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Enforcing the Kyoto Protocol: can punitive consequences restore compliance?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2007

Abstract

To enhance effective cooperation, the Marrakesh Accords provide a compliance system for the international climate regime. An innovative part of this system is an Enforcement Branch authorised to apply punitive consequences against countries that fail to comply with their Kyoto obligations. While previous research has primarily focused on the ability of this compliance system to deter non-compliance, this article discusses whether the actual use of punitive consequences will induce a non-compliant country to return to compliance. The Marrakesh Accords explicitly emphasise that the punitive consequences shall be aimed at the restoration of compliance. However, we show that the application of punitive consequences will accomplish this in only exceptional circumstances.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2007

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