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33 In fact, the actors that constructed this order did not seek at first to eliminate religion from public life, only from international political life. They saw themselves as members of a universal community based on Christianity. See Osiander, Andreas, The States System of Europe, 1640–1990 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 27–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Secularism came with further evolution of the Westphalian system, although for Hurd, secularism in its Judeo-Christian form cannot be separated from its theological roots. See Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, pp. 37–44.

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41 Ibid., p. 30.

42 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, pp. 24–6.

43 Ibid., p. 35.

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49 Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, pp. 67–8.

50 Ibid., pp. 67–70.

51 Sivan, Emmanuel, The Crash within Islam (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers, 2005)Google Scholar.

52 Note that the world orders presented in the table are ideal types. The religious order reflects an interpretation of religion as constitutive of a political world order and as such is just one view of order in universalist religions. As most conceptions of religion and the bulk of people who identify themselves as religious accept the state based order the worldview presented in the table reflects the position of only a small minority.

53 For example, see Scheuer, Michael, Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, rev. edn (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006)Google Scholar.

54 Note that an actor may violate occasionally and for a limited time some of the constitutive principles of international society, but as long as it does not challenge their general validity, it does not represent a systemic threat.

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61 Cited in Amir Taheri, ‘Al Qaeda's Agenda for Iraq’, New York Post (4 September 2003).

62 For example, al-Libi, Moderation of Islam.

63 Ibid.

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66 Mendelsohn, Barak, Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony and Interstate Cooperation in the War on Terrorism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 63–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For AQ's justifications for killing civilians in the 9/11 attacks, see al-Qaeda, ‘Permissibility of Killing Civilians: A Statement from Qaidat al-Jihad Regarding the Mandates of the Heroes and the Legality of the Operations in New York and Washington’, available at: {www.mepc.org/journal_vol10/0306_alqaeda.asp}.

67 al-Libi, Moderation of Islam.

68 Osama Bin Laden, A Message to Our People in Iraq (23 October 2007); Ayman al-Zawahiri, Open Interview (2 April 2008); Ayman al-Zawahiri, Open Interview, Part 2 (22 April 2008).

69 Osama Bin Laden, May Our Brother Become Bereaved If We Do Not Support Our Prophet, Peace be Upon Him (20 March 2008).

70 al-Libi, Moderation of Islam.

71 Note that the AQ worldview inherently conflicts with institutions of the international society such as the Great Powers and the Balance of Power, as they presuppose states are the primary actors in world politics.

72 Osama bin Laden, Declaration of War (12 October 1996).

73 Bin Laden, Declaration of War; Osama Bin Laden, ‘This War is Fundamentally Religious’, Washington Post (7 November 2001); al-Zawahiri, Open Interview.

74 Osama Bin Laden, Interview with ABCNEWS (December 1998).

75 al-Zawahiri, ‘Loyality and Separation’, p. 226; Ayman al-Zawahiri, Realities of the Conflict between Islam and Unbelief (29 December 2006).

76 Osama Bin Laden, ‘Letter to America’, The Observer (24 November 2002); al-Zawahiri, Open Interview.

77 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Realities of the Conflict between Islam and Unbelief (29 December 2006).

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97 Armstrong, Revolution and World Order.

98 Mendelsohn, Combating Jihadism.