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23 I must thank George Lawson for pushing me to clarify these points.

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57 Quoted in Middlemas, Politics, p. 259; see also Shay, British Rearmament, pp. 288–9; Peden, British Rearmament, p. 95; Schmidt, ‘Domestic Background’, p. 109; Wendt, ‘Economic Appeasement’, p. 161; Post, Dilemmas, pp. 317–30.

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68 The significance of the uneven and combined nature of capitalist development for appeasement is crucial as it helps explain the emergence of the Anglo-German antagonism in the first place. From this perspective, we are able to conceptualise the different logics of British and German policymakers' geopolitical strategies. That Germany's ruling classes would adopt a ‘security through expansionism’ logic of geopolitics in contrast to the more ‘defensive’ geopolitical strategy of their British counterparts had much to do with the spatio-temporal sequencing of industrialisation and state-formation processes in relation to the internationally-mediated development of global capitalism. Approaching these opposing geopolitical logics from such a perspective provides the much needed historically-contextualised sociological basis to the somewhat misnamed realist categories of ‘status-quo’ and ‘revisionist’ powers. Developing these points further is, however, beyond the scope of this article. I seek to address these issues, among others, in an analysis of the origins of the First World War in my forthoming PhD dissertation ‘Capital, States, and Conflict: International Political Economy and Crisis, 1914–1945’. See also Justin Rosenberg, ‘Anarchy in the Mirror of Uneven and Combined Development’, International Politics, forthcoming, and; Allinson, James C. and Anievas, Alexander, ‘Uneven and Combined Development: An Anatomy of a Concept’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22:1 (2009), pp. 47–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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99 Ibid., (fn. 92), p. 114.

100 Ibid., p. 107; see Schmidt, Economics and Politics.

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154 Buzan and Little, ‘Beyond Westphalia’, p. 89.

155 Walt's assertion (1992), p. 452 that ‘the threat from Nazi Germany was anything but obvious’ is unconvincing. British and French intelligence agencies provided ample evidence detailing the extent of the Nazi threat; see Young, Robert J., In Command of France, pp. 162–164Google Scholar ; Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall, p. 316Google Scholar ; Post, Gaines, Dilemmas of Appeasement, pp. 164–166Google Scholar ; Jackson, Peter, ‘French Intelligence and Hitler's Rise to Power’, The Historical Journal 41:3 (1998), pp. 795–824.Google Scholar

156 As emphasised within the revisionist historiographical literature against the ‘guilty men’ thesis of the more ‘orthodox’ interpretations. For a recent review of this literature; see Aster, Sidney, ‘Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 19:3 (2008), pp. 443–480.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

157 Well demonstrated in Jonathan Haslam (1984) The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–1939; Carley, 1939; Shaw, Louise Grace, The British Political Elite and the Soviet Union, 1937–1939 (London: Frank Cass, 2003).Google Scholar

158 See, for example, Robert Gilpin, War and Change; Kennedy, Great Powers; Schweller, Deadly Imbalances.