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Neutrality beyond the Cold War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Pertti Joenniemi
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Extract

Radical changes in the international arena in recent years have shattered many of the time-worn accounts of political order on the European continent. As the axis along which international politics evolves continues to shift, not only are states and international institutions being re-ordered into a new hierarchy of power, authority and influence but the changes are also affecting the organization of international political space. In the process, many traditional features of the international political arena are becoming outdated. In particular, (in)security, a central concern of states since early modernity, is giving way to economic growth, integration, cooperation and interdependence. Whereas ‘bipolarity’ used to describe the structure of Europe ‘hegemony’ and ‘hierarchy’ are now more accurate terms for analyzing the distribution of power on the continent.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , July 1993 , pp. 289 - 304
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1993

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References

1 ‘Regime of truth’ refers to knowledge as an exercise of power in bringing certain order and discrete forms of agency out of the disordered stale of being; for the use of the term, see Dillon, G. M., ‘The Alliance of Security and Subjectivity’, Current Research on Peace and Violence, 3 (1990), pp. 101–25.Google Scholar

2 For this evaluation, see Windsor, Philip, ‘Options for Neutral States’, in Bisell, R. E. and Gasteyger, Curt (eds.), The Missing Link. West European Neutrals and Regional Security (London, 1990), p. 186Google Scholar. I am grateful to Bernt Jonsson of the Peace & Life Institute for drawing my attention to this evaluation.

3 Anton Bebler, another recent voice in the debate, arrives at the cautious conclusion that ‘the relative importance of the neutrals will remain’ as their constructive contribution to stability is needed also in the future. See Bebler, Anton, ‘The Neutral and Non-Aligned States in the New European Security Architecture’, The International Spectator, no. 1 (January–March, 1992), pp. 69–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, an Austrian scholar, represents the view that with the re-emergence of the old balance of power schemes—as he sees it—‘the past of the neutrality might become its future’, Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, ‘Neutrality, EES, European Architecture’, discussion paper, Princeton, 1990. Josef B. Binter is close to this view in predicting that the ongoing changes in the international system will not bring the end but a renaissance for the status of neutrality, see Binter, Josef B., ‘Neutrality in Changing Europe: Old Roots, New Branches’, in Birnbaum, Karl E., Binter, Josef B. and Badzik, Stephen K. (eds.), Towards a Future European Peace Order? (European University Centre for Peace Studies, 1991), pp. 113–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Jakobson treats neutrality mainly as a symbol and something left over from a previous period of international politics, see Jakobson, Max, ‘Europe's Neutrals Should Relax and Join Right In’, International Herald Tribune, 17 October 1991Google Scholar.

5 Andrén discusses primarily Swedish neutrality, see Andrén, Nils, ‘On the Meaning and Uses of Neutrality’, Cooperation and Conflict, 26 (1991), p. 67Google Scholar.

6 Finland applied tor a position of an observer at NACC's meeting in Oslo, June 1992, and was granted such a position. There are expectations (hat within some lime the neutrals will join NACC.

7 This process has been well depicted by Waever, Ole, cf. ‘Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War’, International Affairs I (1992), pp. 77–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 For a discussion on the challenges facing the neutrals, see McSweeney, Bill, ‘The European Neutrals and the European Community’, Journal of Peace Research, 3 (1988), pp. 205–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 On this theme, see McSweeney, Bill,‘The Politics of Neutrality: Focus on Security for Smaller Nations’, Bulletin of Peace Proposals I (1987), pp. 33–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Contrary to many expectations, the stringent position adopted by the Community members seems not to rule out the possibility of what has been called ‘minimal neutrality’, maintaining autonomous policies in the field of defence, at least not in the short run.

10 For a discussion on this, see Bitzinger, Richard A., ‘Neutrality for Eastern Europe: Problems and Prospects’, Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 3 (1991), pp. 281–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Ukraine and Belarus are currently to some extent exceptions among the newcomers on the European scene as they seem to stress the virtues of abstentionism and neutralism in the policy they are aspiring for.

12 Some of the argumentation is to be found, for example in the book produced by Healey, Denis, Neutralism. (London, 1955)Google Scholar. See also Luif, Paul, ‘Neutralitet—Ncutralismus— Blockfreiheait’, Österrcichhische Zeilschrifi fur Polilikwissenschafl, 3 (1979), pp. 269–85Google Scholar.

13 This thesis is well exemplified by a recent book, Bisell, R. E. and Casteyger, C. (eds.), The Missing Link. West European Neutrals and Regional Security (London, 1990)Google Scholar.

14 For a more historically conscious presentations, see Ogley, Roderick, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century (London, 1970)Google Scholar, and Cohn, George, Neo-Neutralilel (Copenhagen, 1937)Google Scholar.

15 For an effort to open up this idea, see Sundelius, Bengt (ed.), The Neutral Democracies and the New Cold War. (Boulder, 1987)Google Scholar.

16 For this very fine study on the background of neutrality in the history of ideas, see Politis, Nicholas, ‘Neutrality and Peace’, Pamphlet Series of the Carnagie Endowment for International Peace Division of International Law, 55 (1935), p. 6Google Scholar.

17 This aspect has been the cornerstone in understanding neutrality in Jessup, Philip S. (ed.), Neutrality: Its History, Economics and Law (Oxford, 1936)Google Scholar.

18 On the linkage between the peace movement and neutrality, see Marald, Bert, ‘Neutralitetens pacifistiska rötter’ (The Pacifist Roots of Neutrality), Internationella Studier, 1 (1991), pp. 82–91Google Scholar.

19 For a treatment of neutrality along these lines, see Kruzel, Joseph and Haltzel, Michael H. (eds.), Between the Blocs. Problems & Prospects for Europe's Neutrals and Non-Aligned Countries. (Cambridge, 1989)Google Scholar.

20 For elements of such an endeavour, see Binter, Josef, ‘The Future of Neutrality’, in Neutrality as a Strategy for Peace (Amsterdam, 1988)Google Scholar. For a similar effort, see Kaldor, Mary and Falk, Richard, Dealignment. A New Foreign Policy (Oxford, 1987)Google Scholar.

21 There are still efforts that argue for the continued relevance of neutrality, at least in an altered form. For this, see Penttilä, Risto E. J. (ed.), Mmimalislk Neutrality—A Modelfor the Future (Dartmouth, London and New York, 1993) (forthcoming)Google Scholar.

22 An effort to elaborate such concept has been made by Binter, Josef, ‘The Actual and Potential Role of Neutrality’, Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 4 (1985), pp. 387–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Joenniemi, Pertti, ‘The Peace Potential of Neutrality’, Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 2 (1989), pp. 175–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Olc Wacver, The Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War, p. 82.