1. For excellent reviews of a literature whose extensiveness precludes a comprehensive list see Pachter, Henry, ‘Revisionist Historians and the Cold War’, Dissent, 15 (11–12 1968), pp. 505–581Google Scholar; Maier, Charles S., ‘Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins’, Perspectives in American History, 4, (1970), pp. 313–347Google Scholar; and Tucker, Robert W., The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, 1971)Google Scholar; Laqueur, Walter, ‘Rewriting History’, Commentary, 55, (03 1973), pp. 53–60Google Scholar; and Stover, Robert, ‘Responsibility for the Cold War—A Case Study in Historical Responsibility,’ History and Theory, 11, (1972), pp. 145–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. As one Soviet historian noted, ‘[often] people find that their arguments coincide with the Soviet point of view. Without a question, this is correct—the “revisionists”, somewhat tardily, have agreed with Soviet historians regarding who bears the responsibility for the cold war and who is to blame that the reasonable possibilities in American-Soviet relations were not realized’, Sivachev, N. V. and Yakovlev, N. N., Russia and the United States, (Chicago, 1979), p. 214;Google Scholar see also Stepanova, O. L., ‘Istoriki “revizionisty” o vneshnej politike SShA’ [the ‘revisionist’ historian s on the foreign policy of the US], Voprosy Istorii, no. 3, (1973), pp. 105–6.Google Scholar

3. ‘Will the influence of radical criticism persist, if only in attenuated form?’, Tucker, R. W., The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy, (London, 1971), p. 153.Google Scholar

4. ‘Any attempt to summarize a body of critical thought immediately encounters the objection that it fails to make significant distinctions … The question is whether these differences overshadow the similarities and, even more, whether the similarities themselves are more apparent than real.… If these differences clearly cannot be ignored their significance ought not to be exaggerated…, Tucker, op. cit., pp. 13–15. See also, Ashley, R. K., ‘The poverty of neorealism’Google Scholar, and Gilpin's, R. G. response, ‘The richness of the tradition of political realism’, both in International Organization, 38, (1984).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5. See ‘The return of hostility since the late 1970's was not exactly the return to cold war which some observers had predicted. On the contrary, a residue of trade and contacts, as well as arms control negotiations and careful crisis management, makes the current period of renewed hostility quite different from the 1950's trough in the cycle of attitudes’. Nye, J. S., ‘Can America Manage its Soviet Policy?’ Foreign Affairs, 62, (1984), p. 861.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Or: ‘… the demise of detente was not followed by a new cold war. Strains between the two countries notwithstanding, the dialogue has continued.’ Ulam, Adam B., ‘40 years of troubled co-existence’, Foreign Affairs, 64, (1985), p. 29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6. See for example Gaddis, J. L., ‘The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 7, (1983).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7. ‘The Left draws the dividing line between the Left and the Right, while the Right fights this division systematically—and in vain’, Kolakowski, L., Marxism and Beyond, (London, 1971), p. 94.Google Scholar

8. Maclean, J. [‘Marxist Epistemology, Explanations of “Change ” and the Study of International Relations’, in Buzan, Barry and Jones, R. J. Barry (eds), Change and the Study of International Relations: the evaded dimension, (London, 1981), p. 47]Google Scholar talks about the ‘development of a critical, and scientific, theory of international relations … [as] within cognate social sciences such as politics, sociology, economics, social anthropology and human/social geography’, whilst R. W. Cox seems to miss this particular point (the relation of the ‘critical’ school to an established discipline) when he talks about a ‘critical theory of World Order’, Cox, , ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 10, (1981).CrossRefGoogle Scholar The definition of ‘critical theory’ at the beginning of this article is taken from the same article, pp. 129–30.

9. Since the coining of the term ‘critical theory’ in 1937 by the second director of the Frankfurt School, Horkheimer (who in turn derived inspiration from the understanding of Marxism as a ‘critique of politial economy’), there have evolved at least three usages of the term. First, there are the two distinct usages by each of the generations of the Frankfurt School, around Horkheimer and Habermas respectively. It was used as a code word for Marxism during the American exile of the Frankfurt School. All critical theorists have shared ever since in their idiosyncratic (sometimes extremely abstract and deliberately obscure) development of the concept only one fundamental objective: ‘to come to radically reconstitute the project of huma n emancipation that in traditional Marxist theory had been projected as the proletarian revolution’ [Lowenthal quoted in Antonio, R. J., ‘The Origin, Development and Contemporary Status of Critical Theory’, The Sociological Quarterly, 24 (1983), p. 326CrossRefGoogle Scholar; (in our view the best, most concise and, in terms of bibliography, the most comprehensive introduction for the ‘uninitiated’)]. Any definition more specific than that of Lowenthal's would be unacceptable to most ‘critical thinkers’: not a ‘set of statements or hypotheses’, critical theory has been more a style of understanding of the social world that seeks to promote emancipatory action (Antonio, p. 332) or uprise deposition. The third usage encompasses those derivative meanings of the term across a range of social science disciplines. Cox (whose definition we follow) refers to neither of the two generations of the Frankfurt School and in fact mentions Habermas as a theorist irrelevant for an understanding of international behaviour (Cox, op. cit. (note 8) p. 127). But his distinction between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ theories (see above, p. 163 and notes 1–1, 12 and 15 below), although substantially watered down and simplified, is nonetheless reminiscent of Lowenthal's ‘collective denominator’.

10. Ollman, B. and Vernoff, E. (eds), The Left Academy: Marxist Scholarship on American Campuses, (New York, 1982), p. 7.Google Scholar

11. The shared features of all ‘critical theorists’ from whatever academic discipline they write seems to be: opposition to conservative orthodoxy in their respective disciplines, anti-positivism, sensitivity to change and awareness of conflict as well as of the transitory, impermanent nature of the (capitalist) present. For samples of the massive contemporary literature see: Stewart, J. J., ‘Is a Critical Sociology Possible?’, Sociological Inquiry, 54, (1984)Google Scholar; Bauman, Z., Towards a Critical Sociology, London, 1976)Google Scholar; Freund, M., ‘Toward a Critical Theory of Happiness’, New Ideas in Psychology, 3 (1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Peck, G. R., ‘Black Radical Consciousness and the Black Christian Experience: Toward a Critical Sociology of Afro-America Religion’, Sociological Analysis, 43, (1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Boyle, J., ‘The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 133, (1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Young, I. M., ‘Toward a Critical Theory of Justice’, Social Theory and Practice, 7, (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gabel, P., ‘Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method for Critical Legal Theory’, Minnesota Law Review, 61, (1976–1977)Google Scholar; Landheer, B., Unnithan, T. K. N., ‘The Concept of Critical Sociology and the World System’, The International Journal of Critical Sociology, 1, (1975)Google Scholar; Unger, R. Mangabeira, ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’, Harvard Law Review, 96 (1983).CrossRefGoogle ScholarTelos and New German Critique are two English language journals publishing on ‘critical thought’.

12. As in the original ‘critical theory’ of Horkheimer and the others, critical ‘counter disciplines’ seemingly come together in rejecting, most especially, positivism for ‘becoming a source of reification and an endorsement of the status quo’. In the case of studies of International Relations such ‘critical’ arguments are by no means misplaced since much of the ‘conventional’ discipline of International Relations is still based on a variation of the positivist separation of facts and values and the denial that a rational justification of one's preferences is possible. Such normative judgements are regarded as little more than mere expressions of attitudes and statements of principles incapable of constituting knowledge. Hence the enthusiastic reception accorded Cox's ‘heretical’ pronouncements: ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose.… The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or social class.… There is … no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space. When any theory so represents itself, it is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective’. Cox, op. cit., (note 8), p. 128. Wallerstein, before Cox, quoted Magubane to the same effect: ‘Disinterested analysis and commentary [are] epistemologically excluded.… There are no bystanders, no sidelines, no refugees now. In particular, there is no press box from which to describe the play on the field, and no spectators to whom to describe the play. All are combatants, on one side or the other.’ Wallerstein, I., The Capitalist World Economy, (Cambridge, 1979), p. 140.Google Scholar

13. In a recent self definition the Left was so designated as to embrace those sharing a ‘belief in the desirability and possibility of a world that is politically democratic and socially and economically egalitarian’—making, however, this objective contingent upon the prior ‘demise of capitalism as a historical system’. Amin, S., Arrighi, G., Frank, A. G., Wallerstein, I., Dynamic of Global Crisis, (New York and London, 1982) (hereinafter referred to as Amin et al.) pp. 9–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. Oilman and Vernoff, op. cit., (note 10) p. 1.

15. Cox's definition of ‘critical theory’ (see above) which we follow here attempts to trace the original meaning of the term well beyond Horkheimer (or for that matter Marx) to the 18th century Neapolitan Giambattista Vico. He tries to place what he refers to as a Vichian tradition of critical thought alongside the Hobbesian (for the contemporary term read neo-realist) and the Grotian tradition (read liberal internationalist) as replacement one presumes for the questionable Kantian tradition. (See for example Kubalkova, V., Cruickshank, A. A., Marxism and International Relations, (Oxford, 1985), pp. 1–24 and 248)Google Scholar. Vico apparently criticized the practice (the ‘conceit of scholars’) of taking a form of thought deriving from a particular phase of history and assuming its validity to be universally applicable. Cox's juxtaposition of two types of theories, namely critical (that is transcending the existing order) with problem-solving (taking that order as starting point) plays down the connection between ‘critical theory’ and Marxism, or the Left. His definition enables him to use as an example of a critical theory power realism—until he perceives Waltz and Morgenthau's seeming reduction of that theory to the mere ‘problem-solving’ level. However, it occurs, even to Cox, that at present the main form of critical theory and its principal source is Marx-inspired theories having their origin at the Left end of the ideological spectrum (see Cox op. cit., (note 8), p. 128 and passim). Therefore rather than create a Vichian tradition it would on the face of it seem more appropriate, not to say accurate, in seeking a main source, to refer to critical theory as Hegelian-Marxist (as does for example R. J. Antonio) and to see that theory based on Hegel's philosophy (stressing principles of contradiction, change and movement), as modified by Marx's materialist critique—as alternative to the formal and static nature of Kantism. Antonio, op. cit., (note 9), p. 343.

16. There is substantial overlap in all these terms. The term ‘Left’, or rather ‘on the left’ is notoriously imprecise, and ‘more sensed than understood’. It is based on the assumed continuum into which a seating arrangement in the French parliament two hundred years ago has developed. With the exception of the (radical) ends of the arrangement the ‘leftness’ is always only relative to the equally hazy notion of ‘rightness’. Not for want of trying, as Kolakowski put it, the Left is characterized by a certain ideological and moral attitude, not by a single defined political movement, party, or group of parties. If at all definable, then, it. would be by its attitude of negation towards, or permanent revision of, the existing world and a quest for change; change, however, along the lines set out in its Utopia (Kolakowski op. cit. (note 7) p. 94). The Left is therefore always revisionist and to speak of ‘left revisionism’ is tautological and meaningless unless used in a more specific sense as in US Cold War historical revisionist to mean the reinterpretation of events to refute the conventional view of the past (Osgood, in Tucker, op. cit. (note 1) p. v). Once removed from this context however the term revisionist clashes with the well established (derogatory) meaning of the term revisionist as departing from Marxist orthodoxy. The term Marxism too, in the closing decades of the 20th century, is grossly imprecise, referring vaguely as it does to no more than the sharing of the greater parts of Marx's understanding of capitalism and history and to those using his general method of analysis (Oilman, op. cit. (note 10) p. 7). There is not one Utopia, but several, with Marxism but an ingredient in the different brews. Many authors ‘on the left’ quite justifiably resist a designation as Marxist whilst others appropriating the label, deny it to the others. The label Marxism furthermore appears in the name of the ideologies of over 20 states, whose claims to the name, or to the name ‘socialist’, is contested by calling them ‘actually existing socialism’ to prevent their being lumped together. There is Marxism, orthodox and revisionist, Western and Eastern, Left Old and a Left New. Marxism and the Left in their separate national developments (prevented from universalism incidentally by international relations) evolve along idiosyncratic lines characteristic of the different nations or cultures whose intellectual tradition they reflect. Last but not least there is the term ‘anti-systemic’ used by Wallerstein and his followers whose membership can only be firmly established ‘from the fruits’ in hindsight.

17. Krippendorff, E., International Relations as a Social Science, (Brighton, 1982) p. 27.Google Scholar

18. Amin et al., op. cit. (note 13) p. 9.

19. This ‘… extraordinary intellectual creature who cohabits with the high scholarship of American universities … [incapable of] … any intercourse with the actual world …’, Thompson, E. P. on deterrence theory in ‘Deterrence and “Addiction”’, The Yale Review, 72, (1982–1983), pp. 3, 7.Google Scholar Or: the ‘bankrupt international relations theory’, Editorial, Alternatives, IX (1983—1984).Google Scholar

20. The fashionable term ‘problematique’ or ‘problematic’, was originally taken by L. Althusser from Bachelard and Canguilhem to mean a great deal more than ‘doubtful’ or ‘questionable’. It refers to a ‘theoretical or ideological framework’, whose ‘production’ necessarily involves a value-judgement as t o what is important in the world. Problematique then constitutes the absolute determinative of the forms in which the problem is posed at any given moment. See Althusser, L. and Balibar, Etienne, Reading Capital, (London, 1970), pp. 315, 325.Google Scholar

21. Thompson, , ‘Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization’, The New Left Review, No. 121, (05–06 1980)Google Scholar, reprinted in Thompson, , et al., Exterminism and Cold War, (London, 1982).Google Scholar The reprinted version is cited in this article.

22. Thus Krippendorff, for one, is able to conclude that the critical approach, by enabling a separate focus on the subject of International Relations, makes it worth preserving, op. cit. (note 17), p. 32. A leading scholar in the neo-Marxist mould, Samir Amin, enters a converging path with topics in the area of International Relations when he lists among questions in need of urgent attention by the Left those related to nations and the states-system (alliances and conflict between states): ‘how does world politics function? What are the real conflicts?.… What are the strategic aims of the Soviet Union?.… How valid are the various geopolitical analyses? (in Amin et al., op. cit. (note 13) p. 170). Perry Anderson too lists as one of the ‘most urgent areas of practical research and proposal’, (indeed the) ‘most formidable area of all’, the international relations of ‘unevenly developed socialist countries of the future’. Anderson, , In the Tracks of Historical Materialism, (London, 1983), p. 100.Google Scholar

23. Examples of testing theories of imperialism and dependency include: Rosen, S. and Kurth, J. R. (eds.) Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism, (Lexington, MA., 1974);Google ScholarRosen, S. (ed), Testing the Theory of the Military Industrial Complex, (Lexington, MA., 1973)Google Scholar; Russett, B. M. and Hanson, E. C., Interest and Ideology, (San Francisco, 1975)Google Scholar; Kaufman, R. R., Chernotsky, H. I. and Geller, D. S., ‘A preliminary test of the theory of dependency’, Comparative Politics, 7, (1975).CrossRefGoogle Scholar The ‘compliment was returned’ when attempts were made to assess ‘conventional’ theories of International Relations with the help of particularly Habermasia n language [see Ashley, R. K., ‘Political Realism and Human interests’, International Studies Quarterly, 25, (1981)]CrossRefGoogle Scholar or Foucault's theories [see Ashley, , ‘The eye of power; the politics of world modelling’, International Organization, 37 (1983)].CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24. As becomes obvious from a reading of the article, in our understanding ‘critical studies of International Relations’ are more broadly conceived than to be taken as merely constituting one of the approaches to International Political Economy. Critical studies of International Relations enable also an added focus on culture and ideology. For the delimitation of the Marxist approach to International Political Economy, cf. Gilpin, Robert, ‘Three models of the future’, International Organization, 29, (1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jones, R. J. Barry (ed), Perspectives on Political Economy, (London, 1983)Google Scholar; Strange, Susan (ed), Paths to International Political Economy, (London, 1984).Google Scholar

25. Waltz, K. N., Man, the State, and War, (New York, 1959).Google Scholar In this influential study, Waltz classified the writings of political philosophers about the causes of war into those who saw it as originating in the nature of man (First Image), those who believed it to result from the ways in which states were constituted (Second Image), and those who found its cause in the nature of the society of states (Third Image).

26. See Kubalkova, Cruickshank, op. cit. (note 15), Chapter 10, pp. 205ff.

27. See Williams, W. A., The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (London, 1959)Google Scholar; Kolko, Gabriel, The Politics of War; Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943–1945, (London, 1968)Google Scholar; Alperovitz, Gar, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, (London, 1966)Google Scholar; Alperovitz, , Cold War Essays, (Garden City, New York, 1970)Google Scholar; Horowitz, David, From Yalta to Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in the Cold War, (Harmondsworth, 1967).Google Scholar This last book was published in the U.S.A. under the title, The Free World Colossus, (1965, revised editions 1970 and 1971).

28. Kubalkova, Cruickshank, op. cit., (note 15), passim.

29. For a summary of the four main positions see Ibid. pp. 235 ff.

30. Although Feher, F., Heller, A. and Markus, G. with their book Dictatorship over Needs (Oxford, 1983)Google Scholar have given a new boost to the third position, portraying the Soviet system as an unprecedented nonsocialist and non-capitalist self-reproducing social order, with universalist aspirations, there is still an ambivalence in that position in regard to the nature of Soviet foreign policy.

31. Thompson, , et al., Exterminism and Cold War, (London, 1982).Google Scholar

32. Williams, R., ‘The Politics of Nuclear Disarmament’Google Scholar, reprinted in Ibid.

33. Thompson, op. cit. (note 31) p. 5.

34. Ibid., p. 28.

35. Ibid., p. 4.

36. See Bahro, R., ‘A New Approach for the Peace Movement in Germany’Google Scholar, in Thompson et al., Thompson himself in his reply to the debate stressed that he too believes the two superpowers to be different social formations.

37. The ‘exterminism’ of ‘Thompso n and Company’ is dismissed as one of the ‘pseudo-theories’ the ‘concoctions of cold war tricksters’ and ‘cold war professionals’. The notion of ‘equal responsibility’ amounts to no more than ‘anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism in the attractive wrapping of impartiality’. Lokshin, G., ‘Peace Movement and Ideological Struggle’, International Affairs, (06, 1984), pp. 57–60.Google Scholar ‘One of the chief components of the American ideological export is anticommunism in various packaging: ultraconservative, conservative, ‘moderate’, liberal, neoliberal, and at times pseudo-left’. Levchenko, Yu., ‘The Washington Propaganda Complex: a Weapon of Reaction and Hegemonism’, International Affairs, (06, 1985), p. 117.Google Scholar

38. Sweezy, P. M., ‘On Socialism’, Monthly Review, (10, 1983), p. 39.Google Scholar

39. The ‘Soviet Union has launched a type of foreign politics practically unknown in its preceding history, that of political imperialism. (Political imperialism, not imperialism as such, because economic exploitation is far from being the major target of this politics, if indeed it is one of the targets at all. The goal is to increase political influence and gain dominance in new spheres all over the world in competition with the United States.) Armaments are now a first priority in Soviet industry.… [The intrinsic triggers of the Soviet thrust for world domination has been a wish] to escape from internally unresolvable problems.… The real motivating force of Soviet imperialism [is the] intention to defeat a way of life rather than an army.… By eliminating world capitalism [the Soviet leaders think] they could eliminate, “dissenting wishes” from the minds of their subjects’. F. Feher et al., op. cit. (note 30) pp. 174, 274–5.

40. Mandel, E., ‘The Threat of War and the Struggle for Socialism’, New Left Review, (10 1983), p. 28.Google Scholar

41. Miliband, R., ‘Military Intervention and Socialist Internationalism’, The Socialist Register 1980 (eds Miliband, R. and Saville, J.) (London, 1980), p. 22.Google Scholar

42. Amin et al., op. cit., p. 236.

43. M. Davis, ‘Nuclear Imperialism and Extended Deterrence’, in Thompson et al., (note 31) p. 46.

44. Miliband op. cit. (note 41) p. 23.

45. A. Wolfe, ‘Perverse Politics and the Cold War’, in Thompson et al., op. cit. (note 31) pp. 256–8.

46. F. Halliday, ‘The Sources of the New Cold War’, in Thompson et al., op. cit. (note 31) p. 312.

47. Dan, and Smith, Ron, ‘The New Cold War’, Capital and Class, 12, (1980/81), p. 37.Google Scholar

48. A content analysis of Thompson's volume for example reveals that out of 350 pages only some 85 are devoted to the USSR (other than casual references) and these include 20 pages by the Medvedevs and some 14 by Thompson.

49. Thompson, ‘Europe the Weak Link in the Cold War’, in Thompson et al., op. cit. (note 31) p. 345.

50. Halliday, , ‘The Conjecture of the Seventies and After: A Reply to Ougaard’, New Left Review, (09/10 1984), p. 79.Google Scholar

51. Anderson, P., ‘The Left in the Fifties’, New Left Review, (01/02 1965), p. 12.Google Scholar

52. See Kubalkova, and Cruickshank, , Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations, (London, 1980), pp. 194ff.Google Scholar

53. Halliday, , The Making of the Second Cold War, (London, 1983), pp. 24ff.Google Scholar The underlined names of theories are Halliday's. We have re-ordered them and added further examples.

54. E. Krippendorff, op. cit. (note 17) pp. 43–5.

55. M. Davis, op. cit. (note 43), p. 44.

56. Wolfe, A., The Rise and Fall of the ‘Soviet Threat’, (Washington, 1979).Google Scholar

57. ‘U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1980's’, Monthly Review (editorial), 4, (1980), p. 7.Google Scholar

58. E.g. Braverman, Harry, Labour and Monopoly Capital, (New York, 1975)Google Scholar; Aglietta, Michel, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: the U.S. Experience, (London, 1979).Google Scholar

59. Kaldor, Mary, The Baroque Arsenal, London, 1982Google Scholar, Military R & D: cause or consequence of the arms race?', International Social Science Journal, XXXV, (1983), p. 43.Google Scholar

60. Quoted in Halliday, op. cit., (note 53) p. 27.

61. Chomsky, N., Steele, Jonathan, Gittings, J., Superpowers in Collision, (London, 1982), p. 20.Google Scholar

62. Kaldor, M., The Disintegrating West, (London, 1978), p. 10.Google Scholar

63. D. and R. Smith, op. cit. (note 47).

64. ‘Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism’, Peking Review (11, 1977).Google Scholar

65. For our own attempt at a review of some of the literature see Kubalkova, , Cruickshank, , International Inequality, (London, 1981), Chapter 3.Google Scholar

66. Monthly Review (editorial), 4, (1980), p. 2.Google Scholar

67. Halliday, op. cit. (note 53), p. 30.

68. Davis, op. cit. (note 43), p. 30.

69. Ougaard, M., ‘The origins of the Second Cold War’, New Left Review, (09./10. 1984), p. 62.Google Scholar Those Left authors that endorsed or welcomed Halliday's theory include Hobsbawm, E.; see his ‘Are we on the edge of a world war?’ New Society, (19 01 1984), p. 85.Google Scholar

70. Halliday, op. cit. (note 53) p. 32.

71. See Kubalkova, , Cruickshank, , Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations, Chapter 3; Marxism and International Relations Chapter 4.Google Scholar

72. Halliday, op. cit. (note 53) p. 44.

73. R. Williams, op. cit. (note 32) p. 82.

74. Wallerstein, , ‘The Withering Away of the States’, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 8, (1980), p. 375.Google Scholar

75. Chomsky, , ‘Strategic Arms, the Cold War and the Third World’, in Thompson et al., op. cit. (note 31) p. 231.Google Scholar

76. E.g. Bahro, op. cit. (note 36) p. 98.

77. Ibid.

78. E.g. Kaplan, F., Dubious Specter: a skeptical look at the Soviet nuclear threat, Washington, 1980Google Scholar; Halliday, , ‘Moscow and the Third World, the evolution of Soviet Policy’, Race and Class, XXIV, (1982)Google Scholar; Barnet, R. T., Real Security, (New York, 1981).Google Scholar

79. ‘Western industrial society is presented as the demiurge and the only source of creativity in the world. When advanced industrialism is defined as the actual state of Western or better, American society … [and then measured] by this yardstick, … the Soviet economy is obviously inferior to the Western one.…. Today's claims that the Soviet economic system is ‘absurd’ or ‘anachronistic’ which abound in Western literature are a gross exaggeration.…. The Soviet economy operates in a qualitatively different way than its Western counterpart … it is better protected from both the overproduction of goods and over-production of needs.…. Excessive reliance on largely ethnocentric evaluations of the Soviet performance resulting from the application of criteria not proper for a Soviet-type society may lead to a dangerous underestimation of Soviet capabilities.’ Zasiasky, Victor, ‘Soviet Society and the World Systems Analysis’, Telos, (Winter, 1984–1985), 158, 160.Google Scholar

80. Miliband, op. cit. (note 41) p. 21.

81. Halliday, , The Making of the Second Cold War, p. 39.Google Scholar

82. Monthly Review, (editorial), (Dec. 83), p. 10.

83. Miliband, op. cit. (note 41) p. 21.

84. Halliday, , ‘Moscow and the Third World: the evolution of Soviet Policy’, Race & Class, XXIV, (1982), p. 145.Google Scholar

85. Ibid, p. 147.

86. Davis, op. cit. (note 43) p. 44.

87. Monthly Review, 4, (1980) p. 2.Google Scholar

88. Ougaard, op. cit. (note 64) p. 74.

89. Ibid, p. 64.

90. Mandel, , ‘The Threat of War and the Struggle for Socialism’, op. cit. (note 40) p. 28.Google Scholar

91. Monthly Review, 4, (1980).Google Scholar

92. Davis, op. cit. (note 43) p. 51.

93. Davis, op. cit. (note 43) p. 54.

94. Mandel, op. cit. (note 40) p. 28.

95. See above, note 25.

96. The term ‘new revisionism’ here refers to the (old) US Cold War revisionism and not t o the usage by Ralph Miliband and John Westergaard referring to some of their Left colleagues in the UK. See Miliband, R., ‘The New Revisionism in Britain’, New Left Review, (03/04), 1985.Google Scholar

97. Thompson, op. cit. (note 49) p. 343.

98. Nove, A., The Economics of Feasible Socialism, (London, 1983), pp. 69, 113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

99. For recent references see for example, Stame, Frederico, ‘The Crisis of the Left and New Social Identities’, Telos, (09, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Amin et al., op. cit. (note 13) p. 238.

100. Zasiasky quotes K. Booth's definition of ‘ethnocentric’ as describing ‘feelings of group centrality and superiority, … a faulty methodology in the social science … [and] as a synonym for being “culture-bound”’. Victor Zasiasky, op. cit. (note 79) p. 99.

101. ‘Indeed, it should be possible to take the dependency lesson one step further … by extending its methods to new areas, such as the study of Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe …’ Smith, Tony, ‘Requiem or New Agenda for Third World Studies?’, World Politics, XXXVII, (07, 1985), p. 560.Google Scholar

102. Oilman and Vernoff, op. cit. (note 10), p. 3.

103. ‘…these critics [of the USSR from within the Marxist Left] have also very firmly rejected, as we do, any assimilation of their position to that of anti-communism… anti-communism has been a dominant theme in the political warfare waged by conservative forces against the entire left, Communist and non-Communist; … at no time since 1917 has anti-communism failed to occupy a major, even a central, place in the politics and policies of the capitalist world.’ Miliband, Ralph and Liebman, Marcel, ‘Reflections on Anti-Communism’, Monthly Review, 37, (07–08, 1985), pp. 4 and 1.Google Scholar As a matter of interest compare this statement with the Soviet definition of ‘anticommunism’ as a ‘broad complex of political, economic, military and ideological actions directed against socialism, the revolutionary working class movement and all progressive forces’. Granov quoted in Kubalkova, , Cruickshank, , Marxism–Leninism, p. 372, see also, pp. 195, 202, 204. Also note 37 (above).Google Scholar

104. Miliband and Liebman, op. cit. (note 103) p. 23.