¹ See, for example, Hintze, Otto, ‘Military Organization and the Organization of the State’, in Gilbert, Felix (ed.), The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (Oxford, 1975), pp. 178–215Google Scholar; Tilly, Charles (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, 1975)Google Scholar; and Tilly, Charles, Coercion, Capital, and European Stales (Oxford, 1990).Google Scholar

² On the prevalence of domestic security threats in the Third World, see Buzan, Barry, ‘People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World’, in Azar, Edward and Moon, Chung-In (eds.), National Security in the Third World (Aldershot, 1988), pp. 14–43Google Scholar, and Ayoob, Mohammed, ‘The Security Problematic of the Third World’, World Politics, 43 (1991), pp. 257–283CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ On the need for new concepts in Third World security studies, see Levy, Jack and Barnett, Michael, ‘Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security’, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 14 (1992), pp. 19–40Google Scholar, and Holsti, Kal, ‘International Theory and War in the Third World’, in Job, Brian (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder, 1992), pp. 37–60Google Scholar. A useful discussion of the difficulties of building theory when different causal processes lead to similar outcomes is Benjamin Most and Starr, Harvey, ‘International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and “Nice Laws”’, World Politics, 36 (1984), pp. 383–406Google Scholar.

⁴ The distinction is due to Wulf, Herbert, ‘Dependent Militarism in the Periphery and Possible Alternative Concepts’, in Neuman, Stephanie and Harkavy, Robert (eds.), Arms Transfers in the Modern World (New York, 1979), pp. 246–263Google Scholar.

⁵ See, respectively, Gourevitch, Peter, ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Polities’, International Organization, 32 (1978), pp. 881–912CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Wendt, Alexander, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Polities’, International Organization, 46 (1992), pp. 391–425CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Studies with which we otherwise share much in common; see, for example, Kaldor, Mary and Eide, Asbjorn (eds.), The World Military Order (London, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Eide, Asbjorn and Thee, Marek (eds.), Problems of Contemporary Militarism (London, 1980)Google Scholar.

⁷ For good discussions of counterfactual analysis, see Fearon, James, ‘Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science’, World Politics, 43 (1991), pp. 169–195CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Gould, Stephen Jay, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History (New York, 1989)Google Scholar, especially chapter 5.

⁸ See Ross, Andrew, ‘Dimensions of Militarization in the Third World’, Armed Forces and Society, 13 (1987), p. 564CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ On the problems of measuring this substitutability, see Smith, Ron, Humm, Anthony and Fontanel, Jacques, ‘Capital-Labor Substitution in Defense Provision’, in Deger, Sadat and West, Robert (eds.), Defense, Security, and Development (New York, 1987), pp. 69–80Google Scholar.

¹⁰ The following discussion draws on Roberts, Adam, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defense (New York, 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Wulf, ‘Dependent Militarism in the Periphery’, and Buzan, Barry, ‘Security Strategies for Dissociation’, in Ruggie, John (ed.), Antimonies of Interdependence (New York, 1983), pp. 369–420Google Scholar.

¹¹ On this trend, see Creasey, Pauline and May, S., The European Armaments Market and Procurement Cooperation (New York, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Moran, Theodore, ‘The Globalization of America's Defense Industries’, International Security, 15 (1990), pp. 57–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Kapstein, Ethan (ed.), Global Arms Production (Lanham, 1992)Google Scholar.

¹² See, for example, Neuman, Stephanie, ‘International Stratification and Third World Military Industries’, International Organization, 38 (1984), pp. 167–197CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Ross, Andrew, ‘Arms Acquisition and National Security: The Irony of Military Strength’, in Azar, Edward and Moon, Chung-In (eds.), National Security in the Third World (Aldershot, 1988), pp. 152–187Google Scholar, and Barnett, Michael and Wendt, Alexander, ‘Systemic Sources of Dependent Militarization’, in Job, Brian (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder, 1992), pp. 97–120Google Scholar.

¹³ The term is Roberts ‘ in Nation in Arms.

¹⁴ See, for example: Roberts, Nations in Arms; Buzan, ‘Security Strategies for Dissociation’, especially pp. 410–11; Sharp, Gene, Making Europe Unconquerable (London, 1985)Google Scholar; and Stein, George, ‘Total Defense: A Comparative Overview of the Security Policies of Switzerland and Austria’, Defense Analysis, 6 (1990), pp. 17–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ On the latter case, see H. Park and K. Park, ‘Ideology and Security: Self-Reliance in China and North Korea’, in Azar and Moon (eds.), National Security in the Third World, pp. 102–35.

¹⁶ For discussion of the relationship between political legitimacy and mass mobilization, see Walzer, Michael, ‘Political Alienation and Military Service’, in Obligations: Essays in Civil Disobedience (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 153–170Google Scholar, Giddens, Anthony, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley, 1985), pp. 233Google Scholar, and Barnett, Michael, Confronting the Costs of War (Princeton, 1992), pp. 29–30Google Scholar.

¹⁷ On the reliability problems of Third World military expenditure data, see Ball, Nicole, Security and Economy in the Third World (Princeton, 1988)Google Scholar, chapter 3.

¹⁸ See Brzoska, Michael and Ohlson, Thomas (eds.), Arms Production in the Third World (London, 1986)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ We define such weapons as main battle tanks, light tanks, armoured reconnaissance and mechanized infantry combat vehicles with at least a 20mm cannon, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, and major surface warships. Our primary data source on these weapons and on manpower is Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London, 1986Google Scholar and 1987).

²⁰ ‘Reserve’ manpower needs to be counted because it may be an essential element in a labour-intensive military strategy.

²¹ This assumption is also made by Smith et al., in ‘Capital-Labour Substitution in Defence Provision’.

²² The following discussion draws on O'Connell, Robert, Of Arms and Men (New York, 1989), pp. 7–8Google Scholar.

²³ Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Reading, 1979), p. 127Google Scholar; quoted from Evangelista, Matthew, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca, 1988), p. 7Google Scholar.

²⁴ For a useful comparison, see Buzan, ‘Security Strategies for Dissociation’, pp. 412–13. On the limits of deterministic arguments for high-technology strategies, see Raudzens, George, ‘War-Winning Weapons: The Measurement of Technological Determinism in Military History’, Journal of Military History, 54 (1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ Cf. Migdal, Joel, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, 1988)Google Scholar.

²⁶ We adopt this conventional typology because the three do not seem easily reducible to one underlying structure. We doubt such a reduction is possible, but before it could occur it seems that theory should first work to identify distinct mechanisms on the assumption that they are relatively autonomous, and then try to assess their underlying coherence. For similar arguments to this effect, see Rapkin, David, ‘The Inadequacy of a Single Logic: Integrating Political and Material Approaches to the World System’, in Thompson, William (ed.), Contending Approaches to World System Analysis (Beverly Hills, 1983), pp. 241–268Google Scholar, andMouzelis, Nicos, ‘Political Transitions in Greece and Argentina: Toward a Reorientation of Marxist Political Theory’, Comparative Political Studies, 21 (1989), pp. 443–466CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁷ The basic logic of this argument is nicely laid out in Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States,especially chapter 7.

²⁸ There are various traditions of dependency scholarship; our own, somewhat eclectic, discussion draws on Galtung, Johan, ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’, Journal of Peace Research, 8 (1971), pp. 81–109CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Cardoso, Fernando and Faletto, Enzo, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley, 1979)Google Scholar, Evans, Peter, Dependent Development (Princeton, 1979)Google Scholar, Thomas, Clive, The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies (New York, 1984)Google Scholar, and Robinson, Ronald, ‘The Excentric Idea of Imperialism, with or without Empire’, in Mommsen, Wolfgang and Osterhammel, Jurgen (eds.), Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities (London, 1986), pp. 267–287Google Scholar.

²⁹ On the distinction between strong and weak states, see Buzan, ‘People, States, and Fear’, and Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States.

³⁰ On colonial state formatio n see, for example, Alavi, Hamza, ‘The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh’, New Left Review, 74 (1972), pp. 59–82Google Scholar, and Young, Crawford, ‘The Colonial State and the Post-Colonial Crisis’, in Rothchild, Donald and Chazan, Naomi (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder, 1988), pp. 25–66Google Scholar.

³¹ See Enloe, Cynthia, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies (Athens, 1980)Google Scholar.

³² Although this by no means guaranteed the elimination of internal security threats, since the boundaries inherited from colonial powers often contained antagonisti c ethnic groups. The role of the states system in upholding these boundaries can be seen as an external empowerment of Third World states; see Jackson, Robert and Rosberg, Carl, ‘Why Africa's Weak States Persist’, World Politics, 35 (1982), pp. 1–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Herbst, Jeffrey, ‘War and the State in Africa’, International Security, 14 (1990), pp. 117–139CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Insofar as this process empowers Third World states against the security of societal or ethnic groups under their control, however, the institution of sovereignty can also be seen as a fourth, ‘heteronomous’ dominance structure in the international system; see Onuf, Nicholas, World of Our Making (Columbia, 1989).Google Scholar

³³ See Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European Stales, pp. 207–8.

³⁴ On Third World states’ lack of legitimacy and recourse to coercion, see Saul, John, ‘The State in Post-Colonial Societies’, in Held, David et al. (eds.), States and Societies (New York, 1983), pp. 457–475Google Scholar, Clapham, Christopher, Third World Politics (Madison, 1984)Google Scholar, and Hutchful, Eboe, ‘The Modern State and Violence: The Peripheral Situation’, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 14 (1986), pp. 153–178Google Scholar.

³⁵ For this argument, see O'Donnell, Guillermo, ‘Comparative Historical Formations of the State Apparatus and Socio-Economic Change in the Third World’, International Social Science Journal, 32 (1980), pp. 717–729Google Scholar.

³⁶ Cf. Chase-Dunn, Christopher, ‘Interstate System and Capitalist World-Economy: One Logic or Two?’, International Studies Quarterly, 25 (1981), pp. 19–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Our own emphasis on the relative autonomy of the states system within the world-system is indebted to Zolberg, Aristide, ‘Origins of the Modern World-System: A Missing Link’, World Politics, 33 (1981), pp. 253–281CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Rapkin, ‘The Inadequacy of a Single Logic’.

³⁷ See, for example, Kolodziej, Edward, ‘National Security and Modernization: Drive Wheels of Militarization’, Arms Control, 6 (1985), pp. 17–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Rothstein, Robert, ‘The Security Dilemma and the Poverty Trap in the Third World’, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 8 (1986), pp. 1–38Google Scholar, and Rosh, Robert, ‘Third World Militarization’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32 (1988), pp. 671–698CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on neo-realism more generally, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics. For a neo-realist analysis of systemic hierarchy much closer to our own argument, see Ikenberry, John and Kupchan, Charles, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, International Organization, 44 (1990), pp. 283–316CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ On informal empire, see Doyle, Michael, Empires (Ithaca, 1986)Google Scholar, and Robinson, ‘The Excentric Idea of Imperialism’; the following discussion is elaborated more fully in Alexander Wendt, ‘The States System and Global Militarization’, unpublished PhD dissertation (Minneapolis, 1989).

³⁹ On spheres of influence, see Keal, Paul, Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance (New York, 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Triska, Jan (ed.), Dominant Powers and Subordinate States (Durham, 1986)Google Scholar; on patron-client relations in world politics, see Handel, Michael, ‘Does the Dog Wag the Tail or Vice-Versa? Patron-Client Relations’, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 6 (1982), pp. 24–35Google Scholar, and Shoemaker, Christopher and Spanier, John, Patron-Client Relationships: Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1984)Google Scholar. We prefer ‘informal empire’ because it emphasizes what we believe is a central aspect of such systems that is downplayed in other formulations, namely that the relationship between dominant and subordinate states is one of authority (see below).

⁴⁰ Note that not all military and economic aid constitutes ‘security assistance’ in this sense, despite the fact that it may ultimately have similar effects. Security assistance is defined by its relationship o t Great Power influence over state formation and national security; Swedish arms sales to India are not part of such influence and thus fall outside our argument here.

⁴¹ Arguments of various types to this effect include Wolpin, Miles, Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World (Lexington, 1972)Google Scholar, Fitch, J. Samuel, ‘The Political Impact of U.S. Military Aid t o Latin America’, Armed Forces and Society, 5 (1979), pp. 360–386CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Klare, Michael and Arnson, Cynthia, ‘Exporting Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarianism in Latin America’, in Fagen, Richard (ed.), Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations (Stanford, 1979), pp. 138–368Google Scholar, Asbjorn Eide, ‘Militarisation with a Global Reach’, in Eide and Thee (eds.), Problems of Contemporary Militarism, pp. 299–322, and Condoleeza Rice, The Military as an Instrument of Influence and Control’, in Triska (ed.), Dominant Powers and Subordinate States, pp. 239–60.

⁴² For overviews of US military and security influences on Latin American state formation, see Rouquie, Alain, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 117–150Google Scholar, and Pion-Berlin, David, ‘Latin American National Security Doctrines: Hard- and Softline Themes’, Armed Forces and Society, 15 (1989), pp. 411–429CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for contrasts between this case and that of Eastern Europe, see Triska (ed.) Dominant Powers and Subordinate States, and, on the French West African case, Chipman, John, French Power in Africa (Oxford, 1989)Google Scholar.

⁴³ Compare Galtung, ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’, and Onuf, Nicholas and Klink, Frank, ‘Anarchy, Authority, Rule’, International Studies Quarterly, 33 (1989), pp. 149–173CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for discussion of Weber's types of authority, see Bendix, Reinhard, Max Weber (Garden City, 1962)Google Scholar, and Blau, Peter, ‘Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority’, American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), pp. 305–316CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁴ On this latter point, see Andrew Ross, ‘Arms Acquisition and National Security: The Irony of Military Strength’, in Azar and Moon (eds.), National Security in the Third World, pp. 152–87.

⁴⁵ Cuba and Nicaragua are instructive cases in point. The Batista and Somoza regimes had external bases of support that constituted the principal security threat as internal, whereas the Castro and Sandinista regimes had greater popular legitimacy and saw the US as the principal security threat; the former pair relied on conventional armies, the latter on mass mobilization to deal with these differing threats.

⁴⁶ See Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’.

⁴⁷ Braun, Ottmar and Wicklund, Robert, ‘Psychological Antecedents of Conspicuous Consumption’, Journal of Economic Psychology, 10 (1989), pp. 161–187CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an excellent discussion of the role of material goods in sustaining social identities, see Dittmar, Helga, The Social Psychology of Material Possessions (New York, 1992).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Our discussion of the systemic cultural determinants of militarization draws on Walker, R. B. J., ‘Contemporary Militarism and the Discourse of Dissent’, Alternatives, 9 (1983), pp. 345–364CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Walker, , ‘Culture, Discourse, Insecurity’, Alternatives, 11 (1986), pp. 485–504CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Luckham, Robin, ‘Of Arms and Culture’, Current Research in Peace and Violence, 7 (1984), pp. 1–64Google Scholar; Kolodziej, ‘National Security and Modernization’; and Kaldor, Mary, ‘The Atlantic Technology Culture’, in Kaldor, Mary and Falk, Richard (eds.), Dealignment: A New Foreign Policy Perspective (Oxford, 1987), pp. 143–162Google Scholar. For an argument stressing the domestic cultural sources of militarization, see Payne, James, Why Nations Arm (Oxford, 1989).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ On the relative autonomy of cultural forms, see Williams, Raymond, The Sociology of Culture (New York, 1982)Google Scholar. Our conception of the role of ideas in social life is based on Durkheim, Emile, ‘Individual and Collective Representations’, in Pocock, D. (trans.), Sociology and Philosophy (Glencoe, 1953), pp. 1–34Google Scholar, and Berger, Peter and Luckmann, Thomas, The Social Construction of Reality (New York, 1966).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Luckham, ‘Of Arms and Culture’, p. 32.

⁵¹ See, for example, Johnson, J. (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Societies (Princeton, 1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968)Google Scholar. For a more recent discussion, see Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn, ‘The Concept of Military Professionalism’, Defense Analysis, 6 (1990), pp. 117–130CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁵³ For a good discussion of the African case, see Killingray, David, ‘The Idea of a British Imperial African Army’, Journal of African History, 20 (1979), pp. 421–436CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁵⁵ See Price, Robert, ‘A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case’, World Politics, 23 (1971), pp. 399–429CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a critique of the tendency to treat Third World military elites as ‘modernizers’, see Mazrui, Ali, ‘Soldiers as Traditionalizers: Military Rule and the re-Africanization of Africa’, in Mazrui, (ed.), The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa (Leiden, 1977), pp. 236–258Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ On the transition from colonial to postcolonial armies, see Mullins, A. F., Born Arming (Stanford, 1987).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See Luckham, ‘Of Arms and Culture’, p. 241; Hagelin, Bjorn, ‘Military Dependency: Thailand and the Philippines’, Journal of Peace Research, 25 (1988), p. 441CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Shafer, Michael, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counlerinsurgency Policy (Princeton, 1988), pp. 93–95Google Scholar. Such programmes have a long history; see Nunn, Frederick, Yesterday's Soldiers (Lincoln, 1983)Google Scholar. For a general discussion of their effects, see Wolpin, Miles, ‘External Political Socialization as a Source of Conservative Military Behavior in the Third World’, in Fidel, K. (ed.), Militarism in Developing Countries (New Brunswick, 1975), pp. 259–282Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Robin Luckham, ‘Militarism: Force, Class, and International Conflict’, in Kaldor and Eide (eds.), The World Military Order, p. 239.

⁵⁹ The term is Robin Luckham's, although we use it somewhat differently than he; see his ‘Of Arms and Culture".

⁶⁰ The following discussion draws particularly on Luckham, “Of Arms and Culture”, and Suchman, Mark and Eyre, Dana, ‘Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation’, Sociological Forum, 1 (1992), pp. 137–161CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶¹ In a fascinating study that belies the necessity of such cultural change, Noel Perrin shows how the Japanese ‘gave up the gun’ in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries after having had Western firearms for 100 years. See his Giving Up the Gun: Japan's Reversion to the Sword, 1543–1879 (Boston, 1979).Google Scholar

⁶² Adas, Michael, Machines as a Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca, 1989), p. 160Google Scholar.

⁶³ See Hill, Stephen, The Tragedy of Technology (London, 1988), p. 75Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Adas, Machines as a Measure of Men, pp. 221–30.

⁶⁵ Janowitz, Morris, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, 1964), p. 27Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Ayoob, Mohammed, ‘The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains’, Internationa! Studies Quarterly, 33 (1989), p. 74Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ A good example of the power of such symbolic attachments is the Israeli effort to develop the Lavi, a key motivation for which was its value as a symbol of military-industrial prowess; see Steinberg, Gerald, ‘Large-Scale National Projects as Symbols: The Israeli Case’, Comparative Politics, 19 (1987), pp. 331–346CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁸ This reflects a scientific realist conception of social inquiry; see Dessler, David, ‘Beyond Correlations: Toward a Causal Theory of War’, International Studies Quarterly, 35 (1991), pp. 337–355CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Shapiro, Ian and Wendt, Alexander, ‘The Difference that Realism Makes: Social Science and the Politics of Consent’, Politics and Society, 230 (1992), pp. 197–223CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁹ See Putnam, Robert, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 42 (1988), pp. 427–460CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁰ See, for example, Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968)Google Scholar.

⁷¹ See Aguero, Felipe, ‘Social Effects: Military Autonomy in Developing Countries’, Alternatives, 10 (1984), pp. 75–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Samuel Fitch, J., ‘Military Professionalism, National Security and Democracy: Lessons from the Latin American Experience’, Pacific Focus, 4 (1989), pp. 99–147CrossRefGoogle Scholar, McSherry, J. Patrice, ‘Military Power, Impunity, and State-Society Change in Latin America’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 25 (1992), pp. 463–488CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Pion-Berlin, David, ‘Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America’, Comparative Politics, 25 (1992), pp. 83–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷² On the developmental costs of militarization, see Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World, and Bullock, Brad and Firebaugh, Glenn, ‘Guns and Butter? The Effect of Militarization on Economic and Social Development in the Third World’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 18 (1990), pp. 231–266Google Scholar.

⁷³ For examples of this concern, see Devitt, D. (ed.), Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Security (New York, 1987)Google Scholar, Ross, ‘Arms Acquisition and National Security’, Knorr, Klaus, ‘Militar y Trends and Future World Order’, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 11 (1989), pp. 68–95Google Scholar, and Steinberg, Gerald, ‘Technological Transfer and the Future of the Center-Periphery System: A Realist Perspective’, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 11 (1989), pp. 96–117Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ See Herrera, Luis, ‘The Military as a Link in the Domination Chain of Latin America’, Instant Research on Peace and Violence, 5 (1975), pp. 197–206Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ For a thoughtful discussion of the tensions in this cooptation, see Mohammed Ayoob, ‘The Third World in the System of States’.