1 A similar perspective on the misreadings of classical authors – which will not be addressed here – could focus on the so-called idealistic tradition. Do we also have to realise misreadings of Immanuel Kant's On Perpetual Peace? See, for example, Michael C. Williams, ‘Reason and Realpolitik: Kant's Critique of International Politics’, Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, 25:1 (1992), pp. 99–119.

2 See also Stanley Hoffmann, ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, Daedalus Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1:3 (1977), pp. 41–60; and Kalevi J. Holsti, The dividing discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985). Stanley Hoffmann characterised ‘International Relations’, especially of the 1950s and 1960s, as an ‘American Social Science’. IR would at the same time depend on and utilise the US as an international super power in order to find its conditions for disciplinary development and existence.

3 As an example of ‘misreadings’ as intentional, see Alan Gilbert, Must Global Democracy Constrain Democracy? Great-Power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Hartmut Behr, ‘The conjunction between IR Theory and Political Philosophy: Insights and Difficulties – A review of Alan Gilbert, Must Global Politics constrain Democracy?’ Constellations. An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, 9:3 (2002), pp. 450–2.

4 An ideologically critical reading of realism is explicitly put forward by Morgenthau himself in the preface of Politics among Nations. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1954, 1960, 1963); see also E.H. Carr, The Conditions of Peace (London: Macmillan, 1944), especially the ‘Introduction’.

5 This, in an international perspective, has been self-critically posed by leading German international scholars; see Guenther and Wolf Hellmann, Dieter and Zuern Klaus (eds), Die neuen Internationalen Beziehungen. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003).

6 For Mannheim, this also includes the collective unconsciousness; Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London: Routledge, 1936), pp. 57–62.

7 According to conceptualisations by Horkheimer, from the Frankfurt School. For examples see Max Horkheimer, Critical theory. Selected essays, translated by Matthew J. O'Connell and others (New York: Continuum Pub. Corp, 1982); Theodor W. Adorno, The Positivist dispute in German sociology, translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Heinemann, 1976); Herbert Marcuse, One-dimensional man: studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991); Juergen Habermas, Knowledge and human interests, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro (London: Heinemann Educational, 1978); and Raymond Geuss, The idea of a critical theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

8 On this typology see Michael Freeden, Ideologies and political theory: A conceptual approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); and Michael Freeden et al., (eds), Taking ideology seriously: 21st century reconfigurations (London/New York: Routledge, 2006).

9 See further to the literature referenced above important books by George Lichtheim, The concept of ideology (New York: Random House, 1967); David McLellan, Ideology (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London/New York: Verso, 1981); Alan Cassels, Ideology and international relations in the modern world (London: Routledge, 1986); Louis Althusser, Essays on ideology (London: Verso, 1976); and Karl Dietrich Bracher, The age of ideologies: a history of political thought in the 20th century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).

10 Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations (London: Verso, 1994) p. 30; and Miles Kahler, ‘Inventing International Relations. International Relations Theory After 1945’ in Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds), New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997) pp. 20–53.

11 Ole Wæver, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate’ in Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 159.

12 Wæver, ‘Inter-Paradigm Debate’, pp. 159–160. This distinction between ‘ideology’ and ‘paradigm’ is not just a (unnecessary) terminological sham (if one might think they are conceptually identical). Rather, this differentiation is crucial, especially in the light of our arguments. The dismissal of the term ideology as an introspective analytical concept for a genealogical study of an academic discipline and its replacement by the concept of paradigm, gained and incorporated into IR from the natural sciences, occurs simultaneously with the scientific and positivistic transformation of IR in the context of the so-called second debate, i.e. when the misreadings analysed here occur. See for example Barry Buzan, ‘The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?’ in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 47–65; and Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez (eds), In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). Thereby a substantive loss of inner-disciplinary self-criticism occurs because ‘paradigms’ – including their production and protection of knowledge through its canonisation and dogmatisation as well as including their leaning towards political power and their over-emphasis on practicable and problem-solving knowledge – have become received as something necessary, desirable and value-neutral for a ‘proper’ academic discipline. Contributing to (reviving) self-criticism in IR, we thus try to countervail the self-reflexivity shortfall of the concept of ‘paradigm’. And not coincidentally, Morgenthau himself, as one of the marginalised critical voices against positivism and natural science epistemology in IR, refers to Mannheim in many writings (see below section 4) which explicitly can be read as an ideology critique against any kind of nomological, structural, and positivist theorising.

13 This becomes most evident in Kenneth Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory’, Journal of International Affairs, 44 (1990), pp. 21–7.

14 Most outstanding here are his PhD thesis, written in German, and his post-doctoral monograph, that is, his Geneva habilitation, written in French. No English translation exists for either of these. One might also include in this body of marginalised writings the two volumes of his very important Politics in the 20th Century; see especially See Hans Morgenthau, ‘The State of Political Science’, in Politics in the 20th Century, Vol. I, The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962a) pp. 16–35; and Hans Morgenthau, ‘The Intellectual and Political Functions of a Theory of International Relations’, in Politics in the 20th Century, Vol. I, The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962b) pp. 62–78.

15 Very instructive in this regard is the letter from Morgenthau to the editor of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Hans Morgenthau, ‘Letter from Hans J. Morgenthau’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 252 (1947), pp. 173–4.

16 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Robert O. Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics. Structural Realism and Beyond’, in Ada W. Finifter (ed.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington DC: ASPA, 1983).

17 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 205.

18 Ibid., p. 210.

19 Morgenthau, ‘The State of Political Science’.

20 Morgenthau, ‘The State of Political Science’, p. 29. The argument touched upon here, namely that both Hobbes and Rousseau have been misread by Waltz, or at least done an injustice by undue simplification by him and by the then emerging neo-realist mainstream, will be further discussed in the next section.

21 According to Viotti and Knauppi the misjudgement of a normative and value-oriented origin of realism applies not only to Waltz, but to the entirety of neo-realism. Furthermore, this misjudgement can also be found in critics of (neo-) realism, who, especially if they represent new qualitative approaches, mistakenly criticise realism and disassociate from it needlessly. Viotti and Knauppi speak of a ‘violation of the realist tradition, particularly by ignoring the value sensitivity of the realist legacy as represented by E. H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau.’ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Knauppi, (eds), International Relations: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (Boston: Macmillan 1993),p. 66; see also Michael C. Williams, ‘Reason and Realpolitik: A Reconsideration’, International Organization, 50:2 (2006), pp. 213–36.

Another powerful academic, who holds responsibility for this ‘violation’, in addition to Waltz, is Keohane. He describes Morgenthau as a representative of a rationalistic theory which would have become systematized through Waltz. See Robert O. Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics’, p. 192. These ‘violations’ may be traced back to attempts to canonise and construct a homogenous tradition of realism and neo-realism, which is not only due to the ideologisation of the discipline, but also due to the ‘scientification’ of the social sciences, including International Relations since the Second World War. From such a perspective, any normative and hermeneutic base of realism has been decried as non-scientific and amateurish. For this notion of ‘amateurism’ see Kahler ‘Inventing International Relations’, pp. 27–29.

22 See Morgenthau, ‘The State of Political Science’.

23 Morgenthau, ‘The Intellectual and Political Functions of a Theory of International Relations’, p. 27.

24 Morgenthau, ‘The Intellectual and Political Functions of a Theory of International Relations’,pp. 31 and 64.

25 Morgenthau, ‘The Commitments of a Theory of International Politics’.

26 Which Morgenthau never understood as a theoretical foundation of international relations, but as ideological and counter-ideological writings respectively; more on this discussion to follow in section 4.

27 Morgenthau, ‘Commitments of a Theory of International Politics’, p. 56.

28 This comes across from early works of Morgenthau such as his Swiss post-doctorate certificate, Habilitation, at the Law School of the University of Geneva in 1933, as well as in his PhD thesis from 1929. See Hans Morgenthau, La réalité des normes, en particulier des normes du droit international (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1934), pp. 211–43. Following the legal-philosophical tradition of pacta sunt servanda, he advocates the normative regulation of international politics through norms of international law.

29 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 220–1; he further explains this statement: ‘Moral rules operate within the consciences of individual men. Government by clearly identifiable men, who can be held personally accountable for their acts, is […] the precondition for […] an effective system of international ethics. Where responsibility or government is widely distributed among a great number of individuals with different conceptions as to what is morally required in international affairs, or with no such conceptions at all, international morality as an effective system of restraints upon international policy becomes impossible.’

30 It seems as if Morgenthau was influenced in this point by the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, who speaks of, and condemns, the sanctimony of the modern nation-state. The moral condemnation of national politics is traced back by Niebuhr – as it is with Morgenthau – to the conflict between the claim of uniqueness of the nation and its idea of the embodiment of universal values. See Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: Charles Scribner, 1960); also Eric Voegelin, Political Religions (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1986).

31 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 230.

32 As for example in Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Chapters I–III.

33 Morgenthau, ‘The State of Political Science, pp. 72; 65–6. His perception of the historic continuity of certain assumptions and political principles, which were based on ‘the’ nature of man and political acting; also Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, (1960) p. 34 and (1963) p. 76, is in this case no counterargument. Morgenthau holds only one assumption as historically universal: politics as a conflict of power. His concept of power is to be understood in sharp opposition to the neo-realist notion, especially with regard to Waltz's (1990) own criticism but in a much more comprehensive way. Morgenthau very explicitly criticised neo-realist notions of power. See on power as an ‘interpersonal’, non-quantifiable relation among ‘spiritual and moral beings’, Hans Morgenthau ‘Common Sense and Theories’, reprinted in Truth and Power Essays of a Decade, 1960–1970 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970a), pp. 241–8.

34 Morgenthau adopts here the German term ‘standortgebunden’ according to Karl Mannheim's work on ideology critique. Mannheim uses the term in order to explain the historical and cultural standpoint of social and political modes of thought and theories. For more discussion see further elaboration in section 4 as well as the instructive source Rodney D. Nelson, ‘The Sociology of Styles of Thought’, The British Journal of Sociology, 42:1 (1992), pp. 2–54.

35 ‘[A]ll great political theory […] has been practical theory.’ Hans Morgenthau, ‘The Intellectual and Political Functions of a Theory of International Relations’, in Politics in the 20th Century, Vol. I, The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962b), pp. 16–35.

36 Further to this, the following quotation from Morgenthau, ‘The Limits of Historical Justice’, reprinted in Power and Truth Essays of a Decade, 1960–1970 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970a),pp. 68–83, is very instructive in exactly that sense: ‘Like the balance of power, alliances, arms race, political and military rivalries and conflicts, and the rest of >power politics<, spheres of influence are the ineluctable byproduct of the interplay of interests in a society of sovereign nations. If you want to rid the world of […] >power politics<, you must transform that society of sovereign nations into a supranational one, whose sovereign government can set effective limits to the expansionism of the nations composing it. Spheres of influence is one of the symptoms of the disease […] and it is at best futile and at worst mischievous to try to extirpate the symptom while leaving the cause unattended’. This contingent character of power politics is also seen in his assessments of the relation between ‘intervention’ and ‘morality’ in ‘The Impotence of American Power’, in Power and Truth, pp. 325–31.

37 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) pp. 1–15; 39–44.

38 As for example in Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Chapters I–III.

39 Morgenthau, Power and Truth, pp. 242, 243, and 245. Morgenthau's antiscientific position, or his criticism of the historically insensitive rationalization of politics according to economic modelling, is also clearly articulated in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, (London: Latimer House, 1947).

40 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 36 and 41.

41 Ibid., pp. 8–9.

42 Ibid., p. 7.

43 Ibid., p. 52.

44 See Hans Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy A Critical Examination (London: Mehuen, 1952); Hans Morgenthau, Der Friede im nuklearen Zeitalter, Eine Kontroverse zwischen Realisten und Utopisten (Munich: Salzburger Humanismusgespräch, 1970b); and Morgenthau, Power and Truth.

45 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 9.

46 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

47 For this argument see Behr, War, Peace and Ethics, (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2009). Waltz could have found a notion of international anarchy (and, even morethan that, of ‘national interest’) in GWF Hegel's ideas on ‘aeusseres Staatsrecht’ (which is not the same as ‘international law’ as usually translated into English), though obviously he does not. Regarding the tradition of neo-realism in Hegelian international thought – and not in Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes as commonly argued. With regard to Hobbes, see also Michael C. Williams, ‘Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration’, International Organization, 50:2 (1996), pp. 213–36.

48 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), pp 18–59; 102–28.

49 Waltz, Man, the State and War, p. 170.

50 Ibid., p. 173 (emphasis by the authors).

51 Ibid., p. 174.

52 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The social contract and other later political writings edited by Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 52.

53 Since our focus is on Waltz's misreading of Rousseau, we will not discuss the problematic with Rousseau's concept itself, on which there is a huge body of literature in political theory and political thought.

54 Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings The social contract and other later political writings.

55 Waltz, Man, the State and War, p. 175.

56 Rousseau, The social contract and other later political writings, p. 6.

57 Waltz, Man, the state and War, p.176.

58 Ibid., p.177.

59 Which thus appears as intentionally misinterpreted to suit this purpose. For this interpretation and criticism of Waltz see also Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Rousseau on War and Peace’ in The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 54–87; and Stanley Hoffmann and David Fidler (eds), Rousseau and international relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

60 Waltz, Man, the State and War, p.179 (emphasis by the authors).

61 This is, of course, apart from many empirical counter-examples of domestic demands and influences on foreign policies.

62 Rousseau was not the first to formulate this ‘paradox’. Hugo Grotius in part II of De jure belli ac pacis libre tres and also Cicero in De Officiis, Book I defined the state of war in the same manner. Subsequently, one would have to examine to what extent the recognition of the enemy as a legally equal partner is a typical pattern of thought of natural law. For more on this discussion of contractualism in International Relations see John Charvet, ‘Contractualism and international political theory’ in David Boucher and Paul Kelly (eds), The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls (London: Routledge, 1994).

63 Rousseau, The social contract and other later political writings, pp. 46–7.

64 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 244.

65 On the subject of Hobbes and legitimisation, sovereignty and security see also Williams, ‘Hobbes and International Relations’.

66 Hoffmann, ‘Rousseau on War and Peace’.

67 Hobbes himself addresses this issue in a very illuminating way in Leviathan, p. 244: ‘And every Sovereign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring his own safety. And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoid in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Sovereign Princes, and Sovereign Assemblies’.

68 For detail see Hobbes, The Citizen (Westpoint: Greenwood Press, 1982) where this argument receives an ethical component. In his history of the theory of international relations, Harald Kleinschmidt provides a classification of the ethical justification of acts of war in the 16th and early 17th century. See Harald Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power: A History of International Relations Theory (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), pp. 95–113.

69 A discord of which Morgenthau is aware; see Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Chapters IX and X. For the English School, see Hedley Bull, Anarchial Society, A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), and Martin Wright, Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946).

70 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 82.

71 Ibid., p. vii.

72 For example, Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham (eds), The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin Press, 1998); Phil Williams, Donald Goldstein and Jay Shafritz (eds), Classical Readings of International Relations (London: Harcourt Brace, 1999); Pascal Chaigenau (ed.), Dictionnaire des relations internationales (Paris: Collection Diplomatie, 1998); also quite uncritical towards these narratives is John Baylis and Steven Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics. An introduction to international relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); further examples are Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen (eds), Introduction to International Relations Theory and Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); R.L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); and Stephen J. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (New York: Longman, 2000).

73 Hoffman, ‘An American Social Science’.

74 Examples for this are rich and reach from, just to name a few, McCarthy's anti-communist ‘witch hunt’, the oppression and surveillance of Civil Right and Anti-Vietnam movements to the more general patterns of the ‘production of fear’. See for example Barry Buzan, People, States, Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983); Brian Massumi, The Politics of Everyday Fear (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Weldes et al., ‘Introduction: Constructing Insecurity’ in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds), Cultures of Insecurity. States:. Communities and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 1–33. For strategies of ‘securitization’ see Ido Oren, ‘Is Culture Independent of National Security? How America's National Security Concerns Shaped ‘Political Culture’ Research’, European Journal of International Relations, 6:4 (2000), pp. 543–73; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Juup de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder/Colorado, 1998); and David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

75 Kahler, Inventing International Relations, pp. 22–3.

76 Kahler's events and demands-driven factors in Inventing International Relations can indeed be paralleled to what Morgenthau described as politics driven by a ‘preoccupation with practical concerns’ which manifests itself in the empirical methodology of positivist social sciences – a methodology that further contributes to what Morgenthau considers the complete obfuscation of purpose, or lack thereof, in twentieth century political ‘science’. See Morgenthau, ‘The State of Political Science’, pp. 20–7.

77 See, for example, amongst many other likewise articles and comments, Eric Schmitt and James Dao, ‘A ‘Damaged’ Information Office is Declared Closed by Rumsfeld’, The New York Times, 27 February 2002.

78 We want to emphasise, however, that such a sociology of knowledge study could create an interesting agenda for further critical IR research to throw more light on the development of the discipline, especially in the US. It could also in a cross-national perspective elucidate how the neo-realist hegemony in the discipline – notwithstanding obvious misreadings and manipulations – operated and could manifest its narratives. These questions furthermore call for a more in-depth study of the intellectual climate from the 1950s to the late 1980s when first critical voices started to be heard and to establish a new stream in IR since it is not convincing to assume that individuals nowadays discover those narratives and misreadings while ‘contemporaries’ were, generally and with some exceptions, too naïve. Thus it appears that more general studies on the intellectual climate bring more light and new information into the hegemonic strategies of IR. See for example Benjamin M. Mollov, Power and Transcendence: Hans J. Morgenthau and the Jewish Experience (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2002); Pekka Korhonen, Hans Morgenthau: intellektuaalinen historia (Valti-opin laitos, 1983); and Christoph Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau An Intellectual Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001). Also two forthcoming PhD theses in Politics at Newcastle University will investigate these kinds of questions, with Amelia Heath rereading the oeuvre of E.H. Carr in the light of post-positivistic IR theories; and Felix Roesch contextualising Hans J. Morgenthau's oeuvre, especially his early writings, in the traditions of early 20th century German sociology, associated with Georg Simmel, Alfred Schuetz, and Karl Mannheim.

79 Karl Mannheim, ‘Die Methoden der Wissenssoziologie’, in Kurt Lenk (ed.), Ideologiekritik und Wissenssoziologie (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1984) p. 205.

80 Mannheim, ‘Die Methoden der Wissenssoziologie’, p. 205 (translation by the authors). The meaning of the term ‘genealogical’ in Mannheim is quite similar to its understanding in Foucault and Nietzsche and can be perceived as the methodology to investigate contingent perspectives in political thought which is crucial in Nietzsche's writings and from which immediate influences can be traced back to Mannheim's concept of Standortgebundenheit. For more see Bernd Dollinger, ‘Karl Mannheim, Michel Foucault und die Perspektivitaet von ‘Wahrheit’, In Die Paedagogik der sozialen Frage: (Sozial)Paedagogische Theorie vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ende der Weimarer Republik (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2006), pp. 45–50; and Harvey Goldman, ‘From Social Theory to Sociology of Knowledge and Back: Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Intellectual Knowledge Production’, Sociological Theory, 12:3 (1995), pp. 266–78. Regarding the concept of genealogy in (critical) IR see James Der Derian, On Diplomacy. A Genalogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford, UK/New York: Blackwell, 1987); and James Der Derian, ‘Post-Theory: The Eternal Return of Ethics in International Relations’, in Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds), New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 54–76.

81 Mannheim, ‘Die Methoden der Wissenssoziologie’, p. 205 (translation by the authors).

82 Ibid., p. 209 (translation by the authors).

83 Hans Morgenthau, Political Theory and International Relations: Hans Morgenthau on Aristotle's the Politics (Connecticut: Praeger, 2004).

84 Gabriel A. Almond, ‘Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics’, in Gabriel A. Almond (ed.), A discipline divided: schools and sects in Political Science (Boston: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 32–65.

85 See for example, in addition to those already referenced, R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Andrew Linklater, International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science (London: Routledge, 2000); Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (re)Introduction to International Relations (London: Lynne Reiner, 1994); Maurice Keens-Soper and G.R. Berridge, Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Thomas L. Pangle and Ahrensdorf Peter J.,Justice among nations: on the moral basis of power and peace (Lawrence/Kan: University Press of Kansas, 1999); and Edward Keene, Beyond Anarchical Society: Grotius, colonialism and order in world politics (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

86 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Gay Science (Froehliche Wissenschaft), translated by Thomas Common, poetry rendered by Paul V. Cohn and Maude D. Petre (Mineola/New York: Dover Publications, 2006), p. 344.

87 Francois Lyotard, La condition postmoderne; rapport sur le savior (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1979).

88 See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (eds), Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 40 who note: ‘A recent survey of the international relations literature in the English language academic journals […] revealed that the vast majority of those articles were based on Realist (or neo-realist) assumptions’.

89 Kahler, Inventing International Relations, p. 23

90 See Hartmut Behr, War, Peace and Ethics.