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Coercion and third-party mediation of identity-based conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2019

Jacob Eriksson Open the ORCID record for Jacob Eriksson [Opens in a new window]
Jacob Eriksson*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, University of York
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article analyses third-party mediation of identity-based conflicts, which are notoriously difficult to resolve. It seeks to reconcile the contradiction in the mediation literature between the need for less coercive strategies to ensure ownership of a peace agreement and the need for more coercive strategies to reach a final agreement. Through an analysis of mediation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the article makes four contributions to existing literature. First, the article develops a theoretical ‘best fit’ model that proposes a u-shaped relationship between intensity of mediator coercion and transition through phases of negotiation. Second, it challenges the prevailing notion that pre-negotiation does not involve coercion. Third, it suggests that epistemological and ontological understandings of a conflict and the role of a mediator by both the mediator and the parties mean that mediators enjoy limited capacity to effectively shift from high- to low-coercive strategies. Multi-party mediation can provide the flexibility needed to execute the coercion u-curve effectively. Fourth, it challenges existing understandings of the US-mediated negotiations during the Annapolis process, 2007–08.

Keywords

MediationCoercionIdentity-based ConflictIsraeli-Palestinian Conflict
Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , July 2019 , pp. 387 - 406
Copyright
© British International Studies Association 2019 

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59 The Clinton parameters of December 2000 referred to a Palestinian state, but these were proposals rather than official government positions and expired when he left office.

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71 In her memoirs, Rice reflects on a conversation with Olmert about his hitkansut policy: ‘I didn’t like the sound of that term but thought it could be shaped to mean a negotiated solution – not a unilateral one – to the Palestinian question.’ (Rice, No Higher Honour, p. 414).

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75 Ibid., pp. 249–51.

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77 Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, ‘Is It Still Fall in Annapolis? Thinking About a Scheduled Meeting’, Crown Center for Middle East Studies Middle East Brief, No. 21 (November 2007); Rice, No Higher Honour, pp. 613–16.

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81 Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 249.

82 Ibid.; The Palestine Papers, ‘Meeting Summary: Erekat and EU Heads of Mission’ (13 November 2007).

83 Author’s interview with former US official, 31 May 2017; Rice, No Higher Honour, pp. 613–14.

84 The Palestine Papers, ‘Meeting Minutes: 2nd Negotiation Team Meeting’ (15 October 2007).

85 The Palestine Papers, ‘Meeting Minutes: 7th Negotiation Team Meeting’ (12 November 2007).

86 The Palestine Papers, ‘Meeting Minutes: 6th Negotiation Team Meeting’ (8 November 2007); The Palestine Papers, ‘Meeting Minutes: 9th Negotiation Team Meeting’ (17 November 2007); The Palestine Papers, ‘Meeting Summary: Erekat and EU Heads of Mission’ (13 November 2007).

87 Author’s interview with former US official, 31 May 2017.

88 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Hamilton, Lee H., Hills, Carla, Kassebaum-Baker, Nancy, Pickering, Thomas R., Scowcroft, Brent, Sorensen, Theodore C., and Volcker, Paul, ‘Failure risks devastating consequences’, The New York Review of Books, 54:17 (8 November 2007)Google Scholar ; Ross and Makovsky, Myths, Illusions, and Peace, pp. 123–5. They reference an article by William Quandt entitled, ‘Reluctant peacemaker: Bush brought Arabs and Israelis together but failed to put forth proposals and apply pressure’); Cooper, ‘Rice’s way’. For analysis of this element of Camp David in 2000, see Eriksson, Small-state Mediation in International Conflicts, p. 190

89 Cooper, ‘Rice’s way’.

90 Author’s interview with former US official, 31 May 2017; Cooper, ‘Rice’s way’; Rice, No Higher Honour, p. 600.

91 Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, p. 222.

92 In his negotiations with the Palestinians and the Syrians (1999–2000), Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was particularly concerned about being seen to make significant concessions up front (Indyk, Innocent Abroad, p. 251; Eriksson, Small-state Mediation in International Conflicts, p. 190).

93 Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 250.

94 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Israel and the PLO Joint Understanding presented to the Annapolis Conference by US President George W. Bush’ (27 November 2007), available at:

{http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/history/pages/the%20annapolis%20conference%2027-nov-2007.aspx}.

95 Bernard Avishai, ‘A plan for peace that still could be’, The New York Times Magazine (7 February 2011). While Avishai claims the meetings ended in mid-September, Abrams confirms that another meeting took place on 17 November 2008 (Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 287).

96 Rice, No Higher Honour, pp. 552–3. Author’s interview with Ron Pundak, 10 July 2013. For more on the development of a two-state vision during the Oslo process, see Eriksson, Small-state Mediation in International Conflicts, pp. 120–63 and Eriksson, Jacob, ‘Israeli Track II diplomacy: the Beilin-Abu Mazen understandings’, in Clive Jones and Tore Petersen (eds), Israel’s Clandestine Diplomacies (London: Hurst, 2013)Google Scholar .

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98 Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, p. 225.

99 Author’s interview with former US official, 31 May 2017.

100 The Palestine Papers, ‘Meeting Minutes: 2nd Negotiation Team Meeting’ (15 October 2007).

101 The Palestine Papers, ‘Meeting Minutes: 8th Negotiation Team Meeting’ (13 November 2007).

102 I. William Zartman, ‘Explaining Oslo’, Negotiation Journal, 2:2 (1997), pp. 195–215.

103 Eriksson, Small-state Mediation in International Conflicts, pp. 193–4; Avishai, ‘A plan for peace that still could be’.

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106 Abrams, Tested by Zion, pp. 267–8.

107 Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, p. 226.

108 The Palestine Papers, ‘Meeting Minutes: General Plenary Meeting’ (29 June 2008).

109 Abrams, Tested by Zion, pp. 277–8.

110 Ibid., p. 311.

111 The Palestine Papers, ‘Meeting Summary: Erekat and EU Heads of Mission’ (13 November 2007).

112 Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, p. 191; Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, pp. 222, 230; Barak Ravid and Aluf Benn, ‘Olmert’s negotiator: Full Mideast peace impossible’, Ha’aretz (25 January 2010).

113 The Palestine Papers, ‘Meeting Minutes: US-Palestinian Bilateral Session’ (16 July 2008).

114 Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, pp. 228–9; Avishai, ‘A plan for peace that still could be’; The Middle East Media Research Institute, ‘Mahmoud Abbas: “I Reached Understandings with Olmert on Borders, Security”’ (16 November 2010).

115 Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, p. 229.

116 Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, p. 185.

117 Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 290; The Palestine Papers, ‘Report on Diplomatic Outreach to Russia and Czech Republic’ (10 October 2008). However, as Golan (Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, p. 183) argues, this may be because advisors were not always present for the leaders’ talks.

118 For detailed analysis of the offer made, see Abrams, Tested by Zion, pp. 287–93; Avishai, ‘A plan for peace that still could be’; Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, pp. 179–83; Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, pp. 231–2.

119 Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 291; Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, pp. 231–2; Thrall, The Only Language They Understand, pp. 181–3; Author’s interview with former US official, 31 May 2017.

120 The Palestine Papers, ‘Talking Points for President Mahmoud Abbas Re: Upcoming Quartet Meeting’ (9 November 2008); Avishai, ‘A plan for peace that still could be’; Gil Hoffman and Niv Elis, ‘Abbas: Olmert negotiations would have succeeded’, The Jerusalem Post (14 October 2012).

121 Rice, No Higher Honour, pp. 651–3. NSU documents dated 9 September 2008 confirm that elements of Olmert’s offer had been discussed prior to the presentation of the map on 16 September (The Palestine Papers, ‘NSU Emails Re: Meeting Summary – Saeb Erekat and Territory Team – and Discussion’ (9 November 2008)).

122 The Palestine Papers, ‘President Bush Presents a “Trilateral Understanding”’ (10 August 2008).

123 Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, p. 184.

124 Ibid., pp. 184, 194; Abrams, Tested by Zion, pp. 292–3; Podeh, Chances for Peace, pp. 352–3.

125 Podeh, Chances for Peace, p. 356; Kurzter et al., The Peace Puzzle, p. 275.

126 Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, p. 187; Author’s interview with former US official, 31 May 2017.

127 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, pp. 300, 310–11.

128 Podeh, Chances for Peace, p. 354; Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, p. 195.

129 Abrams, Tested by Zion, pp. 284, 291.

130 Ibid., pp. 285, 291; Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, p. 184; Rice, No Higher Honour, p. 724; Avi Isacharoff, ‘Revealed: Olmert’s 2008 peace offer to Palestinians’, The Jerusalem Post (24 May 2013).

131 Clayton E. Swisher, The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road? (London: Hesperus, 2011), pp. 38–50.

132 Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, pp. 178–9.

133 Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, p. 230.

134 The Palestine Papers, ‘Meeting Minutes: General Plenary Meeting’ (29 June 2008); Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 279.

135 Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, p. 188; Author’s interviews with US officials, 24 May 2017; 31 May 2017.

136 Zoughbie, Indecision Points, pp. 140–1.

137 Interview with former US official, 31 May 2017; Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, pp. 232–3; Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, pp. 360, 381.

138 Thrall, The Only Language They Understand, pp. 68–74.

139 Cooper, ‘Rice’s way’.

140 Eriksson, Small-state Mediation in International Conflicts.

141 Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, ‘Two’s company but is three a crowd? Some hypotheses about multiparty mediation’, in Bercovitch (ed.), Studies in International Mediation.

142 Siniver, Asaf, ‘Arbitrating the Israeli-Palestinian territorial dispute’, International Politics, 49:1 (2012), pp. 117–129 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .