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The Foreign Office and political intelligence 1918–1920

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Erik Goldstein
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Extract

In 1918 Harold Nicolson in discussing the problem of political intelligence observed that ‘any forecast of diplomatic development must inevitably deal, not with concentric forces, but with eccentric tendencies; such data as are available emerge only from a mass of heterogeneous phenomena, mutually conflicting, mutually overlapping, and striving each towards some distinct and often incompatible solution’. At the time Nicolson was writing the Foreign Office was embarking upon an early attempt to assist diplomacy through analysing these eccentric tendencies and coordinating the information emanating from the heterogeneous phenomena of foreign affairs. The vehicle for this experiment was the Political Intelligence Department (P.I.D.), and its experience contains elements common to intelligence activity throughout this century: the need for co-ordination which in turn leads to a struggle for control of the co-ordinating body, the suspicion aroused in traditional departments by any group involved in intelligence work, the pressure of the Treasury to cut costs even at the expense of useful intelligence operations, and the struggle between the prime minister's office and the Foreign Office for the control of policy. Since the turn of the century there had been a growing awareness of the need for foreign intelligence, a development which finally resulted in the creation of an espionage service in 1909 (the ancestor of the Secret Intelligence Service). This department, however, concentrated on military related intelligence. During the First World War it became evident, particularly to Lord Hardinge, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, that while there were numerous sources of political intelligence, no systematic method had been established for collecting and collating this information, verifying it against collateral sources, and synthesizing the result in succinct reports which would be of value to the policy-makers. Military intelligence was clearly the preserve of the Admiralty and the War Office, and the Foreign Office decided to establish that political intelligence fell within its purview. In the process of establishing Foreign Office primacy in this sphere, Hardinge had to fend off attempts by Lord Beaverbrook who as Minister of Information tried to use his personal political clout to control such intelligence. This was, however, only one of several bureaucratic difficulties, the P.I.D. was forced to struggle with. Finally in 1920 the P.I.D. was closed through a combination of financial and bureaucratic pressures. During its brief existence, though, it was able to prove the utility of a centralized body concerned with political intelligence. In some ways it presaged the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (J.I.C.), which in a more sophisticated and elaborate way is meant, to achieve the same ends.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , October 1988 , pp. 275 - 288
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1988

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References

1. Nicolson, Harold, ‘Consideration of Future Political Diplomatic Developments’, 03 1918.Google Scholar Harold Nicolson Papers, made available by courtesy of Mr Nigel Nicolson.

2. Warman, Roberta M., ‘The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the Making of Foreign Policy, 1916–1918’, Historical Journal, 15:1 (1972), pp. 133–159CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Busch, Briton Cooper, Hardinge of Penshurst: A Study in the Old Diplomacy (New York, 1980).Google Scholar

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4. FO 395/148/85465/117714. Foreign Office Papers, Public Record Office, London.

5. A list of such works is to be found in FO 371/4366/9428/PID 263.

6. Seton-Watson, p. 208.

7. Ibid.

8. FO 371/4382/PID 619. Memorandum by Headlam-Morley, 28 October 1919.

9. FO 367/787/44472.

10. On Beaverbrook's role see Taylor, Philip, pp. 893–894; and Taylor, A. J. P., Beaverbrook (London, 1972), pp. 146–150.Google Scholar

11. FO 371/4382/PID 619. Memorandum by Headlam-Morley, 28 October 1919.

12. G. W. Prothero Diary, 8 March 1918. Cited by kind permission of Mr C. W. Crawley, Trinity Hall, Cambridge.

13. CAB 24/45, G.T.3939. Cabinet Office Papers, Public Record Office, London.

14. FO 800/207. Beaverbrook to Balfour, 21 May 1918.

15. Interview with E. H. Carr, Cambridge, 20 May 1981.

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25. The P.I.D. did have some involvement in the sending of a Mr Safrastian to Armenia. He was one of the DIIB staff not transferred to the P.I.D., but ended up with the War Office. The P.I.D. continued to contribute £2 a week to his salary to retain some claim on the information he produced. FO 366/787/44472.

26. FO 371/4382/PID 619.

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29. FO 800/207/9556. Memorandum of a Meeting in First Lord's Room, 12 April 1919.

30. FO 371/4382/PID 619.

31. Ibid.

32. FO 371/4382/PID 586. Memorandum by Tyrrell, 30 July 1918.

33. R. W. A. Leeper to Headlam-Morley, 14 March 1919. Headlam-Morley Papers.

34. A. W. A. Leeper to R. W. A. Leeper, 31 May 1919. A. W. A. Leeper Papers. Cited by courtesy of Mrs Katharine Cobbett. As well as Reilly the Leepers obviously knew one of Reilly's chief Russian contacts, Savinkov.

35. FO 371/4382/PID 619.

36. Ibid.

37. FO 371/4352/fl8/PC20.

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40. FO 371/4354/f65/PC65.

41. FO 371/4355/f68/PC68.

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46. On this period of Smuts' career see Hancock, W. K., Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870–1919 (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 492–504.Google Scholar

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48. ‘I gather that not only Hardinge, but Tyrrell, Tilley,.Montgomery and practically everyone in the Office is persuaded as to the utility of the P.I.D. and they all intend to use their influence in order to make it permanent,’ Koppel to Headlam-Morley, 24 March 1919, Headlam-Morley Papers.

49. R. W. A. Leeper to Headlam-Morley, 14 March 1919, Headlam-Morley Papers.

50. Headlam-Morley to A. W. A. Leeper, 12 March 1919, Headlam-Morley Papers.

51. Headlam-Morley to R. W. A. Leeper, 17 March 1919, Headlam-Morley Papers.

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56. Originally this operations was under the Admiralty but after it deciphered a French diplomatic cable reporting that Curzon had criticized the views of his Cabinet colleagues in a conversation with the French Ambassador Curzon thought it best to assume direct responsibility for this unit. See Andrew, C., ‘Codebreakers and Foreign Offices: the French, British and American Experience’, in Andrew, Christopher and Dilks, David, The Missing Dimension (London, 1984), pp. 44–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

57. David Dilks, ‘Flashes of Intelligence: The Foreign Office, the SID and Security Before the Second World War’, in Andrew and Dilks, pp. 101–25, particularly pp. 122–5.

58. FO 371/23994/W793/793/50. Minute by Cadogan, 14 February 1939.

59. Ibid. Sir Lancelot Oliphant, 15 February 1939.

60. Edward Thomas, ‘The Evolution of the JIC System Up to and During World War II’, in Andrew and Noakes, pp. 219–34.

61. Falkland Islands Review, Command 8787 (London, 1983); Freedman, Lawrence, ‘Intelligence Operations in the Falklands’, Intelligence and National Security, 1:3 (1986), pp. 309–335.CrossRefGoogle Scholar