1 Steele, Brent J., ‘Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British Neutrality and the American Civil War’, Review of International Studies, 31 (2005), pp. 519–540CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Mitzen, Jennifer, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma’, European Journal of International Relations, 12 (2006), pp. 341–370CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Steele, Brent J., Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State (New York: Routledge, 2008)Google Scholar ; Zarakol, Ayşe, ‘Ontological (In)security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan’, International Relations, 24 (2010), pp. 3–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

2 For simplicity, I use the term ‘separation barrier’ even though it is highly contested, as are other terms that are used to describe the wall/fence/barrier. Some are criticised by the Israelis and others by the Palestinians and by the international community. It also should be noted that although most of the separation barrier is made up of a fence (and includes other measures such as trenches), in areas close to Palestinian villages the fence becomes a wall, see Folman, Yeshayahu, The Story of the Security Fence. Life Repudiation Indeed [in Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Carmel, 2004), p. 19Google Scholar .

3 While the construction of the separation barrier started in spring of 2002, it was not until late 2003 that the Israeli government adopted a resolution regarding its specific route, see Jonathan Rynhold, ‘Israel's Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbour?’, Survival, 46 (2004), p. 60. For discussion of the route of the barrier, see Jacoby, Tami Amanda, Bridging the Barrier (Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 26–32Google Scholar ; Tessler, Mark, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2nd edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 825–826Google Scholar . In this respect, it should be noted that the separation barrier does not fully overlap the ‘green line’.

4 In my discussion of Israeli identity I am referring to the Israeli-Jewish identity. Therefore, when I suggest that there is a dissonance or a dilemma among Israeli identities, I mean a dilemma for Israeli-Jews. I'm taking this position since I'm focusing on the dominant Israeli discourse. As Israeli-Arab citizens are de facto excluded from governmental decision-making processes and Israeli governments mainly represent the Jewish population, such an approach is crucial.

5 Barnett, Michael, ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo’, European Journal of International Relations, 5 (1999), pp. 5–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Bially-Mattern, Janice, Ordering International Politics. Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force (New York: Routledge, 2005)Google Scholar ; Sucharov, Mira M., The International Self. Psychoanalysis and the Search for Israeli-Palestinian Peace (New York, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005)Google Scholar ; Steele, , ‘Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity’; Dov Waxman, The Pursuit of Peace and the Crisis of Israeli Identity. Defining/Defending the Nation (New York: Palgrave, 2006)Google Scholar .

6 Smith, Steven M., Fabrigar, Leandre R. and Norris, Meghan E., ‘Reflecting on Six Decades of Selective Exposure Research: Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities’, Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2 (2008), pp. 464–493CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Olson, James M. and Stone, Jeff, ‘The Influence of Behavior on Attitudes’, in Albarraci, Dolores, Zanna, Mark P. and Johnson, Blair T. (eds) The Handbook of Attitudes (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2005)Google Scholar .

7 For important works that explore the connections between Israeli identity and security, and the influences of these on its foreign policy, see Barnett ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change’; Sucharov, The International Self; Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics’; Waxman, The Pursuit of Peace; Bar-Tal, Daniel, Living with the Conflict. Socio-Psychological Analysis of the Jewish Society in Israel [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2007)Google Scholar .

8 Shamir, Jacob, Public opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2007), p. 2Google Scholar .

9 Hopf, Ted, Social Construction of International Politics. Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 & 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 1, 5Google Scholar ; Waxman, , The Pursuit of Peace, p. 188Google Scholar .

10 For example, Roe, Paul, Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma (London: Routledge, 2005)Google Scholar ; Buzan, , Barry, , Wæver, Ole and Wilde, Jaap de, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 119–140Google Scholar .

11 Giddens, Anthony, Modernity and Self-Identity (New York: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 35–69Google Scholar ; Huysmans, Jef, ‘Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier’, European Journal of International Relations, 4 (1998), p. 242CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; McSweeney, Bill, Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 154–158CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 50–51, 131CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Steele, ‘Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity’, pp. 524–30; Sucharov, , The International Self, p. 34Google Scholar ; Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics’, pp. 342–3; Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations.

12 Hopf, , Social Construction of International Politics, pp. 6–7Google Scholar ; see also Ringmar, Erik, Identity, Interests and Action. A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 13–14, 81CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Steele, , Ontological Security in International Relations, pp. 51–52Google Scholar ; Zarakol, ‘Ontological (In)security and State Denial’, p. 3.

13 Giddens, , Modernity and Self-Identity, p. 188Google Scholar ; Steele, ‘Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity’, p. 527; Sucharov, , The International Self, p. 34Google Scholar .

14 Festinger, Leon, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957)Google Scholar . It has been asserted that the dissonance or the tension is stronger when the importance of the cognitions at stake is greater. Eagly, Alice E. and Chaiken, Shelly, The Psychology of Attitudes (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), pp. 459, 471Google Scholar ; Judson, Mills, ‘Improving the 1957 Version of Dissonance Theory’, in Harmon-Jones, Eddie and Mills, Judson (eds), Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory in Social Psychology (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1999), pp. 33, 35Google Scholar .

15 Judson, ‘Improving the 1957 Version’, p. 28.

16 Auerbach, Yehudit, ‘Turning-Point Decisions: A Cognitive-Dissonance Analysis of Conflict Reduction in Israeli-West German Relations’, Political Psychology, 7 (1986), pp. 533–550CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; and in Eagly, and Chaiken, , The Psychology of Attitudes, p. 467Google Scholar .

17 Eagly, and Chaiken, , The Psychology of Attitudes, p. 529Google Scholar .

18 See Kelman, H. C. and Baron, R. M, ‘Inconsistency as a Psychological Signal’, in Abelson, R. P., Aronson, E., McGuire, W. J., Newcomb, T. M., Rosenberg, N. J. and Tannenbaum, P. H (eds), Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook (Chicago: Rand McNally), pp. 331–336Google Scholar ; Auerbach, ‘Turning-Point Decisions’.

19 Yehudit Auerbach, ‘Turning-Point Decisions’, p. 540.

20 Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 387–406Google Scholar .

21 Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘International Norms and Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organizations, 52 (1998), p. 904CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

22 It should be noted, that Wendt mentions the term cognitive dissonance to refer to a dissonance a collective actor experiences following a threat to an identity it holds, but he does not fully elaborate on it, Wendt, , Social Theory, p. 274Google Scholar .

23 Nonetheless, it should be noted, that in fact, ontological dissonance and cognitive dissonance affect each other. In this respect, the dissonance an enunciator experiences may become an additional source for narrating ontological dissonance at the state level. Likewise, a dissonance at the state level may trigger a dissonance in individuals.

24 For some differences between psychologist and constructivist approaches to identity, see Bially-Mattern, , Ordering International Politics, pp. 46–48, 51Google Scholar . For the mutual contribution of these two approaches, see Sucharov, , The International Self, p. 18; Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, p. 198Google Scholar .

25 See, for example, Barnett ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change’; Wendt, , Social Theory of International Politics, p. 230Google Scholar .

26 Wendt, Alexander, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’, International Organization, 46 (1992), p. 411CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Wendt, , Social Theory, p. 274Google Scholar ; Steele, ‘Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity’, pp. 527–8; Steele, , Ontological Security in International Relations, p. 51Google Scholar ; Sucharov, The International Self; Bially-Mattern, , Ordering International Politics, p. 13Google Scholar ; Zürn and Checkel also refer to cognitive dissonance as one of the mechanisms through which international socialisation occurs, although they have not further developed this argument. Zürn, Michael and Checkel, Jeffrey T., ‘Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State’, International Organization, 59 (2005), pp. 1053–1054CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

27 It should be noted that while in situations in which the clashing identities enjoy a similar level of salience the dissonance will be greater, the clash can occur as well when the identities are of varying level of importance, as long as they are not totally negligible. In this regard, see also Wendt, , Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 230–231Google Scholar .

28 The Other in this respect provides ontological security by confirming the identity, and thus validating to one that it is what it is expected to be, Ringmar, , Identity, Interests and Action, pp. 13–14, 81Google Scholar ; Hopf, , Social Construction of International Politics, pp. 136–137Google Scholar .

29 For example, see Steele, , Ontological Security in International Relations, pp. 54–55Google Scholar .

30 Sucharov, , The International Self, pp. 26–28, 159Google Scholar .

31 See Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis; Lipschutz, Ronnie D., ‘Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End’, in Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (ed.), On Security, (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 216Google Scholar . Steele argues that Mitzen views states as ‘black boxes’ and that she needs to further acknowledge the importance of agency and take into account processes of narration and social constructions that create the ontological security, Steele, , Ontological Security in International Relations, pp. 17–21Google Scholar .

32 Regarding securitisation, see Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis; Williams, Michael C., ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, International Studies Quarterly, 47 (2003), pp. 511–531CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

33 Buzan, Barry and Wæver, Ole. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 489CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

34 In this respect, actors may well live in situations in which they hold contradictory identities. However, as Sucharov suggests, when they become aware of this tension – for example, when external forces draw their attention to it – they can no longer ignore the dissonance. See, Sucharov, The International Self, p. 27.

35 On the characteristics of enunciators who may successfully narrate a threat, see Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p. 33.

36 For example, it was even suggested that key foreign policy decisions may result from the way policymakers interpret the state's identity, E. C Jacques Hymans, The psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

37 Cerulo, Karen A., Never Saw It Coming. Cultural Challenges to Envisioning the Worst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar . For a similar discussion on the ability to make a certain object an existential threat, Buzan, et al. , Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p. 33Google Scholar .

38 On the connections between identity and discourse, see Hopf, , Social Construction of International Politics, p. 13Google Scholar . On discourse analysis as a key element in tracing an actor's identity, see Milliken, Jennifer, ‘The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods’, European Journal of International Relations, 5 (1999), pp. 225–254CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

39 Steele, ‘Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity’, pp. 526–7; Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations.

40 Saurette, ‘You Dissin Me’, p. 513, passim.

41 McSweeney, , Security, Identity and Interests, p. 157Google Scholar ; Steele, , ‘Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity’, p. 527Google Scholar ; Sucharov, , The International Self, p. 34Google Scholar .

42 Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security’, pp. 347, 351; Steele, , Ontological Security in International Relations, p. 51Google Scholar . Scholars also suggest that identity (or challenged identity) is the source of emotional reactions, as individuals become emotionally connected to the state and its social structure, Löwenheim, Oded and Heiman, Gadi, ‘Revenge in International Politics’, Security Studies, 17 (2008), p. 690CrossRefGoogle Scholar . Important questions for research concern how emotions become a collective phenomenon, see for example, Bleiker and Hutchison, ‘Fear No More’, pp. 122–3, 130; G. Ross, Andrew A., ‘Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions’, European Journal of International Relations, 12 (2006), p. 213CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

43 Bially-Mattern, , Ordering International Politics, pp. 12–13Google Scholar .

44 Sucharov, , The International Self, pp. 32–34, 37–39, 161Google Scholar .

45 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity; Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make’, p. 411; Steele, ‘Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity’; Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security’, p. 352.

46 Uwe, Hentschel, Smith, Gudmund, Ehlers, Wolfram and Draguns, Juris G., Defense Mechanisms: Theoretical, Research and Clinical Perspectives (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2004)Google Scholar ; Smith et al., ‘Reflecting on Six Decades’; see also Goffman, Erving, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press), pp. 13–14, 212–237Google Scholar .

47 Eagly, and Chaiken, , The Psychology of Attitude, pp. 559–625Google Scholar .

48 For example, Cohen, Stanley, States of Denial. Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (Cambridge: Polity, 2001)Google Scholar ; Zarakol, ‘Ontological (In)security and State Denial’.

49 Case, Donald O., Andrew, James E., Johnson, David J. and Allard, Suzanne L., ‘Avoiding Versus Seeking: The Relationship of Information Seeking to Avoidance, Blunting, Coping, Dissonance, and Related Concepts’, Journal of the Medical Library Association (2005), pp. 353–362Google Scholar ; Olson and Jeff Stone, ‘The Influence of Behavior on Attitudes’, p. 231.

50 Giddens, , Modernity and Self-Identity, p. 188Google Scholar .

51 Northrup, Terrell A., ‘The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict’, in Kriesberg, Louis, Northrup, Terrell A., Thorson, Stuart J. (eds), Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1989), pp. 64–65Google Scholar .

52 Cohen, , States of Denial, p. 23Google Scholar .

53 See in Case et al., ‘Avoiding versus seeking’.

54 For example, Cotton, John L. and Hieser, Rex A., ‘Selective Exposure to Information and Cognitive Dissonance’, Journal of Research in Personality, 14 (1980), pp. 518–527CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

55 Eagly, and Chaiken, , The Psychology of Attitudes, p. 594Google Scholar .

56 Northrup, ‘The Dynamic of Identity’, pp. 70–1.

57 In fact, the difficulty in tracing avoidance of individuals was mentioned as a methodological challenge of studying this process, see Olson and Jeff Stone, ‘The Influence of Behavior on Attitudes’, p. 231.

58 Ringmar, , Identity, Interests and Action, pp. 13–14, 81–82Google Scholar .

59 This assertion also converges with the argument that avoidance measures do not solve a dissonance individuals face but rather prevent a new dissonance from arising, see Eagly, and Chaiken, , The Psychology of Attitudes, p. 594Google Scholar .

60 For discussion of the limited number of studies that explore the separation barrier, see Jacoby, , Bridging the Barrier, pp. 5–7Google Scholar .

61 Gavrilis, George, ‘Sharon's Endgame for the West Bank Barrier’, The Washington Quarterly, 27 (2004), pp. 7–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Rynhold, ‘Israel's Fence’, pp. 55–76; Frisch, Hillel, (the) Fence or Offense? Testing the Effectiveness of ‘the Fence’ in Judea and Samaria (Ramat-Gan: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, 2007)Google Scholar .

62 Benvenisti, MeronSon of the Cypresses: Memories, Reflections, and Regrets from a Political Life (Berkley: University of California Press, 2007), pp. 175–179Google Scholar ; Trottier, Julie, ‘A Wall, Water and Power: The Israeli ‘Separation Fence’, Review of International Studies, 33 (2007), pp. 105–127CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

63 On the contribution of the separation barrier to Israeli security, see Rynhold, ‘Israel's Fence’, pp. 60, 64–5, 70.

64 Frisch, , (the) Fence or Offense, p. 23Google Scholar .

65 Arieli, Shaul and Sfard, Michael, The Wall of Folly [in Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Aliyat Gag Books, 2008), pp. 125–126, 129Google Scholar ; Waxman, , The Pursuit of Peace, p. 180Google Scholar ; Grinberg, Lev Luis, Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 177Google Scholar .

66 According to official Israeli data the number of suicide terror attacks decreased from its highest level in 2001 and 2002 (34, 55 attacks, respectively), to a lower level of 25 (in 2003), 14 (in 2004), 7 (in 2005), 4 (2006) and 1 (2007), see Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000’ (2009), {http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm} accessed on 5 August 2010.

67 Slater, Jerome, ‘Muting the Alarm over the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict The New York Times Versus Haaretz, 2000–2006, International Security, 32 (2007), p. 102CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

68 Amos Harel, ‘From 40 to 5 attacks in a Quarter’ [in Hebrew], Haaretz (8 April 2004), p. 1, {http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=413586&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0} accessed on 5 August 2010; Ben-Israel, Isaac, Setter, Oren and Tishler, Asher, ‘R&D and the War on Terrorism: Generalizing the Israeli Experience’, in James, Andrew D. (ed.), Science and Technology Policies for the Anti-Terrorism Era (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006), p. 55Google Scholar .

69 See Meir, Ben and Shaked, , The People Speak, pp. 87–88Google Scholar ; Waxman, ‘From Controversy to Consensus’, p. 74. A strong political centre was another factor that facilitated Israel's ability to take the unilateral steps. This is because these steps can be seen as a political compromise between a leftist solution that calls for a full withdrawal through agreement with the Palestinians and a rightist solution that calls for refraining from any concession. However, little evidence exists that a compromise in fact shaped the emergence of the idea of the unilateral steps – with the exception of specific negotiations and debates concerning the route of the separation barrier. I suggest rather that it was the narrative of the state that affected large parts of society across the political spectrum as well as political leaders and enunciators themselves (as PM Sharon), see for example, Grinberg, , Politics and Violence, p. 185Google Scholar .

70 See Gavrilis, ‘Sharon's Endgame’, p. 18.

71 Although these unilateral steps preserve the Israeli control over the West Bank, it was not necessarily the initial motivation for taking these steps in the first place. Thus, for example, the route of the separation barrier demonstrates not only Sharon's will, but also domestic pressure from right, see in Arieli, and Sfarad, , The Wall of Folly, pp. 92, 100–101, 163, 196, 202Google Scholar ; Rynhold, ‘Israel's Fence’, pp. 61, 68; Gavrilis, ‘Sharon's Endgame for the West Bank Barrier’, pp. 9–10.

72 Frisch, , (the) Fence or Offense, p. 12Google Scholar ; Rynhold, ‘Israel's Fence’, p. 59; Sucharov, The International Self, pp. 145, 149; Arieli and Sfard, The Wall of Folly, pp. 83–4. For a review of various proposals through the years to disengage from the Palestinians on the one hand and integrate with the Palestinians on the other, see Schueftan, Dan, Disengagement: Israel and the Palestinian Entity [in Hebrew] (Haifa: Haifa University Press, 1999), pp. 35–52Google Scholar .

73 Between May 2001–August 2005 the level of support of a unilateral separation varied between 54 per cent–68 per cent, see War and Peace Index, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel-Aviv University. All reports can be downloaded at: {http://www.spirit.tau.ac.il/xeddexcms008/index.asp?siteid=5&lang=2} accessed on 5 August 2010. Since 2005 the level of support has decreased, Meir, Yehuda Ben and Shaked, Dafna, The People Speak. Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2005–2007 (Tel-Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007), pp. 61–65Google Scholar . For additional discussion of public opinion surveys in Israel, see Meir, Ben and Shaked, , The People Speak, pp. 19–20, 62–64Google Scholar ; and in Rynhold, ‘Israel's Fence’, p. 60. In this respect, the assertion according to which Israeli policymakers could not resist the public demands to implement the barrier, see Gavrilis, ‘Sharon's Endgame’, p. 9, is limited. Although it is impossible to refute this assertion, there is no full correlation between the magnitude of support (which had lasted for years) and the implementation of this plan, nor is it completely clear that politicians were not involved in shaping this public mood.

74 Folman, , The Story of the Security Fence, pp. 216, 242–243Google Scholar , passim; Schueftan, , Disengagement, pp. 173, 192Google Scholar .

75 Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, ‘The Disengagement Plan as an Identity Crisis’, in Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov (ed.), The Rise and Fall of the Disengagement Plan [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2009), p. 24Google Scholar .

76 Arieli, and Sfard, , The Wall of Folly, pp. 31–32, 40–41, 59Google Scholar , author's translation; see also Rynhold, ‘Israel's Fence’, p. 60; Trottier, ‘A Wall, Water and Power’, p. 110.

77 Liebman, Charles and Susser, Bernard, ‘Judaism and Jewishess in the Jewish State’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 555 (1998), pp. 19–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

78 Northrup, ‘The Dynamic of Identity’, pp. 68–9.

79 Waxman, , The Pursuit of Peace, pp. 36–37Google Scholar ; see also, Kimmerling, Baruch. The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society, and the Military (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 82, 111, 113Google Scholar .

80 Liebman and Susser, ‘Judaism and Jewishess’, pp. 22–3.

81 Sucharov, , The International Self, p. 50Google Scholar .

82 Waxman, , The Pursuit of Peace, p. 185Google Scholar ; Waxman, Dov, ‘From Controversy to Consensus: Cultural Conflict and the Israeli Debate over Territorial Withdrawal’, Israel Studies, 13 (2008), pp. 83–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

83 On the rise of the perception that the Palestinians are a source of threat to the Jewish state, see in Waxman, , The Pursuit of Peace, pp. 183–184Google Scholar .

84 Benn Aluf, ‘Israel's Identity Crisis’, Salon (16 May 2005), {http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2005/05/16/identity} accessed on 5 August 2010. On the Israeli fear of the demographic threat, and its exaggeration, see, for example, Paul Morland, ‘Defusing the Demographic Scare’, Haaretz (8 May 2009), {http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/defusing-the-demographic-scare-by-paul-morland-1.275657} accessed on 5 August 2010. On social construction of threats that influenced the establishment of the separation barrier, see also Newman, David, ‘The Lines That Continue to Separate Us: Borders in Our “Borderless” World’, Progress in Human Geography, 30 (2006), p. 149CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

85 On the demographic debate in Israel in recent years, see Shahar Ilan, ‘Demographically Correct’, Haaretz (7 June 2005). Available at: {http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/demographically-correct-1.160632} accessed on 5 August 2010. It is interesting to note that demographers from the right contend that ‘Israeli concerns about demographic pressure from the West Bank and Gaza have evidently been exaggerated. The demographic threat to Israeli society has not quantitatively changed since 1967’, Zimmerman, , Bennett, , Seid, Roberta and Wise, Michael L., The Million Person Gap: The Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza, Mideast Security and Policy Studies no. 65 (Ramat-Gan: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University), p. 54Google Scholar . However, as Prof. Arnon Sofer, an Israeli demographer who supports the separation plan, argues, ‘the Israeli right has begun to discover that the use of demography is a two-edged sword and is now working to its detriment’, quoted in Ilan Shahar ‘Demographically Correct’.

86 Ariel Sharon, Excerpt from Speech by PM Sharon after Government Approval of Disengagement Plan (6 June 2004). Available at: {http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2004/Statement+by+PM+Sharon+6-June-2004.htm} accessed on 5 August 2010; see also, Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Address at the Herzliya Conference (16 December 2004), available at: {http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Speeches/2004/12/speech161204.htm} accessed on 5 August 2010); Ehud Olmert, Address by Acting PM Ehud Olmert to the 6th Herzliya Conference (24 January 2006), available at: {http://www.herzliyaconference.org/Eng/_Uploads/1401olmert.doc} accessed on 5 August 2010. Although Olmert's speech is taken from a later period of time, it clearly demonstrates the above-mentioned assertion. Furthermore, it not only exemplifies the discourse but shows its prevalence.

87 See Meir, Ben and Shaked, , The People Speak, p. 62Google Scholar ; Waxman, , ‘From Controversy to Consensus’, p. 88Google Scholar .

88 Newman, ‘The Lines That Continue to Separate Us’, p. 147.

89 See Sucharov, , The International Self, p. 50Google Scholar ; but see in Feige, Michael, One Space, Two Places: Gush Emunim, Peace Now and the Construction of Israeli Space [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2002), p. 34Google Scholar .

90 See in Smooha, Sammy, ‘Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype’, Israel Studies, 2 (1997), pp. 201–205CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Gavison, Ruth, ‘Jewish and Democratic? A Rejoinder to the “Ethnic Democracy” Debate’, Israel Studies, 4 (1999), pp. 44–47Google Scholar .

91 Barnett ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change’, pp. 11–12. For further discussion of the tension and clashes between the Jewish and democratic characteristics of the state, see also Gavison, ‘Jewish and Democratic’, pp. 64–5.

92 Smooha, ‘Ethnic Democracy’, pp. 201, 205, 208, 233.

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94 Quoted in Tessler, , A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 836Google Scholar .

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98 Amir Lupovici, ‘Identity, Discourse and Deterrence in Israel's Ongoing Battle with Hizbollah’ paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York (February 2009).

99 Bar-Tal, Daniel and Sharvit, Keren, ‘The influence of the threatening transitional context on Israeli Jews' reactions to Al Aqsa Intifada’, in Esses, V. M. & Vernon, R. A. (eds), Explaining the breakdown of ethnic relations: Why neighbors kill (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), pp. 147–170CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Kurtz, Anat N., The Palestinian Uprisings: War with Israel, War at Home (Tel- Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies, 2009), p. 77Google Scholar . See also Grinberg, , Politics and Violence, pp. 174–175Google Scholar .

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101 Sucharov, , The International Self, p. 114Google Scholar ; See also, Trottier, ‘A Wall, Water and Power’, p. 111; Waxman, ‘From Controversy to Consensus’, p. 85.

102 Tessler, , A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 835Google Scholar .

103 Barnett ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change’, pp. 10–12.

104 Barnett, ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change’; ‘Sucharov, The International Self; Waxman, The Pursuit of Peace.

105 Meir, Ben and Shaked, , The People Speak, pp. 70–71Google Scholar ; Waxman, ‘From Controversy to Consensus’, p. 85.

106 Barnett, ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change’, p. 27.

107 In fact, many in the political arena and in the security establishment warned that concessions – and even unilateral steps – would be interpreted as a ‘prize for terror’. See, for example, Silvan Shalom, Address by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Silvan Shalom at the Fourth Herzliya Conference, (17 December 2003), available at: {http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2003/Address+by+FM+Silvan+Shalom+at+the+Fourth+Herzliya.htm} accessed on 5 August 2010.

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111 Alex Fishman and Sima Kadmon, ‘We Are Seriously Concerned about the Fate of the State of Israel’, Yediot Ahronot (14 November 2003).

112 For some similar arguments, see Yuval Yoaz, ‘Barak: Coming Years Will Determine the Identity of Israel’, Haaretz (19 May 2005); and Israel Harel Israel, ‘Israel Containment Forces’, Haaretz (17 March 2005), available at:{http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=553114} accessed on 5 August 2010.

113 Quoted in Benn Aluf, ‘The Shin Bet Chiefs Did It’, Haaretz (13 October 2004), available at: {www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=487921} accessed on 5 August 2010.

114 Waxman, ‘From Controversy to Consensus’, p. 90; See also in Bar-Tal, Daniel, Living with the Conflict. Socio-Psychological Analysis of the Jewish Society in Israel [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2007), p. 295Google Scholar .

115 Ibid., p. 87.

116 Olmert, Address by Acting PM Ehud Olmert to the 6th Herzliya Conference; and see in Nahum Barnea ‘Olmert Calls for a Unilateral Withdrawal from Most Territories’ [in Hebrew], Yedioth Ahronoth, weekend supplementary (5 December 2004).

117 Waxman, ‘From Controversy to Consensus’, p. 87.

118 See in Schueftan, , Disengagement, p. 58Google Scholar ; and A. B. Yehoshua, ‘Eleven Degrees of Separation’ [in Hebrew], Haaretz (2 August 2002).

119 Benvenisti, Son of the Cypresses, p. 189; see also, War and Peace Index, December 2003, pp. 1, 3Google Scholar .

120 Meir, Ben and Shaked, , The People Speak, pp. 18, 36Google Scholar . See also, Waxman, ‘From Controversy to Consensus’, p. 81.

121 Olmert, Address to the 6th Herzliya Conference.

122 Sharon, Ariel Sharon Spoke at the Caesaria Conference. See also, Benn Aluf, and Yossi Verter, ‘PM: I Can Withstand Pressure for Another Disengagement Plan [in Hebrew]’, Haaretz (22 April 2005); Grinber, , Politics and Violence, p. 182Google Scholar .

123 Quoted in Sucharov, , The International Self, p. 164Google Scholar .

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125 Sharon, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon Spoke at the Caesaria Conference.

126 See in Zaki Shalom, ‘Underlying the Disengagement Plan’, Strategic Assessment, 8 (2005), p. 3. This assertion should also be understood in the context of criticism of the disengagement plan, which allegedly erodes the Israeli deterrent posture, and is a sign of defeatism, see above p. 13.

127 Sharon, Address at the Herzliya Conference; Olmert, Address to the 6th Herzliya Conference. See also in Shaked, Ben Meir, The People Speak, p. 36Google Scholar ; Evron, Yair, ‘Disengagement and Israeli Deterrence’, Strategic Assessment, 8 (2005), p. 13Google Scholar ; Rynhold, ‘Israel's Fence’, p. 60.

128 Quoted in James Bennet, ‘Sharon's Wars’, The New York Time Magazine Online (15 August 2004), emphasis added; See also, Waxman, , The Pursuit of Peace, p. 181Google Scholar ; Del-Sarto, ‘Region-Building, EU Normative Power, and Contested Identities’, p. 321.

129 Although there were some opponents who criticised this solution, most of the debates, including the appealing for the supreme court, was regarding the route and not the basic question of the establishment of the separation barrier, Trottier, ‘A Wall, Water and Power, pp. 107–8, 111; and see also, for example, in Arieli, and Sfard, , The Wall of Folly, pp. 361–363Google Scholar ; and in Slater, ‘Muting the Alarm over the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’.

130 Arieli, and Sfard, , The Wall of Folly, p. 136Google Scholar , author's translation; see also, War and Peace Index, December 2003, pp. 1, 3; Benvenisti, , Son of the Cypresse, p. 181Google Scholar .

131 Newman, ‘The Lines That Continue to Separate Us’, p. 152.

132 Shavit, quoted in Waxman, ‘From Controversy to Consensus’, p. 87.

133 Avi, Issacharoff, ‘The Bystanders’, Haaretz (15 June 2007).

134 Zvi Bar'el, ‘Let There Be Calm Already, Haaretz (15 June 2008), available at: {http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/992691.html} accessed on 5 August 2010.

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137 Olmert, Address by Acting PM Ehud Olmert to the 6th Herzliya.

138 Meir, Ben and Shaked, , The People Speak, p. 62Google Scholar .

139 Yoel Esteron, ‘Let's Dismantle the Fence’, Haaretz (7 July 2004), available at: {http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/let-s-dismantle-the-fence-1.127806} accessed on 5 January 2011.

140 Ari Shavit, ‘Listen to Me [in Hebrew]’, Haaretz (5 May 2005), available at: {http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArt.jhtml?contrassID=1&subContrassID=5&sbSubContrassID=0&itemNo=577101} accessed on 6 January 2011.

141 See {http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=210H8wavqbc&feature=player_embedded} accessed on 5 August 2010.

142 Ziv Amitai, ‘Ahmed Tibi joins opposition to Cellcom commercial’, Haaretz (13 July 2009), available at: {http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1100030.html} accessed on 16 March 2010.

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