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Imperial interests in the British decision for war, 1914: the defence of India in Central Asia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Keith M. Wilson
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Extract

The most striking feature of the British Cabinet's decision for war on 2 August 1914 is the absence of any attempt by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, to convince his colleagues of the necessity for intervention on the grounds of British interests. According to the fullest contemporary source, the diary kept by L A. Pease, President of the Board of Education, Grey simply presented the Cabinet with the alternative of his resignation. In so doing, he made the decision a matter of politics rather than policy. At no stage did he place before his colleagues the considerations that had convinced him of the necessity for the step on which he insisted. Although Britain's treaty obligations were examined on 29 July, British interests, as such, were not spelled out. Even on the morning of 3 August, by which time the decision had effectively been taken, Grey was urged merely to ‘allude’ to unspecified British interests in his forthcoming meeting with the French ambassador.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , July 1984 , pp. 189 - 203
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1984

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References

1. Wilson, K. M. (ed.), ‘The Cabinet Diary of J. A. Pease 24 July-5 August 1914’ in Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society, vol. xix, part III (1983), pp. 39–51.Google Scholar

2. Harcourt to Grey 8, 14 Jan., Grey to Harcourt 10 Jan. 1914, Grey MSS PRO F.0.800/91; O'Beirne to Nicolson May 1909, Carnock MSS P.O.800/342; Hardinge to Lowther 18 May 1909, Hardinge MSS vol. 17.

3. S. E. Crowe to the Editor, Times Literary Supplement, no. 4082, 26 June 1981, p. 729.

4. Grey, Sir E., Twenty-Five Years (London, 1925) i. 165–6Google Scholar; Trevelyan, G. M., Grey of Fallodon (London, 1937), p. 193Google Scholar; Ibid. pp. 187–8, and minute by Grey 6 Aug. 1907, F.O.371/371/ 26042.

5. Nicolson to Spring-Rice 14 Aug. 1907, Spring-Rice MSS, F.O.800/241.

6. Hardinge to de Salis 29 Dec. 1908, Hardinge MSS, vol. 13.

7. CAB 16/2.

8. Minute by Hardinge 6 Aug. 1907, F.O.371/371/26042; Tyrrell to Spring-Rice 25 May 1907, Spring-Rice MSS, F.O.800/241.

9. Minto, the Viceroy, wrote to Morley, the Secretary of State for India, on 29 May 1907: ‘You possibly think that I am over suspicious as to Russian diplomacy, and I am afraid that I do put very little value on any engagement they may enter into with us in respect to their Central Asian policy…’ India Office MSS, Eur.D 573/9. See minutes by Lee Warner and Fitzpatrick 12 June 1906, India Office L/P&S/10/122/3128, and by Fitzpatrick 26 Feb., 5 Apr. 1907, Ibid./ 2718.

10. Minto to Morley 12 Jun e 1906, I.O.MSS Eur.D 573/8.

11. The Times, 21 Oct. 1905; Grey to Spring-Rice, 22 Dec. 1905, Grey MSS, F.O.800/72; Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, H. W. V. (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914 (London, 1926-1938), iv. 623Google Scholar; Williams, B., ‘The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907’, Historical Journal, ix, 3 (1966), p. 361Google Scholar, note 10.

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13. Hardinge to Grey 17 Jun e 1908, Grey MSS, F.O.800/92.

14. Sweet and Langhorne, op. cit. pp. 239–41; Williams, B., ‘The Revolution of 1905 and Russian Foreign Policy’ in Abramsky, C. and Williams, B. (eds), Essays in honour of E. H. Can (London, 1974), pp. 115–17.Google Scholar

15. de Siebert, B., Entente Diplomacy and the World (New York, 1921), p. 99Google Scholar; see Grey to Barclay 28 Sept. 1910 in Kazemdadeh, F., Russia and Great Britain in Persia 1864–1914 (New Haven, 1968), p. 576Google Scholar.

16. Tyrrell to Chirol 31 Jan. 1912, Grey MSS, F.O.800/106.

17. Grey to Hardinge 28 Jan. 1912, Hardinge MSS, vol. 92; Nicolson to Goschen 27 Nov. 1911, Carnock MSS, F.O.800/352; Hardinge to Nicolson 20 Oct. 1908, Hardinge MSS, vol. 13; Buchanan to Grey, Grey to Buchanan 20 Feb. 1912, Grey MSS, F.0.800/74; de Siebert op. cit. pp. 113, 132–3.

18. Hardinge to Nicolson 11 Jan., Nicolson to Hardinge 18 Apr. 1912, Hardinge MSS, vol. 92.

19. Nicolson to Goschen 15 Apr. 1912, B.D. vi no. 575; to Lowther 15 Jan. 1912, Carnock MSS, F.O.800/353.

20. Klein, I., ‘The Anglo-Russian Convention and the Problem of Central Asia 1907–14’, Journal of British Studies, xi, 1 (1971), pp. 140–3.Google Scholar

21. Grey to Buchanan 21 Oct. 1912, Grey MSS, F.O.800/74.

22. Minutes by Nicolson and Mallet on Buchanan to Grey 14 May 1913, F.0.371/1712/22222.

23. Minute by Hirtzel 21 Dec. 1909, L/PS/l0/160/4355.

24. India Office to Foreign Office 23 Dec. 1909, Ibid.

25. Note by Hankey (Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence) 7 Jan. 1913, CAB 16/26, para. 15.

26. Hirtzel to Crewe 3 Jan., Crewe to Hirtzel 6 Jan. 1913, Crewe MSS, C/26.

27. Memo by Buchanan 19 May 1913, Grey MSS, F.0.800/74. He would appear to have missed the point that Russia need not refrain from anything so long as Grey continued to doctor the Blue Books. Buchanan to Grey 2 Jan., Grey to Buchanan 3 Jan. 1913, Ibid.; minute by Hirtzel 27 May 1913 L/P&S/l0/122/2276.

28. Minute by Hirtzel 6 June 1913, Ibid.

29. Hardinge to Chirol 30 Apr. 1913 Hardinge MSS, vol. 93.

30. Hardinge to Chirol 26 Sept. 1912 Ibid., vol. 92.

31. O'Beirne (St. Petersburg) to Grey 17 Sept. 1913, L/P&S/l0/416/4425.

32. Minutes by Crowe and Grey 16 Jan. 1914, F.O.371/2071/1492.

33. Minute by Crowe 21 Jan. 1914, Ibid./2069/1481.

34. Minutes by Clerk and Nicolson on Buchanan to Grey 5 Feb. 1914, Ibid./2064/5382.

35. Memo by Sazonov 12 Feb., in Buchanan to Grey 27 Feb. 1914, L/P&S/l0/416/927.

36. F.O.371/2069/9682.

37. Minute by Oliphant Ibid./2072/10372.

38. Buchanan to Grey 4 Mar., Ibid./2064/10331; Grey to Buchanan 18 Mar. 1914, Grey MSS, F.O.800/74.

39. L/P&S/10/416/927; the report of this conference is in F.O.371/2065/13422.

40. Townley to Grey 20 Mar. 1914, minutes by Oliphant, Crowe, Nicolson, Grey Ibid./2066/ 12446; Grey to Crewe 21 Mar. 1914, Crewe MSS, C/17; L/P&S/l0/450/1187.

41. Nicolson to Townley 7 Apr. 1914, Carnock MSS, F.0.800/373.

42. Minute by Grey 28 Apr. 1914, F.O.371/2092/18564.

43. L/P&S/l 0/455/P2696.

44. Grey to Crewe H May 1914, Crewe MSS, C/17; minutes by Crowe 22 May, F.0.371/2069/ 22975, 28 May 1914, Ibid./2070/23786.

45. B.D.x(ii) nos 547, 556, 561.

46. The situation in this respect was quite as bad as during the negotiation of the Agreement of 1907, when the French had forecast difficulties from this quarter. On 14 August 1906, for instance, Descos had written from Tehran to Bourgeois in Paris: ‘Si une entente anglo-russe doit se produire, il sera sage de la realiser loin de la Perse; ici les agents anglais et agents russes sont trop domines par les vieilles querelles; ils se battent par accoutumance, parce que c'est leur raison d'etre ou, plus simplement parcequ'ils n'ont past autre chose a faire…’, Documents Diplomatiques Francois (Paris, 1929-1962)Google Scholar, 2nd Series x no. 184. For Spring-Rice's pessimism see also Ibid, nos 235, 295, 395. See also Townley to Grey 7 Nov. 1912, Grey MSS, F.O.800/70.

47. Minutes by Oliphant and Crowe 2 June 1914, F.O.371/2059/24443.

48. Grey to Buchanan 8 June 1914, Ibid./2076/25918.

49. Ibid./2071/28844.

50. Buchanan to Grey 25 June 1914 Grey MSS, F.O.800/74.

51. India Office to Foreign Office 16 June 1914, L/P&S/10/455; same to same 29 June 1914, Ibid./ 10/450/2255; Buchanan to Grey 25 June 1914, Ibid./2475, 2873–4.

52. Minute by Grey 8 July 1914, F.0.371/2076/29456.

53. Memo by Clerk, ‘Anglo-Russian Relations in Persia’ 21 July 1914, F.O.371/2076/33484 paras 1,4,22,27.

54. On 7 July Buchanan had suggested that these oil resources be developed by an Anglo-Russian Company specially set up for the purpose. Crowe had minuted: ‘there will be a certain advantage in our having something to concede or offer to Russia in the general discussion about Persia, since in other respects all the asking is on our side, and it will be easier for Russia to meet us on some points if she can show that she has obtained something in return.’ Grey had immediately contacted Churchill at the Admiralty and urged him to agree to the leasing of the oilwells to a Russian or Anglo-Russian subsidiary company. Buchanan to Grey 7 July, minutes by Crowe and Grey 8 July 1914, F.0.371/2077/30744; Grey to Buchanan 14 July 1914, Grey MSS, F.O.800/74.

55. Clerk memo loc. cit. paras 31, 32, 36, 41, 53.

56. Ibid. para. 54.

57. Minute by Crowe 14 July, F.O.371/2076/31801; Ibid./32291; minute by Hirtzel 19 July 1914, L/P&S/10/416/2743.

58. Buchanan to Grey 19 July 1914, Grey MSS, F.O.800/74.

59. Minutes by Crowe 23 July on Clerk memo, loc. cit.; in his para. 45 Clerk had said that Britain could not make good a claim to the neutral zone of Persia.

60. Townley to Grey 23 July 1914, L/P&S/10/450/3205. On 27 July Townley produced the idea that an auction of Persia should be held: F.O.371/2078/34232.

61. Clerk memo loc. cit. para. 50; minute by Nicolson 22 July 1914, F.O.371/2094/32813.

62. B.D.x(ii) no. 538; Paleologue, M., La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre (Paris, 1921), i. 23Google Scholar; B.D.xi, no. 125.

63. Geiss, I., July 1914 (London, 1967), pp. 205Google Scholar, 217, 238–9, 241, 243; Spender, J. A. and Asquith, C., Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith (London, 1932) ii. 81Google Scholar. See also minute by Crowe 25 July, Buchanan to Grey 2 Aug. 1914: B.D.xi nos 101,490; and Wilson, K. M., ‘British power in the European balance 1906–14’ in Dilks, D. (ed.), Retreat from Power (London, 1981), pp. 39–40Google Scholar. See Buchanan to Grey 22 Oct. 1912 for Sazonov's threat at the time of the first Balkan War: Grey MSSS F.O.800/74. In December 1912 Buchanan reminded Nicolson that he had ‘all along reported that in the event of an Austro-Serbian conflict Russia will be drawn in’: Buchanan to Nicolson 7 Dec. 1912, Ibid.

64. B.D.xi nos 426, 447; A. Murray's diary 1 August 1914 in Hazlehurst, Cameron, Politicians at War (London, 1971), p. 91Google Scholar; D.D.F. 3rd Series xi no. 532.

65. See Wilson, K. M., ‘The British Cabinet's Decision for War, 2 August 1914’, British Journal of International Studies, vol i, no. 2 (1975), pp. 152–3Google Scholar.

66. Townley to Grey 29 July 1914, Grey MSS, F.O.800/70.

67. Morley, John Viscount, Memorandum on Resignation: August 1914 (London, 1928), p. 6Google Scholar.

68. Wilkinson, Spencer, Britain at Bay (London, 1909), pp. 73Google Scholar, 77, 189.

69. Grey told Nicolson and Bertie in February and March 1906 that it was Russia who would change the situation in Europe, on which the positions of France and Germany in Morocco depended, to the advantage of France; that it was Russia who would assure the peace of Europe and the ‘civility’ of Germany to France and to Britain. (B.D.iii no. 278; Grey to Bertie 15 Mar. 1906 Bertie MSS F.0.800/160) Grey was fully aware that even at the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian negotiations, the recovery of Russia necessary to fulfil this role had not been effected. (B.D.iv nos 544, 550) In May and October 1909 Hardinge wrote that there still remained much to be done and that it would require at least two or three years before the Russian army was prepared for a European war. (Memo by Hardinge May 1909, B.D.v App.V; Hardinge to Cartwright 18 May, 4 Oct. 1909, Cartwright MSS). Yet throughout this time the British had invoked the power of Russia. Grey in May 1908 had said that not the British but the Russian army ought to be regarded as the ‘great counterpoise to Germany on land’. (Memo by Grey 28 Apr. 1908, Grey MSS F.O.800/92; minute by Grey 29 May 1908, F.O.371/455/18454) In September 1908 he had reported to Asquith yet another encounter with Clemenceau at which the latter had dwelt on Waterloo rather than on Trafalgar; Asquith commented that the Frenchman was ignorant ‘if he imagines we are going to keep here a standing army of VI-VA million men, ready to meet the Germans in Belgium if and when they are minded to adopt that route for the invasion of France. As you point out, he completely ignores the existencefrom a military point of view—of his Russian ally.’ (Asquith to Grey 7 Sept. 1908, Grey MSS, F.O.800/100) The C.I.D. sub-committee on the Military Needs of the Empire that was appointed in October 1908 was encouraged by the FO to presume that if Germany provoked hostilities with France the latter ‘would be able to count on the armed support of her ally Russia’. (Memo by Hardinge 11 Nov. 1908 Grey MSS F.O.800/92) On 9 August 1911, at a meeting between Grey, Haldane, Sir Henry Wilson and Crowe, the question of Russian support was raised yet again. According to the D.M.O.'s account, he ‘shattered rather rudely’ the theory advanced by Grey ‘that Russia was a governing factor’. Grey was told that ‘Russian interference would scarcely relieve the pressure from Paris’. In a paper drafted on 11 August Wilson wrote: ‘It is true that France might have the active assistance of Russia. In point of fact however, this assistance is-more imaginary than real.’ (Wilson Diary 9 Aug. 1911; memos by Wilson 11, 13 Aug. 1911, W.O.106/47A, CAB 38/19/ 47; minutes on Buchanan to Grey 3 Sept. 1911, B.D.vii no. 501) At the C.I.D. on 23 August Wilson said the Russians were so frightened of the Germans that he did not think they would allow a single man to leave the country. The meeting could have been forgiven had it taken away the impression that, of the two armies, the Belgian was the more valuable, (minutes of 114th meeting of C.I.D., CAB 2/2/2) These views made no difference to Grey. He minuted in February 1912 on a letter from the French military attache in Berlin to his colleague in London: ‘This takes no account of the Russian army.’ (letter dated 9 Feb. 1912, in Carnock MSS, F.O.800/353; minute by Parker on Buchanan to Grey 3 Sept. 1911, F.O.371/1164/34653) If it was on Grey's instructions that Nicolson made this point to Cambon, there would appear to be little difference between irresponsibility and downright stupidity. At any rate, the reply was that the Russians were ‘in a transition state. They said they would not be ready for taking a serious part in a campaign for about 16–1 8 months from now.’ Only in the spring of 1913 was it beyond all doubt that the recovery of Russia was complete in European terms. (Nicolson to Grey 15 Feb. 1912, to Goschen 11 Mar. 1913, Carnock MSS, F.0.800/353, /364).

70. For example Robbins, K., ‘Sir Edward Grey and the British Empire’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, i, 1972–1973, p. 220Google Scholar.

71. Hardinge to Nicolson 15 May 1907, Carnock MSS, F.0.800/339.