1 {http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Political-cooperation.html} accessed on 21 January 2010.

2 Webber, Douglas (ed.), The Franco-German Relationship in the EU (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 2Google Scholar .

3 Baylis, John (ed.), Anglo-American Relations since 1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 155Google Scholar .

4 At the 2004 Anglo-French summit, the final communiqué stressed that: ‘Our joint aim is to reduce poverty in Africa [and] to help build lasting peace and democracy’, {http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Franco-British-summit-conclusions.html} accessed on 23 June 2010.

5 This term was originally coined by Rose, Gideon in a review article entitled ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, 51:1 (1998), p. 146CrossRefGoogle Scholar . For an overview of neo-classical realism, see Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., and Ripsman, Norrin M., Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)Google Scholar . The authors contend that there is no single neo-classical realist theory, but a diversity of such theories.

6 Most major neo-classical realist works are case studies examining the response of great powers to the rise or fall of their relative power. On the US, see Dueck, Colin, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006)Google Scholar . On the US and China, see Christensen, Thomas J., Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996)Google Scholar . On the Soviet Union, see Wohlforth, William, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993)Google Scholar . On the major players in the Second World War, see Schweller, Randall L., Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1998)Google Scholar .

7 See Rathbun, Brian, ‘A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism’, Security Studies, 17 (2008), pp. 294–321CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

8 The importance of the ideational dimension is recognised by a number of neo-classical realists, see, for example, Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism’, p. 168; Rathburn, ‘A Rose’, p. 16; and Kitchen, Nicholas, ‘Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: a Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation’, Review of International Studies, 36 (2010), pp. 117–143CrossRefGoogle Scholar . According to Kitchen (p. 127), ‘Neoclassical realism […] places the impact of ideas alongside the imperatives of material power in the making of foreign policy, rejecting the notion that either ideas or material factors are somehow “most fundamental” and therefore deserving of analytic focus to the exclusion of the other.’

9 This exchange has led to occasional seminars involving UK and French Foreign Ministry staff discussing issues such as Sudan and the Sahel. However, Chatham House's efforts to host a ‘St-Malo ten years on’ seminar elicited little interest from either Foreign Ministry; personal communication, Whitehall insider (2009).

10 Kitchen, ‘Systemic Pressures’, p. 133. This ‘executive’ is composed of ‘high-ranking bureaucrats’ and elected representatives ‘charged with the overall conduct of foreign affairs’.

11 Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism’, p. 147.

12 Personal communication, FCO (2008).

13 Personal communication, FCO (2009). The UK and France nonetheless agreed to create a joint counterterrorism committee that should meet quarterly {www.nytimes.com/2007/07/20/world/…/20iht-france.4.6757003.html}.

14 See the unpublished reports by Niagalé Bagayoko (L'appareil de sécurité de la République centrafricaine and Cameroon's Security Apparatus) and by Niagalé Bagayoko and Jeffrey Isima (Security Systems in Francophone and Anglophone Africa).

15 Personal communications, DFID (2010) and MFA (2009).

16 The UK tied 44.1 per cent of assistance in 1974–1975 and 41.3 per cent in 1982–1983, see Cumming, Gordon, Aid to Africa (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), p. 90Google Scholar .

17 France tied 67.5 per cent of aid in 1974–1975 and 46.1 per cent in 1982–1983, Cumming, , Aid to Africa, pp. 90, 64Google Scholar .

18 The UK insisted that France show ‘clearly demonstrable impartiality’ and avoid involvement in the fighting, see Fenton, Neil, Understanding the Security Council (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 140Google Scholar .

19 Styan, David, ‘Does Britain have an African Policy?’, in Centre d'Etudes d'Afrique Noire, Afrique Politique (Paris: Karthala, 1996), pp. 261–286Google Scholar .

20 Personal communication, French Foreign Ministry (2008).

21 On ‘balancing’ and ‘bandwagoning’, see Walt, Stephen M., ‘Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power’, International Security, 9:4 (1985), pp. 4–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

22 George Ball, American undersecretary of state in the Kennedy administration, recognised Africa as a ‘special European responsibility’, see Ball, George, The Disciples of Power (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968)Google Scholar .

23 Attendance by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) is sporadic, due to a turf war with the MFA; personal communication, DFID (2009).

24 {http://www.nytimes.com/auth/login?URI=http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/20/world/europe/20iht-france.4.6757003.html} accessed on 20 July 2007. Brown and Sarkozy subsequently wrote a joint article published in The Times and Le Monde (31 August 2007).

25 Personal communication, FCO official (2009).

26 African leaders were instrumental in placing Africa on the G8 agenda as from the 2002 Kananaskis summit, see Vines, Alex, ‘Into Africa’, World Today (March 2005)Google Scholar . Significantly too, the AU Chairperson, Jean Ping, was invited to the G20 summit for the first time by the UK in 2009; personal communication, EU official (2009).

27 Britain leads on the MDGs and France on Climate Change. While headed up by the EU, the Peace and Security panel is chaired by a French general and heavily influenced by the UK.

28 Personal communications, FCO official (2009).

29 Ibid.

30 Personal communications, former UK official in New York (2008).

31 Personal communications, former UK officials in New York and London (2008).

32 Personal communication, FCO official (2008).

33 Personal communication, Whitehall insider (2009).

34 Personal communication, FCO, London (2009).

35 Ibid.

36 Personal communications with Claire Short via email (2008) and with Charles Josselin in Paris (2009).

37 See Vines, Alex and Cargill, Thomas, ‘Le monde doit nous juger sur l'Afrique’, Politique Africaine, 101 (2006), pp. 132–148CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

38 Most decisions are by qualified majority voting, with votes being a function of contributions to the EDF. France, Germany and Britain have contributed 24.3 per cent, 23.4 per cent and 12.7 per cent respectively, European Report (23 February 2005).

39 Initially conceived by the French and Brazilian Presidents in 2003, UNITAID was subsequently launched by France, Britain, Brazil, Chile and Norway. It now enjoys support from Spain, Luxembourg and 22 developing countries, {http://www.unitaid.eu/en/UNITAID-donors.html} accessed 23 June 2010.

40 OECD, Peer Review: France (Paris: OECD, 2008), p. 40Google Scholar .

41 This culminated in a UN conference at which the UK contributed £400 million to a 5.3 billion US dollar pool to improve global health care, see M2 PressWIRE (23 September 2009).

42 {http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2008/mar/27/sarkozy.brown.france.statevisit}.

43 Personal communication, FCO official (2008).

44 OECD, Peer Review: The United Kingdom (Paris: OECD, 2006)Google Scholar .

45 {http://www.eubusiness.com/topics/social/millennium-development-eu/} accessed on 23 June 2010.

46 Personal communications, MFA, Paris (2008).

47 OECD, Peer Review: France, p. 15.Google Scholar

48 Personal communications, MFA and DFID officials (2009).

49 DFID, Annual Report and Resource Accounts 2008–09, Volume I (London: DFID, 2009), p. 9Google Scholar .

50 France promised, at the 2002 Monterrey Conference, to increase aid to 0.5 per cent of GNP in 2007 and 0.7 per cent by 2012. However, France did not meet its 2007 target and has postponed the 0.7 per cent commitment to 2015, see OECD, Peer Review: France, p. 39Google Scholar .

51 Personal communications, FCO (2009) and MFA (2008).

52 Personal communication, FCO (2009).

53 Porteous, Tom, ‘British government policy in sub-Saharan Africa under New Labour’, International Affairs, 81:2 (2005), p. 293CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

54 Porteous, ‘British government’, p. 293.

55 The initial figure was US $8 million, see {http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/DRC-countryplan08–10%5B1%5D.pdf} accessed on 12 February 2010.

56 Personal communication, MFA official (2009).

57 Personal communication, former UK official in New York (2009).

58 European Report (11 December 2007).

59 Personal communication, former UK Minister (2009).

60 Zakaria, Fareed, ‘Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay’, International Security, 17:1 (1992), p. 198CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

61 See Richard Youngs, Is European Democracy Promotion on the Wane?, CEPS Working Document No. 292 (2008).

62 Porteous, ‘British government’, p. 286.

63 Personal communication, MFA, Paris (2009). Bockel's dismissal came about after his outspoken stance on human rights provoked protests by Omar Bongo, the former President of oil-rich Gabon.

64 The Angolagate arms-for-oil scandal which came to court in 2008 is an example of this. See also, ‘Entre Paris et Dakar’, Le Monde (12 June 2010).

65 For further details of UK-French security cooperation, see Chafer, Tony and Cumming, Gordon D., ‘Beyond Fashoda: Anglo-French Security Cooperation in Africa since Saint-Malo’, International Affairs 86:5 (2010), pp. 1129–1147Google Scholar .

66 Full agreement was only reached on this force, with German support, in 2001.

67 Bagayoko, Niagalé, ‘Les politiques européennes de prévention’, Les Champs de Mars, second semester (2004), p. 103Google Scholar .

68 Personal communication, former UK Minister (2009).

69 Personal communication, UK official (December 2009).

70 Personal communication, FCO official (2009).

71 France nonetheless offered diplomatic support to the British intervention in Sierra Leone. The UK also backed France's request for UN peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire, see Loisel, Sébastien, ‘Entente cordiale ou moteur européen?’, Le Champs de Mars, first semester (2004), p. 52Google Scholar .

72 The UK's intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, initially to shore up a UN peacekeeping mission and then to stabilise the elected regime, is hailed by Dunne, Tim as an operation to uphold ‘the humanitarian values embodied in the UN Charter’, see ‘“When the Shooting Starts”: Atlanticism in British Security Strategy’, International Affairs, 80:5 (2004), p. 906CrossRefGoogle Scholar . France's large-scale intervention in Côte d'Ivoire after the failed 2002 coup is better understood in terms of France's realpolitik concerns to shore up a country that is pivotal to its African sphere of influence, see Gray, Christine, ‘Peacekeeping and enforcement action in Africa’, Review of International Studies, 31 (2005), p. 216Google Scholar .

73 Matlary, J. H., EU Security Dynamics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 101–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

74 Personal communication, FCO official (2009).

75 Rose, ‘Neoclassical realism’, p. 146.

76 Sterling-Folker, Jennifer, ‘Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables’, International Studies Quarterly, 41:1 (1997), p. 19CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

77 For a discussion of these intervening variables, see Taliaferro, et al. , ‘Neoclassical Realism’. pp. 1–41Google Scholar . As noted earlier, Zakaria (‘Realism and Domestic Politics’, p. 198) includes ‘domestic and other influences’. Kitchen (‘Systemic Pressures’, p. 118) identifies ‘domestic politics, state power and processes, leaders’ perceptions and the impact of ideas’, while Sterling-Folker (‘Realist Environment’, pp. 19–20) highlights the ‘identities, interests and behaviors’ of bureaucrats.

78 Gallagher, Julia, ‘Healing The Scar?’, African Affairs, 108:432 (2009), pp. 435–451CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

79 Speech by Tony Blair, Lord Mayor's Banquet (1 November 1997). Blair also stressed, however, that he still saw Britain as a global player given its position in the UNSC, Commonwealth and G8.

80 Personal communication, former UK official, New York (2008). The threat to their P5 status is longstanding. More recently, China pressed at the G20 (Pittsburgh) to have UK and French voting rights on the IMF Board reduced, see Lettre du Continent, no. 1429 (23 October 2009). Unlike the UK, France's status is also at risk within the World Bank.

81 The Observer (9 January 2005).

82 Personal communication, former UK Minister (2009).

83 Loisel, ‘Entente’, p. 56 and {www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf5/beu_ukfr_nov03_defence} accessed on 5 December 2009.

84 ‘Elite consensus’ is one of four intervening variables said to affect the capacity of elites to extract the societal resources needed to execute their preferred foreign policy, see Schweller, Randall L., ‘Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing’, International Security, 29:2 (2004), pp. 159–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

85 Dyson, Tom, ‘Convergence and Divergence in Post-Cold War British, French, and German Military Reforms’, Security Studies, 17:4 (2008), pp. 725–774CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

86 Vines and Cargill, ‘Le monde’, p. 135.

87 Personal communication, Paris (2009).

88 See Glaser, Antoine and Smith, Stephen, Comment la France a perdu l'Afrique (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2005)Google Scholar .

89 Personal communications, AFD, Paris (2009).

90 Personal communication, former UK Minister (2009).

91 Personal communication, London (2009).

92 To illustrate, in 2006, France allocated 151 million US dollars to basic schooling compared to 1.2 billion dollars for tertiary education, OECD, Peer Review: France, p. 15Google Scholar .

93 Federal News Service (27 March 2008).

94 Ripsman, Norrin, ‘Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups’, in Taliaferro, et al. , Neoclassical Realism, p. 192Google Scholar .

95 {http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2010/11/uk-france-summit-press-conference-56551} accessed on 15 November 2011.

96 Porteous ‘British government’, p. 293.

97 The Conservative Party was said by Bernard Kouchner to be ready to collaborate bilaterally with the French but less inclined to cooperate within a European framework, Agence France-Presse (7 April 2010).