1. Dror, Yehezkel, Crazy States: Fanaticism and Terrorism as a Strategic Problem, (Hebrew, Tel Aviv, 1974), pp. 15–45Google Scholar.

2. This diversity of crisis theories is discussed by Tanter, Raymond, ‘Crisis Management: A Critical Review of Academic Literature’, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 1 (Fall 1975), pp. 95–97Google Scholar.

3. Young, Oran R., The Politics of Force (Princeton, 1968), pp. 16–17Google Scholar; Snyder, Glenn H. and Diesing, Paul, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton, 1977), p. 10Google Scholar.

4. This relationship is well reflected in the debate between system-oriented theorists who view crises as processes marked by distinctive patterns of interaction, and decision-oriented theorists who view crises as situations marked by perceptual attributes. See Hermann, Charles F. (ed.), International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research (New York, 1972), pp. 6–9Google Scholar. Also, Tanter, ‘Crisis Management’, pp. 73–77Google Scholar.

5. This distinction between systemic and perceptual (or decision making) definitions; appears in Robinson, James A., ‘Crisis: An Appraisal of Concepts and Theories’ in Hermann, International Crisis, p. 20Google Scholar. Also in Tanter, , ‘Crisis Management’, pp. 73–77Google Scholar.

6. See McClelland's comment in Hermann, , International Crises (fn. 4), p. 6Google Scholar. Also, McClelland, Charles A., ‘The Beginning, Duration and Abatement of International Crises’, in Hermann, International Crises, pp. 83–105Google Scholar. Id., ‘Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events’, in Singer, J. David (ed.), Quantitative International Politics (New York, 1968), p. 160Google Scholar; Young, Oran R., The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton, 1967), p. 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar; id., The Politics of Force, pp. 8–15Google Scholar. Additional systemic attributes are listed in Kahn, Herman, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York, 1965), p. 62nGoogle Scholar.

7. An operational expression of this differentiation can be found in the following statement: ‘… the mix of actions does, indeed, change in crisis toward greater variety’. McClelland, , ‘Access to Berlin’, p. 185Google Scholar. See also Young, , The Politics of Force, and Snyder and DiesingCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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9. Some of the implications of Sadat's initiatives are discussed by Shamir, Shimon, Egypt Under Sadat (Hebrew, Tel Aviv, 1978), pp. 226–46Google Scholar.

10. This element is common to many systemic as well as perceptual definitions. See, for example, Snyder and Diesing, pp. 6–8Google Scholar.

11. McClelland himself became aware of this problem recently. See his ‘The Anticipation of International Crises’, International Studies Quarterly, 21 (March 1977), pp. 15–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also, Tanter, Raymond, International Crisis Behavior: An Appraisal of the Literature’, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 3 (Winter-Spring 1978), pp. 341–42Google Scholar; Pauker, Guy, Military Implications of a Possible World Order Crisis in the 1980s (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 1977)Google Scholar. McClelland and Tanter suggest that the nature of crisis is changing. This is a rather puzzling proposition, since crisis is an abstract theoretical concept, not a variable. It is suggested here that it is not the nature of crisis which is undergoing change. Rather, the conventional definitions of crisis are too narrow to include non-violent phenomena tha t have severe implications for the present structure of the international system. What ought to be changed, then, is the definition of crisis.

12. Crises among allies are explicitly excluded by Snyder and Diesing, because they do not entail ‘coercive bargaining’, Snyder and Diesing, p. 7Google Scholar. But coercive bargaining may characterize intra-alliance as well as inter-alliance bargaining. See, for example, Golan, Matti, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger (New York, 1976)Google Scholar. Also, Quandt, William B., Decade of Decision: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977)Google Scholar.

13. Hermann, Charles F., International Crisis as a Situational Variable’, in Rosenau, James N. (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, 1969), p. 414Google Scholar. Id., Crises in Foreign Policy (New York, 1969), pp. 29–36Google Scholar. Brecher, Michael, ‘Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior’, International Studies Quarterly, 21 (March 1977), p. 41CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Id., ‘State Behavior in International Crisis’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 23 (September 1979), pp. 446–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Robinson, , ‘Crisis’, p. 19Google Scholar. One point should be made about the time element in crisis which seems to have been subject to acute debates among scholars. While the precise meaning of short or finite time is highly ambiguous, it is a necessary element of crisis in that it enables us to differentiate between crises and long term changes in the system or in states’ policies. Empirically, the mean duration of the 827 serious interstate disputes identified by the Correlates of War Project to have occurred since the Congress of Vienna in 1815 is roughly 99 days. The term ‘serious interstate dispute’ largely overlaps the concept of crisis. See: Maoz, Zeev, Interstate Dispute Initiation, 1816–1976, Ph. D. Dissertation (The University of Michigan, 1981), chs. 1–2Google Scholar.

14. A similar point is made by Snyder and Diesing, p. 9Google Scholar.

15. These crises are: (1) the Austrian crisis, 1934 (2) the rearmament of Germany, 1934 (3) the remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936 (4) the ‘Anschlus’, 193 8 (5) the Sudetenland (Munich) crisis, 1938 (6) the Czechoslovakia Crisis, 1939 (7) the Danzig crisis, 1939. Some of the sources used for this study are: Bullock, Allan, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York, 1970)Google Scholar; Churchill, Winston, The Gathering Storm (London, 1948)Google Scholar; Robertson, E. M., Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans 1933–1939 (London, 1963)Google Scholar; Shirer, William L., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, 1960)Google Scholar; Taylor, A. J. P., The Origins of the Second World War, 2nd edition (London, 1961)Google Scholar; Weinberg, Gerhard L., The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany (Chicago, 1970)Google Scholar.

16. On the significant pressure put by the Israeli Chief of Staff, Dayan, and his attempts to escalate local border incidents as a pretext to war see Dayan, Moshe, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (London, 1966), ch 1Google Scholar. Also Brecher, Michael, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1975), pp. 232–54Google Scholar.

17. Ibid. pp. 254–82.

18. This change was due to the impression that Kennedy made on Khruschev at the Vienna Conference as a weak and inexperienced leader, and partly to what was perceived as hesitant American behavior during the 1961 Berlin Crisis. In addition, the installation of missiles in Cuba became feasible due to the Cuban request for arms. See George, Alexander A. and Smoke, Richard, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1974), pp. 460–65Google Scholar.

19. Ibid. pp. 157–62.

20. Dayan made this point at a television interview following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem (21 Nov. 1977). This was also one of the main themes of several Israeli parliament members during the debate on the Camp David Accord. Haknesset, Divrei (Knesset Documents), Vol. 82:2 (October 1978)Google Scholar.

21. Tanter, , ‘International Crisis Behavior’Google Scholar.

22. In addition to the McClelland studies see Andriole, Steven J. and Young, Robert A., ‘Toward the Development of an Integrated Crisis Warning System’, International Studies Quarterly, 21 (March 1977), pp. 107–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Azar, Edward E., ‘Conflict Escalation and Conflict Reduction in an International Crisis: Suez 1956’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16 (June 1972), pp. 183–202CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For more extensive lists of such studies see Tanter, ‘International Crisis Behavior’, p. 344Google Scholar, and Hopple, Gerald W. and Rossa, Paul J., ‘International Crisis Analysis: Recent Developments and Future Directions’, Mimeo (McLean, Va., International Public Policy Research Corporation, 1978)Google Scholar.

23. Tanter, , ‘International Crisis Behavior’, pp. 345–47Google Scholar.

24. See, for example, Burrowes, R. and Muzzio, D., ‘The Road to the Six Days War: Aspects of an Enumerative History of Four Arab States and Israel, 1965—1967’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16 (June 1972), pp. 211–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25. Examples of the tendency to focus exclusively on the defender's decision making process can be found in the Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 3 (Winter-Spring 1978)Google Scholar. This issue is devoted to studies in crisis behavior. Five out of nine case studies deal exclusively with defenders’ behavior, while the other four studies deal with crises to which we shall refer as ‘crises with domestic precipitation’. Notable exceptions to this tendency can be found in the Stanford studies of the 1914 crisis, also Shlaim, Avi and Tanter, Raymond, ‘Decision Process, Choice and Consequences: Israel's Deep Penetration Bombing in Egypt, 1970’, World Politics, 30 (July 1978), pp. 483–516CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26. Brecher, Michael, ‘A Theoretical Approach to International Crisis Behavior’, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 3 (Winter-Spring 1978), p. 10Google Scholar.

27. Snyder, Glenn H., ‘Crisis Bargaining’, and Thomas Milburn, ‘The Management of Crisis’ in Hermann, International Crises, pp. 217–80Google Scholar.

28. Schelling, Thomas C., Arms and Influence (New Haven, 1966)Google Scholar.

29. George, Alexander L., Hall, David K. and Simons, William, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston, 1971.)Google Scholar

30. Young, , The Politics of Force, pp. 337–61Google Scholar. Young points out that actors that are strategically committed to the preservation of the status quo may assume the role of tactical initiators. This is an important and often neglected observation in western strategic thought.

31. George, and Smoke, , pp. 519–31Google Scholar.

32. Ibid.

33. Kahn, , On Escalation, p. 63Google Scholar.

34. Morse, Edward L., ‘Crisis Diplomacy, Interdependence, and the Politics of International Economic Relations’, in Tanter, Raymond and Ullman, Richard A. (eds.). Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton, 1972), p. 127Google Scholar.

35. This point is diametrically opposed to the view expressed by Snyder, Jack, ‘Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence’, World Politics, 30 (April 1978), pp. 345–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This argument will be developed below.

36. For another distinction between crisis and other types of international interaction, see Young, , The Politics of Force, p. 16Google Scholar.

37. Sadat's trade-off situation is analyzed by Shamir, , pp. 226–46Google Scholar, and Baker, , pp. 140–43Google Scholar. Israel's trade-off situation is analyzed by Harkabi, Yehoshafat, ‘Correspondence on the (Israeli) Government's Policy’, Ma'ariv (Hebrew, 05 May 1978), pp. 37–38Google Scholar; ‘A Settlement on the Basis of Universal Norms’, Ha'aretz (Hebrew, 6, 8 June 1978)Google Scholar; and ‘The Demise of the Policy of Arrogance’, Ma'ariv (02 November 1979), p. 16Google Scholar. While it may be argued that Sadat's move was designed to eliminate the atmosphere of mutual mistrust that impeded settlement, and thus was not designed to coerce Israel, some key policy makers in Israel viewed this move as an attemptot disarm Israel of its traditional claim that the Arabs do not want to make peace. See Weizman, Ezer, The Battle for Peace (Hebrew, Jerusalem: Edanim, 1981), p. 53Google Scholar: Dayan, Moshe, Shall the Sword Devour Forever? (Hebrew, Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 87–88Google Scholar.

38. Gross-Stein, Janice and Tanter, Raymond, Rational Decision Making: IsraeVs Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus, Ohio, 1980), chs. 1–3Google Scholar. This is the main theoretical flaw in Snyder's argument, namely, the assumption that a disposition to face value trade-offs is the sole determinant of rationality.

39. This analysis is based on the following sources: Gardner, Lloyd C.,Architects of Illusion (Chicago, 1974)Google Scholar; George, and Smoke, , pp. 107–139Google Scholar; Gabriel, and Kolko, Joyce, The Limits of Power (New York, 1972)Google Scholar; Tanter, Raymond, Modeling and Managing International Conflicts (Beverly Hills, 1974)Google Scholar; Ulam, Adam, Expansion and Co-existence (New York, 1974)Google Scholar.

40. George, and Smoke, , p. 184Google Scholar.

41. This interpretation of the crisis is based on: George and Smoke; Neudstadt, Richard E., Presidential Power (New York, 1960)Google Scholar; Rivera, Joseph De, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio, 1968)Google Scholar; Janis, Irving L., Victims ofGroupthink (Boston, 1972)Google Scholar; Whiting, Allen S., China Crosses the Yalu (Stanford, 1960)Google Scholar.

42. See, for example, Brecher, , Decisions, p. 368Google Scholar; Stein and Tanter.

43. Allon, Yigal, Massach Shel Hoi (Hebrew, A Curtain of Sand) (Tel Aviv, 1968), pp. 369–73Google Scholar; Safran, Nadav, From War to War (New York, 1969)Google Scholar; Lacouture, Jean, Nasser: A Political Biography (New York, 1973)Google Scholar; Copeland, Miles, The Game of Nations (New York, 1969), pp. 277–84Google Scholar.

44. Excerpts from these statements can be found in: Gilboa, Moshe, Shesh Shanim, Shisha Yamim (Hebrew, Six Years, Six Days) (Tel Aviv, 1968), p. 60Google Scholar; and Brecher, , Decisions, pp. 355–61Google Scholar.

45. Syria had been experiencing severe domestic turmoil, conducted by religious opposition groups. Bar-Simantov, Yaacov, The Relations Between Domestic and External Conflict: Syria, 1961–1967 (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1978)Google Scholar. See also chart in Hudson, Michael C., Arab Politics: The Struggle for Legitimacy (New Haven, 1977), p. 409Google Scholar; Burrowes, Robert and Spector, Bertram, ‘The Strength and Direction of Relationship Between Domestic and External Conflict and Cooperation: Syria, 1961–1967’, in Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (ed.), Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics (New York, 1973), pp. 297–98, 316Google Scholar.

46. Gilboa, , pp. 103–105Google Scholar; Brecher, , Decisions, pp. 362–63Google Scholar; Safran, , pp. 303–4Google Scholar; Kerr, Malcolm H., The Arab Cold War, 3rd edition (Oxford, 1971), pp. 426–27Google Scholar.

47. One of the reasons for the initiator's decision makers’ failure to observe the trade-off situation might be that they have no intention of initiating a crisis. Thus they believe that their actions do not generate threat when they are not intended to. Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 354–55Google Scholar.

48. George, and Smoke, , pp. 309–58Google Scholar; Safran, , pp. 103–6Google Scholar.

49. Shapira, Yoram, ‘The 1954 Guatemala Crisis’, The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 3 (Winter-Spring 1978), pp. 81–116Google Scholar.

50. Dowty, Alan, ”The US and the Syria-Jordan Confrontation, 1970', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 3 (Winter-Spring 1978), pp. 172–96Google Scholar; Quandt, , pp. 105–27Google Scholar.

51. Dawisha, Karen, The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, 1968', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 3 (Winter-Spring 1978), pp. 143–71Google Scholar.

52. Jervis, Robert, ”Deterrence Theory Revisited’, World Politics, 31 (January 1979), pp. 289–324CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

53. Kennan, George F., ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, 25 (July 1947)Google Scholar. An Israeli version of these premises can be found in Allon, pp. 18–31Google Scholar.

54. Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 9Google Scholar.

55. George, and Smoke, , p. 532Google Scholar.

56. Ibid. pp. 519–31.

57. Gochman, Charles S., ‘Status, Capabilities, and Major Power Conflict’, in Singer, J. David (ed.), The Correlates of War: II (New York, 1980), p. 87Google Scholar. Gochman labels this constant propensity to initiate as the ‘opportunity’ model, and contends that it is ‘predicated on a Hobbesian world view’. Studies of dispute escalation led to considerable overprediction when escalation was predicted solely on the basis of ‘balance or risks’ (where risks were operationalized in terms of military capabilities and preparedness). That is, a large number of disputes predicted to end up in an interstate war, did, in fact, not escalate. The list of such disputes reveals that they were initiated by a major power against a remote minor power. The initiator did not have, apparently, high stakes in the dispute. Stoll, Richard J. and Champion, Michael, ‘Predicting the Escalation of Serious Disputes to International War’. Paper delivered at the 15th Peace Science Conference, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (November 1977), revised version (September 1979)Google Scholar.

58. The definitions of frustration are as diverse as those of crisis. The traditional psychological definition is ‘externally-induced interference or failure in goal-seeking behavior’, see Dollard, J. et al., Frustration and Aggression (New Haven, 1939)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Berkowitz, Leonard, ‘The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis Revisited’, in Berkowitz, Leonard (ed.), Roots of Aggression (New York, 1969), pp. 1–28Google Scholar. In political science literature this term is defined, however, as a discrepancy between aspiration and achievement, or as a discrepancy between two dimensions of human and societal aspirations such as power and prestige. See Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, 1970), p. 13Google Scholar; Markus, Gregory B. and Tanter, Raymond, ‘A Conflict Model for Strategists and Managers’, American Behavioral Scientist, 15 (07–08 1972), p. 812Google Scholar; Rummel, Rudolph J., Understanding Conflict and War: The Dynamic Psychological Field (Beverly Hills, 1975), p. 40Google Scholar. For a more elaborate discussion of the concept and its relation to crisis initiation, see Maoz, , Interstate Dispute Initiation, ch. 3Google Scholar.

59. The concept of threshold probability is central in game theory. For our purposes it will be defined as the probability of success above which an actor is willing to escalate, since the benefits of escalation outweigh its costs. See Ellsberg, Daniel, ‘The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choices’, in Muller, John F. (ed.), Approaches to Measurement in International Relations (New York, 1969)Google Scholar; Snyder, and Diesing, (fn. 2) discuss a special form of this concept, the ‘critical risk’ model, pp. 48–52Google Scholar.

60. There is some evidence suggesting that such a model has considerable explanatory power. Gun outlines numerous experimental and aggregate studies of individual and group behavior, and suggests (p. 260) that it may well apply to international relations. Studies linking frustration to war involvement came up with remarkably good results. See Champion, Michael and Stoll, Richard J., ‘Capability Concentration, Alliance Bonds, and Conflict Among the Major Powers’, mimeo (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, September 1979)Google Scholar; Midlarsky, Manus, On War: Political Violence in the International System (New York, 1975)Google Scholar; Wallace, Michael, War and Rank Among Nations (Lexington, Mass., 1973)Google Scholar. In my study on dispute initiation I found that a combination of frustration and opportunit y indices is significantly related to dispute initiation, and that the relative importance of frustration increases under conditions of high systemic stability, whereas the importance of opportunities increases under low systemic stability. See Maoz, , Interstate Dispute Initiation, ch. 4Google Scholar.

61. Heikal, Mohammed H., The Road to Ramadan (New York, 1975), pp. 208–10Google Scholar.

62. Waterbury, John, Egypt: Burdens of the Past, Optionsfor the Future (Bloomington, Ind., 1977), pp. 201–6Google Scholar.

63. A preliminary analysis relating initiation to outcomes of serious disputes in 288 cases involving at least one major power between 1820–1977 shows a significant association between initiation and victory. Maoz, Zeev, ‘The Initiation and Outcomes of Serious International Disputes’, (mimeo, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan, 1980)Google Scholar. A subsequent analysis of a sample of 164 cases involving both major power and minor power disputes revealed that the association between initiation and victory is unrelated to the balance of initiator/target capabilities. Rather, initiators tend to win because they are more motivated than targets to bring the dispute to a favorable conclusion despite the risk of escalation, and hence are more effective dispute managers. See Maoz, , Interstate Dispute Initiation, ch. 5Google Scholar.