presented to the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 21–6 July, 1990.

⁸⁵ Özdalga, Elisabeth, Turkiets väg in i Europa (Stockholm, 1989Google Scholar) discusses how the Europeans' stressing of the logic of culture looms large in Ankara's perceptions of the EC.

⁸⁶ We are not denying that questions of an economic nature also played a role here. The Treaty of Rome explicitly states that a state must be democratic to join.

⁸⁷ Mortimer, Edward, ‘Is This Our Frontier?’, Financial Times, 3 April 1990Google Scholar. Of course, variants of the Christian faith remain the state religions of a number of European states.

⁸⁸ Nures, Nurver, ‘Turkey's Place in Europe’, Financial Times, 20 April 1990Google Scholar. The Gulf War sparked a new set of Turkish comments on the same theme.

⁸⁹ Immigration statistics help to convey the magnitude of Europe's ‘resident Other’ population. For example, of the French foreign population in 1982 (the most recent census), 1.76m were European; 1.12m were North African; 138k were French W. African; 294k Asian; 124k Turks; and 51k were from the Americas. In a recent documentary anthology, Alec Hargreaves expands upon the North African portion of these statistics to reveal some of the social, political and educational problems associated with the clash of European and Islamic cultures: ‘As the geographical sources of emigration to France widened, so too did the cultural differences between the sending and receiving countries. Despite language and other differences, France shared a long heritage of Christian belief with her European neighbours, which, even in the more secular world of the twentieth century, was reflected in many aspects of ordinary life.’ Cf. Hargreaves, , Immigration in Postwar France (London, 1987), p. 4Google Scholar. For a more personalised account of the tensions between France and its North African population, see Kramer, Jane, Unsettling Europe (New York, 1980), Chapter 4.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Wight, , Systems, p. 34.Google Scholar

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