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Hegemony, consensus and Trilateralism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Stephen Gill
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Extract

This essay attempts to apply concepts of hegemony to the case of contemporary North American—Western European—Japanese (‘Trilateral’) relations and, more specifically, to analyse the role and importance of a unique international organization the Trilateral Commission (TC), within Trilateral relations. The essay comprises: (i) a comparison of the Realist and Gramscian concepts of hegemony and relates them to aspects of the post-war international order; (ii) a more extended discussion of the Gramscian concept of hegemony and related concepts; (iii) an exposition of aspects of the ‘Trilateral’ approach, a discussion of the TC and an interpretation of the TC using Gramscian analysis; and (iv) a discussion of the long-term structural pressures on the Trilateral relationship in the context of a reconstituted hegemony.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , July 1986 , pp. 205 - 222
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1986

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References

1. These perspectives correspond to those dealt with by Sylvan, D. in ‘The Newest Mercantilism’ International Organisation xxxv (1981), pp. 375–379.CrossRefGoogle Scholar He discusses Block, F., The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present, (Berkeley, 1977)Google Scholar, Gilpin, R., US Power and the Multinational Corporation, (London, 1976)Google Scholar, and Krasner, S., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy, (Princeton, 1978).Google Scholar

2. ‘Liberalizing’ is emphasized here since the system as it originated at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 was not entirely liberal—a great deal of protectionism was tolerated. The success of the USA, which at the time had a massive preponderance of material and military resources, was to gain acceptance for the principles of multilateralism and the ‘open door’ for foreign investment. However, the system reflected the changed nature of the (now more interventionist) post-war capitalist states, Ruggie argues that the system was ‘embedded’ in the ongoing state-society relations of the major powers, although in principle it was committed to the long term liberalization of trade and capital flows. See Ruggie, J. G., ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change—Embedded Liberalism in the Post War Economic Order’ International Organisation, xxxvi (1982), pp. 379–415.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. Russett, B., ‘The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?’, International Organisation, xxxix (1985), pp. 207–231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. Hveem, H., ‘The Global Dominance System: Notes on a Theory of Global Political Economy’, Journal of Peace Research, iv (1973), pp. 319–340.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5. See Nye, J. S., ‘US Power and Reagan Policy’, Orbis, xxvi (1982), pp. 391–412Google Scholar; Petras, J. and Rhodes, R., ‘The Reconsolidation of US Hegemony’, New Left Review, lxxxxvii (1976), pp. 37–53Google Scholar; Keohane, R. O.After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (Princeton, 1984)Google Scholar; Arrighi, G., ‘A Crisis of Hegemony’, in Amin, S., Arrighi, G., Frank, A. G. and Wallerstein, I. (eds.), Dynamics of Global Crisis, (New York, 1982) pp. 55–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6. The world political system has been analysed in structural terms by a number of Neo-Realist writers such as Waltz, K.[Theory of International Politics, (Reading, MA. 1979)].Google Scholar International economists have analysed what they call the world economy. The term ‘global political economy’ is meant to refer both to an integrated entity and to the analysis of political and economic structures and processes at a global level. The term GPE is used in preference to the term ‘international political economy’ which may imply a degree of state-centricity. The conceptualization of such integrated structures and processes is a matter of debate between rival perspectives. For summaries of these different perspectives see Gourevitch, P. A., ‘The Second Image Reversed: Domestic Sources of International Polities’, International Organisation, xxxii (1978), pp. 929–952Google Scholar; Jones, R. J. Barry, ‘International Political Economy: Perspectives and Prospects’, Review of International Studies, viii (1982), pp. 39–52;CrossRefGoogle ScholarTooze, R., ‘In Search of International Political Economy’, Political Studies, xxxii (1984), pp. 637–646.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7. Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S.Power and Interdependence, (Boston, 1977), pp. 24–29, quote is on p. 25.Google Scholar

8. An important early text was Cooper, R., The Economics of Interdependence, (New York, 1968).Google Scholar

9. Ruggie, op. cit. (note 2).

10. See Gramsci, A., Selections from ‘The Prison Notebooks’ translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith (London, 1971)Google Scholar; Cox, R., ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method’ Millennium, xii (1983), pp. 162–175CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Davis, M., ‘The Political Economy of Late Imperial America’, New Left Review, 143 (1984), pp. 6–38;Google Scholar Keohane, op. cit. (note 5) pp. 31–46.

11. Cox, , ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millennium x (1981), p. 139.Google Scholar

12. Joll, J.Gramsci, (Glasgow, 1977), p. 99.Google Scholar

13. Showstack-Sassoon, A., Gramsci's Politics, (London, 1980), p. 111.Google Scholar

14. Ibid, p. 116.

15. Gramsci, op. cit. (note 10) p. 97.

16. Showstack-Sassoon, op. cit. (note 13) p. 134.

17. Keohane and Nye, op. cit. (note 7).

18. See, for a representative selection of TC literature, Duchene, F.et al., The Crisis of International Cooperation, (New York, 1974)Google Scholar; Bergsten, C. F.et al., The Reform of International Institutions, (New York, 1976)Google Scholar; Crozier, M.et al., The Crisis of Democracy, (New York, 1975)Google Scholar; Cooper, R.et al., Towards a Renovated International System, (New York, 1977)Google Scholar; Camps, M.et al., Trilateralism and the International Economy of the 1980s, (New York, 1982)Google Scholar; Ushiba, N.et a., Sharing International Responsibilities among the Trilateral Countries, (New York, 1983)Google Scholar; Watanabe, T.et al., Facilitating Development in a Changing Third World, (New York, 1983)Google Scholar; Owen, D.et al., Democracy Must Work: A Trilateral Agenda for the Decade, (New York, 1984).Google Scholar

19. Owen et al., op. cit., (note 18) p. 6.

20. Gill, S., ‘From Atlanticism to Trilateralism’ in Smith, S. (ed.) International Relations: British and American Perspectives, (Oxford, 1985), pp. 185–212.Google Scholar

21. The Bilderberg Meetings are held annually and in complete secrecy. They originated in the mid-1950s as a private counterpart to the Atlantic Alliance, and helped serve to introduce leaders from various West European countries to their American counterparts. It has been referred to as the ‘international’ of post-war Atlanticist capitalism. Virtually every post-war major Western leader has attended Bilderberg at one time or another. The meetings ceased temporarily after the Lockheed scandal, since Bilderberg's chairman, Prince Bernhardt of the Netherlands, was heavily implicated in the imbroglio. The Atlantic Institute is primarily a research organization and is another private counterpart to NATO. Unlike Bilderberg, it has a significant number of Japanese members, but since its concerns have tended to be in the security field, the Japanese have given it lower priority than the TC. The Hakone meetings are annual and were started in 1977. They involve selected TC members and younger aspiring members of the elites of Japan and the major Western European countries. The originator of these meetings was Max Kohnstamm, the former Private Secretary to Bernhardt, and a previous Chairman of the European branch of the TC.

22. Dye, T.Who's Running America? The Carter Years, Second Edition (Englewood Cliffs, 1979), pp. 213, 225, 226.Google Scholar

23. Cox, , ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations’, (note 10) p. 169, citing Gramsci in The Prison NotebooksGoogle Scholar.

24. Cox, op. cit. (note 10) pp. 170–172.

25. Watanabe et al., op. cit. (note 18); Campbell, J. C.et al., Energy: A Strategy for International Action, (New York, 1974)Google Scholar; Gardner, R. N.et al., OPEC, The Trilateral World and the Developing Countries: Arrangements for Cooperation, (New York, 1975)Google Scholar; Sawhill, J. C.et al., Energy: Managing the Transition, (New York, 1978)Google Scholar; Hardy, M.et al., A New Regime for the Oceans, (New York, 1976).Google Scholar

26. Cox, , ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders’, (note 11) p. 172.Google Scholar

27. See Cooper et al., op. cit. (note 18) and Ushiba et al., op. cit. (note 18).

28. Interviews with C. Heck, North American Director of the TC, 21 June 1979, 27 July 1982.

29. I am grateful to David Law for bringing some of these points to my attention.

30. Owen et al., op. cit. (note 18) p. 5. On uneven development and the implications of a technology gap emerging between Western Europe, on the one hand, and the USA and Japan on the other, see Ibid, p. 63.